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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Evolutionary Aestheticism:  
Scientific Optimism and Cultural Progress, 1850-1913 
 
by 
 
Lindsay Puawehiwa Wilhelm 
Doctor of Philosophy in English 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2017 
Professor Joseph E. Bristow, Chair 
 
 
While evolutionary science may appear to have little in common with the Aesthetic 
Movement—the “art for art’s sake” philosophy of culture that arose in Britain in the late 
1860s—this dissertation contends that these schools of thought formed interdependently, through 
a sustained dialogic exchange between writers whose interests spanned both art and science.  
Prominent Victorian figures such as the polymath Herbert Spencer, the aesthete Oscar Wilde, 
and the critic Vernon Lee (Violet Paget) not only accepted the truth of Charles Darwin’s insights, 
but also converged in their conception of what I term “evolutionary aestheticism”: a rational and 
yet remarkably optimistic philosophy that looked to the enjoyment of beauty and the cultivation 
of taste, rather than violent Darwinian competition, for modes of peaceable evolutionary 
progress.  
		 iii 
 Each chapter explores the development of evolutionary aestheticism, from the decade 
leading up to Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) to the publication of Lee’s aesthetic primer The 
Beautiful (1913).  The first chapter traces the tradition to Darwin’s and Spencer’s mid-century 
evolutionary theories, which exempted aesthetic experience from brutal natural laws of scarcity 
and struggle.  Next, the dissertation considers how the cultural critic Walter Pater and the 
mathematician W. K. Clifford shaped aestheticism in the 1870s—the movement’s formative 
years—by postulating a scientifically inflected ideal of the aesthetic temperament.  The third 
chapter juxtaposes Wilde’s criticism with Grant Allen’s popular science writing: in the 1890s, 
these two writers articulated a radically hedonic aesthetics that equated individual happiness with 
social progress.  The fourth chapter analyzes the “life-enhancing” aesthetics of Lee and the 
connoisseur Bernard Berenson, both of whom discerned the true value of beauty in its capacity to 
revitalize the entire species as well as the individual.  
A short coda evaluates the legacy of evolutionary aestheticism in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  Although the scientific claims of evolutionary aestheticism have all but 
disappeared from modern-day discourse, its central aim of reconciling aesthetic pleasure with 
social good has reemerged, this study concludes, in recent debates within literary and cultural 
criticism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 iv 
 
The dissertation of Lindsay Puawehiwa Wilhelm is approved. 
Jonathan Hamilton Grossman 
Louise E. J. Hornby 
Robert G. Frank, Jr. 
Joseph E. Bristow, Committee Chair 
 
 
 
 
University of California, Los Angeles 
2017 
 
  
		 v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To JFS—an unexpected optimist, a man of science, and a true artist.  
		 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
List of Figures  ………………………………………………………………………………. vii 
 
Acknowledgments ………………………………………………………………………….. viii 
 
Vita …………………………………………………………………………………………… x 
 
 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………1 
 
 
Chapter One …………………………………………………………………………………. 25 
Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and the Origins of Evolutionary 
Aesthetics 
 
 
Chapter Two ………………………………………………………………………………… 90 
A Religion of Humanity:  
The Evolutionary Aestheticism of W. K. Clifford, Walter Pater, 
and Mathilde Blind 
 
 
Chapter Three ……………………………………………………………………………….. 143 
Sexual Selection and Social Progress:  
The Utopian Evolutionism of Grant Allen and Oscar Wilde 
 
 
Chapter Four ………………………………………………………………………………… 217 
“Art for the Sake of Life”:  
The “Life-Enhancing” Aesthetics of Vernon Lee and Bernard 
Berenson  
 
 
Coda …………………………………………………………………………………………. 291 
Evolutionary Aestheticism in the Twentieth Century   
 
 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………… 318 
 
  
		 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
George Du Maurier, “An Aesthetic Midday Meal,” Punch, 17 July 1880 …………………… 5 
 
Edward Linley Sambourne, “Mr. Punch’s Designs After Nature,” Punch, 1 April 1871 ……. 17   
  
		 viii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 None of this would have been possible without the tireless mentorship of Joseph Bristow, 
whose brilliant scholarship is equaled only by his generosity toward his students.  It has been my 
honor and privilege to work closely with him (and, more often than not, his dachshunds Leo and 
Sabrina) over the years.  I also owe a great debt to Jonathan H. Grossman for his careful and 
incisive feedback on the dissertation as well as his unfailing collegiality.  In addition, I offer my 
sincerest thanks to both Louise Hornby and Robert Frank for putting their prodigious bodies of 
expertise at my disposal.  Throughout this whole endeavor, the four members of my committee 
have been consistently kind, encouraging, and enthusiastic: I am deeply grateful to them all. 
Many other faculty, from UCLA and elsewhere, have fostered my academic career.  In 
particular, I must acknowledge the justly celebrated Anne K. Mellor, Chris Mott (nou kēia 
mahalo no kou ho‘okahua‘ana kūmaumau mai ia‘u), and my undergraduate advisor Jeff Spear.  
Thanks also to Kristin Mahoney, Diana Maltz, and Anne Stiles—three Victorianists at the height 
of their powers—for graciously taking me under their wing at every NAVSA conference.  
Furthermore, both my scholarship and my mental health have benefitted immensely from the 
friendship and guidance of my remarkable fellow graduate students, including Sarah Nance, 
Mike Nicholson, Dan Couch, Will Clark, Amy Wong, Jay Jin, Sam Sommers, Jordan Wingate, 
Alex Zobel, Amanda Hollander, Sydney Miller, Katie Charles, Cailey Hall, Jonathan Kincade, 
Ben Beck, Grant Rosson, Caitlin Benson, Alethia Shih, and others too numerous to name here.   
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents Marcy and Lance, my sister Kate, my 
grandmother Merle, and my partner John for their unconditional support.  When the going got 
tough, what motivated me to keep working was the sure knowledge that they would love me 
regardless of whether I finished. 
		 ix 
*** 
Portions of the Introduction have appeared previously in “Evolutionary Science and 
Aestheticism: a Survey and a Suggestion,” Literature Compass 13:2 (2016): 88-97, DOI: 
10.1111/lic3.12315.   
 
Chapter 2 is a version of “The Utopian Evolutionary Aestheticism of W. K. Clifford, Walter 
Pater, and Mathilde Blind,” Victorian Studies 59, no. 1 (Autumn 2016): 9-34. 
 
Chapter 3 is a version of “Sex in Utopia: The Evolutionary Hedonism of Grant Allen and Oscar 
Wilde,” in preparation for publication in Victorian Literature and Culture. 
 
  
		 x 
LINDSAY PUAWEHIWA WILHELM 
Curriculum Vitae 
       
       
 
EDUCATION 
 
2017 Ph.D. Candidate, English, University of California, Los Angeles 
 Dissertation Title: “Evolutionary Aestheticism: Scientific Optimism and Cultural 
Progress, 1850-1913” 
 Advisor: Professor Joseph Bristow 
 
2013 M.A., English, UCLA 
 
2010 B.A., magna cum laude, English and American Literature (Highest Honors), Politics, 
New York University 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
2017 “Sex in Utopia: The Evolutionary Hedonism of Grant Allen and Oscar Wilde,” 
forthcoming in Victorian Literature and Culture 
 
2016 “The Utopian Evolutionary Aestheticism of W. K. Clifford, Walter Pater, and Mathilde 
Blind,” Victorian Studies 59:1 (Autumn 2016), 9-34 
 
2016 “Evolutionary Science and Aestheticism: a Survey and a Suggestion,” Literature 
Compass 13:2 (2016): 88-97 
 
2014 “'Looking South': Envisioning the European South in North and South,” Studies in the 
Novel 46:4 (2014): 406-422 
 
 
AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS 
 
2016 Graduate Division Dissertation Year Fellowship, UCLA 
2015 Department Distinction in Teaching, UCLA 
2015 Department Dissertation Fellowship, UCLA 
2013 Graduate Research Mentorship, UCLA 
2010 Eugene V. Cota-Robles Fellowship, UCLA 
 
 
INVITED TALK 
 
2016 “Sex and Social Progress: The Utopian Hedonism of Grant Allen and Oscar Wilde,” 
UCLA Department of English Winter Athenaeum, February 18 
		 xi 
 
 
SELECTED CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
2016 “Diagnosing the Body Politic: Victorian History and the Social Organism,” North 
American Victorian Studies Association (NAVSA) Annual Conference, Phoenix, AZ, 
November 2-5 
 
2015  “A Meeting of ‘Sister Sovereigns’: Hawaiian Royalty at Victoria’s Golden Jubilee,” 
NAVSA Annual Conference, Honolulu, HI, July 9-12 
 
2014 “Connoisseurship, Curation, and Pleasure in the Work of Vernon Lee and Her Circle,” 
Victorian Interdisciplinary Studies Association of the Western United States Annual 
Conference, CSU Fullerton, Fullerton, CA, October 16-18 
 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Instructor of Record 
 
2013 Critical Reading and Writing, Utopia and Dystopia 
 
Teaching Assistant 
 
2015 Science Fiction; Early Romantic Literature 
2014 English Literature from 1700-1850 
2013 Literary Los Angeles; Shakespeare 
2012 English Literature from 1700-1850; English Literature from 1850-Present 
2011 The American Novel 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
2016 UCLA Friends of English Southland Graduate Conference Co-chair 
2015 UCLA Nineteenth Century Group Graduate Coordinator 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS 
 
Modern Language Association; North American Victorian Studies Association; Victorian 
Interdisciplinary Association of the Western United States; Phi Beta Kappa Society 
		 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Aesthetics, like sexual selection, make life lovely and wonderful, fill it with new 
forms, and give it progress, and variety and change. 
—Oscar Wilde, “The Critic as Artist” (1890, revised 1891) 
 
 
 
 This dissertation investigates the cultural, ideological, and political linkages between 
literary aestheticism and the evolutionary sciences in Britain, from the decade leading up to 
Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) to the publication of Vernon Lee’s aesthetic 
précis The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics (1913).  In the British context, 
the Aesthetic Movement emerged in the late 1860s with the publication of Algernon Charles 
Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads (1866) and Walter Pater’s collection of critical essays Studies in 
the History of the Renaissance (1873).1  Despite their many philosophical and artistic 
differences, the adherents of aestheticism generally rallied behind the creed of “art for art’s 
sake”: a phrase that Swinburne and Pater adapted from the early nineteenth-century criticism of 
French poet and dramatist Théophile Gautier.  Drawing on the work of Gautier, Charles 
Baudelaire, and other French writers, British aesthetes such as Pater, Swinburne, and Oscar 
Wilde asserted that the primary purpose of art was to convey beauty, not to communicate ideas 
or impart moral lessons.  From its inception until its decline in the early years of the twentieth 
century, aestheticism was thus a lightning rod for controversy, both for its celebration of sensual 
pleasure and for its concomitant rejection of moralistic standards of artistic value.  Around the 
same time that Swinburne and Pater were publicizing their contentious views on aesthetics, 																																																								
1 Dennis Denisoff points out that the first use of the term “aestheticism” appeared in George Brimley’s 1856 review 
of Alfred Tennyson’s poem “The Lotos-Eaters.”  While Denisoff observes that Brimley’s review anticipates 
many of the “characteristics and concerns soon to be associated with aestheticism” (especially a fascination with 
bodily sensation), Denisoff adds that Brimley had a minimal impact on the subsequent development of the 
movement.  Dennis Denisoff, Aestheticism and Sexual Parody, 1840-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 21.  
		 2 
another highly public debate—this one surrounding Darwin’s theories about the evolution of 
species—was also raging in magazines and lecture halls.  To many Victorian readers, Darwin 
and his scientific heirs had radically overturned traditional doctrines about the purpose of the 
universe and humankind’s place in the cosmos.  For this reason, in the decades after Darwin 
published Origin, supporters and detractors from a variety of disciplines heatedly argued not 
only about the validity of Darwin’s hypotheses, but also about the wider impact of evolutionary 
theory on the realms of art and culture.  
While the concurrence of these two controversies in the late nineteenth century might 
appear coincidental at first glance, Wilde’s striking analogy between aesthetics and Darwinian 
sexual selection—which appeared in his dialogic essay “The Critic as Artist”—shows us that 
Victorian critics recognized points of real congruence between evolutionary science and 
aestheticism.2  For Wilde, aesthetics and sexual selection were parallel processes of organic 
growth: unlike ethics and natural selection, which Wilde contends merely “make existence 
possible,” both aesthetics and sexual selection encourage positive “progress” by beautifying the 
world and thus improving our quality of life.3  The present study, in light of Wilde’s quip, 
considers how and why late nineteenth-century aestheticism and evolutionism converged in such 
remarkably hopeful conceptions of beauty.  More precisely, I offer a fuller account of both 
schools of thought in this period by tracing their development within an interdisciplinary 
tradition of evolutionary aestheticism—a genealogy of naturalists, journalists, and critics that 
included Darwin, Pater, Wilde, and Lee as well the polymath Herbert Spencer, the 
mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford, the popular science writer Grant Allen, and the 																																																								
2 Oscar Wilde, “The Critic as Artist,” in Criticism, Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man, ed. Josephine 
M. Guy, vol. 4 of The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 204-205.  
3 Wilde, “The Critic as Artist,” 204. 
		 3 
connoisseur and critic Bernard Berenson.  Beyond their respective investments in scientific 
rationalism and materialist theories of beauty, these writers shared a broader commitment to the 
optimistic notion, implicit in Wilde’s comment, that aesthetic pleasure opened up alternative 
processes for cultural evolution.  These processes, they believed, would operate not through 
unchecked Darwinian competition—the confluence of natural selective pressures that Darwin 
famously termed the “struggle for existence”—but through the concerted, widespread cultivation 
of aesthetic sensibility.4  By calling our attention to this intellectual alliance, “Evolutionary 
Aestheticism” intervenes in several rich strands of modern-day scholarship concerning literary 
aestheticism, the history of Victorian science, and, finally, the intersection of the two.  This 
introduction provides a brief synopsis of the relevant criticism in these fields before elaborating 
on my specific contribution to this body of work and outlining the structure of the four chapters 
that follow.   
Aestheticism in Britain sprang from a constellation of earlier artistic movements, 
including Pre-Raphaelitism—the mid century school of visual art that Dante Gabriel Rossetti 
also applied to his poetry—and William Morris’s Arts and Crafts movement, which championed 
old-fashioned workmanship, simplicity of design, and tasteful home decoration.  As previously 
mentioned, Swinburne’s and Pater’s respective vindications of what Pater called “the love of art 
for its own sake” launched the Aesthetic Movement into the public eye in the late 1860s.5  
Notably, aestheticism and adjacent artistic schools were not concerned merely with fine art and 
literature, but also with the renovation of the home, the material beautification of public spaces, 
and the cultivation of taste and style: Clarence Cook’s widely read interior decoration manual 																																																								
4 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, ed. William Bynum (London: Penguin, 2009), 65.  
5 Walter Pater, conclusion to The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry: The 1893 Text, ed. Donald L. Hill 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 190. 
		 4 
The House Beautiful (1877), for instance, stoked trans-Atlantic interest in the acquisition and 
arrangement of “tasteful, pretty, beautiful things.”6  Since these movements entailed, and at times 
explicitly called for, drastic changes in the culture at large, the rise of these movements in the 
1860s and 1870s attracted an immense volume of often moralistic and satirical commentary.  
The most impassioned and contested of these early critiques was the poet Robert Buchanan’s 
review “The Fleshly School of Poetry” (1871), which responds to a revised edition of Rossetti’s 
collected poems.  Under a pseudonym, Buchanan attacks Rossetti, along with his fellow poets 
Swinburne and Morris, for what Buchanan sees as their “shameless” and “nasty” fixation on 
“mere animal sensations.”7  By the early 1880s, as Wilde became the public face of the Aesthetic 
Movement, critics increasingly associated aestheticism in particular with extreme views about 
beauty.8  The illustrator George Du Maurier, in his many cartoons for the satirical magazine 
Punch, famously lampooned Wilde and other aesthetes for their purportedly excessive devotion 
to the decorative object: in Du Maurier’s “An Aesthetic Midday Meal” (1880), for instance, a 
Wildean dandy visits a restaurant only to stare lovingly at a lily without eating (see figure 1).  An 
entire industry of satires and farces—including W. S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan’s wildly 
successful opera Patience and F. C. Burnand’s play The Colonel, both first produced in 1881—
similarly spoofed the quintessential aesthete’s perceived vanity and frivolity.9   
 
 																																																								
6 Clarence Cook, The House Beautiful: Essays on Beds and Tables, Stools and Candlesticks (New York: Scribner, 
Armstrong, 1878), 320. 
7 Thomas Maitland [Robert Buchanan], “The Fleshly School of Poetry,” Contemporary Review 18 (1871): 338. 
8 Denisoff discusses at length Wilde’s popular reputation and the lucrative cultural industry that sprang up around it.  
Denisoff, Aestheticism and Sexual Parody, 82-83, 165. 
9 Denisoff, Aestheticism and Sexual Parody, 60. 
		 5 
Fig. 1. George Du Maurier, “An Aesthetic Midday Meal,” Punch, or the London Charivari, 17 
July 1880 
 
 
		 6 
In the 1880s, these comic riffs on the Aesthetic Movement were accompanied by much 
earnest, but generally measured, discussion in the press.  In his Pall Mall Gazette editorial “The 
Aesthete” (1882), for example, the positivist historian Frederic Harrison grants the need for a 
return to beauty after the “slough of ugliness which oppressed the first fifty years of the present 
century.”10  But Harrison denies that “this new aesthetic zeal for Art” is up to the task: it “is a 
militant, critical, most disputatious affair,” he concludes, a “thing of fashion” rather than a 
genuine philosophy.11  Against Harrison, Du Maurier, and other critics, writers such as the 
American radical Moncure Conway and the essayist Walter Hamilton defended aestheticism by 
stressing its positive impact on the public taste.  Conway’s Travels in South Kensington (1882) 
praises Morris, the painter James McNeill Whistler, and other aesthetic luminaries for helping 
popularize the desire for “beautiful interiors” among the “great middle classes.”12  In the short 
treatise The Aesthetic Movement in England (1882)—one of the earliest attempts to recount the 
cultural history of the movement—Hamilton impresses on his readers all the good that 
aestheticism has “wrought…in the improved taste shown in poetry and painting, in dress, 
furniture, and house decoration.”13  
However, the tenor of these discussions changed in the 1890s, when aestheticism came to 
be conflated with popular notions of “decadence”—a capacious term that, as Alex Murray and 
Jason David Hall explain in their book Decadent Poetics (2013), “designat[es] variously a 
																																																								
10 Frederic Harrison, “The Aesthete,” in The Choice of Books: And Other Literary Pieces (London: Macmillan, 
1886), 291. 
11 Harrison, “The Aesthete,” 292. 
12 Moncure Conway, Travels in South Kensington: With Notes on Decorative Art and Architecture in England 
(London: Trübner, 1882), 171. 
13 Walter Hamilton, The Aesthetic Movement in England (London: Reeves & Turner, 1882), 127. 
		 7 
literary form, a movement, and a period in literary history.”14  As a literary movement, 
decadence was closely related to both British aestheticism and French Symbolism; its members 
included Wilde as well as younger poets such as Ernest Dowson, Lionel Johnson, Arthur 
Symons, and W. B. Yeats, many of whom would become leading figures in early twentieth-
century modernism.  While modern-day scholars such as Linda Dowling, Murray, and Hall have 
recuperated some of the stylistic and ideological nuances of the movement, decadence carried a 
strongly pejorative connotation in its own day and for decades after.  The “tendency then and 
now,” Dowling wrote in 1986, was to see decadence as a “cultural episode with sensational or 
lurid overtones.”15  To its critics in the 1890s, the decadents—and, by association, the 
aesthetes—seemed to embrace, even encourage, the dissolution of the political, linguistic, and 
moral fabric of British society.  Concerns about aestheticism’s sexual and moral character, which 
had fueled the gentler parodies of the 1880s, were further inflamed by post-Darwinian anxieties 
about the potential devolution of the species.  Max Nordau’s Degeneration (1895) was one of the 
most influential, and certainly the most notorious, articulations of degeneration panic in the 
period: in his meticulous critique of modern culture, Nordau declares Rossetti’s and Wilde’s 
work complicit in an epidemic of apocalyptic feeling that he describes, with characteristic drama, 
as “a sort of black death of degeneration and hysteria.”16  The movement that Harrison had once 
dismissed as a misguided but harmless fad had become, for fin-de-siècle commentators such as 
																																																								
14 Alex Murray and Jason David Hall, introduction to Decadent Poetics: Literature and Form at the British Fin de 
Siècle, ed. Hall and Murray (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1. 
15 Linda Dowling, Language and Decadence in the Victorian Fin de Siècle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986), ix.  
16 Max Nordau, Degeneration (New York: D. Appleton, 1895), 537.   
		 8 
Nordau, a social cancer.  In the public’s mind, Wilde’s salacious 1895 trial for homosexuality 
only cemented a reductive association between aestheticism, perversity, and decay.17  
Given this stigma, a truly scholarly (rather than polemical) interest in the Aesthetic 
Movement began only after its zenith in the 1890s.  Much of this valuable early scholarship 
attempted to redeem aesthetic and decadent literature by decoupling it from its damaging 
reputation for degeneracy and immorality.  In The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1899, 
revised 1919), for instance, Symons analyzes the work of several French poets, including 
Stéphane Mallarmé and Arthur Rimbaud, whose verse was instrumental in the formation of 
British aestheticism and decadence.  In a departure from previous critiques of fin-de-siècle 
literature—including his earlier version of the review, “The Decadent Movement of Literature” 
(1893)—Symons in The Symbolist Movement takes care to define “decadence” as a stylistic 
feature, a “perversity of form” rather than a “perversity of manner.”18  Symons’s assessment thus 
went some way toward promoting a fairer view of aestheticism as a serious literary movement—
and not, as one Victorian observer put it, a fleeting outbreak of “cultured anarchism.”19  More 
ambitiously, the journalist and critic Holbrook Jackson, in his book The Eighteen Nineties 
(1913), attempts to give a comprehensive picture of the “Zeitgeist of the decade” in which 
aestheticism thrived.20  Crucially for my discussion of aestheticism’s optimistic strain, Jackson 
contradicts major misconceptions about fin-de-siècle Britain that he traces to the Aesthetic 
Movement’s reactionary critics.  Far from being an era of decline and decay, he recalls, “[the 																																																								
17 William Greenslade, Degeneration, Culture and the Novel: 1880-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 122-23. 
18 Arthur Symons, The Symbolist Movement in Literature, 2nd ed. (London: Archibald Constable, 1908), 6. 
19 Hugh E. M. Stutfield, “Tommyrotics,” Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 157 (1895): 839. 
20 Holbrook Jackson, The Eighteen Nineties: A Review of Art and Ideas at the Close of the Nineteenth Century (New 
York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914), 46. 
		 9 
eighteen nineties] was a time when people went about frankly and cheerfully endeavoring to 
solve the question of ‘How to Live’”; “those who lived through the Nineties,” he continues, “will 
remember that this search for a new mode of life was anything but melancholy or diseased.”21  It 
was exactly this yearning for “a new mode of life”—one that was simultaneously satisfying to 
the spirit and compatible with new scientific conceptions of the universe—that animated the 
writings of Pater, Wilde, and the other aesthetes that I examine here. 
 In the decades after Jackson’s retrospective, several noteworthy works on aestheticism 
appeared in French, including Albert J. Farmer’s Le mouvement esthétique et “Décadent” en 
Angleterre, 1873-1900 (1931) and Louise M. Rosenblatt’s L’idée de l’art pour l’art dans la 
littérature Anglaise pendant la période Victorienne (1931).  Curiously, few comparably 
comprehensive accounts were available in English until Robert V. Johnson’s introductory guide 
Aestheticism appeared in the Critical Idiom series in 1969.  Among English-speaking academics, 
critical interest in aestheticism expanded in the 1970s and 1980s, due in part to the publication of 
several focused studies of the movement: David J. DeLaura’s learned Hebrew and Hellene in 
Victorian England: Newman, Arnold, and Pater (1969), Gerald Monsman’s authoritative Walter 
Pater (1977), Dowling’s Language and Decadence in the Victorian Fin de Siècle (1986), and 
Richard Ellmann’s flawed, but moving, Oscar Wilde (1987) are four prominent examples.22  The 
1990s subsequently witnessed an explosion of scholarship on the Aesthetic Movement and, more 
broadly, aesthetic theory in late Victorian Britain.  The most formative studies from that decade 
																																																								
21 Jackson, The Eighteen Nineties, 33. 
22 As I explain further in the third chapter, Ellmann’s biography is exhaustive, but it contains numerous factual 
errors.  Most famously, Ellmann misidentifies an image of Hungarian actress Alice Guszalewicz in Richard 
Strauss’s opera Salome as Wilde in drag.  Horst Schroeder has since compiled a comprehensive list of these 
inaccuracies.  Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 430; Joseph Bristow, 
“Picturing His Exact Decadence: The British Reception of Oscar Wilde,” in The Reception of Oscar Wilde in 
Europe, ed. Stefano Evangelista (London: Continuum, 2010), 49. 
		 10 
include Leon Chai’s Aestheticism: The Religion of Art in Post-Romantic Literature (1990), 
Jonathan Freedman’s Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and Commodity 
Culture (1990), Richard Dellamora’s Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian 
Aestheticism (1990), and Kathy Alexis Psomiades’s Beauty’s Body: Femininity and 
Representation in British Aestheticism (1997).  These diverse works helped set the tone for 
future scholarship by identifying certain key issues within aestheticism.  Chai and Freedman, for 
instance, conceive of aestheticism as a formal response to the sense of alienation inherent in 
economic and cultural modernity.  According to their respective readings, the aesthete’s 
elevation of beautiful artifice over naturalistic realism is part of a strenuous attempt to cultivate 
what Chai calls a “heightened consciousness,” a mode of perception that serves to endow 
everyday existence “with something of a sacred aura.”23  (To varying degrees, both Chai and 
Freedman also agree that the aesthetic “quest” for transcendence through literary form 
continuously resulted in failure.24)  In this vein, some of the most compelling recent scholarship 
on aestheticism—including Joseph Bristow’s edited collection The Fin-de-siècle Poem: English 
Literary Culture and the 1890s (2005) and Angela Leighton’s On Form: Poetry, Aestheticism, 
and the Legacy of a Word (2007)—foregrounds the movement’s distinctive theorizations of 
literary and artistic form. 
Dellamora’s and Psomiades’s respective books initiated an equally fruitful line of 
scholarly inquiry regarding the ways in which gender difference and sexual dissidence informed 
aesthetic philosophy.  As Dellamora persuasively argues in Masculine Desire, aestheticism often 
served as a vehicle for articulating passionate bonds between men: in the work of Pater, Alfred 																																																								
23 Leon Chai, Aestheticism: The Religion of Art in Post-Romantic Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1990), 95, 1.  
24 Chai, Aestheticism, xi; Jonathan Freedman, Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism, and 
Commodity Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3. 
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Tennyson, Gerard Manley Hopkins, and other male writers, an erotic admiration for masculine 
beauty (an illicit admiration, at the time) motivated forms of cultural critique that would come to 
be seen as characteristically aesthetic.25  In Beauty’s Body, by comparison, Psomiades extends 
and challenges Dellamora’s narrative by revealing the crucial function that “signs of femininity” 
performed in aesthetic discussions of ideal beauty and queer desire.26  Many significant studies 
have since expanded on Dellamora’s and Psomiades’s pioneering research, including Talia 
Schaffer and Psomiades’s anthology Women and British Aestheticism (1999), Dennis Denisoff’s 
Aestheticism and Sexual Parody 1840-1940 (2001), Ana Parejo Vadillo’s Women Poets and 
Urban Aestheticism: Passengers of Modernity (2005), and Stefano Evangelista’s British 
Aestheticism and Ancient Greece: Hellenism, Reception, Gods in Exile (2009).  Fortunately, this 
recent surge of critical work surrounding both queerness and the status of women in the 
Aesthetic Movement has led to the rediscovery of fin-de-siècle women writers such as Lee, the 
poet and critic Mathilde Blind, the novelist George Egerton (Mary Chavelita Dunne Bright), and 
the poetic duo Katharine Bradley and Edith Cooper (who published under the joint pseudonym 
Michael Field).  Although my study does not deal primarily with questions of gender and 
sexuality, I look closely at the writings of Michael Field, Blind, and especially Lee—figures 
whose reintegration into the canon can be credited to scholarly work in this area.  
 The second major body of scholarship with which “Evolutionary Aestheticism” engages 
concerns the interaction of science and literature, both generally and in the Victorian period.  In a 
broad sense, my study is guided by Thomas Kuhn’s important insights into scientific innovation: 
as he argues in his monumental work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), paradigm 																																																								
25 Richard Dellamora, Masculine Desire: The Sexual Politics of Victorian Aestheticism (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1990), 46. 
26 Kathy Alexis Psomiades, Beauty’s Body: Femininity and Representation in British Aestheticism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 8. 
		 12 
shifts in science trigger “transformations of vision” that, in turn, yield new worldviews.27  By 
analyzing progressive conceptions of evolution within scientific and aesthetic writing, this 
dissertation tracks one of these new worldviews—a happier “gestalt,” to quote Kuhn, which 
opposed the grim evolutionism of writers such as Nordau and Thomas Hardy—as it gained 
cultural authority in the second half of the nineteenth century.28  Like all scholarship on science 
and literature from the past thirty years, my study is also indebted to Gillian Beer’s and George 
Levine’s respective investigations into what Levine calls the “interplay between scientific and 
nonscientific discourses.”29  While neither Beer’s Darwin’s Plots (1983) nor Levine’s One 
Culture (1989) discusses the Aesthetic Movement, both of these monographs make the case for 
expansive and generous readings of the overlap between Victorian literature and science: as 
Levine explains, “science and literature reflect each other because they draw mutually on one 
culture, from the same sources, and they work out in different languages the same project.”30  In 
addition, my emphasis on a particularly affirmative tradition of evolutionary science finds 
precedent in Levine’s more recent book Darwin Loves You (2006), an illuminating history of 
post-Darwinian efforts to “re-enchant” the world.  Levine shows us the diverse ways in which 
secular naturalists, from Darwin to Clifford to Richard Dawkins, discern “in nonhuman nature 
the energy, diversity, beauty, intelligence, and sensibility that might provide a world-friendly 
alternative to otherworldly values.”31  In the period immediately after Darwin’s publication of 																																																								
27 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 112. 
28 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 112. 
29 George Levine, Darwin and the Novelists: Patterns of Science in Victorian Fiction, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991), 3. 
30 Levine, introduction to One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature, ed. Levine (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 7. 
31 Levine, Darwin Loves You: Natural Selection and the Re-enchantment of the World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006), xv. 
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Origin, as we will see, many of these scientific optimists looked to the program of 
aestheticism—specifically, its insistence on a refined, imaginative perception of the world—for a 
possible route toward this re-enchantment.  
 My dissertation also builds on a growing branch of scholarship, within the wider field of 
science and literature, which focuses on the Victorian periodical press and its role in the 
proliferation of scientific ideas.  In the introduction to their collection Science Serialized (2004), 
for instance, Sally Shuttleworth and Geoffrey Cantor expound on the ways in which the eruption 
of new print media in the nineteenth century transformed both the composition and the reception 
of scientific writing.  “Not only did many general periodicals carry a significant portion of 
articles specifically on science,” Shuttleworth and Cantor observe, “but science often informed 
and infiltrated articles ostensibly devoted to other topics.”32  Similarly, in their anthology Science 
in the Marketplace (2007), Aileen Fyfe and Bernard Lightman chronicle the nineteenth-century 
emergence of cross-disciplinary cultural “sites” (lecture halls, generalist and specialist 
periodicals, museums, etc.) within which scientific knowledge circulated.33  As Lightman further 
points out in Victorian Popularizers of Science (2007), science in the period had yet to be 
professionalized and institutionalized: writers from outside the scientific “elite,” including 
journalists and non-specialists such as Allen and (I would add) Lee, thus occupied surprisingly 
powerful positions in what Lightman calls “the topography of Victorian science.”34  The present 
study, keeping this mass of historical scholarship in mind, presumes some element of 
																																																								
32 Geoffrey Cantor and Sally Shuttleworth, introduction to Science Serialized: Representations of the Sciences in 
Nineteenth-Century Periodicals, ed. Cantor and Shuttleworth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 2. 
33 Aileen Fyfe and Bernard Lightman, introduction to Science in the Marketplace: Nineteenth-Century Sites and 
Experiences, ed. Fyfe and Lightman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 4-13. 
34 Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New Audiences (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 9. 
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interpenetration between aesthetic and scientific discourses.  (The historical record also bears 
this out: as I will reiterate later, Clifford and Pater often published in the same magazines, and 
Allen and Wilde struck up a correspondence after reading each other’s articles in the same issue 
of the Fortnightly Review.)  By giving both scientific and aesthetic thinkers a venue for open 
intellectual exchange, liberal periodicals such as the Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, 
and Macmillan’s Magazine fostered the material conditions within which evolutionary 
aestheticism could develop. 
 Above all, “Evolutionary Aestheticism” extends a small, but robust, body of work—
which arose in the 1990s and rapidly expanded in the mid 2000s—that brings the history of 
science to bear on our knowledge of aestheticism.  In the chapters that follow, I will have 
occasion to refer to many scholarly works in this subfield, but here I wish to underscore several 
studies that have proved especially useful for my own research.  The first of these important 
monographs is Ian Small’s edifying Conditions for Criticism (1991), which connects the 
subjective character of Pater’s aesthetic criticism to mid-century shifts in the science of 
psychology.  As Small argues, and as we will see again in later chapters, psychological 
formulations of the sense of beauty shaped the ontological foundations of aestheticism by 
convincing Pater and his heirs that the “most significant feature of any aesthetic response,” in 
Small’s words, “is the relationship which exists between the spectator or the reader and the 
artefact or art-object.”35  Along similar lines, Regenia Gagnier, in The Insatiability of Human 
Wants (2000) and several of her other works, pinpoints two competing paradigms of aesthetic 
appreciation in the late nineteenth century.  The older of these two paradigms hinged on the 
figure of the “productive body,” which Gagnier attributes to the moralistic, proto-Marxist 																																																								
35 Ian Small, Conditions for Criticism: Authority, Knowledge, and Literature in the Late Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 9.   
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aesthetics of Morris and the critic John Ruskin; the other centered on the “pleasured body,” 
which she links to the aestheticism of Pater, Allen, and Wilde.36  While Gagnier’s chief concern 
is the economic model that each of these paradigms furthered, she also astutely argues that the 
concept of the pleasured body had roots in physiological and biological approaches to aesthetics.  
Helpfully for this dissertation, both Gagnier and Small uncover the fundamental ideological 
shifts that allowed the Aesthetic Movement to flourish in its specific historical moment. 
 Over the past ten years, several scholars have expanded on Gagnier’s and Small’s work, 
both by investigating how scientific ideas might have passed into the purview of Pater and his 
followers, and by considering whether ideas ever traveled the other way—that is, whether 
scientific writers ever responded, consciously or unconsciously, to contemporary aesthetic 
writers.  In Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture (2006), for instance, Jonathan Smith 
documents Darwin’s own intervention in wider debates about the nature of aesthetic sensibility, 
particularly his career-long disagreement with Ruskin.  As Smith observes, “part of the threat 
posed by scientific naturalism for figures like Ruskin was that it claimed the imaginative, 
aesthetic realm as its own”: in doing so, scientists such as Darwin necessarily appropriated and 
questioned concepts that originated in literary aesthetic circles (including work by writers, such 
as Ruskin, who were hostile to evolutionary theory).37  Gowan Dawson, in his well-researched 
monograph Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability (2007), makes an even more 
intriguing argument for the bidirectional flow of ideas between scientific naturalists and aesthetic 
theorists.  Dawson makes extensive use of archival material in order to reconstruct the vexed 
reception of Darwin’s theories in the Victorian press: to many readers, Dawson discovers, the 																																																								
36 Regenia Gagnier, The Insatiability of Human Wants: Economics and Aesthetics in Market Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 128, 124. 
37 Jonathan Smith, Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
27. 
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materialist aspects of evolutionary thought recalled the “infamously transgressive” verse of 
Swinburne and other aesthetic poets.38  In order to safeguard the reputation of their nascent 
secular naturalism, Dawson further argues, scientific figures such as Darwin, T. H. Huxley, and 
John Tyndall strategically distanced themselves from Swinburne and his heterogeneous coterie 
of aesthetes, revolutionaries, atheists, and freethinkers.   
More recently, in his memorably titled essay “Why is the peacock’s tail so beautiful?” 
(2013), Laurence Shafe identifies the convergence of aesthetic and evolutionary discourses in 
popular representations of the peacock feather.  The peacock, Shafe argues, functioned as a 
symbolic link between the Darwinian materialist and the aesthetic sensualist, in part because the 
peacock’s functionless beauty furnished evidence for sexual selection at the same time its iconic 
feather became the favored motif of “decadent” artists such as Aubrey Beardsley.39  Shafe also 
points us to an especially revealing illustration of this popular connection between aestheticism 
and evolutionary theory.  In one of Edward Linley Sambourne’s cartoons from Punch, entitled 
“Mr. Punch’s Designs after Nature” (1871), a fashionable young woman sports a peacock 
parasol and matching hat; her ostentatious dress, ostensibly tailored to attract mates, is made 
more ridiculous by its juxtaposition with a satirical notice of Darwin’s Descent of Man, which 
had appeared earlier that year (see figure 2).  Sambourne’s cartoon thus tellingly collocates its 
critiques of both aesthetic affectation and scientific naturalism, which appear equally concerned 
with sexuality and superficial display.  As Shafe, Dawson, and Smith demonstrate, and as this 
dissertation further explains, debates over aestheticism and evolutionism were closely 
intertwined in the nineteenth-century public sphere.   																																																								
38 Gowan Dawson, Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 46.   
39 Laurence Shafe, “Why is the peacock’s tail so beautiful?” in Darwin and Theories of Aesthetics and Cultural 
History, ed. Barbara Larson and Sabine Flach (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 43-47. 
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Fig. 2. Edward Linley Sambourne, “Mr. Punch’s Designs After Nature,” Punch, 1 April 1871 
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 Perhaps most salient for my account of evolutionary aestheticism is Benjamin Morgan’s 
ongoing work, which has recently culminated in his new book The Outward Mind: Materialist 
Aesthetics in Victorian Science and Literature (2017).40  Building on previous research, Morgan 
“situates aesthetic thought at the intersection of multiple discourses and practices, including art 
history, the novel, interior design, physiology, and evolutionary biology.”41  In his survey of 
British aesthetics, which stretches from the early nineteenth to the early twentieth century, he 
pays particular attention to the ways in which the burgeoning science of mind provided a 
framework for the theorization of beauty in a multiplicity of contexts, from the art gallery to the 
laboratory.  Morgan’s resulting argument is twofold.  He first asserts that many scientific and 
literary writers viewed aesthetics from a shared materialist perspective, which broke down 
aesthetic experience into so many “dynamic interactions among nerves, muscles, stone, and 
ink.”42  By tracing aesthetic judgment to “nervous reflex” and “mechanistic response,” Morgan 
further argues, this materialist approach “tended to de-emphasize the uniqueness of human 
aesthetic experience and open up nonhuman frames of reference”: he concludes that Victorian 
aesthetics had the effect of exteriorizing “mind, consciousness, and the self into networks of 
matter, sensation, and objects.”43  To some extent, some of the arguments that Morgan forwards 
in The Outward Mind thus overlap with my own.  Like Morgan, I maintain that many 
evolutionary aesthetic thinkers adopted the same form of neo-Hellenic materialism—a 
materialism that, as Morgan points out, was “based on an ontology of physical matter as the basis 																																																								
40 Although almost all of the research for this dissertation was conducted before the release of The Outward Mind, I 
have consulted Morgan’s dissertation—an early draft of the book—as well as his article “Critical Empathy: 
Vernon Lee’s Aesthetics and the Origins of Close Reading” (2012).   
41 Benjamin Morgan, The Outward Mind: Materialist Aesthetics in Victorian Science and Literature (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 5. 
42 Morgan, The Outward Mind, 6. 
43 Morgan, The Outward Mind, 6. 
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of all phenomena.”44  Similarly, The Outward Mind addresses several of the same writers that are 
central to my project, including Spencer, Pater, Allen, and Lee.     
 “Evolutionary Aestheticism,” however, both departs from Morgan’s research in pivotal 
ways and makes several timely contributions to the trajectory of scholarship that I summarize 
here.  First, I question Morgan’s stress on what he calls the “antihumanist energies” of Victorian 
aesthetics, which, he argues, “denatured rather than recuperated the autonomy and 
distinctiveness of human beings.”45  While I agree that evolutionary aesthetics undercut older, 
theological aesthetic theories that reserved the sense of beauty for humankind, I would posit that 
the formulation of aestheticism was in some ways an effort to recover humanism within the 
parameters of scientific reason.  Secondly, I confront some pressing questions about the affinity 
between evolutionary science and aestheticism that scholars such as Morgan, Dawson, and 
Gagnier have yet to investigate fully.  Why did so many Victorian aesthetes—including the 
familiar litany of Pater, Wilde, and Lee but also John Addington Symonds, Bernard Berenson, 
and Michael Field—readily espouse methods of criticism that they deemed not just broadly 
scientific, but also specifically evolutionary?  To what extent did these aesthetic writers 
participate in, and not just borrow from, contemporary biological and psychological discourses?  
To what end did scientific writers—and here I am thinking of Clifford, Allen, and even 
Huxley—utilize the language of aesthetic poetry and prose?  Finally, why did evolutionists such 
as Clifford, Allen, and Spencer endorse certain elements of aesthetic philosophy, Dawson’s 
arguments notwithstanding?  By treating evolutionary aestheticism as a unified intellectual 
tradition—one made up of a diverse assortment of polymathic art critics, connoisseurs, 
																																																								
44 Morgan, The Outward Mind, 12. 
45 Morgan, The Outward Mind, 22. 
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biologists, and philosophers—I hope to deepen our understanding of both evolutionary science 
and aestheticism in this period.   
 Thirdly, and most important, my project foregrounds an extraordinary, but as yet little-
studied, intersection of evolutionism and aestheticism: namely, their shared inclination toward 
optimistic and even utopian visions of future progress.  While this assertion at first seems to 
contradict aestheticism’s professed rejection of reformist ambition, a few scholars have 
recognized the affirmative tone that British aesthetes often adopt in their writing.  As Diana 
Maltz demonstrates in British Aestheticism and the Urban Working Classes (2005), for instance, 
Victorian aesthetes often joined forces with social reformers in order to pursue utopian schemes 
for the dissemination of art and culture among the poor.46  Several scholars of Wilde, including 
John Wilson Foster and Elisha Cohn, have likewise noted his association of science with 
progress.  As we will see, Wilde’s zeal for science—which his aphoristic tribute to aesthetics and 
sexual selection so clearly reflects—was widespread among his aesthetic colleagues.  On the 
whole, then, British aestheticism was a sanguine, forward-looking ideology.  Moreover, this 
progressive strain within aestheticism gained strength from a parallel strain in evolutionary 
thought that is often lost amid the volume of dystopian fiction and degeneration literature that the 
post-Darwinian era inspired.  Even as evolutionists such as Nordau, E. Ray Lankester, and 
Cesare Lombroso combed psychiatric hospitals and literary periodicals for evidence of 
sociocultural and biological devolution, an opposing camp of scientific writers hailed the modern 
period as one of unprecedented liberalization and growth.47  Many of these progressive 
evolutionists, who were both aware of and repulsed by the violence of Darwinian natural 																																																								
46 Diana Maltz, British Aestheticism and the Urban Working Classes, 1870-1900: Beauty for the People (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2. 
47 See Lankester’s Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880) and Lombroso’s Criminal Man (1876, translated 
1900) for two important examples of degeneration discourse in addition to Nordau’s Degeneration. 
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selection, instead looked to the advancement of secular, humane culture for an evolutionary path 
forward.  Allen, for instance, urged his readers to resist the “silly parrot cry” of alarmist 
reactionaries and to “be a conscious partaker in one of the great ages of humanity”: late 
nineteenth-century Britain, Allen avowed, was experiencing a period of cultural “expansion” to 
rival classical Rome and Renaissance Italy.48  We can discern Allen’s aspirational sentiments, if 
not always his florid rhetoric, in countless other examples of post-Darwinian science writing, 
including that of Clifford, Spencer, and, on occasion, Darwin himself.   
This redemptive view of evolutionary process—which we might consider a positivist 
version of the elevated state of consciousness toward which aestheticism as a whole strived—
unites the central figures of my study.  All of these aesthetic and scientific writers, I argue, both 
accepted the validity of modern science and extrapolated evolutionary theories of beauty into a 
program for long-term generational development, one driven by the promulgation of aesthetic 
taste rather than competition between individuals.  To this end, my dissertation organizes these 
writers into four principal pairings: Darwin and Spencer, Pater and Clifford, Wilde and Allen, 
and, finally, Lee and Berenson.  (While I discuss other authors in the course of the dissertation—
including several, such as Blind, who also belong to this tradition—these eight core figures were 
the primary theorists and proponents of evolutionary aestheticism.)  This arrangement is intended 
to achieve two main goals.  First, these pairings model the collaborative, dialogic process by 
which both evolutionary and aesthetic ideas developed in this period.  The nineteenth century, as 
Lightman and others have documented, largely predated the professionalization of science and 
its segregation from the humanities: meaningful participation in scientific conversations was thus 
not limited to those who identified as naturalists, and scientific writers regularly weighed in on 																																																								
48 Grant Allen, “The Romance of the Clash of the Races,” in Post-Prandial Philosophy (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1894), 76-78. 
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questions of art and culture.  By organizing this study into multi-author chapters, I emphasize 
evolutionary aestheticism’s basis in an interdisciplinary network of intellectuals, all of whom 
either knew each other socially or encountered each other’s views in the periodical press.  
Furthermore, the chronological ordering of the material allows us to follow several turns in 
evolutionary aesthetic philosophy as it took shape in the late nineteenth century—from its origins 
in mid century evolutionary theory, to its development into a peculiar form of secular piety in the 
1870s, to its more political iterations in the 1880s and 1890s.  In brief, each section explicates a 
particular stage in the formation of evolutionary aesthetic thought, while a coda examines its 
vestiges in twentieth-century criticism.   
The first chapter traces the notion of “art for art’s sake” to the evolutionary theories of 
Darwin and Spencer, who first engaged with questions of aesthetics in the early 1850s.  In their 
attempts to account for the evolution of the sense of beauty—an adaptation with no obvious 
survival value—both writers exempted a wide swath of aesthetic activities from the natural laws 
of scarcity and struggle that governed other areas of biological life.  Their evolutionary 
explanations for beauty thus laid the scientific groundwork for later conceptions of aesthetic 
experience as escapist, salutary, and therefore beneficial for the species.  The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of selected works by Swinburne, Thomas Hardy, and George Meredith, whose 
respective corpuses help illustrate the diffuse impact that these ideas had on Victorian literary 
conceptions of the beautiful.  In the second chapter, I place Pater in conversation with Clifford 
and Blind in order to elucidate the impact of evolutionary thought on the founding of the 
Aesthetic Movement.  Around the same time that Pater made the case for “art for art’s sake,” 
Clifford laid out a sweeping secular humanism that strenuously reaffirmed an anthropocentric 
and pseudo-religious view of the cosmos.  Clifford’s optimistic reinterpretation of evolutionary 
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science both reinforced and drew on Pater’s contemporary conception of the aesthetic 
temperament: a receptive personality capable of transforming, in Pater’s words, the “ghastly 
spectacle of the endless material universe” into the “delightful consciousness of an ever-
widening kinship and sympathy.”49  Both Clifford and Pater—and subsequently Blind, who 
adapted and synthesized their ideas in her own work—hoped to compensate for the dispiriting 
realities of the material world by inculcating their readers into this attitude of reverent 
admiration.  
Next, I trace these linkages between evolutionary science and aestheticism through the 
work of Allen and Wilde, who shared a penchant for progressive politics as well as a firm belief 
in the truth of both Darwin’s and Spencer’s evolutionary theories.  More important, Allen and 
Wilde were similarly repulsed by the cultural implications of social Darwinism, and they thus 
looked to sexual selection—and, by extension, aesthetics—for a life-affirming alternative to the 
pressures of Darwinian competition.  Over the course of the 1880s and 1890s, both Allen and 
Wilde grappled with these complex political, philosophical, and scientific concepts in their 
fiction and critical prose; they eventually arrived at a markedly individualistic and utopian 
aesthetics that saw self-culture, through the emancipated pursuit of pleasure, as the key to social 
progress.  My fourth and final chapter argues that this evolutionary theory of self-cultivation 
culminated in the “life-enhancing” aesthetics of Lee and her younger colleague Berenson.50  
Steeped in Pater’s aesthetic philosophy and Spencer’s progressive evolutionism, both Lee and 
Berenson attempted to balance their spiritual passion for Renaissance art with their equally 
strong commitments to scientific rationalism and (especially in Lee’s case) social amelioration.  																																																								
49 Pater, “Giordano Bruno,” Fortnightly Review (1889): 240-41. 
50 Bernard Berenson, The Florentine Painters of the Renaissance: With an Index to their Works (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1896), 64, 70. 
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In order to reconcile these impulses, Lee and Berenson embarked on intersecting investigations 
into the physiological, psychological, and evolutionary raisons d’être of the sense of beauty.  
The most significant result of their turn-of-the-century studies was Lee’s influential theory of 
“psychological aesthetics,” which posited that beautiful art improved the species by 
reinvigorating the minds and bodies of individual observers.51   
Since Lee and Berenson had a peripheral presence in the avant-garde Bloomsbury group, 
a short coda to the dissertation considers the legacy of their aesthetics in the work of painter and 
critic Roger Fry, novelist Virginia Woolf, literary theorist I. A. Richards, and several other 
twentieth-century writers.  Although these modernist figures inherited their predecessors’ ideas 
about the counter-utilitarian ethics of beauty, I argue that Woolf, Fry, and their contemporaries 
rejected the developmental telos that defined nineteenth-century evolutionary aestheticism.  
Nevertheless, some of the more humanistic claims of Lee’s psychological aesthetics worked their 
way into the influential school of New Criticism: a literary critical theory, emerging in part from 
Richards’s work, that privileged form over content and touted the social benefits of good taste.  
In conclusion, I suggest that the utopian elements of evolutionary aestheticism continue to 
resurface in present-day debates about aesthetic appreciation and its capacity to facilitate (or 
hinder) the establishment of a more just and equitable society.  The coda thus gestures toward 
several promising avenues for future expansion of the project: first, the complex intellectual 
continuity between Victorian and modernist aesthetics, and secondly—and perhaps more 
intriguingly—the lessons of evolutionary aestheticism for our understanding of aesthetics and 
politics today. 
																																																								
51 Vernon Lee, The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1913), 153-55. 
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Chapter 1 
Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and the Origins of Evolutionary Aesthetics 
 
 For a work that relies so heavily on the relentless cataloging of violent encounters—
between predator and prey, siblings in the nest, even parents and offspring—Charles Darwin’s 
On the Origin of Species (1859) is suffused with the language of beauty and wonder.  His 
meditation on the “slow, intermittent action of natural selection” is an illustrative example:  
Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by his powers of 
artificial selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and infinite 
complexity of the coadaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with 
their physical conditions of life, which may be effected in the long course of time by 
nature’s power of selection.1 
 
Here, Darwin offers us a brief respite from Origin’s relentless sense of disenchantment with a 
natural world that reveals itself, again and again, to be brutal and uncaring.2  Darwin dedicates 
most of Origin to proving his theory of natural selection: variations arise randomly in organisms, 
he argues, and these variations persist only if they confer an advantage in the violent competition 
for resources that he calls the “struggle for existence.”3  Taken separately, the “coadaptations” 
that natural selection thus produces are often spectacularly horrifying.  Parasitic ants, for 
instance, enslave their fellows, while queen bees obey a “savage instinctive hatred” that drives 
them to murder their daughters.4  Darwin’s turn to the aesthetic, in this context, is both surprising 																																																								
1 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, ed. William Bynum (London: Penguin, 2009), 104.  Unless otherwise 
noted, citations refer to the Penguin edition. 
2 This disenchantment is clearest in Darwin’s uncompromising Malthusianism: “We behold the face of nature bright 
with gladness, we often see superabundance of food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly 
singing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life.”  Darwin, Origin, 65.   
3 Darwin uses the phrase “struggle for existence” to encapsulate, in a “large and metaphorical sense,” the natural 
conditions of scarcity that force organisms to compete with one another, either directly or indirectly, for survival.  
In modern parlance, the struggle for existence is a zero-sum game: an organism’s continued survival necessarily 
uses up resources that another organism needs to live.  Darwin, Origin, 65.  
4 Darwin, Origin, 184. 
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and counterintuitive. The logic of natural selection dictates that the relative success of an 
adaptation depends on its survival value, not on its aesthetic appeal to a beholder—and yet he 
counts beauty, alongside “change” and “complexity,” among the chief indices of evolutionary 
progress.  His rhetoric becomes accordingly creative rather than enumerative: the temporal 
ambiguity of Darwin’s syntax (to what period does “long course of time” refer?  Are these 
coadaptations already extant or yet to be seen?), his use of the conditional, and his aesthetic 
register make this vision fanciful and speculative, even prophetic.  In Darwin’s panoptic and 
aestheticizing vision, the grotesqueries of natural selection coalesce into a “beautiful and 
harmonious” system that promises upward development without end.5  
 I begin with this passage from Origin partly to point out the easily overlooked lushness of 
Darwin's prose, which speaks to his theoretical interests in abundance, excess, and ornament—
qualities that, ironically, appear to defy the practical etiology he proposes in his theory of natural 
selection.  Moments like this one, in which scientific exactitude is lost in paroxysms of 
unnecessary admiration, offer us intriguing insights into Darwin’s subtle resistance against a 
purely instrumentalist view of nature.  More important, the passage also underscores the ways in 
which Darwin's broaching of the aesthetic drives the latent recuperative momentum of much of 
his writing.  For while Darwin nominally seeks to silence his critics on logical grounds, his 
assertion of the “beauty and infinite complexity” of the natural world is part of a broader claim—
one that would reappear more forcefully in The Descent of Man (1871)—about the evolutionary 
potency of the aesthetic.  Specifically, he hints at two related theories about beauty that, as I will 
argue in this chapter, shaped both scientific and literary discussions of the aesthetic from the 
1850s onward: first, that the experience of beauty is essentially non-functional and thus set apart 																																																								
5 Darwin, Origin, 157. 
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from the conditions of struggle that determine other areas of biological life; and secondly, that 
the cultivation of aesthetic taste both signals and furthers humankind’s evolutionary progression 
beyond the bitter, day-to-day violence of natural selection.   
This chapter begins by addressing the subversive implications of the beautiful in Origin, 
which led Darwin to focus on evolutionary mechanisms founded on organismic choice rather 
than environmental circumstance.  In later works such as Descent and The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Darwin configured the aesthetic into a locus of individual 
freedom within an otherwise oppressive cosmos.  I then trace this concept of a non-utilitarian 
aesthetic in the contemporary work of evolutionary philosopher Herbert Spencer, whose 
influential ideas about play and human development promoted scientific views of the aesthetic 
emotion as a liberating and salutary physiological experience.  Finally, I analyze the ways in 
which several illustrative late nineteenth-century literary writers—including Algernon Charles 
Swinburne, Thomas Hardy, and George Meredith—responded to Darwinian and Spencerian 
theory.  The contrast between Hardy’s famously despairing reception of evolutionary theory and 
Meredith’s comparatively celebratory evolutionism demonstrates how aesthetic writers in 
particular adopted and developed the revolutionary implications of Darwin’s and Spencer’s 
respective evolutionary aesthetics.  Darwin's and Spencer's constructions of beauty in this period, 
I ultimately argue, thus sanctioned many of the unorthodox opinions—that beauty is amoral, that 
art should be separate from daily life, and that aesthetic emotion is a corporeal phenomenon—
upon which Swinburne, Walter Pater, and others founded the Aesthetic Movement.  
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I. Darwin’s Non-Functional Aesthetics  
 Throughout his career, Darwin expanded his personal affinity for natural beauty into 
substantive claims about the ways in which aesthetic response resisted the stultifying 
functionalism of natural selection.  The paleontologist Richard Owen, in a blistering review of 
Origin, opined that Darwin’s “charming style” betrayed an “imaginative temperament” 
particularly vulnerable to fantastic and unscientific conjectures.6  Although Owen’s hostility 
toward evolution turned out to be misguided, his assessment of Darwin’s disposition was not 
entirely inaccurate.  As a young man, Darwin was an ardent reader of poetry, and his early 
memoir Journal of Researches (1839)—better known as Voyage of the Beagle—reveals a keen 
relish for color and composition in landscape: “the colours were intense,” he writes of Rio de 
Janeiro, and “the sky and the calm waters of the bay vied with each other in splendour.”7  In 
Origin, Darwin generously applies the aesthetic term “beautiful” to both individual 
morphological features (the “beautiful adaptations [we see] everywhere and in every part of the 
organic world”) and entire natural systems (the “great Tree of Life” with its “ever branching and 
beautiful ramifications”).8  His sustained attention to the marvelous within nature culminates in 
Origin’s final sentence, which provides a remarkably affirmative interpretation of the organic 
order he has uncovered.  “There is a grandeur in this view of life,” Darwin concludes, “that, 
whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a 
beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.”9   
																																																								
6 [Richard Owen], review of The Origin of Species, by Charles Darwin, Edinburgh Review 111 (1860): 487, 503. 
7 The young Darwin famously carried a copy of John Milton’s Paradise Lost aboard the Beagle.  Darwin, Journal of 
Researches, 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1845), 19.  
8 Darwin, Origin, 64, 124. 
9 Darwin, Origin, 427.   
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 At first glance, Darwin’s deployments of “beauty” in Origin may appear merely to 
aestheticize the practical ingenuity of those material adaptations that allow organisms to compete 
successfully in the struggle for existence.  Along these lines, Jonathan Smith’s Charles Darwin 
and Victorian Visual Culture (2006) argues that Darwin’s “naturalized aesthetics” define beauty 
as the “utilitarian means by which individuals secured the best breeding partners and species 
promulgated themselves.”10  In Smith’s account, Darwin’s insistence on the organic and 
functional origins of beauty largely set the tone for evolutionary and physiological approaches to 
aesthetics in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Darwin and his heirs, Smith claims, thus 
challenged an earlier, theological tradition of aesthetics that considered beauty as evidence of 
God’s beneficent design.  The most influential of these mid-Victorian aesthetic theorists was the 
cultural critic, painter, and naturalist John Ruskin: in his multivolume critical opus Modern 
Painters (1843-60), Ruskin argued that beauty was nothing less than the residual “impress of 
divine work and character” upon Creation, and he consequently rejected the “false opinion that 
beauty is usefulness.”11  By challenging Ruskin’s theological explanation for beauty, Smith 
asserts, Darwin also dispatched Ruskin’s counter-utilitarian aesthetics.12   
 Smith’s interpretation of Darwin’s aesthetics, however, overstates its commitment to 
utility.  As we have seen, the apparently purposeless experiences of “grandeur,” “beauty,” and 
“wonder” feature prominently in the conclusion to Origin, and these superlatives (which in part 																																																								
10 Jonathan Smith, Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
139.  
11 In one of the letters from his pamphlet series Fors Clavigera (1871-84), Ruskin claimed that he lost his faith in 
1858 after he saw Paolo Veronese’s painting Solomon and the Queen of Sheba; in reality, Timothy Hilton 
observes, Ruskin had been entertaining serious doubts about Evangelical Christianity for years.  That Ruskin 
rejected programmatic Christian doctrine did not prevent Grant Allen, Vernon Lee, and others from associating 
his aesthetics with a religious paradigm: his many disputes with Darwin likely furthered Ruskin’s reputation as a 
Romantic critic.  John Ruskin, Modern Painters, vol. 2, rev. ed. (London: George Allen, 1906), 27, 33; Timothy 
Hilton, John Ruskin, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 254-55, 452. 
12 Smith, Victorian Visual Culture, 139. 
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motivated Owen’s criticisms of the younger naturalist) become the very watchwords of Darwin’s 
discussion of sexual selection in Descent.  Over the last few decades, several modern scholars 
have drawn attention to these elements of Darwin’s prose.  Gillian Beer, in her groundbreaking 
monograph Darwin’s Plots (1983), argues that Darwin’s “style and theory” were “lyrical and 
effusive, rather than sceptical and parsimonious.”13  While the operation of natural selection 
depends upon the continuous elimination of unfit organisms—and the consequent preservation, 
in Darwin’s terms, of only “useful variations”—Beer reminds us that his language often 
foregrounds, by contrast, the “clutter and profusion” of nature.14  In Origin especially, Beer 
further contends, “affirmative” visions of the “delicate richness and variety of life” tend to 
overshadow adjacent descriptions of ferocious competition.15  Simon Reader, in his more recent 
study of Darwin's notebooks, likewise “assemble[s] a new picture of Darwin, as a man not 
shackled to a nature 'red in tooth and claw,'” but one who “acts with tenderness and care toward 
what seems to serve no purpose and without insisting upon its future redemption.”16  Darwin’s 
aesthetic rhetoric, I would add, meshes with his curiosity about the evolutionary history of 
beauty itself: a trait that, as Darwin immediately recognized, lacked clear survival value in the 
struggle for existence.  
 Darwin’s association of beauty with uselessness, though perhaps unexpected in an 
evolutionary context, has precedence in the aesthetics of the Enlightenment.  In A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Edmund Burke 																																																								
13 Gillian Beer, Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 116. 
14 Darwin, Origin, 64; Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 116. 
15 Beer, Darwin’s Plots, 159. 
16 Simon Reader, “Thinking in Pieces: Victorian Notebooks and Notation” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2014), 
27. 
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explicitly distinguishes beauty from function: if “utility…is the cause of beauty,” Burke reasons, 
then “the wedge-like snout of a swine,…so well adapted to its offices of digging, and rooting, 
would be extremely beautiful,” and the hedgehog “would be then considered [a] creature of no 
small elegance.”17  For Burke, beautiful objects generate a serene pleasure by bringing about a 
“relaxation in the body” and its various sensory organs (the sublime, in contrast to the beautiful, 
stimulates those tense feelings of pain and terror that he associates with self-preservation and 
self-interest).18  Immanuel Kant, in The Critique of Judgment (1790), similarly defines the 
beautiful in non-utilitarian terms: unlike objects that we call “agreeable” or “good,” which 
gratify us because they somehow enable or ease our existence, the “beautiful” is an ideal form of 
“satisfaction…without any interest.”19  Although Kant, according to his system, considers the 
sensory aspects of art to be merely “agreeable”—truly beautiful art, he argues, prompts us to 
experience the more elevated pleasures of “cognition”—he nonetheless affirms a categorical 
separation between the beautiful and the useful.20  Most significantly, both Burke and Kant 
characterize aesthetic experience as fundamentally disinterested: that is, the type of satisfaction 
that we derive from beauty is of a different order than the type of satisfaction that we feel when 
our basic needs are fulfilled.  
Darwin’s early writings build on Burkean and Kantian aesthetics by attempting to explain 
how evolutionary processes might have produced, over time, such a non-essential adaptation as 																																																								
17 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. Adam 
Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 95.  
18 Burke’s aesthetics are also theological: he is hesitant to posit the efficient causes of the sublime and beautiful, but 
he considers it beyond doubt that “the great chain of causes,” however obscure, eventually leads to “the throne of 
God himself.”  Burke, Philosophical Enquiry, 136, 117. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96.  Although Kant’s treatise is more commonly known as The Critique of 
Judgment, Guyer opts for a title that better reflects the original German.   
20 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 184. 
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aesthetic sensation.21  While the first edition of Origin mostly concerns natural selection, Darwin 
occasionally grapples with adaptations that appear to confer no survival advantage: these 
moments are conspicuous by comparison, and they hint at his evolving ideas about the escapist 
possibilities of aesthetics.  In a chapter entitled “Difficulties on Theory,” for example, Darwin 
addresses several challenges to the concept of natural selection, chief among them the belief that 
“many structures have been created for beauty in the eyes of man, or for mere variety.”22  At the 
time of Darwin’s writing, Ruskin was arguably the most vocal adherent of the theistic view to 
which Darwin refers.23  Darwin counters Ruskin and his ideological allies on several fronts, first 
suggesting that structures of “no direct use”—including traits such as ornamental feathers and 
behaviors such as dancing and singing—may arise out of environmental conditions, inheritance, 
or reversion to an ancestral type.24  More important, Darwin also directs his critics to consider his 
nascent theory of sexual selection, which he introduces in a two-page summary earlier in Origin.  
Sexual selection, as Darwin defines it, is a separate evolutionary process in which females 
choose the most attractive mates, thereby disseminating beautiful traits (along with the taste for 
them) through future generations.  In contrast to natural selection, sexual selection occurs 																																																								
21 As Barbara Larson points out, Darwin’s conception of natural selection in many ways responds to Burke’s ideas 
about self-preservation, the corporeality of psychological experience, and the state of nature.  Certain passages 
from Descent also refer directly to Kant.  Barbara Larson, “Darwin, Burke, and the Biological Sublime,” in 
Darwin and Theories of Aesthetics and Cultural History, ed. Larson and Sabine Flach (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 
2013), 17; Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, ed. James Moore and Adrian Desmond 
(London: Penguin, 2004). 133.  Unless otherwise noted, citations of Descent refer to the Penguin edition. 
22 Darwin, Origin, 181-82.  
23 Many scholars, including Jonathan Smith and George Levine, discuss Ruskin’s life-long difficulties with 
evolutionary science, which persisted even after Ruskin had abandoned evangelical Christianity in the 1860s.  
Here, I would only add that Ruskin’s disagreements with Darwin on aesthetics were part of the critic’s more 
fundamental dispute not with science per se (Ruskin was himself an accomplished geologist), but with what he 
saw as a coarse and empty scientific materialism—a materialism that the Darwinian revolution helped foment.  
Smith, Charles Darwin and Victorian Visual Culture, 26-27; George Levine, “Ruskin and Darwin and the 
Matter of Matter,” in Realism, Ethics and Secularism: Essays on Victorian Literature and Science (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 81. 
24 Darwin, Origin, 182. 
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through non-fatal sexual competition rather than violent struggle and mass death.  Since sexual 
selection is both “less rigorous” and “less rigid” than natural selection, Darwin speculates, the 
process could foster the transmission and gradual augmentation of characteristics that natural 
selection might otherwise eliminate.25  
 But Darwin, in positing sexual selection against Ruskin’s natural theology, does not 
necessarily overturn the non-utilitarian elements of Ruskin’s aesthetics.  “The effects of sexual 
selection, when displayed in beauty to charm the females,” Darwin admits in Origin, “can be 
called useful only in rather a forced sense.”26  Plumage, spurs, and horns, in other words, often 
perform no function aside from “charm[ing]” potential mates.  Darwin’s tentative explanation of 
sexual selection thus hints at an account of beauty that is perhaps more radically anti-utilitarian 
than Ruskin’s: while Ruskin, like many of his contemporaries, believed that beauty had intrinsic 
religious or moral meaning, Darwin here seems to vacate the beautiful of all value (including 
survival value) beyond the immediate pleasure it gives the beholder.  In this context, Darwin’s 
many exclamations of wonderment at the natural world are not incongruous digressions but 
celebratory, stylistic enactments of his non-functional and escapist aesthetics.  Even as Origin 
uncovers the systematic brutality of nature, which operates through natural selection’s 
subtractive mechanisms, its rhetorical flourish appeals to the same superfluous sense of pleasure 
that underlies sexual display as well as aesthetics at large.  Furthermore, Darwin in Origin urges 
his audience to follow his lead by regarding nature, despite its cruelties, as a source of aesthetic 
gratification.  At one point, he directs his reader’s gaze toward the “dense clouds of pollen” that 
fir-trees release, “in order that a few granules may be wafted by a chance breeze on the ovules”: 
																																																								
25 Darwin, Origin, 86, 146. 
26 Darwin, Origin, 182.  
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although the process dismays us, he explains, we really “ought to admire” nature’s profligacy.27  
By discerning “perfect[ion]” in the excesses of nature, Darwin proposes an antidote to the 
despair that Alfred Tennyson—shocked to discover “that of fifty seeds / [Nature] often brings 
but one to bear”—so famously captured in his elegiac poem In Memoriam (1850).28  
 In the subsequent editions of Origin that appeared throughout the 1860s, Darwin fleshed 
out these cursory references to sexual selection and reaffirmed the counter-utilitarian elements of 
his aesthetics.  The 1869 version of Origin (the last to be published before Descent appeared two 
years later) demonstrates his growing confidence in the theory of sexual selection and its 
capacity to explain otherwise functionless adaptations: “I willingly admit that a great number of 
male animals…have been rendered beautiful for beauty’s sake,” he writes, “but this has been 
effected not for the delight of man, but through sexual selection, that is from the more beautiful 
males having been continually preferred by the less ornamented females.”29  Darwin’s candid 
admission of beauty for beauty’s sake also seems to license his multiplying usages of “beautiful” 
and “wonderful,” descriptors that appear more frequently in later editions of Origin.30  
Spectatorial pleasure also begins to perform a role in his scientific as well as rhetorical practice, 
in part because deciding which adaptations are produced by sexual selection requires some 
sensitivity to whatever is beautiful in nature.   
Darwin’s shifting theoretical focus—which partly reflected his engagement with the 
evolutionary work of Herbert Spencer, whose contributions to Victorian aestheticism I discuss 																																																								
27 Darwin, Origin, 184-85. 
28 Darwin, Origin, 184; Alfred Tennyson, In Memoriam, ed. Erik Gray (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 40.  
29 Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 5th ed. (London: John Murray, 1869), 247.  Emphasis mine. 
30 A simple text search demonstrates the increasing frequency with which Darwin applied aesthetic descriptors to 
objects that he was nominally considering only in a scientific light.  The first edition of Origin uses “beauty” or 
“beautiful” 27 times, while the 1876 edition—the last edition Darwin himself edited—uses the same two terms 
over 60 times.  In The Descent of Man, these words appear hundreds of times.  
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later in the chapter—resulted in the publication of Origin’s much-anticipated sequel, Descent.  In 
Descent, Darwin develops his earlier speculations about sexual selection into more assertive 
claims for its capacity to disrupt the operations of natural selection.  To reiterate, Darwin first 
theorized sexual selection in the 1850s in order to account for examples of useless animal 
ornamentation, and he had recognized early on that sexual selection was “less rigorous” than 
life-or-death natural selection.  He repeats this point in Descent, adding that the “power to charm 
the female” with eye-catching coloring or a pretty song is often “more important than the power 
to conquer other males” through combat (these battles, in any case, “rarely” result in death).31  
Since “unornamented or unattractive males would succeed equally well in the battle for life,” he 
further reasons, beautiful adaptations such as ornamental plumage do not enhance an organism’s 
“fitness” in the ordinary sense.32  As Irene Tucker points out, Darwinian sexual selection thus 
depends, to an unusual degree, on the “desires of the individual…members of the species” rather 
than the “ever-shifting pressures of survival.”33  Moreover, Darwin allows that sexual selection, 
by privileging beauty and charm over strength and speed, often results in adaptations that are 
advantageous for reproduction but neutral or even disadvantageous in the everyday struggle for 
existence.  Confronted with the preposterously cumbersome horns of certain stags, for instance, 
Darwin marvels at the “wonderful extreme[s]” produced by sexual selection, many of “which, as 
far as the general conditions of life are concerned, must be slightly injurious” to the animals that 
boast them.34  The modifications that sexual selection produces, unlike traits generated via 
natural selection, can thus accrete ad infinitum, with “no definite limit” as to their number or 																																																								
31 Darwin, Descent, 262-63. 
32 Darwin, Descent, 245. 
33 Irene Tucker, The Moment of Racial Sight: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 183. 
34 Darwin, Descent, 262. 
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character.35  In this way, Descent frames sexual selection not as a secondary or complementary 
counterpart to natural selection, but as a separate and competing paradigm of evolutionary 
success: one that allows organisms to make a genetic contribution to future generations without 
bowing entirely to the demands of basic survival.  Where natural selection rewards efficiency 
and conformity to an ecological niche, sexual selection not only allows for, but also often 
encourages, ostentatious deviances from the norm.  
 In light of the “wonderfully diversified” and seemingly limitless products of sexual 
selection—and in a stark departure from the environmental determinism of Origin—Descent 
explicitly grants complex organisms a modicum of control over evolutionary process.36  Early on 
in his study, Darwin attributes the widely varied colors, crests, and mating rituals that he sees in 
the “lower animals” to their “capricious…sense of beauty” and their apparent “love [of] novelty, 
for its own sake.”37  Later on in the book, in an attempt to refute theological explanations of 
beauty, Darwin credits female birds for gradually shaping the appearances of their respective 
species:  
It would even appear that mere novelty, or change for the sake of change, has sometimes 
acted like a charm on female birds, in the same manner as changes of fashion with us.  The 
Duke of Argyll [Liberal politician and prominent anti-Darwinist George Campbell] 
says…“I am more and more convinced that variety, mere variety, must be admitted to be 
an object and an aim in Nature.”  I wish the Duke had explained what he here means by 
Nature.  Is it meant that the Creator of the universe ordained diversified results for His own 
satisfaction, or for that of man?  The former notion seems to me as much wanting in due 
reverence as the latter in probability.  Capriciousness of taste in the birds themselves 
appears a more fitting explanation.38 
 
																																																								
35 Darwin, Descent, 262.  
36 Darwin, Descent, 401, 432. 
37 Darwin, Descent, 116. 
38 Darwin, The Descent of Man, 1st ed. (London: John Murray, 1871), 230. 
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Similarly to Campbell, the Darwin of Origin deployed “nature” as a convenient shorthand for the 
confluence of environmental conditions that constituted natural selection—then still the primary 
process driving evolution.  By contrast, the Darwin of Descent chides Campbell, and perhaps 
also himself, for exaggerating the evolutionary sway of monolithic “Nature.”  Darwin instead 
traces the variation among bird species to the purposeless vagaries of “taste”: a striking choice of 
diction that cedes to animals both the capacity for aesthetic discrimination and, through that 
ability, some power over evolutionary selection.   
 Crucially for the late Victorian aesthetic traditions that responded to Descent, Darwin 
further claims that sexual selection has played a part in the development of humankind up to the 
present day.  Although he argues that human males have “gained the power of selection” and 
placed the onus of decoration on women, this role reversal is far from ubiquitous: “civilised” 
women, he alleges, enjoy “free or almost free choice” in their mates, and sexual selection acts in 
a similarly “capricious manner” among both humans and non-humans.39  In his survey of human 
cultures, as in his study of the “lower” animals, Darwin can neither find “any universal standard 
of beauty with respect to the human body” nor provide a functional reason why “brilliant colours 
and certain forms, as well as harmonious and rhythmical sounds, give pleasure and are called 
beautiful.”40  From ritualized scarring and the “savage” fascination with feathers to rouge and 
“the fashions of our own dress,” human aesthetic taste reveals to Darwin the “same desire to 
carry every point to an extreme”—the same arbitrary love of variety and extravagance for their 
																																																								
39 Darwin’s personal and professional writings indicate some discomfort with the prospect of sexually assertive or 
otherwise competent women.  In Descent, he dismisses women’s intellectual capabilities, and women who belied 
this preconception seemed to disarm him: the brilliant sociologist and novelist Harriet Martineau, for instance, 
greatly intimidated him when they first met in the 1830s.  Darwin, Descent, 665, 653, 553; The Correspondence 
of Charles Darwin, vol. 2, 1837-1843, ed. Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
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own sake.41  At the same time that he applies the theory of sexual selection to humankind, then, 
Darwin also suggests—with an understatement that belies the potential radicalness of his 
argument—that the sense of beauty in humans is as perverse, relativistic, and pleasure-driven as 
the sense of beauty in other animal species. 
 Darwinian sexual selection thus jeopardizes two common assumptions at the heart of mid 
Victorian aesthetics, especially as Ruskin defined it: first, that the aesthetic sense belongs 
exclusively to humankind (a view that even many evolutionists, including Alfred Russel Wallace, 
shared), and second, that beauty always conveys some inherent moral, spiritual, or social 
meaning.42  By establishing a through-line from animal mating rituals to modern fashion, sexual 
selection proves that even the so-called “higher” emotions are not unique to humans.  
Furthermore, Darwin’s emphasis on the non-functional nature of the beautiful produces an 
amoral and (although he might have been mortified by the term) implicitly hedonic aesthetics.  
Since those physical qualities that humans find aesthetically attractive signal nothing about the 
organism’s fitness, Darwin can only define the “beautiful” as simply that which “give[s] 
pleasure.”43  Taste, in its most basic form, derives from an inchoate combination of inherited 
predisposition, cultural convention, and personal idiosyncrasy: not, as Ruskin believed, from the 
universal, God-given “theoretic faculty” for perceiving and appreciating divine “intelligence” 
																																																								
41 Darwin, Descent, 651.  
42 Wallace co-discovered the theory of natural selection and was a staunch proponent of Darwin’s work.  However, 
Wallace doubted whether evolutionary mechanisms could entirely explain certain human abilities, including 
mathematical and abstract reasoning, morality, and aesthetic emotion.  In his essay “The Limits of Natural 
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within nature.44  The aesthetic sense, according to Darwin’s theory, was thus the most potent way 
for organisms to throw off both the constraints of heredity and the pressures of biological 
competition.  In this context, much of the innovation and controversy of Descent stemmed less 
from its assertion that humans evolve—after all, T. H. Huxley had initiated this argument years 
earlier in his essay collection Evidence as to Man’s Place in Nature (1863)—than from the 
linkages it made between the irrepressible, insurgent sexual instinct and the development of 
human culture.  (As Gowan Dawson points out, and as I will discuss further in conjunction with 
the rise of aestheticism, Descent thus scandalized several early reviewers with its “veritable 
obsession with sex and its attendant passions.”45) 
In a subtler, but no less significant, way, Descent further reinforces these claims for the 
escapist power of the aesthetic by making several revealing concessions to Lamarckian heredity.  
Put simply, Lamarckian heredity is a theory of inheritance—named after its original theorist, the 
French naturalist and early evolutionist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck—that allows for the transmission 
of habits and other acquired traits.46  The theory of “hard” inheritance, by contrast, asserts that an 
individual organism’s actions cannot affect the genetic makeup of its offspring.  While 
Darwinian evolutionism is commonly understood to exclude Lamarckian heredity (often known 
in the nineteenth century as “use and disuse” heredity), Darwin himself became increasingly 
receptive to Lamarckian thinking in the 1860s and 1870s, as he struggled to account for 																																																								
44 Ruskin, Modern Painters, vol. 2, 11. 
45 Gowan Dawson, Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 45. 
46 Lamarck describes the archetypal example of Lamarckian inheritance in his landmark treatise Zoological 
Philosophy (1809).  In one much-referenced passage, Lamarck argues that the giraffe’s neck gradually 
lengthened due to its “long maintained…habit” of reaching for high foliage.  Even those scientists amenable to 
Lamarck’s ideas soon dismissed this particular explanation as crude.  Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Zoological 
Philosophy: An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals, trans. Hugh Elliott (London: 
Macmillan, 1914), 122. 
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adaptations that he could attribute to neither natural nor sexual selection.  In the case of the stag’s 
thunderous bellow, for instance, he concludes that “the frequent use of the voice, under the strong 
excitement of love, jealousy, and rage, continued during many generations, may at last have 
produced an inherited effect,” even in the absence of external selective pressures.47  
 On one level, Darwin’s Lamarckian reasoning reflects contemporary scientific 
uncertainty about the mechanisms underlying heredity, which would remain a mystery until the 
rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s genetic experiments in the twentieth century.  More 
compellingly, however, both Lamarckian heredity and hard inheritance each evoke distinct sets 
of beliefs concerning the evolutionary function of competition, choice, and effort.  As Mike 
Hawkins explains, hard inheritance is associated with so-called Darwinian (more precisely, social 
Darwinian) theories of evolution, which typically share a “commitment to the struggle for 
survival made necessary for the elimination of the ‘unfit.’”48  According to this model of 
inheritance, unfit organisms are “incapable of improvement because of their hereditary 
disposition,” and so a species can only improve through the continuous eradication of its weakest 
members—in other words, through natural selection.49  By contrast, Lamarckian theory 
conceives of heredity as a more flexible apparatus, one in which the sustained effort of 
individuals can transform the genetic patrimony of the species.  Since this theory granted 
individual actions some impact on future generations, Hawkins remarks, Lamarckism “could be 
used to explain cumulative mental or social improvement” and became correspondingly salient to 
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those evolutionists “who believed in progress.”50  Spencer, for example, prominently advocated 
for the viability of Lamarckian inheritance throughout the nineteenth century, claiming in “The 
Factors of Organic Evolution” (1886) that its share in evolutionary process “has been much 
larger than [Darwin] supposed even in his later days.”51  
As such, Darwin’s allowance of use/disuse inheritance in Descent—coupled with his 
interest in sexual selection—signals an evolutionary worldview very different from the relatively 
uncompromising vision that he presented in Origin, and which later thinkers subsequently 
developed into the philosophy of social Darwinism.  Through the lens of Lamarckism, Darwin 
can postulate forms of evolutionary improvement that will not compromise what he sees as the 
“noblest part of our nature”: our desire to alleviate, through welfare programs and technologies 
such as vaccination, the “severe struggle” that natural selection requires.52  If Lamarckian 
inheritance and sexual selection obviate the need for selection via violence, he subsequently 
suggests, then humankind need not resort to what he calls “open competition” (with its “many 
and obvious evils”) in order to advance the species.53  Darwin, continuing this logic, arrives at 
what he admits is a “remarkable conclusion”:   
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Courage, pugnacity, perseverance, strength and size of body, weapons of all kinds, musical 
organs, both vocal and instrumental, bright colours and ornamental appendages, have all 
been indirectly gained by the one sex or the other, through the exertion of choice, the 
influence of love and jealousy, and the appreciation of the beautiful in sound, colour, or 
form.54 
 
Nowhere else in Descent does Darwin so forcefully articulate the cultural repercussions of his 
inquiries into non-functional beauty.  Here, the vocabulary of fitness and competition (a 
vocabulary characteristic of Origin as well as more modern articulations of social Darwinism) 
has given way to an aesthetic register of “choice” and “appreciation.”  Since, as he argues, the 
purposeless desires of individual organisms substantially determine the physical and mental 
capacities of subsequent generations, even seemingly trivial aesthetic decisions—the picking out 
of an outfit, the selection or rejection of a lover, the decoration of a sitting room—can exert a 
small influence over the long-term development of the species.   
More broadly, Darwin’s acknowledgment of evolutionary alternatives to natural 
selection—that is, sexual selection and Lamarckian inheritance—results in Descent’s 
comparative openness to ideas of evolutionary progress.  While its dour assertion that “progress 
is no invariable rule” obliquely criticizes an evolutionary optimism that, as I will explain, was 
closely associated with Spencer, Descent nonetheless invests “progress” with an approximate 
directionality absent in Origin.55  In Origin, Darwin had taken care to restrict “progress” to 
neutral procession in time.  In Descent, by contrast, Darwin confidently places human societies 
on a hierarchical “scale of civilization,” drawing on the ethnographic work of Edward Burnett 
Tylor and John Lubbock, as well as his own first-hand encounters with indigenous peoples, in 
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order to do so.56  As the historian George Stocking attests, post-Darwinian anthropologists such 
as Tylor constructed standards of culture with an “easy ethnocentrism,” in which Western 
European nations and “savage tribes” represented opposite ends of a developmental continuum.57  
The problematic aspects of this racist model notwithstanding, Darwin’s turn toward ethnography 
in Descent yields an unexpectedly optimistic appraisal of human evolutionary history: “it is 
apparently a truer and more cheerful view,” Darwin concludes, “that progress has been much 
more general than retrogression; that man has risen, though by slow and interrupted steps, from a 
lowly condition to the highest standard as yet attained by him in knowledge, morals and 
religion.”58  In a maneuver that we will see throughout Spencer’s work, Darwin in Descent 
characterizes evolutionary progress as a kind of transcendence over primitive existence, a 
movement away from primordial conditions and toward a humane modernity no longer regulated 
solely by natural selection (hence Descent’s endorsement of vaccination, which thwarts natural 
selection by protecting individuals who might otherwise succumb to disease).  Humankind’s 
“progressive advancement,” Darwin reasons, therefore depends on the same “faculties” that seem 
to circumvent natural selection, including “the powers of the imagination, wonder, curiosity, an 
undefined sense of beauty, a tendency to imitation, and the love of excitement or novelty.”59  By 
exempting the sense of beauty from the state of constant, harrowing struggle that enables natural 
selection, Descent proposes more humane evolutionary processes that operate instead through the 
pursuit of sexual pleasure and the habitual exercise of taste. 																																																								
56 Darwin, Descent, 158.   
57 In Darwin’s time, there was no hard and fast distinction between ethnography and anthropology, but Stocking 
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made extensive use of ethnographic fieldwork.  George Stocking, Victorian Anthropology (New York: Free 
Press, 1987), 162, 262.   
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 Darwin’s next book, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals—which 
appeared the year after Descent and was originally conceived as a subsection of that book—
expands on his earlier theories about the evolution of expressive behavior.  Since these 
adaptations include facial expressions and gestures, Expression represents one of Darwin’s most 
pointed statements concerning the evolution of aesthetic preferences and their correspondence (or 
lack thereof) with genetic fitness.  In the course of his study, Darwin necessarily draws on 
contemporary research in the burgeoning Victorian fields of psychology and physiology—
disciplines that overlapped considerably with the evolutionary school of thought that Darwin had 
initiated in the late 1850s.  Among Darwin’s most important psychological sources were Spencer 
and Alexander Bain, both of whom advanced materialist theories of mind that interpreted mental 
phenomena in terms of physical processes.  In his influential study The Senses and the Intellect 
(1855), for instance, Bain asserts that the “connexion of the mental processes with certain of the 
bodily organs is…of the most intimate kind.”60  In Bain’s wake, many late nineteenth-century 
psychologists (including G. H. Lewes, James Sully, and William James) accepted that cognition 
was somehow linked to the operation of the nervous system and the brain.  This notion—that 
emotions, including aesthetic emotions, were rooted in physiology and thus capable of evolving 
in accordance with biological laws—in turn furnished a key theoretical basis for both Darwin and 
the evolutionary aesthetes who expanded on his ideas. 
 Building on this materialist psychological tradition as well as his own extant work on 
non-functional adaptations, Darwin’s Expression posits an evolutionary account of emotional 
expression that nonetheless stresses the superfluity and randomness of many expressive 
behaviors.  While Darwin acknowledges the communicative utility of expression, he argues that 																																																								
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most expressions cannot be the result of natural selection.  “The force of language,” he explains, 
“is much aided by the expressive movements of the face and body,” but no “muscle has been 
developed or even modified exclusively for the sake of expression.”61  As in his explanation of 
sexual selection in Descent, Darwin in Expression thus grants the individual some power to 
intervene in the gradual habituation of expressions and the cultivation of new ones.  “Actions, 
which were at first voluntary,” he remarks, “soon become habitual, and at last hereditary”: once 
these purposeful gestures pass into hereditary instinct, he further argues, they often shed their 
“primary purpose or object” and acquire merely expressive import.62  Consider the example of 
the sneer: although this expression once served a purpose in the violent struggle for existence (we 
inherited the instinct, Darwin argues, from “semi-human progenitors” who bared their canines in 
preparation for an attack), the sneer has long since lost its practical utility and become a passive 
signal of contempt.63  In a tacit continuation of his earlier discussions of caprice in sexual 
selection, Darwin in Expression also emphasizes the sheer arbitrariness of certain expressive 
gestures—shrugging, for instance, bears no obvious symbolic relationship to the emotion that it 
is purported to express.  In this context, Darwin finds it difficult to discriminate between 
expressions that are “innate or instinctive” and those that are “conventional” or socialized: both 
types of expression often seem equally arbitrary, and Lamarckian logic dictates that even socially 
determined habits can become hereditary if given enough time.64  Over the course of the book, 
Darwin thus attributes various expressions to acquired habit, physiological reflex, or some 
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complex mixture of both, transmitted from generation to generation through Lamarckian 
hereditary mechanisms.   
 The implications of this uncertainty for Darwin’s conception of aesthetics become clearer 
in Expression’s discussions of singing and facial expressions—discussions that provocatively 
prioritize pleasure over function.  In his inquiry into singing, Darwin responds directly to 
Spencer’s essay “The Origin and Function of Music” (1857), in which the philosopher ascribes to 
the musical instinct long-term social purposes beyond “the direct pleasure it gives”; one of the 
“indirect benefits” of music, Spencer argues, is its supposed refinement of “the language of the 
emotions” and its consequent fostering of social cohesion.65  Darwin, although he broadly agrees 
with Spencer’s physiological approach, argues instead that the habit of singing began as a 
courtship ritual “in the early progenitors of man,” long before the development of articulate 
speech.66  Gradually, Darwin continues, music “became associated with the strongest emotions of 
which [these progenitors] were capable,—namely, ardent love, rivalry and triumph.”67  In 
Darwin’s analysis, the communicative function of music (which Spencer had considered the 
entire purpose of vocal expression) is actually an extrinsic side effect of a sustained process of 
sexual selection.  Like Descent, Expression locates the origins of vocal music not in its moral, 
social, or survival value, but in its gratification of an audience: in most cases the wooed female, 
whose approval ensures that the singer’s talents will be passed on to the next generation.  In 
Darwin’s explanation, the purpose of vocal music—and, by extension, other forms of artistic 
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creation—is simply to give pleasure, while the more complex emotional associations that we 
attach to music constitute secondary and incidental social conventions.  
 The essential meaninglessness of expression extends, for Darwin, to the face, which he 
considers the “chief seat of expression” as well as “of beauty and of ugliness.”68  Consequently, 
he plainly states his skepticism of the “so-called science of physiognomy” and its claims to read 
character through the study of facial features.69  As Sharonna Pearl explains, late nineteenth-
century physiognomy was both an anthropological tool and the dominant lay-discourse for 
discussing faces, temperament, and racial difference, even though an intellectual elite (which 
included Darwin and his peers) largely dismissed the field as pseudoscience.70  While Pearl 
rightly points out that Darwin’s distancing from physiognomy is strategic—he shuns the field’s 
“taint of illegitimacy,” Pearl remarks, without altogether eschewing physiognomic 
terminology—I would argue that his understanding of aesthetic evolution is incommensurate 
with the very logic that underlies physiognomy.71  In Descent, as we have seen, Darwin argued 
that beautiful features lacked practical value, precisely because they were the products of 
capricious tastes.  In Expression, Darwin further convolutes any attempt to interpret beauty of 
countenance by attributing facial expressions to an amorphous combination of automatic instinct, 
acquired habit, and voluntary practice.  While he allows that a “small and weak lower jaw,” for 
instance, is “commonly thought to be characteristic of feebleness of character,” Darwin considers 																																																								
68 Darwin, Expression, 329. 
69 Darwin also announces in Expression’s opening sentence that his book is “not here concerned” with the subject of 
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70 Sharonna Pearl, About Faces: Physiognomy in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2010), 211. 
71 For instance, Darwin frequently refers to the works of Swiss physiognomist Johann Kaspar Lavater and Scottish 
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this physiognomic association a matter of social custom rather than biological rule.72  By using 
images of asylum patients as archetypes for normative expressive behaviors, he also calls into 
question physiognomy’s claims about the diagnostic power of faces: if the “insane” provide 
illustrative examples of certain common expressions, as his project assumes, than their faces can 
hardly be taken as evidence for psychological disorder.73  To Darwin, the face thus yields only 
contestable information about the personality behind the visage, and a beautiful (or ugly) 
countenance cannot reliably indicate either genetic health or moral rectitude.  
 Of the many facial expressions that he touches on, Darwin’s account of the blush is 
perhaps the most disruptive to contemporary literary and aesthetic figurations of human beauty.  
As Mary Ann O’Farrell argues, the nineteenth-century novel “exploit[ed] the blush for its 
suggestiveness about character” as well as its capacity to discipline and socialize the body by 
making it transparent to others: the blush served as a tell, a sign of emotional turmoil that 
undercut attempts to dissemble or disguise the feelings.74  That the blush was also a token of 
beauty served to link aesthetics and morality in ways that conformed with Ruskin’s philosophy, 
in which the beautiful—if properly interpreted—always revealed some kind of moral content.  In 
Darwin’s understanding, however, blushing (like all expressions) resists simple physiognomic 
interpretation.  The blush, he explains in Expression, is a physiological reaction involving the 
flow of “nerve-force” to small arteries in the skin, which is triggered whenever we become aware 
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that “others are attending to our personal appearance.”75  For Darwin, the blush serves no 
consistent communicative purpose beyond signaling that the blushing individual believes her or 
himself to be the object of another’s gaze or critical consideration: since the guilty and the 
innocent alike will blush under these circumstances, blushing can indicate nothing about one’s 
“moral conduct.”76  O’Farrell, in her analysis of Expression, observes that the “vagaries of 
complexion and the temporal nature of physiology tease efforts to find—or, not finding, to 
construct—legibility of character and of the body.”77  Darwin’s scientific approach to expression, 
O’Farrell continues, thus destabilizes the “social and novelistic premise of the blush: that blushes 
exist to be read.”78   
To be sure, the blush for Darwin is not a sexual selective adaptation.  Although he 
acknowledges that blushing “adds to the beauty of a maiden’s face,” he suggests that the blush is 
only incidentally an aesthetic ornament: in this regard, the blush differs from those secondary 
sexual characteristics that are cultivated and transmitted from one generation to the next precisely 
because they are beautiful.79  Like the brilliant plumage and pretty baubles of Descent, however, 
the Darwinian blush derives its aesthetic value purely from the purposeless pleasure it stimulates 
in an observer.  In short, Darwin’s evolutionary account of expression deprives the countenance 
of fixed physiognomic meaning and clear adaptive purpose, and in doing so implies that personal 
beauty is a matter of individual taste and cultural custom rather than biological determinism or 
divine commandment.  The same potentially radical logic guides Darwin’s late-career revisions 																																																								
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of Origin and his exploration of human evolution in Descent: the aesthetic, for Darwin, 
constitutes a special realm of animal life in which pleasure and desire take precedent over the 
pressures of survival that otherwise dominate the natural world.  As the nineteenth century 
progressed, his theories of expression and sexual selection equipped a robust subset of 
evolutionary discourses, including a manifestly aesthetic one, which consequently looked to 
culture as a peaceful mechanism for the evolutionary improvement of the species. 
 
II. Spencer’s Progressive Evolutionism and the Play Theory of Aesthetics   
 At the same time that Darwin was exploring natural selection and its more liberating 
alternatives, the younger Spencer was both popularizing Darwin’s theories and developing his 
own influential ideas concerning the evolution of aesthetic feeling, which he considered a form 
of “play.”  As Spencer’s biographer Mark Francis laments, many of Spencer’s theories “have 
been remembered in the form of a caricature”: thanks to his coinage of the memorable phrase 
“survival of the fittest” in 1864, Spencer’s name is often linked with an especially chilling form 
of social Darwinism.80  Spencer’s modern reputation, however, belies his philosophical 
investment in aesthetics and culture, his intellectual versatility (he was conversant in an 
astounding array of disciplines besides biology, including psychology, sociology, and political 
science), and his consequent prestige in late nineteenth-century intellectual life.  Spencer’s rising 
public profile in the 1850s and 1860s is particularly apparent in Darwin’s references to the 
younger writer.  The first and second editions of Origin make no reference to Spencer or his 
evolutionary ideas, while the third edition from 1861 briefly acknowledges Spencer’s early essay 																																																								
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“The Development Hypothesis” (1852).  The fifth edition of Origin, published in 1869, bears the 
unmistakable residue of Spencer’s influence: by this time, the “development hypothesis” had 
become a byword for evolutionary theory as a whole, and “survival of the fittest” was so well 
known that Darwin adopts it as a synonym for natural selection.81   
While little read today, Spencer profoundly shaped popular conceptions of evolution in 
the nineteenth century, in part by giving the process a teleological cast technically inconsistent 
with Darwinian theory.  His aforementioned essay “The Development Hypothesis,” which 
appeared in G. H. Lewes’s radical journal the Leader, argues that simple organic forms develop 
into more complex forms through “successive modifications” rather than acts of “special 
creation.”82  Spencer thus introduced the Leader’s readership to a noticeably progressive concept 
of evolution several years before Origin broached the same topic.  A few years later, in 
“Progress: Its Law and Cause” (1857), Spencer more precisely defines the directionality of 
organic “development”: it is “beyond dispute,” he contends, that “organic progress consists in a 
change from the homogenous to the heterogeneous.”83  He further claims that this process of 
differentiation drives every phenomenon in the universe, from star formation and animal 
evolution to “the development of Society, of Government, of Manufactures, of Language, 
Literature, Science, Art.”84  Crucially, Spencer’s notion of evolution as a continuous process of 
differentiation and sophistication—an idea that he applied to his work in sociology, 																																																								
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anthropology, and economics as well as biology—distinguished him from Darwin, whose 
version of evolution is inherently directionless.  For Spencer, the cosmos obeyed a grand 
trajectory, and his evolutionism therefore re-inscribed secular order in a universe that otherwise 
lacked intelligence and purpose.   
Simultaneously comprehensive, rational, and comforting, Spencer’s progressivism 
pervaded later nineteenth-century thought and proved particularly compelling to his diverse 
literary interpreters.  His close friend George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), for instance, incorporated 
his notion of causality into her mid-career essays, which locate the possibility for a renewed form 
of faith in the “great conception of universal regular sequence.”85  Eliot’s landmark novel 
Middlemarch (1871-72) is likewise sympathetic to the Spencerian ambitions of country doctor 
Tertius Lydgate, who sets out to unravel nature’s “true order” by discovering what he calls the 
“primitive tissue” underlying all organic life.86  Later in the century, the New Woman novelist 
Olive Schreiner integrated some of Spencer’s work—particularly his treatise First Principles 
(1862), which, Schreiner claimed, “showed [her] the unity of existence”—into her own calls for 
secular social reform.87  In addition, her novel The Story of an African Farm (1883) implicitly 
invokes Spencer’s evolutionism in its structural reliance on generational development, writ small 
in the narrative’s spiral-like movement from Otto’s Christian piety to his son Waldo’s more 
sophisticated reverence for “Universal Life.”88  For Schreiner, as for many of Spencer’s 
followers, the universality of Spencerian evolution provided a substitute for older forms of 																																																								
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religious feeling that were no longer sustainable in a rational age.  Throughout the nineteenth 
century, Spencer’s unshaken faith in progress thus remained a touchstone for rationalists and 
liberals in a variety of scientific and literary fields, even in the face of physical theories that 
rendered his law of “increasing complexity” thermodynamically impossible.89  As we will see, 
Spencer’s progressive evolutionism also inspired and vindicated the varieties of rational 
optimism that appear in the work of evolutionary aesthetes such as W. K. Clifford, Oscar Wilde, 
and Vernon Lee. 
 Beyond advancing a distinctly teleological cosmology, Spencer also redefined evolution 
in the public sphere by advancing a model of biology within which organisms had some control 
over their own evolutionary development.  In Spencer’s understanding, organic entities—
including organisms, ecologies, and societies—perpetuate themselves by absorbing energy from 
external sources and expending it toward various vital processes: “equilibrium” is Spencer’s term 
for the state in which these processes of absorption and expenditure are balanced.90  An organism 
with enough resources, Spencer further explains, can produce a new equilibrium by growing or 
modifying itself in a manner that “compensate[s]” for environmental changes.91  In this view, 
adaptation depends less on incessant natural checks than on the actions of organisms within a 
larger economy of vital forces, in which different forms of energy (“nervous energy,” “muscular 
energy,” “social energy,” “mental energy,” etc.) are concentrated, diffused, gained, spent, and 
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recycled.92  Spencer, as his term “survival of the fittest” suggests, thus locates the organism itself 
at the center of evolutionary process.  In this way, Spencer departed considerably from Darwin’s 
early formulations of evolution: while the Darwinian organism is so often at the mercy of natural 
selection, the Spencerian organism autonomously reacts to, and often counteracts, its 
environment by applying surplus energy toward activities above and beyond mere continued 
existence.  It was partly in response to this interpretation of evolution that Darwin, as we have 
seen, gradually softened his view on the evolutionary sway of natural selection.  In the fifth 
edition of Origin, for example, Darwin defers to Spencer’s definition of life as “the incessant 
action and reaction of various forces…tending towards an equilibrium.”93   
 Spencer’s unique interpretation of organic evolution, which theorized nature as a self-
regulating economy rather than an all-out war for resources, calls into question modern-day 
dismissals of the philosopher as a champion of crude social Darwinism.94  As Francis remarks, 
Spencer found the violence and instability inherent in “the present state of nature”—that is, 
nature as governed by the law of “survival of the fittest”—to be “morally intolerable.”95  For this 
reason, Spencer concludes The Principles of Biology (1864-67) by postulating an end-state to 
human evolution that is essentially non-Darwinian: the reproductive imperative, he asserts, will 
“gradually bring itself to an end,” thereby resolving the twin problems of overpopulation and 
resource scarcity that drive organismic competition.96  By devoting its energies toward the 																																																								
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improvement of civilization and culture, Spencer speculates, humankind might one day achieve 
an ideal equilibrium with its environment and thus do away with the need for destructive 
competition altogether.  This ideal “state of things,” he further predicts, would improve our 
quality of life dramatically, since maintaining equilibrium would require “from each individual 
no more than a normal and pleasurable activity.”97  Regardless of whether he believed this state 
to be achievable, Spencer (like Darwin in parts of Descent) necessarily roots human perfectibility 
in the gradual suspension, not the intensification, of the struggle for existence.   
 Importantly for his conception of aesthetics, Spencer’s notion of progress through 
equilibration required that organisms expend energy in excess of what was necessary for basic 
survival.  From the earliest days of his career, then, he often directed his critical attention to the 
sense of beauty—a phenomenon that, for Spencer as well as for Darwin, seemed to defy the 
regime of practicality presiding over both the state of nature and the world of laissez-faire 
commerce.  Spencer first addresses the non-functional aspects of aesthetics in his brief, but 
significant, early essay “Use and Beauty” (1852), which also appeared in Lewes’s Leader.  In the 
essay, Spencer illustrates “the evolution of beauty out of what was once purely utilitarian” using 
several examples, including fairy lore, Greek mythology, and medieval history.98  In all of these 
cases, Spencer explains, an object (or creed, custom, style, etc.) that “has performed some 
practical function in society during one era, becomes available for ornament in the subsequent 
one” only once the object ceases to be considered useful.99  To become beautiful, he argues, 
once-useful objects must shed their associations with the “harsh and dreary facts” and “practical 
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life-and-death affairs” that make up “stern…prosaic reality”: a Greek temple or pastoral 
landscape, for example, furnishes picturesque imagery for modern audiences precisely because 
moderns no longer genuinely fear ancient deities or toil long hours in the field.100  Consequently, 
Spencer concludes that the industrialization of society, the concomitant advent of leisure, and the 
rise of scientific method have opened up countless “past modes of life” to pleasurable aesthetic 
contemplation.101  
 “Use and Beauty” encapsulates several of Spencer’s most important contributions to both 
late Victorian aesthetics and, more precisely, the principles of evolutionary aestheticism.  First, 
Spencer provides a rational, proto-evolutionary gloss on an earlier aesthetic tradition that 
includes Kant and Burke as well as Johann Goethe (Spencer quotes Goethe’s exhortation to “do 
our utmost to encourage the Beautiful, for the Useful encourages itself” in the epigraph to the 
Leader version of the essay).102  Spencer thus lays some groundwork for the emerging science of 
aesthetics that would dominate late nineteenth-century inquiries into the beautiful, including 
Darwin’s.  Secondly, “Use and Beauty” implies a link between the aesthetic pleasure of 
individuals and the evolution of humankind at large.  While he never expressly states that the 
ability to appreciate beauty furthers social development, Spencer does conflate the expansion of 
aesthetic sensibility with the general “progress of Humanity.”103  For Spencer, the capacity to 
appreciate objects, customs, and institutions apart from their uses—to view them as sources of 																																																								
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“relaxation and enjoyment” rather than food or other necessities—coincides with one’s removal 
from an “aboriginal” state of nature.104  Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, “Use and 
Beauty” takes an evolutionary approach to beauty and arrives, nonetheless, at a strikingly 
subjective and pleasure-oriented aesthetics.  Whether or not an observer considers an object 
“beautiful,” according to Spencer’s formulation, depends on the observer’s perception of that 
object rather than the intrinsic qualities of the object itself.  In other words, beauty is a relative 
and unfixed quality that refers ultimately to the psychological responses of individual viewers.  
The subtly hedonic argument of “Use and Beauty” became more pronounced in Spencer’s 
influential work on “play,” which he developed in the late 1850s and 1860s.  As his career 
progressed, the tenability of play in turn encouraged him to draw more explicit connections 
between individual aesthetic experience and the long-term evolutionary development of the 
species.  Spencer’s interest in play first emerged from his investigations into childhood 
development, which convinced him, as he explains in Education: Intellectual, Moral, and 
Physical (1861), that educators should cultivate students’ “physique[s]” as well as their 
intellects.105  To this end, he urges teachers and parents to allow children time to engage in 
unstructured play, which “makes the pulse bound and ensures the healthful activity of every 
organ.”106  His usage of play draws loosely on the work of eighteenth century German poet, 																																																								
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playwright, and philosopher Friedrich Schiller, who traced aesthetic feeling to what he called the 
“play-impulse”: a universal animal desire, especially strong in humans, for “aimless effusion” 
and “superfluous life” in excess of “present need.”107  Like Schiller, Spencer regards play 
activity as both instinctual and pleasurable, but he moreover emphasizes play’s salutary benefits.  
For Spencer, the spontaneous and non-functional nature of play—evident in the “riotous glee 
with which [children] carry on their rougher frolics”—greatly assists in the development of 
healthy children, since “happiness is the most powerful of tonics.”108  He therefore endorses 
recent attempts to make the “acquirement of knowledge pleasurable rather than painful,” and he 
approves of curricula that incorporate nursery rhymes, fairy tales, and other lighthearted 
entertainments appealing to infantile aesthetic tastes.109  
Spencer soon brought the concept of play and its counter-utilitarian implications to bear 
on topics, such as vocal and musical expression, that were adjacent to questions of aesthetics.  In 
the “The Physiology of Laughter” (1860), Spencer applies his understanding of biology to 
laughter by reducing it to a “display of muscular excitement,” which obeys the “general law that 
feeling passing a certain pitch habitually vents itself in bodily action.”110  Although he never 
explicitly defines laughter as play, his description of its uselessness largely conforms to his 
existing definition of play.  “In general,” he remarks, “bodily motions that are prompted by 
feelings” are directed toward “special ends” such as escaping danger or finding food, “but the 
movements…we make when laughing have no object.”111  Spencer describes music in similarly 																																																								
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physiological terms: at its core, he argues, music is a vocal utterance that occurs when strong 
emotional impulses stimulate the nervous system and, as a result, generate “contractions” in the 
“chest, larynx, and vocal chords.”112  For Spencer, expressions such as laughter and singing are 
instinctual physiological reflexes that give healthy vent to “overflow[s] of nerve-force,” which 
bodies accumulate in the course of daily life.113  Like play, he argues, these expressions aid in the 
maintenance of a healthy body by releasing excess energy that the organism does not require for 
its mere continued existence.  
Over the next two decades, Spencer both elaborated on his idea of play and prominently 
promoted its wider practice outside the schoolroom.  In a revised edition of The Principles of 
Psychology (1870-72), he offers a more precise definition of play as any activity that springs 
from the animal “tendency to superfluous and useless exercise”; this tendency, in turn, derives 
from a physiological impulse to use faculties that have lain dormant for an unusually long 
time.114  While the instinct for play has arisen through evolution, he suggests, play itself carries 
no survival value in the violent struggle for existence.  Instead, Spencer argues, play is 
evolutionarily beneficial because it stimulates various physiological processes without wearing 
them out in “the business of life.”115  At “one extreme” on the spectrum of play, he continues, are 
the “sportive activities”: by diverting our inborn desires to hunt and fight into harmless avenues, 
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play activities such as wrestling, games of skill, and bantering serve to repair and refine our 
physical and mental agility.  At the “other extreme” are the “aesthetic sentiments,” which we 
experience when we exercise an otherwise “life-serving” sensory faculty entirely “for its own 
sake, apart from ulterior benefits.”116  Both forms of play, he explains, allow us to take 
immediate pleasure in bodily existence—in the perception of color, for instance, or in the tensing 
and relaxing of muscles—without regard to the practical ends that the body is supposed to serve.  
Spencer thus values play for many of the same reasons that Darwin, in his early scientific 
writing, valued the capacity for wonder: play, like the purposeless admiration of the beautiful, 
circumvents the cycles of routine violence that so often drive natural, social, and commercial 
life.  As Francis points out, Spencer’s personal “beliefs in play and relaxation” were evident in 
his own conduct, particularly his flamboyant dress, his love for games, his eccentric affinity for 
children, and his public advocacy for leisure.117  In a famous lecture that he delivered in New 
York in 1882, for instance, Spencer presented his audience of arch-capitalist admirers (including 
Scottish-American steel magnate Andrew Carnegie) with a “revised ideal of life” founded on a 
“gospel of relaxation.”118  Spencer urged his listeners to seek “a better adjustment of labor and 
enjoyment” by accumulating, in both their business and personal lives, a “surplus of 
energies…not absorbed in fulfilling material needs.”119  Surrounded by the pioneers of modern 
industrial capitalism, Spencer turned to the biological idiom of energy in order to propose an 																																																								
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alternative economy: one that prioritized the accrual of health and happiness through play rather 
than the circulation of capital through competition.  In doing so, Spencer granted aesthetic 
experience a privileged role in regulating the equilibrium of not only the individual body but also 
the body politic—or in his terms, the “social organism.”120 
Spencer’s aesthetics—more so than Darwin’s, which were mostly restricted to the realm 
of biology—thus intervened in long-standing economic as well as scientific and aesthetic debates 
about the nature and function of beauty.  More precisely, Spencer’s theory of aesthetics 
articulated a nuanced critique of utilitarianism by making ethical claims for the purposeless 
enjoyment of beauty.  Founded by Jeremy Bentham and developed in the nineteenth century by 
his protégé, John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism holds that ethically good actions maximize a quality 
known as utility.  Bentham and Mill defined utility in subtly different ways, but they generally 
agreed that the utility of any given action consisted in the net happiness (or total pleasure minus 
total pain) that the action produced.  Bentham, in one of utilitarianism’s founding treatises, 
argues that pleasure and pain are the “sovereign masters” of humankind and the sole moral bases 
for determining right and wrong: strictly speaking, then, Benthamite utilitarianism overlapped 
with a tradition of philosophical hedonism (from the Greek hēdonē, meaning “pleasure”) 
stretching back to the Greek materialist Epicurus.121  Bentham, however, both eschewed what he 
called “the odious name of Epicurean” and rejected Epicurus’s concern for self-development in 
favor of legislative reform.122  Since the competent management of the state was Bentham’s 
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primary objective, he considered the happiness of individuals important only insofar as they 
counted toward the net happiness of the entire population, and he had correspondingly scant 
regard for art (Bentham once famously declared that, where happiness is concerned, “the game 
of push-pin [a children’s game played with sewing needles] is of equal value with…music and 
poetry”123).  By the time Spencer was composing his works, Bentham had come to represent—
especially to humanists and freethinkers—a particularly inflexible, miserly, and unimaginative 
pragmatism.124  In Culture and Anarchy (1869), for instance, the critic Matthew Arnold 
associates Bentham’s philosophy with “Jacobinism,” a rigid functionalism that Arnold sees as 
inherently opposed to the serene “sweetness and light” of genuine culture.125   
  Although Mill attempted to humanize many of Bentham’s ideas, Mill’s later theorization 
of utilitarianism in the mid nineteenth century remained relatively inhospitable to both 
evolutionism and aestheticism.  In his “Essay on Bentham” (1838), Mill challenges his mentor’s 
“want of imagination,” hostility to literature, and indifference toward “disinterested feelings” 
such as the “love of beauty.”126  Bentham, in Mill’s estimation, was personally and theoretically 
unequipped to appreciate any pleasure pursued for its own sake.  Several of Mill’s major works 
seek to address these shortcomings: his revolutionary polemic On Liberty (1859) stresses the 
importance of diversity, spontaneity, and eccentricity for individual and social wellbeing, and his 
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treatise Utilitarianism (1861) credits Epicurus’s contributions to utilitarian thought.127  At the 
same time, however, Mill anxiously distances himself from Epicurean hedonism both by 
underscoring his own commitment to the useful and by circumscribing “pleasure” so as to 
downplay its corporeal dimensions.  That is, Mill softens Bentham’s pragmatism not by 
embracing the uselessness of certain pleasures, but rather by expanding the definition of “useful” 
to include these pleasures: “instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental,” 
Mill argues in Utilitarianism, the utilitarians “have always declared that the useful means these, 
among other things.”128  Mill also repeatedly asserts a distinction between what he considers the 
intrinsically “higher” pleasures of mind—including the imagination, the “moral sentiments,” and 
other feelings that he associates with poetry in particular—and the purportedly baser pleasures of 
“mere sensation.”129  While his privileging of intellectual pleasure allowed him to defend art and 
poetry on utilitarian grounds, Mill implicitly denied one of the basic assumptions of Spencer’s 
and Darwin’s work—namely, the notion that even complex emotions had their basis in 
physiological process and sexual instincts.  Mill’s hedonism, such as it was, contradicted 
evolutionary accounts of aesthetics by trivializing sensory pleasure and upholding the use value 
of aesthetic feeling. 
 Against Bentham’s and Mill’s respective theories of pleasure—theories that frequently 
renounced the stigmatized name of hedonism—Spencer posits a comparatively daring version of 
hedonistic philosophy. Throughout his work on aesthetics, but particularly in “Use and Beauty” 
and his writings on play, Spencer hypothesized that purposeless physical pleasures could yield 
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palpable evolutionary benefits for the species.  Hedonism, consequently, was one of the pillars of 
the system of ethics that he derived from evolutionary theory.  In The Data of Ethics (1879), for 
instance, Spencer elaborates a particularly evolutionary hedonism that stands in contrast to 
existing utilitarian theories, including those of both Bentham and the economist Henry Sidgwick, 
who forwarded a more altruistic utilitarianism.  “Happiness,” Spencer maintains, “is the supreme 
end” of action, because happiness is the “concomitant of that highest life” toward which 
evolution, as he understands it, tends: in other words, pleasure signals those conditions of 
abundance and harmony that are best suited to the development of an ideal “social 
equilibrium.”130  Spencer thus expands his theory of aesthetic play and its role in the 
maintenance of equilibrium into a bolder, more sweeping defense of hedonism as an ethical, as 
well as rational, stance.  As I demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the version of hedonism that 
he lays out in The Data of Ethics inspired several of his readers in the Aesthetic Movement: 
Grant Allen, one of Spencer’s most devoted disciples, courted controversy in the 1890s by 
advocating for a “new hedonism” that synthesized Spencerian ethics and Darwinian sexual 
selection with the dissident flamboyance that Allen admired in Wilde.131   
 Spencer’s counter-utilitarian ethic of hedonism, coupled with his concept of play and his 
progressive evolutionism, motivates several remarkably optimistic visions of a future specifically 
founded on the proliferation of aesthetic pleasure.  Of course, Spencer assumed even in his early 
works that humankind would gradually evolve toward a higher state of equilibrium with its 
environment: his teleological view of evolution all but ensured this eventuality.  His 
engagements with aesthetics in his later career, however, allowed him to theorize more 																																																								
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specifically how this widespread improvement was to come about.  For Spencer, aesthetic 
experiences divert our energy away from those activities associated with what he calls 
“predatory life.”132  In doing so, aesthetic pleasure guides individuals toward more inherently 
ethical, because less violent and competitive, courses of action.  The history of art and culture, in 
this context, registers not only humankind's aesthetic sophistication but also its increasing 
“economization of energy” and its concomitant transcendence over the brutalizing state of 
nature.133  For this reason, Spencer concludes The Principles of Psychology by predicting that the 
“aesthetic activities in general may be expected to play an increasing part in human life as 
evolution advances.”134  He reiterates this point in The Data of Ethics, in which he imagines what 
the “highest life” might look like in a developed industrial society: “we may recognize as not 
only possible but probable, the eventual existence of a community” that, having satisfied all its 
basic desires, can “achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with 
aesthetic activities.”135 
 Since Spencer believed that art was both an instrument and a metric of society’s 
progression toward his counter-natural ideal, questions of aesthetic taste became increasingly 
urgent for him toward the end of his life.  The topic appears frequently in his final collection of 
fragmentary essays, Facts and Comments (1902), which he published shortly before his death.  
In “The Purpose of Art,” for instance, Spencer bemoans the “over-valuation of the intellectual 
element” in art, a critical tradition that he traces in part to the didacticism of mid Victorian 
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philosophers such as Arnold.136  The “primary purpose” of art, Spencer counters, is “neither 
instruction nor culture but pleasure,” and music especially diminishes in power whenever we 
attempt to assign it any “higher meaning.”137  Even art’s “culture-effect”—its ability to “awaken 
[one’s] higher nature” by appealing to more “refined and noble” feelings—is secondary, for 
Spencer, to its capacity to satisfy the aesthetic appetite.138  In “Barbaric Art,” another essay from 
the same collection, he cautions his readers against styles of art that threaten larger political 
trends toward “Imperialism and Re-barbarization.”139  While he singles out the artist and critic 
William Morris—an associate of both the Arts and Crafts movement and the Aesthetic 
Movement—Spencer aims his critique less at Morris’s aestheticism than at his preference for 
medieval design.  The medieval period, to Spencer, was fraught with a superstition, militancy, 
and despotism in which contemporary art was complicit: a renewed vogue for the medieval 
aesthetic, he fears, could once again enable “coercive” regimes by socializing individuals to 
admire, and thus tolerate, the autocrat’s ornamental pomp.140   
Both “The Purpose of Art” and “Barbaric Art,” two of Spencer’s final statements on the 
subject, thus leave unquestioned the basic tenets of the evolutionary aesthetics that he developed 
in the 1870s and 1880s: first, that the primary focus of aesthetic analysis should be the spectator 
or listener rather than the art-object itself, and second, that aesthetic culture can have either 
beneficial or pernicious effects on social development.  Along with his theory of play, these 																																																								
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claims about taste and evolutionary development were among Spencer’s most significant 
interventions in the broader field of aesthetics.  The philosopher and political theorist Bernard 
Bosanquet, in a revealing passage from his encyclopedic History of Aesthetic (1892), hails 
Spencer as one of the few English writers to make a “real contribution” to aesthetic theory.141  
However inexpert or outdated, Bosanquet continues, Spencer deserves credit for recognizing the 
real “value of beauty for human life.”142  As Bosanquet’s assessment shows us, Spencer’s 
classification of aesthetic experience as an elevated form of play was not a dismissal of beauty 
and art: on the contrary, Spencer believed that play would determine humankind’s evolutionary 
destiny, precisely because play was utterly noncritical in day-to-day life.   
  
III. Evolutionary Aesthetics and the Movement to Aestheticism   
 Darwin’s and Spencer’s respective theories of the beautiful, far from remaining 
ensconced in the sciences, helped usher in the innovative methods of art criticism that came to 
prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century.  As Ian Small observes in Conditions for 
Criticism (1991), both Darwin and Spencer made decisive interventions in the discipline of 
aesthetics by establishing “that aesthetic response could be investigated scientifically”—a view, 
Small explains, that “was never seriously doubted until the last years of the century.”143  
Spencer’s application of economic and psychological theories to this burgeoning field, Small 
further argues, was particularly instrumental in the rise of a new, recognizably aestheticist 
approach to cultural criticism in the 1870s.  This new form of criticism, which Small associates 
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with the impressionistic prose of Pater and Swinburne, “assert[ed] that subjective—rather than 
inter-subjective, communal, or objective—experiences of art were the only ones which were 
valuable or indeed possible.”144  As such, this critical method broke from an older school of 
criticism that presupposed art’s capacity to express what Small terms “shared symbolic 
knowledge.”145  Small points out that these critical approaches were epistemologically 
antithetical: the older criticism focused on “art-objects, their origin and what they expressed,” 
while the new approach “limited its concern to ‘aesthetic states’ or attitudes (and, in doing so, to 
psychological affects).”146  By treating the art object “only as the cause of a sensation or an 
emotional condition in the spectator, listener, or reader,” Small observes, psychologists such as 
Spencer, Bain, and Sully erected a scientific framework for the impressionistic style of 
criticism.147  Spencer’s aesthetics thus underwrote the view—one central to the Aesthetic 
Movement—that art had no absolute moral, social, or communicative purpose beyond the 
feelings it stimulated in an observer.  It is on these grounds that Swinburne defends his 
contentious collection Poems and Ballads (1866): as he explains in his pamphlet Notes on Poems 
and Reviews (1866), good poetry does not express the “author’s personal feelings” on issues of 
morality or faith, but instead conveys strong emotions such as “fierce fondness” and “passionate 
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despair.”148  As Small suggests, Swinburne’s claim that poetry should concern itself with 
arousing feelings in the reader tacitly draws on the aesthetics that Spencer and Darwin helped 
popularize.  More provocatively, Swinburne’s wholehearted espousal of affective aesthetics 
allows him to argue that his verse has achieved a level of artistic “purity” higher than the 
moralistic “prudery” of his critics.149 
Similarly, Regenia Gagnier credits Darwin and Spencer for initiating subjective 
conceptions of aesthetics structured around what she describes as the “pleasured body” of the 
observer.150  As Gagnier argues, developments in science as well as the economy gave rise in the 
mid nineteenth century to an “aesthetics of taste or consumption.”151  In the last quarter of the 
century, Gagnier continues, this aesthetics of taste supplanted an older “theory of creative 
production” that focused on the artist as the source of aesthetic meaning (Ruskin and Morris, 
Gagnier adds, were the most prominent supporters of this critical paradigm).152  For proponents 
of the new aesthetics of taste, including Allen, Pater, and Wilde, the art object could only be 
analyzed in terms of its psychological and physiological effects on an audience, which consumed 
art as they would any other luxury good: art was valuable, in this view, insofar as it pleased its 
consumer.  Spencer’s and Darwin’s respective theories, although they differed on important 
points, generally agreed that the quality of beauty inhered in the observer’s sensory perception of 
an external object, not in the object itself.  Spencer argued that the aesthetic sense was immanent 
in the internalized, physiological process of play; according to Darwinian sexual selection, the 																																																								
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sense of beauty evolved because generations of spectators (typically females) preferred certain 
phenotypes to others.  For many Victorian aesthetes—particularly those who had a firm 
grounding in evolutionary theory, such as Wilde and Lee—Spencer and Darwin thus 
corroborated the notion that aesthetic perception took place entirely within the spectator’s body.  
As I explain in later chapters, many of these critics looked to the cultivation and refinement of 
taste, rather than the creation of art, as a means for improving aesthetic culture at large.  
 The ideological congruencies between aestheticism and evolutionary aesthetics were 
apparent to Victorian readers and writers: early reviews of Descent, for instance, immediately 
identified in its scientific approach to beauty an implicit endorsement of the emerging Aesthetic 
Movement.  As Gowan Dawson observes, several of these critics charged Darwin with 
sanctioning certain subversive ideas—including materialism, atheism, and promiscuity—that 
they associated with the “lascivious philosophies of the corrupt pagan world.”153  In the 
Edinburgh Review, the geologist William Boyd Dawkins warns that Darwin’s evolutionism 
threatens nothing less than “a revolution in thought…which will shake society to its very 
foundations.”154  While Richard Owen, as we have seen, once dismissed Darwin’s “imaginative 
temperament” as merely unscientific, Dawkins offers a far more sinister reading of Darwin’s 
prose by asserting a resemblance between the visionary naturalist and the “heathen poet” 
Lucretius.155  A follower of Epicurus, Lucretius was an atomic materialist who believed that 
everything in the universe was reducible to finite particles of matter.  These particles, Lucretius 
explains in his first-century BCE poem De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), are neither 
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created nor destroyed, but rather cycle through different forms for all eternity, in accordance with 
fixed natural law.156  Importantly for Dawkins’s critique of Descent, Lucretius also inveighs 
bitterly against religion and superstition, which he considers inherently violent.157  For Lucretius, 
scientific investigation is an act of heroism, and the concomitant demystification of the world a 
moral imperative.  He thus concludes his introduction to De Rerum Natura with a scientific call 
to arms:  
Then it be ours with steady mind to clasp 
The purport of the skies—the law behind 
The wandering courses of the sun and moon; 
To scan the powers that speed all life below; 
But most to see with reasonable eyes 
Of what the mind, of what the soul is made.158 
 
Dawkins’s review suggests that Darwin and his scientific contemporaries obey, almost to the 
point of blasphemy, Lucretius’s command to investigate the material composition of the “soul.”  
In Descent, for instance, Darwin provides an evolutionary explanation for the “ennobling belief 
in God,” a faculty that “naturally follows from other mental powers.”159  Although he attempts to 
assuage religious readers by distinguishing the evolution of religion from the “higher” matter of 
the existence of a deity, Darwin’s gesture toward orthodoxy is trivial in comparison to his 
lengthy discussions of animism and other primitive forms of belief.160  For Dawkins, Lucretius’s 
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impiously inquisitive spirit lives on in Darwin and his evolutionist supporters, all of whom 
subject the once-sacrosanct realms of morality and faith to a menacing scientific empiricism.   
 Even more shockingly for Dawkins, Darwin’s palpable relish for beautiful adaptations—
the products, in his theory, of sexual selection—also seems to echo Lucretius’s invocations of 
Venus.  For the atheistic Lucretius, Venus is not a real deity but instead a symbol for the 
“procreant” forces that guide the cosmos: since these forces spur civilization and give rise to the 
richness of material experience, Lucretius ritually thanks the goddess for all that is “joyful” and 
“lovely” in the world.161  Like Lucretius, Dawkins contends, Darwin makes sexuality “the 
dominant force of life” by attributing the sense of beauty—from its lowest to its highest cultural 
expressions—to countless consummations of erotic desire.162  In Dawkins’s estimation, the 
theory of sexual selection endows desire with transcendent, semi-mystical qualities, even as it 
reduces mind and spirit to physiological processes.  (Elsewhere in the same issue of the 
Edinburgh Review, Thomas Spencer Baynes attacks Swinburne in similar terms: Swinburne’s 
verse, Baynes remarks, immodestly exalts the body by depicting “sensual enjoyment” as the 
“crown of life.”163)  In this context, Dawkins’s comparison of Darwin to Lucretius conveys an 
unstated accusation of sexual immorality—an indecency made more insidious by its incongruity 
with what Dawkins calls the “purity and elevation of [Darwin’s] own life and character.”164  
Dawkins was hardly alone in his dismay at the recent turn in Darwin’s studies: the anatomist St. 																																																								
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George Mivart, in the Quarterly Review, likewise warns his readers to remain vigilant against 
Descent’s “radically false metaphysical system,” which Darwin presents in a seductively “clear 
and attractive” style.165  Darwin’s contemporaries, as Dawkins’s and Mivart’s reviews 
demonstrate, identified his theory with sexual licentiousness and neo-Hellenic materialism. 
As such, Darwin’s scientific elevation of sexuality reflected the ways in which early 
aesthetic poets such as Swinburne addressed the body, particularly their assumption of what 
Dawson calls a “sensuous materialist epistemology.”166  Consider, for example, Swinburne’s 
“Anactoria,” a dramatic monologue that appeared in the controversial Poems and Ballads.  As we 
will see in the next chapter, Swinburne’s poetry resonates with several aspects of progressive 
evolutionary thought, but for now I want to foreground how “Anactoria” literalizes the aesthetics 
of consumption that Darwin and other scientists advanced.  In the monologue, the lesbian poet 
Sappho addresses her beloved Anactoria, who has left Sappho for another lover.  Embittered by 
her abandonment, Sappho alternately bemoans Anactoria’s coldness and fantasizes about 
enjoying her sexually once again: “That I could drink thy veins as wine,” Sappho cries, “and eat / 
Thy breasts like honey! that from face to feet / Thy body were abolished and consumed, / And in 
my flesh thy very flesh entombed!”167  Here, Sappho’s desire for Anactoria’s beauty is a desire 
not only to see, but also to cannibalize Anactoria’s body and integrate its physical atoms into her 
own flesh.  Significantly, the poem acknowledges no substantive difference between the bodily 
function of eating and the sensation of beauty.  Although older critics such as Ruskin and Mill 
often considered aesthetic emotion a spiritual experience, beauty in “Anactoria” is a distinctly 																																																								
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physiological phenomenon.  So, too, is poetry: Swinburne’s Sappho asserts that she will 
immortalize her beloved in her famous “songs” as well as in her own body.168  As Yopie Prins 
argues in her reading of the poem, “Anactoria” is thus a “song of the body” that also seeks to 
“resuscitate the Sapphic corpus as a living body of song.”169  That Swinburne parallels Sappho’s 
aesthetic consumption of Anactoria’s body with her creative endeavors further conflates 
physiological experience with supposedly higher cultural pursuits.  Certainly, Swinburne’s poetry 
does not respond directly to Darwin’s or Spencer’s work: the poet inherited his corporeal 
aesthetics from both his Classical education and his reading of French decadent writers such as 
Théophile Gautier and Charles Baudelaire.  Nonetheless, Darwin and Spencer lent scientific 
validity to the eroticized and embodied notion of beauty that Robert Buchanan, in his 1871 
critique “The Fleshly School of Poetry,” associates with Swinburne as well as Morris and Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti.170  
Beyond sanctioning the notorious fleshliness of Swinburne’s aesthetic poetry, Darwin’s 
and Spencer’s evolutionary aesthetics also shaped literary discussions of beauty in the period.  In 
particular, the progressive and escapist aspects of Darwin’s and Spencer’s aesthetics motivated a 
certain secular optimism that we can see more clearly in the work of George Meredith and his 
erstwhile protégé Thomas Hardy.171  As Gillian Beer and Richard C. Stephen have pointed out, 
both writers admired Darwin, and their work was similarly indebted to both Darwinian and 																																																								
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Spencerian evolutionary theory.172  Meredith’s and Hardy’s writings, I would add, also evince an 
intense interest in evolutionary aesthetics and its ramifications for the evolutionary worldview.  
Their respective depictions of the blush, for instance, demonstrate an awareness of Darwin’s 
work on expression.  From Darwin, both writers had gleaned that the blush was an unstable 
signifier: their novels consequently describe blushes that alternately indicate shame, innocence, 
pleasure, embarrassment, and a host of other contradictory emotions.  As the astute Mrs. 
Mountstuart explains to a blushing Clara Middleton, the protagonist of Meredith’s The Egoist 
(1879), “flaming cheeks won’t suffice” as evidence of emotion since blushes indicate little more 
than “dim apprehension” acting upon a “nervous frame.”173  Similarly, in Hardy’s Tess of the 
d’Urbervilles (1891), the lovely Tess Durbeyfield blushes for such diverse reasons as “joy,” 
“excitement,” and gratitude, while her rakish cousin Alec Stoke-D’Urberville “superimpose[s]” a 
flush of libidinous excitement over his already “heated” face.174  The narrator of Tess also 
reverses our physiognomic expectations about the beauty of countenance by connecting Tess’s 
blushes only tenuously to her emotional state: “when she was pink she was feeling less than 
when pale,” the narrator informs us, “her more perfect beauty accorded with her less elevated 
mood; her more intense mood with her less perfect beauty.”175  In keeping with Darwin’s and 
Spencer’s aesthetics, Tess displays her “best face physically” under the influence of serene 
emotions, including her feelings of “sweet pleasure” and “rekindled” energy, her pleasant sense 																																																								
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of “Pagan” kinship with the landscape, and her rediscovered “zest for life.”176  Tess’s personal 
beauty, as Hardy represents it, bespeaks little more than an overall feeling of wellbeing. 
 More generally, Hardy’s and Meredith’s representations of the beautiful evoke positive, if 
not always optimistic, conceptions of aesthetic pleasure as a temporary escape from the everyday 
struggle for existence.  Hardy’s vision of the natural world was especially bleak, in part because 
he subscribed to a relatively unforgiving model of “hard” inheritance that he derived from the 
German biologist August Weismann.177  Beer argues that Hardy discerned in this biological 
determinism a kind of “malign tautology”: a brutal logic that justified any behavior so long as it 
resulted in evolutionary success.178  The sole source of relief from this oppressive cosmology, 
Hardy suggests in Tess, lies in what the narrator calls (in reference to Tess’s lover, Angel Clare) 
an “aesthetic, sensuous, Pagan pleasure in natural life.”179  While the novel indicts several of 
Angel’s character flaws—including his lack of sympathy, which leads him to reject Tess after he 
learns that Alec once raped her—Hardy’s prose mirrors Angel’s sensualism in its many 
interludes of vivid and enthusiastic description.180  In some of the novel’s most luminous 
moments, Tess and Angel take refuge from “cruel nature’s law” in the “irresistible, universal, 
automatic tendency to find sweet pleasure somewhere,” whether in the “oozing fatness and warm 
ferments” of the Wessex countryside, the dazzling “polychrome” of weeds, or the “thin notes of a 
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second-hand harp.”181  For Hardy, as for Darwin, the enjoyment of beauty constitutes a way of 
being in the world that liberates the individual, however briefly, from the day-to-day pressures of 
Darwinian competition.  For this reason, the novel’s only hope for “human progress” lies in the 
advent of what the narrator describes as a “finer intuition,” a keener sexual (and also aesthetic) 
instinct that could have attracted Angel to Tess before she ever encountered Alec.182  Although 
the narrator dismisses his speculation as a counterfactual—Tess, he states, is tragically “doomed 
to be seen and coveted…by the wrong man”—the very possibility of progress in Tess is 
inextricable from the more tractable process of sexual selection.183  Had Angel “select[ed] Tess” 
earlier on, the narrator suggests, their marriage might have been a social and genetic success, 
culminating not in “Sorrow”—Tess’s quixotic name for her “tender and puny” child by Alec, 
which dies in infancy—but in healthy, happy offspring.184   
 Meredith, by contrast, synthesized contemporary evolutionary theories into a far more 
optimistic worldview: one that “saved him,” as his biographer Mervyn Jones observes, “both 
from a relapse into traditional religion and from a surrender to hopeless pessimism.”185  As we 
can see in his life and work, Meredith’s affirmative, even neo-Pagan attitude toward the cosmos 
was entirely consonant with his modern scientific rationalism.186  His circle of acquaintances and 
correspondents included a diverse assortment of literary and scientific freethinkers, including the 
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poets Rossetti and Swinburne (with whom Meredith lived for a time), the popular science writers 
Grant Allen and Edward Clodd, and the agnostic critic Leslie Stephen.  While Meredith probably 
never met Darwin or Spencer in person, Jones makes note of the writer’s special “rapport” with 
Darwin, and Meredith recommended Spencer’s work to a friend on at least one occasion.187  
Moreover, Meredith appears to have accepted the scientific accuracy of evolution without the 
existential anguish of his fellow poets Tennyson and Hardy: in “Whimper of Sympathy” (1887), 
for instance, Meredith ridicules an unnamed “sweet sentimentalist” (likely Tennyson) for his 
histrionic, “totter-knee’d” verse.188   
Similar to Hardy, however, Meredith was acutely aware of the brutality of Darwinian 
nature.  We can see the impact of Meredith’s reading of Origin in the unusually cynical tone of 
his semi-autobiographical sonnet sequence Modern Love (1862), which chronicles the decline 
and breakdown of a marriage.189  As modern-day scholars such as Arthur L. Simpson, Jr. 
observe, the poem’s bitterness reflects not just the circumstances of Meredith’s failed first 
marriage, but also the poet’s pervasive disillusionment with the post-Darwinian world.190  In one 
revealing sonnet, the speaker ruminates on the pitilessness of “Nature,” who laughingly professes 
to “play for Seasons; not Eternities”: “scarce any retrospection in her eye,” the speaker continues, 																																																								
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“for she the laws of growth most deeply knows, / Whose hands bear, here, a seed-bag—there, an 
urn.”191  Nature, as Meredith depicts her here, disseminates both life and death in equal measure, 
and she is correspondingly less adversarial than Tennyson’s iconic vision of “Nature, red in tooth 
and claw.”192  But Meredith’s portrayal of nature in Modern Love also diverges considerably 
from the image he presents in early pastoral lyrics such as “South-West Wind in the Woodland” 
(1851), in which the speaker affirms that “every elemental power / Is kindred to our hearts.”193  
In the early 1850s, before Darwin published Origin, Meredith could picture the earth in Romantic 
sympathy with humankind: by the time he composed Modern Love, however, he understood that 
nature’s cosmic processes were crushingly indifferent to the solitary organism.  By personifying 
nature as an inconstant woman, Meredith in Modern Love retroactively dissolves the marital 
“union” between humankind and nature that the speaker of “South-West Wind” once declared to 
be “eternal.”194  In this context, the plot of Modern Love—the story of a world-weary husband’s 
alienation from his wife—reenacts microcosmically what Meredith sees as a larger crisis in the 
relationship of humankind to the cosmos.  
 Many of Meredith’s early-career nature poems seek to repair this rift by concertedly 
aestheticizing the natural world—while recognizing, at the same time, the material reality of a 
universe in constant flux.  The speaker of “Ode to the Spirit of the Earth in Autumn” (1862), for 
instance, revels in the sumptuous sights and sounds of a spectacular storm.  In the speaker’s 
imaginative vision, trees become dryads and nature transforms into the awe-inspiring but 
generous “Bacchante Mother,” whose fecundity is evident in the rich sensory stimuli that she 																																																								
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offers.195  Midway through the poem, the speaker’s orgiastic “night of Pagan glee” precipitates 
soberer contemplation about his place within the cosmos: he imagines his life “shining a 
moment” before being disintegrated and reabsorbed into the “onward-hurrying stream” of 
material life.196  Here, Meredith recalls Lucretius’s atomism as well as its modern iterations in 
Darwin’s and Spencer’s evolutionary theories.  More important, Meredith’s description of 
material flux also anticipates Pater’s foundational essay “Poems by William Morris” (1868), 
which reduces physical life to a “perpetual motion” of “elements” and “forces.”197  We can see in 
Meredith’s “Ode” the beginnings of this aesthetic engagement with contemporary scientific 
thought: in the face of a vast and ever-shifting cosmos, Meredith’s speaker concludes that the 
only way to “attain the glee / Of things without a destiny” is by taking immediate pleasure in “the 
joy of motion, the rapture of being.”198  The speaker thus asks “Great Mother Nature” to “teach 
[him], like thee, / To kiss the season and shun regrets,” so that he may experience a “life 
thoroughly lived” in the present.199  As I explain in the next chapter, Pater responded to 
Darwinian evolution by cultivating an aesthetically sensitive temperament that might make the 
most of life’s fleeting pleasures—the Aesthetic Movement largely coalesced around this ideal.  
Before Pater began articulating the tenets of aestheticism in the late 1860s, Meredith was 
																																																								
195 Meredith, “Ode to the Spirit of the Earth in Autumn,” in Poems, 198. 
196 Meredith, “Ode to the Spirit of the Earth in Autumn,” 196, 198. 
197 Tennyson also addresses Lucretius’s philosophical legacy in his dramatic monologue “Lucretius,” which 
appeared the same year as Pater’s “Poems by William Morris.”  While Tennyson's association of Epicurean 
atomism with nihilism—Lucretius eventually commits suicide—departs from Meredith's and Pater's 
materialisms, “Lucretius” does capture the emotionally fraught nature of atomism in the later nineteenth century.  
There are hints of Darwin in Tennyson's representation of the Lucretian worldview: Lucretius is horrified by 
Nature's ability to “smile / Balmier and nobler from her bath of storm,” and his “manlike” suicide is partly an 
attempt to escape his “beastlike” self.  Walter Pater, “Poems by William Morris,” Westminster Review 34 (1868): 
310; Tennyson, “Lucretius,” Macmillan's Magazine 18 (1868): 6-8.  
198 Meredith, “Ode to the Spirit of the Earth in Autumn,” 199. 
199 Meredith, “Ode to the Spirit of the Earth in Autumn,” 198, 199.  
		 81 
exploring the ways in which recent scientific understandings of nature justified, even demanded, 
the gratification of aesthetic desires.   
The Bacchanalian pleasures that Meredith proposes in “Ode,” however, are ultimately 
solitary rather than social: while a “life thoroughly lived” can reconcile the speaker to his own 
mortality, it can offer him no hope of a “destiny” beyond the moment of death.  In Poems and 
Lyrics of the Joy of Earth (1883), his belated follow-up to Modern Love, Meredith consequently 
develops his Pagan relish for nature into a more sweeping humanistic philosophy that might 
recuperate the possibility of long-term evolutionary progress.  To this end, in the intervening 
decades between Modern Love and Joy of Earth, Meredith adapted Spencer’s teleological model 
of evolution—which, as we have seen, was as prominent as Darwin’s—into his own secular 
program for the advancement of the human race.  Humankind, according to Meredith’s reading 
of evolutionary history, has proceeded through three stages of development: “blood,” “brain,” 
and “spirit,” each of which he associates with a component of human nature.  “Each of each in 
sequent birth,” he asserts in “The Woods of Westermain” (1883), “Blood and brain and spirit, 
three / … / Join for true felicity.”200  For Meredith, a complete life required a “union” of all three 
of these qualities—corporeal vigor, intellect, and an ennobled sense of self—but he nonetheless 
conceived of the triad in a hierarchical way, as markers of evolutionary development.201  As his 
biographer George Macauley Trevelyan observes in The Poetry and Philosophy of George 
Meredith (1906), “soul is to [Meredith] the flower of evolution,” an “autochthonous” product of 
nature that both emerges from and transcends the “primitive slime of Mother Earth.”202  Like 
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Spencer and Darwin, then, Meredith defines evolutionary progress as the gradual taming of 
humankind’s bestial instincts through the development of more humane faculties—faculties that, 
importantly, are immanent in the animal life of the body. 
Meredith’s blood-brain-spirit triad undergirds many of the themes in Joy of Earth, 
including its faith in the inherent good of civilization and its commitment to the viability of 
generational improvement.  As John Holmes argues, Meredith's verses from this period often 
“urge us to repudiate the animal within and strive towards a higher level of evolution.”203  The 
sonnet “Progress,” for instance, counters its pessimistic interlocutor with an anecdote about two 
nations that “deferred / The bloody settlement of their disputes” in order to tend to their 
struggling crops: their prioritization of communal wellbeing over brute “interests” and “base 
hates” is emblematic, the speaker proposes, of humankind’s overall movement away from its 
animal origins.204  Similarly, the longer lyric “Earth and Man” offers a heartening allegory for 
humankind’s evolution under the nourishing, though distant patronage of a maternal Earth.  Over 
the course of the poem, the titular Man gradually passes through the three stages of development 
and eventually achieves “order, high discourse, / And decency.”205  When Man’s spirit falters, 
Meredith’s Earth encourages him to find solace in the prospect of future generations rather than 
the religious “fables of the Above”: “live in thy offspring,” Earth says to Man, “as I live in 
mine.”206  
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Significantly for our understanding of evolutionary aestheticism, Meredith’s poetic 
invocations of the triad demonstrate how pleasurable sensory experience came to occupy a 
crucial place in literary conceptions of evolutionary progress during the period.  His long, often 
cryptic poem “The Woods of Westermain” offers a particularly nuanced account of the important 
roles that sensation and beauty play in his optimism.  In the poem’s first lines, the speaker invites 
his audience to embark on a journey through the “enchanted woods” of Westermain, which serve 
as an extended metaphor for the arduous process of self-development.207  Over the course of the 
poem, the speaker guides us through the many wonders and dangers of the woods, at the same 
time narrating our progression through blood, brain, and spirit.  As he explains toward the end of 
“Westermain,” this spiritual awakening can only occur through the experience of “pleasures 
pure”: “pleasures,” he further elaborates, “that through blood run sane, / Quickening spirit from 
the brain.”208  In contrast with the facile Bacchanalian glee of Meredith’s early “Ode,” “pleasure” 
in “Westermain” demands a disciplined, penetrating, and yet noticeably aestheticized, vision of 
the earth, which Meredith models in the poem’s plentiful metaphors.  The enjoyment of “sane” 
and “pure” sensory pleasure nourishes (or in his procreative verb, “quickens”) spirit by 
“unfold[ing]” to the otherwise cold intellect “the heaven of things”—that is, the true majesty of 
the material universe and the dignity of a civilized life within it.209  (His poem “Melampus,” also 
from Joy of Earth, recasts this ideal vision as specifically proto-scientific: Melampus, the titular 
physician and soothsayer, walks the earth “luminous-eyed,” his “ears…charged / With tones of 
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love,” and his sensual passion for nature grants him privileged insight into its inner workings.210)  
Just as Darwin, with his much-mooted imaginative powers, grasped the true “beauty and infinite 
complexity” of evolutionary process, Meredith scrutinizes nature carefully and takes comfort in 
the rich beauties of its infinite, progressive order.  Inducting readers into this mode of joyous 
apprehension emerges as one of the chief missions of “Westermain”: nature “show[s] a kind face 
and sweet,” the speaker implores, “look you with the soul you see’t.”211  As Tess Cosslett 
observes, Meredith thus replaces a “sentimental” view of nature with a “rational attitude” 
characterized by “selflessness, respect for and delight in the object itself, sympathetic insight, 
receptivity, [and] alertness to hidden beauty.”212 
Through these works, we can trace Meredith’s reevaluation of the evolutionary 
possibilities of beauty, a decades-long shift in his thinking that approximately maps onto the 
history of evolutionary aesthetics that I have delineated.  In the early poems Modern Love and 
“Ode,” which appeared shortly after Darwin published Origin, Meredith palpably struggles with 
the new view of nature that Darwin uncovered.213  Many of Meredith’s early nature poems also 
answer the naturalist’s call to “admire” nature despite its violence: hence Meredith’s use of 
classical and druidic landscapes—which aim for charm rather than verisimilitude—and his 
famously elaborate prosody.214  In the decades after Origin, as we have seen, Darwin’s and 
																																																								
210 Meredith, “Melampus,” in Poems, 248. 
211 Meredith, “The Woods of Westermain,” 209. 
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213 Darwin, Origin, 184. 
214 Meredith’s tendencies toward mixed metaphor and complicated, highly wrought syntax can make both his poetry 
and his prose difficult to understand.  Trevelyan addresses at length the “charges of eccentricity” and “obscurity” 
that critics sometimes leveled at Meredith’s style, particularly those “tricks of omission, which, when they do not 
violate grammar, at least confuse the construction and delay the appearance of meaning.”  In his dialogic essay 
“The Decay of Lying” (1889, revised 1891), Wilde’s speaker Vivian calls Meredith’s style “chaos illuminated by 
flashes of lightning.”  Trevelyan, The Poetry and Philosophy of George Meredith, 67, 74; Oscar Wilde, “The 
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Spencer’s respective aesthetic theories helped recast evolutionary thought: Meredith’s later 
poems, such as “Earth and Man” and “Westermain,” reflect this more optimistic and redemptive 
evolutionism.  For the agnostic Meredith, the recognition of a positive cosmos—a recognition 
that requires a certain level of aesthetic sensitivity—invests individual lives with evolutionary 
purpose and constitutes the only viable form of religious feeling.  Hardy, by contrast, never 
accepted the Spencerian reinterpretation of evolutionary theory that his mentor gladly embraced.  
While Hardy always appreciated the lush beauty of the natural world, his nature poetry from this 
period is fraught with a sense of clear-eyed despair that no flight of imagination can overcome.  
In his anti-Romantic lyric “In a Wood” (1887), for instance, Hardy’s demoralized speaker hopes 
to find in “nature a soft release / From men’s unrest”: he is horrified to discover, however, that 
even the trees must fight for resources and are “to men akin— / Combatants all!”215  Meredith’s 
neo-Pagan optimism, which looked to nature for confirmation of the teleological structure of the 
universe, in many ways represents the obverse of Hardy’s pessimistic materialism.  
Meredith’s lyric “Hymn to Colour,” from his 1888 collection A Reading of Earth, neatly 
captures the connection between evolutionary aesthetics and progress that many aesthetes—not 
just Meredith but also Swinburne, Pater, and Wilde—assimilated into their own work.  Like 
“Westermain” and “Earth and Man,” “Hymn to Colour” uses a dreamlike allegory to explain the 
natural processes by which individuals as well as societies grow and improve.  In the poem’s first 
stanzas, the speaker walks alongside the personifications of Life and Death; they are soon joined 
by the figure of Love, who undertakes to teach the speaker about the intricacies of the human 
spirit.  Love proclaims “Colour” the “soul’s bridegroom”: in his description, the experience of 																																																																																																																																																																																		
Decay of Lying,” in Criticism, Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man, ed. Josephine M. Guy, vol. 4 of 
The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81. 
215 Hardy, “In a Wood,” in Wessex Poems and other Verses: Poems of the Past and the Present, vol. 18 of The 
Writings of Thomas Hardy in Prose and Verse (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1898), 81. 
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color is a kind of sexual consummation in which the feminized soul wanders “through widening 
chambers of surprise to where / Throbs rapture near an end that aye recedes.”216  In a 
recapitulation of Darwin’s central argument in Descent, Meredith figures Colour as an alluring 
lover who continuously stimulates and fulfills (but never fully quenches) the erotic desire for 
sensual pleasure.  This desire for and ability to appreciate beauty, Love further explains to the 
speaker, ennobles the soul by lending “her homeliness in the desert air, / And sovereignty in 
spaciousness.”217 
 In the triumphant second half of “Hymn to Colour,” Meredith extols the spiritual and 
evolutionary potential of the aesthetic sense.  Love, continuing his lesson to the speaker, 
attributes humankind’s higher powers to the “joy of sight”: “this way,” he sings, “have men come 
out of brutishness / To spell the letters of the sky and read / A reflex upon earth else 
meaningless.”218   Humankind’s sexual attraction to the beautiful, Love explains here, inspires its 
impulse to invest meaning in the natural world by “read[ing]…upon” it, an act that for Meredith 
is both interpretive and creative (the importance of astute “reading” is a common refrain in 
Meredith’s works, including his collections A Reading of Earth and A Reading of Life [1901]).  
Interestingly, the poem remains ambivalent about the ontological accuracy of these readings: that 
is, the “reflex” that “men” perceive in nature may signify some genuine sympathy between earth 
and humankind, or (as the physiological denotation of “reflex” suggests) may simply emerge 
from the species’ innate tendency to anthropomorphize the external world.  Certainly, much of 
Meredith’s optimistic nature poetry favors the former conclusion by insisting on humankind’s 
privileged relationship to a maternal natural world.  Contemporary anthropology, however, 																																																								
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offered a rational explanation for these animist feelings of kinship with nature: in his landmark 
study Primitive Culture (1871), which I also discuss in the next chapter, Edward Burnett Tylor 
traces all mythology to early “anthropomorphic myths of nature,” which arose, in turn, out of 
deep-seated psychological instincts common to all humans.219  In an unspoken concession to the 
most recent science, “Hymn to Colour” both conspicuously declines to personify “earth” and, 
more important, acknowledges that the material world is “meaningless” except for the 
significance that humans “spell” or “read” upon it.  Consequently, humankind owes its progress 
“out of brutishness” not to earth’s maternal generosity, but to its own aesthetic faculties: humans 
themselves, the poem claims, are responsible for their cultural and evolutionary development. 
 In the conclusion to “Hymn to Colour,” Meredith expands this humanistic idea into a 
rousing prediction of humankind’s evolutionary transcendence.  Before parting, Love offers the 
speaker a prophetic and comforting vision of the future: “more gardens will [men] win than any 
lost; / The vile plucked out of them, the unlovely slain. / Not forfeiting the beast with which they 
are crossed, / To stature of the Gods will they attain.”220  In a continuation of the poem’s re-
assessment of “earth,” Meredith chooses the garden as his central metaphor, rather than the 
woods that feature so prominently in his other poems.  Unlike wild, uncultivated forest, the man-
made garden evokes Darwinian discussions of artificial and sexual selection: discussions that 
privilege, as we have seen, novelty, choice, and pleasure over environmental constraint and the 
pressures of survival.  This notion of selection looms large over Meredith’s image of the garden 
as a non-natural space where organisms are selected exclusively for their beauty, and whatever is 
“vile” or “unlovely” is consequently weeded out.  The syntax of this stanza, moreover, diverts the 																																																								
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violence of selection—which requires that maladapted organisms be “plucked” out and “slain”—
onto undesirable traits (“the vile,” “the unlovely”) rather than individuals.  By deemphasizing the 
acts of elimination that enable evolution and foregrounding instead the progress of universal 
“Man,” Meredith proposes a more humane, less nihilistic view—or in his terms, a “reading”—of 
an otherwise “meaningless” world.  As the laudatory title of “Hymn to Colour” suggests, this 
process of apotheosis depends on the capacity for aesthetic emotion: humankind only reaches the 
“stature of the gods” in the revolutionary space of the garden, where taste and desire supersede 
questions of fitness and necessity.   
 Of course, many of Meredith’s ideas—his sincere naturalism, his insistence on the labor 
and struggle of intellectual life, and his consequent distaste for self-indulgence, which verged on 
moralism—set him apart from many of his contemporary aesthetic writers.  Nonetheless, the 
trajectory of Meredith’s work concisely illustrates the logic by which evolutionary aesthetes, in 
the decades after Darwin’s Origin, deduced a particularly anthropocentric and humanistic brand 
of evolutionism.  Like Meredith, aesthetes such as Pater, Wilde, and Lee accepted the fact that 
species evolved through both Darwinian and Spencerian processes; they furthermore 
acknowledged that this idea necessarily demolished older, theological models of the universe.  
On the one hand, the rise of evolutionary science in the 1850s thus seemed to deprive human life 
of purpose and importance—it is this strain of post-evolutionary thought that animates Hardy’s 
prose and verse writings.  On the other hand, as Meredith’s poetry reminds us, evolutionary 
theories of aesthetics also offered Victorian thinkers a way of reinvesting meaning in the 
individual human life by stressing the long-term efficacy of the aesthetic instinct.  While 
humankind would never regain its place of honor at the center of a divinely-ordered universe, 
aesthetic experience promised individuals leverage over evolutionary process: through the 
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purposeless enjoyment of beauty, individuals could both escape the struggle for existence and 
exert their own selective pressure, however small, on the world around them.  The notion that 
aesthetic taste was a form of evolutionary selection—one that could countermand natural 
selection and thus further humankind’s transcendence over the state of nature—powerfully 
influenced scientific as well as aesthetic thought in the late nineteenth century.221  As we will see 
in the next chapter, both Pater and Clifford premised their respective philosophies on these 
scientifically inflected conceptions of the aesthetic sense.  In doing so, they introduced a 
progressive and humanistic evolutionism into the very foundations of British aestheticism. 
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Chapter 2 
A Religion of Humanity: 
The Evolutionary Aestheticism of W. K. Clifford, Walter Pater, and Mathilde Blind 
 
 
The mastery of new powers, whose mere exercise is delightful, … multiplies at 
once the intensity and the objects of our pleasures.  This, I say, is especially and 
exceptionally true of the pleasures of perception.  Every time that analysis strips 
from nature the gilding that we prized, she is forging thereout a new picture more 
glorious than before, to be suddenly revealed by the advent of a new sense 
whereby we see it—a new creation, at sight of which the sons of God shall have 
cause to shout for joy. 
     —W. K. Clifford, “Cambridge Notebook” 
 
 
 In this remarkable passage from the notebook he kept at Cambridge in the late 1860s, the 
mathematician W. K. Clifford gives voice to a productive friction between evolutionary theory 
and the burgeoning Aesthetic Movement in Britain.  For Clifford, materialist “analysis” such as 
Charles Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) both “strips” the natural world of its beauty and 
furnishes the procedure by which we will recover the “pleasures of perception.”1  No matter how 
much science compromises our belief in nature's benignity, Clifford argues, the evolutionary 
hypothesis also allows for the spontaneous adaptation of a “new sense” through which we will 
recognize the wonder of the universe afresh.  In making this move, Clifford attempts a secular 
reclamation of aesthetic pleasure: despite his reference to God, he attributes the spectacular “new 
creation” to a sensory adaptation that takes place within the individual spectator.  This line of 
argument aligns him not only with older scientific luminaries such as Darwin and Herbert 
Spencer—whose contributions to British aestheticism I examined in the last chapter—but also 
with contemporary aesthetes such as the critic Walter Pater and the poet Mathilde Blind.  In 
“Poems by William Morris” (1868), Pater likewise couches his aesthetic philosophy as a 
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response to modern science and the accompanying emergence of a new “sense of the splendour 
of our experience and of its awful brevity.”2  Twenty years later, in her epic poem The Ascent of 
Man (1889), Blind attributes the upward evolution of humankind to its growing sensitivity to the 
“shows of things in colour, sound, and form.”3  The intriguing overlap between Clifford’s, 
Pater’s, and Blind’s ideas alerts us to the fact that both aesthetic and evolutionary discourse in 
this period evince shared concerns about the nature of perception, the social and evolutionary 
value of beauty, and the status of the human in the post-Darwinian universe.  Certainly, scholars 
such as Helen Hawthorne Young, Gerald Monsman, Elisha Cohn, and Gowan Dawson mention 
Clifford’s association with Pater and other aesthetes—but few, if any, have studied the legacy of 
Clifford’s own aesthetics and his consequent place in the history of aestheticism.4   
 In this chapter, I locate Clifford, Pater, and Blind within the tradition of optimistic 
evolutionism that I have traced through Darwin’s and Spencer’s respective works on aesthetics 
as well as George Meredith’s poetry.  I argue that Clifford’s optimistic vision of the progressive 
evolution of humankind—and the liberating role that he thought aesthetic experience could play 
in this process of gradual perfection—draws into focus Pater’s parallel interests in evolutionary 
aesthetics during the 1860s and beyond.  A committed evolutionist, Clifford championed an 
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aesthetics that he believed would rescue Darwinian theory from its dehumanizing implications: 
namely, its subjection of the individual to the various deterministic pressures (natural selection, 
heredity, instinct, and so on) that constituted natural law in the post-Darwinian era.  Clifford thus 
scientifically legitimated an alternative ethics of freedom—freedom from convention, from 
nature, from what Pater called the “magic web” of “necessity”—around which Pater's 
conceptions of aesthetic temperament and cultural development coalesced.5  Though nominally 
opposed to metaphysical conjecture, Clifford and Pater similarly fashioned these libertarian 
principles into an almost religious creed founded on the ideal of a refined, richly varied life.  For 
both writers, individuals could make a positive contribution to the long-term evolution of the 
species by cultivating a disciplined, and yet joyous, receptivity to a wide range of ideas and 
experiences.  In this way, I suggest, these writers expanded the theoretical details of evolutionary 
aesthetics into a humanistic philosophy that might supersede older, now untenable, forms of 
faith.  To conclude, I examine the influence of Clifford’s and Pater’s evolutionary aestheticism in 
Blind’s lecture, “Shelley's View of Nature Contrasted with Darwin’s” (1886), and in The Ascent 
of Man.  In these works, Blind envisions an evolutionary teleology propelled not by cold 
Darwinian processes, but by emancipation, through the humanities, from these very Darwinian 
conditions—in her words, a “delivery in the realm of art.”6   
 Beyond elaborating on how this particularly progressive version of evolutionism came to 
be a fundamental part of British aestheticism, this chapter also makes several more general 
additions to existing scholarship on the Victorian period.  First, this project recognizes Clifford’s 																																																								
5 Pater first published “Winckelmann” in the Westminster Review in 1867 and then included it in Studies in the 
History of the Renaissance in 1873.  He made numerous changes to the second edition of Studies, which he 
subsequently retitled The Renaissance.  This chapter typically cites the original periodical versions of Pater’s 
articles.  When referring to revised materials that appear in Studies, I cite Donald L. Hill’s edition of The 
Renaissance.  Pater, “Winckelmann,” Westminster Review 31 (1867): 110.  
6 Blind, The Ascent of Man, 51. 
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significant intervention in late Victorian discussions about the relationship between evolutionary 
theory—only recently codified in Darwin's Origin and Descent of Man (1872)—and human 
culture.  In the decades following Origin, Victorian intellectuals as varied as biologist T. H. 
Huxley and critic John Ruskin deciphered Darwin’s findings for the public by applying (or, in 
Ruskin’s case, refusing to apply) the lessons of evolution to the conduct of life.  Though little 
read today, Clifford was one of the most original and emphatic voices in this chorus of 
Darwinian interpreters.  Secondly, this juxtaposition of Clifford’s and Pater’s writings 
foregrounds the easily overlooked impact that popular scientific writing had on the formation of 
British aestheticism in the 1860s and 1870s, and vice versa.  As Bernard Lightman argues in 
Victorian Popularizers of Science (2007), developments in mass publication in the mid 
nineteenth century radically changed the “dynamics of authorship and audience” by providing a 
surplus of print venues for the fluid exchange of ideas across disciplines and coteries.7  A more 
comprehensive understanding of Clifford’s and Pater’s participation in periodical culture offers 
us a clearer picture of the material as well as ideological origins of British aestheticism.  Thirdly, 
this chapter’s concluding reading of Blind contextualizes her work and underscores her 
importance in the development of fin de siècle aestheticism: figures such as Oscar Wilde, Grant 
Allen, and Vernon Lee, as we will see in subsequent chapters, formulated their own progressive 
evolutionary aesthetics partly by drawing on Blind’s synthesis of Clifford’s and Pater’s 
respective humanisms.  
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I. Clifford on “Absolute Receptivity” and the “Kingdom of Man” 
 Born in 1845 to a modest Exeter bookseller, Clifford earned a scholarship to Trinity 
College, where he was renowned for his polymathic genius, his eccentric dress, his daring 
athleticism, and his witty, often blasphemous, conversation.8  In 1868, he achieved the rank of 
second wrangler in the mathematical tripos and was elected a fellow of the College: he gave his 
first lecture at the Royal Institution (and launched his short but storied career in public speaking) 
that same year.9  Three years later, Clifford left Cambridge to join the faculty of University 
College London, where he began building a reputation as a scientific materialist and 
nonbeliever.10  In addition to delivering his University lectures and working on his mathematical 
papers, Clifford published eloquent and often controversial articles on numerous topics in the 
Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, and other liberal general interest periodicals.  He 
also gave popular public talks on a range of topics including evolution, psychology, religion, and 
the philosophy of science.  His attempts to appeal to a wide audience produced an eminently 
readable style that blended precision and clarity with gentle self-deprecation, a diffuse 
literariness, and an aphoristic wit: Blind, reflecting back on Clifford’s body of work, remarks on 
“his magical faculty of illuminating the most abstruse subjects by his vivid directness of 
exposition.”11  By the time of his early death in 1879, Clifford had become, in Dawson’s words, 
“perhaps the most infamous scientific firebrand in Victorian Britain” (in 1896, William James 
still remembered Clifford as “that delicious enfant terrible”).12  As such, Clifford and his spouse, 																																																								
8  Chisholm, Silver Currents, 13-19. 
9 Chisholm, Silver Currents, 27-28. 
10 Chisholm, Silver Currents, 28-30. 
11 Blind, George Eliot, 2nd ed. (London: W. H. Allen and Co., 1883), 84. 
12 Dawson, Darwin, 164, 168; William James, “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy (New York: Longman, 1896), 8. 
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novelist Lucy Lane Clifford, maintained close friendships with other prominent Victorian 
rationalists and regularly welcomed Huxley, G. H. Lewes, Leslie Stephen, and Grant Allen, 
among others, to their London home.13  
As Dawson colorfully asserts, Clifford “could always be relied upon flamboyantly to 
stick the boot into orthodoxy in all its forms.”14  Clifford’s commitment to free thought—he 
concluded his 1868 lecture with the provocative pronouncement, “it is not right to be proper”—
extended to his literary tastes and associations.15  If the British “salon,” as Susanne Schmid 
argues, was one of the foremost “formative cultural sites” in nineteenth-century Britain, then the 
Clifford home was a veritable crucible for trends in later Victorian literature.16  Writers such as 
Thomas Hardy and George Eliot, with whom William and Lucy were especially intimate, 
attended the Cliffords’ Sunday gatherings.17  Clifford supported young Robert Louis Stevenson, 
whom he had met through the art critic Sidney Colvin, in his bid for admission to the Savile 
Club.18  The flair with which Clifford overturned bourgeois morality on a scientific basis 
inspired then-undergraduate Oscar Wilde.19  After William died, Lucy, who published as “Mrs. 
W. K. Clifford” until her death in 1929, became the center of a thriving literary circle that 																																																								
13 Chisholm, Silver Currents, 41.  
14 Dawson, Darwin, 168.   
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included the critic and aesthete Vernon Lee, who incorporated some of Clifford’s ideas into her 
own work.20  The importance of this literary milieu is evident in Clifford’s argumentative 
practices: he frequently peppered his already inflammatory arguments with quotations from the 
aesthetic poet Algernon Charles Swinburne, whose celebration of “the joys of the flesh” and “art 
for art’s sake” made him a contentious figure to the British reading public.21  Clifford himself 
also composed fragmentary verses and published wryly satirical, proto-Wildean fairy tales for 
children.  With his diverse interests, he emblematized an interdisciplinarity characteristic of 
Victorian intellectual life: the “one culture,” to use George Levine’s term, in which literary 
writers routinely published alongside scientific writers, especially in secular journals such as the 
Fortnightly Review.22 
 Clifford’s interest in the aesthetic dates to his earliest days at Cambridge, when he began 
searching for a philosophy that might fulfill the emotional and spiritual functions of his once-
robust Christian faith.  He grew up in a pious High Church household; as an undergraduate, he 
clung to grandiose visions of nature even as he abandoned his religious beliefs, partly in response 
to Darwin’s recent formulation of natural selection.23  Further on in his meditation on the 
“pleasures of perception,” Clifford attempts to restore “romance” to a natural world that science 
was rapidly redefining, often to devastating effect: 																																																								
20 A catalog of Vernon Lee’s letters in the Colby College archive includes nearly twenty mentions of visits to Lucy 
Clifford’s home.  “List of ‘Vernon Lee (Violet Paget) Letters Home,’” Colby College Libraries, last updated 25 
March 2015, http://libguides.colby.edu/ld.php?content_id=1059875. 
21 Algernon Charles Swinburne, “Dolores,” in Poems and Ballads & Atalanta in Calydon, ed. Kenneth Haynes 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 122; William Blake: A Critical Essay (London: John Camden Hotten, 1868), 101. 
22 The November 1874 issue of the Fortnightly Review demonstrates, in miniature, the collocation of liberal-leaning 
science and literature in this period.  In one sitting, readers encountered Pater’s “Fragment on Measure for 
Measure,” Swinburne’s elegiac poem “In Memory of Barry Cornwall,” Huxley’s landmark essay “On the 
Hypothesis that Animals Are Automata,” and chapter seven of Meredith’s serial novel Beauchamp’s Career.  
George Levine, introduction to One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 3.  See John Morley, ed., Fortnightly Review 16 (1874): 555-700.  
23 Chisholm, Silver Currents, 18.  
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What now shall I say of this new-grown perception of Law…?  Why, that it kills our sense 
of the beautiful, and takes all the romance out of nature.…But wait a moment.  What if this 
combining and organising is to become first habitual, then organic and unconscious, so that 
the sense of law becomes a direct perception?  Shall there not be a new revelation of a 
great and more perfect cosmos, a universe freshborn, a new heaven and a new earth?  Mors 
janua vitae [death the door to life]; by death to this world we enter upon a new life in the 
next.  A new Elysium opens to our eager feet, through whose wide fields we shall run with 
glee, stopping only to stare with delight and to cry, “See there, how beautiful!”24 
 
At first, the discovery of cold natural “Law” seems to dim the once pleasurable spectacle of a 
divinely ordered universe.  But as Tess Cosslett points out, Clifford finds “consolation for the 
loss of his religious faith in a new perception of the beauty of scientific Law,” which he 
“express[es] in the old religious terminology.”25  In other words, he recuperates spectatorial 
pleasure by adapting the mystical idioms of his childhood Christianity to the material reality of 
the world around him: hence Clifford’s quasi-religious reverence, which is sustained here in his 
resplendent and curiously hybridized language.  Over the course of this short paragraph, he calls 
upon Biblical imagery (“a new heaven and a new earth,” lifted from Revelation [21:1]), liturgical 
tradition (the common epitaph mors janua vitae), classical myth (“a new Elysium”), and 
psychological and biological discourse (“habitual,” “organic,” “unconscious,” “perception”).  By 
fusing so many varied intellectual realms—the sciences, we should keep in mind, were in the 
process of being professionalized and differentiated from literary and historical disciplines—
Clifford assembles a kind of meta-vocabulary in which gradual “perfect[ion]” emerges as 
nature’s organizing principle.26  Insofar as Clifford’s “sense of Law” describes a sensorial 
receptivity to the beauties of cosmic order, his revelatory mission also necessitates a form of 																																																								
24 Qtd. from Stephen and Pollock, introduction to Lectures and Essays, 46-47.  
25 Tess Cosslett, The “Scientific Movement” and Victorian Literature (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), 105. 
26 As Lightman and others have pointed out, science was in the early stages of professionalization in this period.  
Several Victorian naturalists, especially Huxley, encouraged this process by attempting to codify scientific 
practice into a set of experimental procedures and agnostic beliefs.  Generally speaking, Clifford bucked this 
trend.  Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science, 12-13. 
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aesthetic education, one that cultivates a mindset at once empirical and imaginative, scientific 
and poetic.  Toward the end of his life, and with a homiletic conviction essentially unchanged 
from his undergraduate years, Clifford prophesied a future in which such thinking will be 
commonplace: the “good time is coming,” he writes in an 1878 essay on science education, in 
which “Dynamics and Prose Composition [will] have met together” and “Literature and Biology 
[will] have kissed each other.”27   
Clifford’s resolute optimism regarding the advent of what he calls “whole culture” points 
to the ways in which he theorized and popularized already extant connections between aesthetic 
theory and evolutionary science.28  His rose-tinted revision of material reality had roots in what 
Gillian Beer calls “Romantic materialism”: a strain of idealism that, as we have seen, not only 
survived the shock of the Darwinian revolution but also flourished in the work of both Darwin 
and his followers.29  For Darwin, as for the younger Clifford, sensitivity to the beauties of nature 
constituted a precious antidote to the bitter reality of an indifferent and directionless cosmos.  
Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, to reiterate the argument of my first chapter, further codified 
this escapist aesthetics by vacating beauty of all survival value and emphasizing instead the 
arbitrariness of aesthetic taste.  Darwin’s conception of the constructed and mutable character of 
beauty in turn distinguished his evolutionary aesthetics from that of earlier critics such as 
Edmund Burke and John Ruskin: unlike his predecessors, Darwin considered the beautiful a 
privileged category of natural phenomena over which individual taste (rather than the 
functionalist demands of nature or the moralistic dictates of God) had complete sway.  Spencer’s 
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classification of aesthetic pleasure as a type of disinterested and generative “play”—which 
formed the bedrock of his uniquely optimistic projection of human evolution—lent further 
support to this progressive and non-functional aesthetics.  For Darwin and Spencer, the sense of 
beauty defied the desolate functionalism of natural selection and unlocked alternative modes of 
evolutionary development that relied on the desires and exertions of individual organisms—not 
on violent encounters between organisms and their environments, or between organisms and 
other organisms.  Darwin’s and Spencer’s evolutionary accounts of beauty thus cleared the way 
for aestheticism’s major cultural innovation, inklings of which we can discern in Clifford’s 
undergraduate journal: that is, the notion that aesthetic pleasure (the “pleasures of perception”) 
need not abide by the crushing rules that govern other areas of life.  
Much of Clifford’s work also draws on mid century trends in the psychological study of 
aesthetics.  As Regenia Gagnier, Carolyn Burdett, and other modern-day scholars have shown us, 
the study of aesthetics in the 1860s and 1870s fell increasingly under the purview of psychology, 
which was gaining rapid recognition as an institutionalized branch of life science.30  In his study 
The Senses and the Intellect (1855), as we have seen, Alexander Bain argues that psychological 
states are the complex byproducts of muscular and nervous reactions to physical stimuli; these 
states, he reasons, are altered and organized according to acquired associations unique to every 
brain.31  His assertion that emotion is physiological in origin influenced late Victorian aesthetic 
thought in several ways.  Most obviously, Bain's materialist psychology—an approach that 
Spencer, Lewes, and James Sully, Bain’s protégé, also helped popularize—had the effect of 																																																								
30 Regenia Gagnier, “Production, Reproduction, and Pleasure in Victorian Aesthetics and Economics,” in Victorian 
Sexual Dissidence, ed. Richard Dellamora (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 136-39; Carolyn 
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subjecting once-metaphysical properties of mind to physical laws, including the law of evolution.  
A contemporaneous tradition of German experimental optics, pioneered by Johannes Müller and 
Hermann von Helmholtz, further convinced many in the British intellectual elite that aesthetic 
perception was a quantifiable, corporeal phenomenon.  Bain and other proponents of the new 
“psychological aesthetics,” Benjamin Morgan observes, thus “pursued a surprisingly decadent 
aesthetics” that fed directly into the work of Pater and his heirs.32   
Significantly for both Clifford’s and Pater’s humanist philosophies, Bain’s physical 
model of sensation also internalized the act of perception within the body and, consequently, 
called into question the individual’s ability to access objective reality through the senses.  As 
Jonathan Crary argues, the nineteenth century witnessed the gradual reorganization of the 
observer into “both the site and producer of sensation.”33  Bain’s psychology was instrumental in 
this wider movement toward a subjective view of perception: “the sense of the external,” he 
states outright in The Senses and the Intellect, “is the consciousness of particular energies and 
activities of our own.”34  While his reduction of sensation to “energies and activities of our own” 
deprives the observer of direct contact with the external world, his theory of perception 
simultaneously grants the individual the powerful capacity to shape her own view of the world.  
Bain’s psychology thus contributed to late nineteenth-century figurations of what Crary calls a 
“newly empowered body”—one in which every impression, in psychological fact, was an 																																																								
32 Benjamin Morgan, “The Matter of Beauty: Materialism and Self in Victorian Aesthetic Theory,” PhD diss., 
(University of California, Berkeley, 2010), xix. 
33 Crary traces this notion of “subjective vision” through a lineage of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
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“separate in a sensation what is objective from what is subjective.”  Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, 371; 
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autonomous act of original creation.35  It is in this context that Clifford, writing in Bain’s wake, 
continually lionizes the perceiving subject as the god-like creator of the world around him. In 
one of the lectures from his collection Seeing and Thinking (1879), for instance, Clifford asks his 
audience to consider their view of him at the lectern: that sensation, he remarks, “appears to 
come from outside of your mind,” but “of course it is entirely in your mind; any sensation you 
have got belongs to you, and is part of you, and is just a change of your consciousness.”36  Since 
the processes of perception take place entirely in our own bodies, Clifford continues, we can 
determine our sense of the external world by “direct[ing] our attention to particular things by an 
effort of the will.”37  Clifford’s early engagements with this idea—that is, the notion that the 
sensate body actively fashions a world that only appears to be outside our control—culminated in 
his theorization of “mind-stuff,” his term for a hypothetical elementary particle of 
consciousness.38  As his friend and biographer Frederick Pollock later noted, Clifford’s mind-
stuff hypothesis ultimately postulates that “mind is the one ultimate reality.”39 
 In this vein, Clifford’s inaugural lecture “On Some Conditions of Mental Development” 
(1868) advocates for a “creative rather than acquisitive” temperament on the basis that this 
“attitude of the mind” is most “likely to change for the better.”40  In brief, Clifford argues that 
physical and mental growth occurs through the “spontaneous action” of organisms themselves 
rather than the “direct action of the environment” on the organism: spontaneous actions are in 
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turn enabled, he adds, by a “store of force…necessarily accumulated within the organism.”41  
Since every “effect of the environment” on the organism leads to its gradual ossification, 
Clifford summarily dismisses natural selection in favor of a Spencerian and Lamarckian 
evolutionism that considers adaptation a “matter of habits and desires” rather than competition 
and fitness.42  Here, Clifford clearly premises his arguments on Spencer’s concept of play as well 
as his theory of organic evolution, which tended to regard the organism as the agent of its own 
adaptation.  In Clifford’s turn toward choice and desire, we also recognize the logic of sexual 
selection, which Darwin had expanded in later editions of Origin. 
 Clifford applies this counter-functionalist evolutionary logic to the temperaments suitable 
for science and art, which were for him analogous pursuits.  “If scientific,” Clifford argues, “[the 
mind] must not rest in the contemplation of existing theories,” but must instead “create things not 
immediately useful.”  (While Clifford admits that he is “putting in a word” for abstract 
mathematics, his rejection of the useful also echoes the increasingly publicized mantra of “art for 
art’s sake,” a phrase associated in this period with Swinburne’s William Blake [1868] and Pater’s 
Studies in the History of the Renaissance [1873].)  Similarly, the artistic mind “must not sit down 
in hopeless awe before the monuments of the great masters”; “still less,” he adds, “must it 
tremble before the conventionalism of one age, when its mission may be to form the whole life 
of the age succeeding.”43  Clifford concludes his first lecture with a call for intellectual dissent 
and artistic originality, unfettered by considerations of utility or propriety.44  “A mind that would 
grow,” Clifford asserts,  																																																								
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42 Clifford, “Mental Development,” 112, 116.   
43 Clifford, “Mental Development,” 115. 
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must maintain an attitude of absolute receptivity; admitting all, being modified by all, but 
permanently biased by none.  To become crystallised, fixed in opinion and mode of 
thought, is to lose the great characteristic of life, by which it is distinguished from 
inanimate nature: the power of adapting itself to circumstances.  Propriety, in fact, is the 
crystallisation of a race.…In the face of such a danger it is not right to be proper.45 
 
As in the undergraduate diary, Clifford in “Mental Development” yokes the possibility of 
progress to the widespread cultivation of a particular temperament: one that is passionate but 
non-dogmatic, creative rather than reactive in the face of change, and radically receptive to, but 
never governed by, new ideas and external impressions.46  In doing so, Clifford extrapolates his 
understanding of modern psychological and biological theory into a deliberately iconoclastic 
claim for the evolutionary potential of idiosyncrasy. 
 “Mental Development” puts this valorization of free expression into practice by subtly 
and strategically quoting Swinburne’s “Ilicet,” from the collection Poems and Ballads (1866).  
Specifically, Clifford uses several lines from the fourth stanza—“There is not one thing with 
another, / But Evil saith to Good: My brother, / My brother, I am one with thee”—in order to 
illustrate an infantile state of consciousness, in which the developing child cannot distinguish 
objects from one another.47  Although Poems and Ballads was several years old by the time 
Clifford delivered his lecture, the collection was still controversial for its sumptuous (one 
reviewer said “filthy”) language, its deviant eroticism, its moral relativism (captured in the 
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selection from “Ilicet”), and its political radicalism.48  Several years later, as we have seen, 
Robert Buchanan would count Swinburne, along with Dante Gabriel Rossetti and William 
Morris, among the most offensively immoral poets of his generation.49  In an implicit repudiation 
of this line of criticism, Clifford’s lectures and essays from the late 1860s and early 1870s often 
encourage his audience to reassess their assumptions about what he calls Swinburne’s “splendid” 
poetry.50  As Dawson points out, Clifford was one of the few scientific figures in this period 
willing to endorse not only Swinburne but also Walt Whitman, the contentious American poet 
whose sensual verse was similarly associated with Lucretian materialism (many of Clifford’s 
“more circumspect” colleagues, including Huxley, Darwin, and John Tyndall, preferred to cite 
less problematic writers such as Alfred Tennyson and William Shakespeare).51  In “Mental 
Development,” Clifford’s divisive references to the avant-garde Swinburne enact, on a rhetorical 
level, the refusal to be “proper” that the mathematician considers indispensable to evolutionary 
progress. 
 Importantly for his late-career essays, Clifford also seriously engaged with the 
philosophic content of Swinburne’s poetry, particularly the poet’s spiritual reinterpretation of 
evolutionary thought.  As Lionel Stevenson observes, Swinburne refined the “materialistic 
assumptions” of evolutionary science into a “metaphysical system of explanation,” a “positivist 
‘religion of humanity’” in which humankind occupied the position of supreme deity.52  In 																																																								
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“Hymn of Man” (1871), for instance, Swinburne gleefully deposes the Christian God and exalts 
in his place the transcendent human race: “Glory to Man in the highest!” the speaker concludes, 
“for Man is the master of things.”53  Elsewhere in “Hymn,” Swinburne poetically reimagines the 
Spencerian concept of the social organism by envisioning humankind as one “manifold body and 
breath,” in which individual “lives are as pulses or pores”; for Swinburne, this figure of 
collective “Man” continues to live and grow, even as the individual lives that constitute his body 
perish.54  Clifford, as the nineteenth-century literary critic Edmund Gosse notes, “early insisted 
on the intellectual importance of Swinburne’s idealism,” including the poet’s triumphant vision 
of “Man.”55  By giving Swinburne pride of place in “Mental Development” and other works, 
Clifford publicly connected his own evolutionism not only to Swinburne’s transgressive social 
agenda—including his espousal of republicanism, sexual liberation, and Pagan materialism—but 
also to the aesthete’s more fundamental idealization of humankind’s place in the cosmos. 
 In the eleven years between “Mental Development” and his death, Clifford’s 
subordination of scientific accuracy to the imaginative vision allowed him to stake unique 
ground in the Victorian critical landscape.  On the one hand, he launched withering rationalist 
critiques of organized religion and conventional morality.56  On the other hand, he consciously 
appropriated scriptural rhetoric, and he often discussed physical health and intellectual freedom 
in a spiritualized, even moralistic register reminiscent of Swinburne’s poetry.  This contradiction, 
far from constituting an ironic derision of religious feeling, speaks to Clifford’s desire to 																																																								
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colonize the spiritual and moral functions of religion by recasting his atheistic worldview into a 
noble humanism akin to faith.  His humanism was one expression, as Charles Taylor has shown, 
of a larger tradition of secular humanism that philosophers such as John Stuart Mill, Matthew 
Arnold, and Auguste Comte advanced in the nineteenth century.57  Significantly for later British 
aesthetes such as Wilde and Lee, Clifford expanded on philosophical precedent by closely tying 
his secular ethics to the cultivation of particular modes of seeing and representing the world.  For 
example, in “The Unseen Universe” (1875), Clifford counts the “love of action which would put 
death out of sight” as an inherent “good, as a holy and healthy thing.”58  Since our “present life,” 
he asserts, “in so far as it is healthy, rebels once for all against its own final and complete 
destruction,” it is “right and good…to cover over and dismiss the thought of our own personal 
end.”59  Similarly, he continues, we “give the most worthy honour and tribute” to our friends and 
loved ones “if we never say nor remember that they are dead, but contrariwise that they have 
lived.”60  In other words, we must aestheticize human life by deliberately excising from our 
thoughts the ugly truths of death and decay; a sacred idiom, for Clifford, was the natural vehicle 
for such aesthetic revision.  Also implicit in Clifford’s exhortation is the assumption, grounded in 
Bainian psychology, that this habitual diversion of our attention can transform our immediate 
perception of the material world.  With practice, he suggests, we can suppress our dread of death 
and cultivate a more spiritually fulfilling consciousness of the sheer joy and triumph of living.   
 Many of Clifford’s later essays, including “The First and the Last Catastrophe” (1875), 
“The Ethics of Religion” (1877), and “Cosmic Emotion” (1877), seek to foster this renewed 																																																								
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consciousness by representing physical life through a kind of vitalist lens.  Of course, we cannot 
call Clifford a vitalist in the strictest sense: as Sebastian Normandin and Charles T. Wolfe 
explain, in this period vitalism denoted “the idea of a life force that somehow transcends the 
known material world.”61  While Clifford denied the existence of such a force, he still deployed a 
mélange of literary and scientific language—culled in part from Swinburne’s sensual imagery 
and Spencer’s theory of organismic energy—in order to elevate organic life as a “holy and 
healthy thing.”  To the extent that this idealistic view of life poses a “middle way” (to quote 
Normandin) “between the extremes of materialism and spiritualism,” Clifford’s philosophy 
emerges as a form of rhetorical, if not literal, vitalism.62  More precisely, Clifford’s ennoblement 
of the organic belongs to a particular strain of vitalism that Michel Foucault attributes to the late 
eighteenth-century French anatomist Xavier Bichat, who defined “life” as “the sum of the 
functions by which death is resisted.”63  After Bichat’s intervention, Foucault argues, the 
organism becomes “the visible form of life in its resistance to that which does not live and which 
opposes it.”64  For Clifford, and subsequently for Pater, the enjoyment of life thus constituted an 
act of noble struggle against the external, inorganic forces of decay, degeneration, and 
“crystallisation.”  Clifford’s frequent references to Baruch Spinoza’s aphorism, “the freeman 
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thinks of nothing so little as of death,” stems partly from its encapsulation of this concept of 
organic life as resistance.65 
 Through the versatile discourse of vitalism, Clifford strengthens the causal link between 
the liberated conduct of life (in his parlance, not being “proper”) and the long-term good of both 
the individual and the species.  In “Cosmic Emotion,” for instance, he defines “good action” as 
any “mode of action…which makes an organic thing more organic, or raises it in the scale.”66  In 
a noticeably Spencerian gesture, Clifford further asserts that only the “overflowing energy” of 
living tissue can generate the “quasi-spontaneous” actions necessary for this evolutionary 
progress: by contrast, the “dead stuff” that forms a part of every complex organism belongs 
properly to “the external world,” and is thus anathema to “that me, whose free action tends to 
progress.”67  Consequently, the zealous accumulation of vitality—which organisms gain by 
acting spontaneously, according to their impulses—becomes for Clifford nothing less than a 
sacred duty.  He concludes “The First and the Last Catastrophe” with a proclamation to this 
effect, which he adapts from both Isaiah 22:13 and 1 Corinthians 15:32: “Do I seem to say, ‘Let 
us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?’  Far from it…I say, ‘Let us take hands and help, for this 
day we are alive together.’”68  Clifford here revises an iconic expression of Pagan abandon into 
an alternative moral code, one that he premises on the inherent good of being fully “alive.”  
Within a broader cultural context, Clifford’s vitalist vocabulary emerges as a scientific 
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counterpart to Swinburne’s literary aestheticism: both approaches seek to spiritualize matter by 
describing physical life in metaphysical terms.  
 Clifford further expands this mystical understanding of organic life into a secular religion 
that grants individuals, insofar as they contribute to the development of future generations, a kind 
of abstract immortality.  His depiction of cultural inheritance as an afterlife recalls Comte’s 
notion of “subjective immortality,” which held that the individual brain “assimilate[d] the 
feelings and conceptions of all its peers” as well as its predecessors.69  Those who “left great 
results,” Comte asserts in his System of Positive Polity (1854), “acquire in others a subjective 
immortality,” because their work “is perpetuated and even extended” in the minds of their 
readers.70  Clifford reworks Comte’s predominately sociological “religion of humanity” within 
an expressly evolutionary framework by channeling religious feeling toward universal “Man,” 
the personification of the evolutionary future that he adapts in part from Swinburne’s verse.71  
More so than Swinburne, however, Clifford’s invocations of “Man” combine the authority and 
excitement of empirical discovery with the sentimental force of Christian revelation.  In “The 
Unseen Universe,” for instance, Clifford urges his readers to hold fast to their memories of 
deceased loved ones as they were in life, “that hereby the brotherly force and flow of their action 
and work may be carried over the gulfs of death and made immortal in the true and healthy life 
which they worthily had and used.”72  Perhaps counter-intuitively, Clifford’s atomism—that is, 
his translation of “life” into the phenomena of “force,” “flow,” “action,” and “work”—allows 
him to posit a scientifically tenable form of afterlife in which the individual’s efforts cascade in 																																																								
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an endless and unbroken chain of action and reaction.  He concretizes this vision of immortality 
both in his own syntax, with its exhausting accumulation of conjunctions, and in the metaphor of 
a wave: to the “noble and great ones, who have loved and labored yourselves not for yourselves 
but for the universal folk,” Clifford promises “life as broad and far-reaching as your love,…[and] 
life-giving action to the utmost reach of the great wave whose crest you sometime were.”73  In 
essays such as “The First and the Last Catastrophe” and “The Ethics of Religion,” Clifford 
similarly diverts “our pious allegiance” away from a “superhuman deity” and toward “our father 
Man,” or the spirit of the species that speaks to each of us through our “conscience.”74  Since 
scientific “truth will not allow us to see” a deity, he continues in “The Ethics of Religion,” the 
“shadowy outlines” of the gods “fade slowly away before us”; as the illusion dissolves, however, 
“we perceive with greater and greater clearness the shape of a yet grander and nobler figure,” 
whom he names the “Great Companion.”75  Through figurative contrivances such as the “Great 
Companion,” the “universal folk,” the “great wave,” and “our father Man,” Clifford reinvests 
spiritual meaning in evolutionary process even as he dismantles traditional religious beliefs.  His 
brand of humanism—which required from its followers a degree of aesthetic sensitivity—thus 
proposes a more consciously scientific, but also more emotionally gratifying, version of Comte’s 
religion of humanity. 
Clifford’s essay “Cosmic Emotion,” with its rousing appeals to freedom and prophecies 
of an imminent “kingdom of Man,” compelling connects this humanistic evolutionism to the 
methods and objectives of aestheticism.76  In the essay, Clifford differentiates between two forms 																																																								
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of cosmic emotion, although both describe the manner in which “men contemplate the world, the 
temper in which they stand in the presence of the immensities and the eternities.”77  The simpler 
type of cosmic emotion, activated in response to the “Macrocosm or universe surrounding us,” 
consists in feelings analogous to Burke’s established definition of the sublime, including “awe,” 
“veneration,” and “submission.”78  By comparison, the more complex form of cosmic emotion, 
which refers to the “universe of our own souls,” results from totalizing conceptions of the human 
race, the social and psychological laws that govern human action, and the place of the individual 
within the destiny of “Man.”79  In his own day, Clifford continues, the experience of cosmic 
emotion has shifted in accordance with contemporary empirical science, which daily attests to 
the provisionality and relativism of all knowledge of the universe.  Clifford declares the shift a 
happy one: for him, this new conception of the universe has “a character of incompleteness about 
it, a want, a stretching out for something better to come,” and those with the right “temperament” 
can look forward with “hope” to “greater mysteries yet…behind the veil.”80  Darwinian and 
Spencerian theory, Clifford further argues, has challenged longstanding views on the 
immutability of human nature, conscience, and reason, proving instead “that the nature of man 
and beast and of all the world is changing, is going somewhere.”81  Crucially, this aestheticized 
interpretation of the world—an updated version of the “glorious…new Elysium” that he sketched 
in his Cambridge notebook ten years earlier—allows Clifford to recuperate an affirmative, 
anthropocentric view of the cosmos. “Inorganic chaos” gradually gives way to what Clifford, 																																																								
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quoting Swinburne, calls the “mother of life”: an emblem for the cosmic tendencies toward 
organic order and sophistication.82  To experience cosmic emotion in the modern era, as Clifford 
defines it, is to recognize the “mother” at work,” to perceive the universe in such a way that one 
feels neither alienation nor disappointment but instead pleasure, curiosity, pride, and hope.  
  For Clifford, the sense of vitality and wellbeing that springs from the experience of 
cosmic emotion—which, in essence, is an aesthetic experience—helps to cultivate freer, more 
evolutionarily generative individuals.  “Cosmic Emotion” thus concludes by laying out an ethics 
of self-determination that will protect the autonomous subject (“that me, whose free action tends 
to progress”) from both the “pressure of external circumstance” and the pull of primitive instinct 
(“that baneful strife which lurketh inborn in us”).83  Clifford derives his evolutionary idea of 
freedom, or “action from within,” from many progressive scientific discourses, including 
Spencerian and Darwinian evolution, vitalist conceptions of matter, and Bain’s subjective 
psychology.84  His concomitant wariness of “survivals in the mind”—inherited “rudiments” that 
compromise the individual’s ability to think and act freely—also borrows from the evolutionary 
anthropology of Edward Burnett Tylor, which I touched on in the last chapter.  In his influential 
monograph Primitive Culture (1871), Tylor argues that various “processes, customs, opinions, 
and so forth” are sometimes “carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different 
from that in which they had their original home”—he terms these vestigial cultural features 
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“survivals.”85  As George Stocking has shown, Tylor’s insistence on “the progressive rather than 
degenerative character of human history,” which swayed anthropological thought for a 
generation, was closely connected to his conception of survivals.86  By cautioning against 
“survivals in the mind,” then, Clifford invokes Tylor’s reformist imperative to “mark…out for 
destruction” those “remains of crude old culture” that persist into modernity.87  For Clifford, as 
for Tylor, the growth of civilization depends on the continuous excision of undesirable survivals 
from every branch of human culture: a process to which individuals actively contribute by 
throwing off the fetters of tradition in their own lives.  Self-willed action and creation become 
for Clifford the highest ethical goods, and freedom itself becomes a kind of divine emanation—
here Clifford quotes Swinburne’s “To Walt Whitman in America” (1871)—of the “great god 
Man.”88  To do anything for its “own sake,” in obedience to no force or system save one’s own 
genuine desire, is to participate in the larger project of active self-making that underpins 
Clifford’s optimistic evolutionism.  Equipped with this understanding of evolution, Clifford 
“read[s] the signs of the times”—including the spread of democracy, the relaxation of social 
mores, and the rise of sociological thinking—and declares: “the kingdom of Man is at hand.”89 
As we can see in the dramatically prophetic denouement of “Cosmic Emotion,” Clifford’s 
confidence in the evolutionary apotheosis of humankind was very nearly a form of religious 
faith: hence his evangelical crusade of public education, which he pursued both in the periodical 
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press and in lecture halls.90  Above all, his willingness to merge scientific rationalism with the 
spiritual consolation, aesthetic pleasure, and utopian impulse of religious feeling distinguishes 
him from scientific contemporaries such as Huxley and Spencer, who sought to replace magical 
thinking with a more clinical scientism.  Clifford’s nuanced view of the social and evolutionary 
possibilities of faith emerges with particular clarity in his flippant fairy tale “The New Crown,” 
which presents the fantasy kingdom of Nequesdhour as a humorous case study in Tylorian 
cultural evolution.  Midway through the tale, an accident involving the titular crown leaves the 
most powerful woman in the kingdom with burnt fingers.  Courtiers, eager to please their queen, 
quickly adopt the “fashion of having red finger-tips,” and the custom undergoes the same process 
of mythicization through which all religious customs, according to Tylor, arise: gradually, 
Clifford’s narrator drily observes, the fashion comes “to be regarded as one of very high 
antiquity, resting on deep reasons connected with the welfare of the human race, and, in fact, as a 
sacred custom of which it would be a sacrilege and profanity to question the wisdom or the 
necessity.”91  On one level, Clifford intends for his readers to laugh at the ludicrousness of this 
superstition—and, while laughing, to question the contingency and mutability of those beliefs 
that they themselves hold sacred.  On another level, however, given Clifford’s own sanctification 
of “Man,” the example of Nequesdhour models how his religion of humanity might eventually 
unseat older forms of religious orthodoxy.  Both in “The New Crown” and throughout his work, 
Clifford’s aim is not to extinguish his audience’s sense of the “sacred,” but instead to direct their 
feelings of cosmic emotion toward evolutionary processes that, in his view, really will promote 
the “welfare of the human race.”    																																																								
90 Clifford was very prolific: his friends were so alarmed by his work habits that they more than once started a 
collection to send him to southern Europe to recuperate.  Chisholm, Such Silver Currents, 55. 
91 Clifford, “The New Crown,” in The Little People: And Other Tales (London: Chapman and Hall, 1874), 46. 
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II. Pater, the Aesthetic Temperament, and the “Regeneration of the World”  
 In October 1868, only seven months after Clifford made his audacious debut before the 
Royal Institution, Pater published “Poems by William Morris”: in his essay’s famous defense of 
the “love of art for art’s sake,” which he later adapted for the much-maligned “Conclusion” of 
Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), Pater spelled out the philosophical foundations 
of the Aesthetic Movement.92  His intellectual stance toward evolutionary theory was unique 
among the cultural critics of his generation, in part because he so clearly connected his own 
risqué criticism to the pioneering natural sciences.  As Gerald Monsman points out, Pater’s 
“excited acceptance of what he took to be aspects of the scientific spirit” (especially its “covert 
or direct materialism”) set him apart from other men of letters and antagonized his hidebound 
superiors at Oxford, where he was an instructor.93  Of course, Pater had already articulated major 
portions of his response to evolutionary science before Clifford rose to prominence in the 1870s: 
in “Winckelmann” (1867), for instance, Pater advocates a “nobler…attitude” capable of looking 
on bleak material reality with “blitheness and repose.”94  Nevertheless, Pater’s search for modes 
of thinking and being that could redeem human experience in an apparently purposeless universe 
bears notable resemblances to Clifford’s contemporary concerns.  Beyond this early ideological 
congruence, elements of Pater’s thinking also provide evidence of more substantive engagement 
with Clifford’s ideas after the mid 1870s, when the two writers began publishing regularly in the 
Fortnightly Review.  Pater’s late-career explorations of ethical aestheticism also acquire an 
evolutionary character—perhaps best exemplified in his 1885 novel Marius the Epicurean—that 
reflects and revises Clifford’s famous discussion of “cosmic emotion.” 																																																								
92 Pater, “Poems by William Morris,” 312. 
93 Gerald Monsman, Walter Pater (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1977), 29, 62-64.  
94 Pater, “Winckelmann,” 110.  
		 116 
 As Monsman, Billie Andrew Inman, and other scholars have noted, it is difficult to trace 
Pater’s scientific reading with any precision, since he often incorporated ideas into his richly 
referential writing without explicitly citing his sources.95  Undoubtedly, however, Pater was both 
a voracious reader and a full participant in the interdisciplinary culture of late Victorian 
periodical print.  Pater’s own essays, for instance, often appeared alongside articles by 
contemporary scientists such as Tyndall and Huxley.  Monsman points out that Pater’s earliest 
pieces consequently “espouse the predominately Positivist philosophy” of the journals in which 
they appeared, including Macmillan’s Magazine and the Fortnightly Review.96  Pater’s prose, 
Monsman adds, “clearly…draw[s] imaginatively on biological, chemical, physical, and 
geological terminology”; Monsman also hears subtler echoes of Clifford, Darwin, Spencer, 
Huxley, and Tyndall in the general “empirical-scientific spirit” of Pater’s work.97  In her 
exhaustive study of Pater’s library borrowings and literary references, Inman finds that Pater 
studied and discussed Origin shortly after its publication, and she further speculates that he read 
Spencer's Principles of Biology (1864-67) before composing his famous review of Morris’s 
poetry.98  Similarly, Ian Small suggests that Pater’s writings demonstrate “considerable 
familiarity” with Bain’s psychological theories.99  Although we cannot say for certain whether 
Pater read Clifford’s articles or attended his lectures, Pater surely came into contact with 
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Clifford’s philosophy—and, at times, his very language—in the work of the younger aesthetes 
who Pater mentored (Vernon Lee, as we will see in the fourth chapter, quotes Clifford in several 
of her essays and presents a fictionalized sketch of him in her 1884 novel Miss Brown).  Pater 
may have also met Clifford in person at the Century Club, a London-based organization of like-
minded liberals to which both writers belonged; many of Pater’s scientific and literary 
interlocutors, including Huxley, Tylor, Spencer, and the historian John Addington Symonds, 
were also members.100  
 The influence of these various thinkers is evident in the materialist vision of the natural 
world that Pater presents in “William Morris” and, subsequently, the “Conclusion” to The 
Renaissance.  While his materialism owed much to his reading of classical philosophers such as 
Heraclitus and Lucretius, Pater drew a through-line from Greek atomism to modern-day natural 
science.  Much later, in 1893, he linked the Heraclitean “burden” (“all things are in motion and 
nothing at rest,” which also serves as the epigraph to the “Conclusion”) directly to Darwin and 
other “physical enquirer[s] of to-day,” who daily prove that “races, laws, arts…are themselves 
ripples only on the great river of organic life.”101  As Monsman argues, Pater’s earliest works 
agonize over “a problem deriving from the new science” of Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley: 
namely, how best to live in the conditions of constant flux to which biology, psychology, and 
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physics had reduced the universe.102  It is the self-annihilating nature of this flux that occupies the 
most recognizable passage of “William Morris.”  “Our physical life,” Pater observes,  
is a perpetual motion of [elements]—the passage of the blood, the wasting and repairing of 
the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain by every ray of light and 
sound—processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary forces.…Far out 
on every side of us these elements are broadcast, driven by many forces; and birth and 
gesture and death and the springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten 
thousand resulting combinations.…This at least of flame-like our life has, that it is but the 
concurrence renewed from moment to moment of forces parting sooner or later on their 
ways.103   
 
As Inman and others have observed, Pater’s language broadly evokes both Tyndall’s discussions 
of the conservation of energy and Helmholtz’s experimental work on the physiology of the 
eye.104  Pater’s equation of biological processes with physical forces, I would add, also recalls 
Spencer’s theorization of organic life as the accumulation, expenditure, and transfer of energy: 
the natural world, for Spencer, is an exchange economy, and an organism lives only so long as it 
can maintain a delicate “moving equilibrium” between the forces within and outside its body.105  
With characteristic finesse, Pater’s “William Morris” captures the Heraclitean instability of such 
an existence in his own syntax, which surges relentlessly through numerous non-terminal 
punctuation marks—polysyndetons, em-dashes, and semicolons—often nested in the same 
sentence.  In the proverbial blink of an eye, elements and energies cohere into a body, live 
briefly, then dissolve and reform into a new “combination”: the graveside violets, which “spring” 
upward with a force recycled from the “gesture” that once animated the matter in its human 
form.  In a departure from Spencer’s teleological view of evolution, however, Pater’s rendition 
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of biological process is noticeably cyclical and, as a result, non-directional.  Both here and 
throughout his oeuvre, Pater often resists teleology in favor of the Heraclitean view of the 
world—a world that “properly is not but is only always becoming.”106  Crushingly for Pater, this 
materialism forecloses the possibility of spiritual immortality.  “Well, we are all condamnés,” he 
reasons, quoting Victor Hugo: “we have an interval and then we cease to be.”107 
 Like Clifford, however, Pater emphasizes the “seem[ingly] desolate” materialism of 
science so that he may advance an aesthetic attitude best suited to these circumstances.108  Pater’s 
articulation of the aesthetic life thus sustains scientific materialism insofar as it authorizes 
intellectual deviance and experiential variety.  As Carolyn D. Williams argues in her analysis of 
the “Conclusion,” Pater takes the nihilistic and hedonistic ramifications of modern thought to 
their “extreme limits,” only to “devote the full force of his rhetorical, figurative, and 
philosophical energies to proposing an alternative”: the philosophy of aestheticism.109  Following 
a line of reasoning that bears comparison with Clifford’s, Pater’s aestheticism seeks both to 
assimilate scientific understandings of natural law and to resist their most dehumanizing 
implications.  For instance, Pater responds to scientific assertions of our mortality—we enjoy no 
more than a “counted number of pulses,” he reflects, in the brief “interval” of life—by proposing 
a cognitive praxis that might allow us “to be present always at the focus where the greatest 
number of vital forces unite in their purest energy.”110  Tellingly, Pater’s alternative to the 																																																								
106 Pater, “Plato and the Doctrine of Motion,” 14.   
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potential nihilism of the scientific worldview comes not from a position of anti-scientific 
spiritualism, but from within science itself: his quantification of “vital forces,” and his 
consequent assumption that we might increase our quality of life by maximizing our contact with 
these forces, builds on Spencer’s connection of organismic growth to the “spontaneous overflow 
of energy.”111  Clifford's evolutionary conception of social and intellectual deviance in “Mental 
Development” also resonates powerfully in Pater’s early writing.  Confronted with the same 
specter of a cold and ever-changing universe, Pater delineates an ideal method of vision and 
cognition remarkably congruous with Clifford’s notion of “receptivity.”  “What we have to do,” 
Pater famously concludes in both “William Morris” and the “Conclusion,” “is to be for ever 
curiously testing opinion and courting new impressions” without “acquiescing in a facile 
orthodoxy.”112  Since Pater shares with Clifford an understanding of “life” as receptivity and 
impressibility—the prerequisites of adaptability—Pater rejects “habit” as a “failure” akin to 
Clifford’s notion of degenerative “crystallisation.”113   
 In the early essays that he collected in The Renaissance, Pater expands this notion of 
intellectual receptivity into his more comprehensive concept of the exemplary temperament, an 
ideal that would come to define the art for art’s sake movement.  Pater’s “Notes on Leonardo da 
Vinci” (1869), for instance, enthuses over the painter’s “boundless curiosity,” his insuppressible 
“restlessness,” and his “intolerance of the common forms of things,” which spurred both his 
scientific studies and his extraordinary, at times “profane,” artistry.114  Leonardo’s ineffable 																																																								
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“strange[ness],” Pater suggests, is one manifestation of the liberated, intellectually fearless 
character that might “make as much as possible of the interval” of life.115  In his essay “Pico 
della Mirandula” (1871), Pater is likewise sympathetic to the Renaissance philosopher’s quixotic 
attempts to reconcile Paganism with Christianity.  Although Pater acknowledges that Pico’s 
scholarship is historically inaccurate—in part because he predated what Pater calls the modern 
“idea of development”—Pater discerns in Pico’s “rehabilitation of human nature” the more 
valuable hallmarks of the “true humanist.”116  Pico’s humanism, Pater elaborates, anticipated 
both the High Renaissance and modern science: anthropology and psychology, in a retroactive 
validation of Pico’s approach, now trace all religion to “the inexhaustible activity and 
creativeness of the human mind itself.”117  Importantly, Pater’s understanding of Leonardo’s and 
Pico’s respective temperaments taps into the vitalist celebration of life that Clifford later 
integrated into his scientific writing.  For Pater, the “essence” of Pico’s humanism—and what 
makes his example so enlightening—is his conviction “that nothing which has ever interested 
living men and women can wholly lose its vitality.”118  As Pater elaborates elsewhere, the ideal 
temperament is thus “elastic” and capacious, and it “cries out against every formula less living 
and flexible than life itself.”119  In this sense, Clifford’s energetic endorsement of uninhibited 																																																								
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“receptivity” on rational grounds provides a model for Pater’s own project in the “Conclusion”—
to “achieve,” as Kate Hext observes, “autonomy under the conditions of modernity through 
aesthetic experience.”120   
 Pater’s reassertion of freedom, like Clifford’s before him, depends upon the sensory 
enjoyment of the material universe, in part because contemporary science (as we have seen in the 
first chapter) defined the aesthetic sense as an organic function relatively unconstrained by the 
deterministic pressures of natural selection and heredity.  In his 1867 essay on Johann 
Winckelmann, Pater describes these stultifying external forces metaphorically, as a “magic web 
woven through and through us, like that magnetic system of which modern science speaks, 
penetrating us with a network, subtler than our subtlest nerves, yet bearing in it the central forces 
of the world”: for Pater, it is this understanding of the inexorable “universality of natural law, 
even in the moral order,” that defines modernity.121  In the face of this new paradigm, Pater 
asserts that art and culture must train individuals to adopt a more spiritually fulfilling outlook on 
the otherwise demoralizing “conditions of modern life.”122  A truly “modern” art, Pater 
continues, should “represent men and women in these bewildering toils so as to give the spirit at 
least an equivalent for the sense of freedom” that the new sciences have jeopardized.123  “Natural 
laws we shall never modify,” he allows, “but there is still something in the nobler or less noble 
attitude with which we watch their fatal combinations.”124  The pleasures of beauty, Pater adds in 
his later essay “On Wordsworth” (1874), help foster this attitude by “withdraw[ing] the thoughts 																																																								
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for a little while from the mere machinery of life.”125  In a remarkable reframing of Darwin’s and 
Spencer’s non-functionalist aesthetics, Pater argues that aesthetic contemplation—in his words, a 
life of “being as distinct from doing”—offers an escape from the “meanness” of daily life, 
precisely because beauty has no “end” aside from the “mere joy of beholding.”126  “To treat life 
in the spirit of art,” Pater concludes, “is to make life a thing in which means and ends are 
identified.”127  Certainly, Pater’s repudiation of “doing” as a concession to the utilitarian 
pressures of survival departs from Clifford’s insistence on the vitalizing “love of action.”  But 
Clifford, as we have seen, consistently rejected utilitarian standards of value in both science and 
art, and he accordingly considered an action ethically “good” only insofar as the individual could 
act freely, without regard to custom or practicality.  Pater’s and Clifford’s views converge in this 
escapist impulse: both writers focus on the cultivation of an aesthetic disposition toward the 
world that might allow one to break free, however briefly, from the pall of material life. 
 This attitude of “sustained, not unpleasurable awe” in the midst of an otherwise unlovely 
universe is central to Pater’s dissection of psychological growth in his later imaginary portraits, 
many of which are motivated by the same humanist sentiment that suffuses Clifford’s 
writings.128  As Hext argues, Pater’s depictions of nature in this period often invite their reader 
“to envisage evolution with the perverse pleasure of a decadent” and to make a spectacle of one’s 
“own fate within evolutionary history.”129  For example, in “The Child in the House” (1878), a 
semi-fictionalized sketch of Pater’s earliest memories, the child puts Clifford’s perceptual 																																																								
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program into practice by instinctively detecting a “higher and more consistent harmony” behind 
the “acts and accidents of daily life.”130  The child’s proto-aesthetic sensibility allows him to 
superimpose an imagined perfection onto what Pater’s narrator calls “every-day existence,” with 
all its small, unsightly troubles.131  In his imaginary portrait “Sebastian van Storck” (1886), Pater 
advances a similar revision of dismal cosmology—not, in this case, post-Darwinian materialism, 
but instead Sebastian’s pre-Darwinian belief that all “vividly-coloured existence” is just a 
“transient perturbation of the absolute mind.”132  The same theory that leads Sebastian to frigid, 
“well-reasoned nihilism,” Pater argues, might have instead prompted a humane sense of “joy and 
love…allied to the poetical or artistic sympathy, which feels challenged to become acquainted 
with and explore the various forms of finite existence all the more intimately, just because of that 
sense of one lively spirit circulating through all things.”133  Sebastian, in other words, might have 
accepted the premises of his “well-reasoned” worldview without succumbing to nihilism, if only 
he had tempered his rationalism with an all-embracing admiration for the resplendent beauty of 
the universe.  
In his late portrait “Giordano Bruno” (1889), Pater correspondingly relates this sense of 
harmony to the scientific temperament.  Among Bruno’s many admirable qualities, Pater 
reserves special praise for the Franciscan friar’s pantheism, for which he was eventually burned 
at the stake: in Bruno’s vision, Pater writes, the “ghastly spectacle of the endless material 
universe” transformed into “the delightful consciousness of an ever-widening kinship and 
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sympathy.”134  Pater specifically attributes Bruno’s generative heterodoxy to the “largeness of 
mind” that gave rise to such scientific innovators as Bacon and Darwin.135  In many ways, 
Pater’s Bruno is an exemplar of Clifford’s, as well as Pater’s, ideal thinker: consider Bruno’s 
ceaseless curiosity, his consequent ability to form “true ideas” in acts of demiurgic creation, his 
“mystic recognition” of the divine uniformity of nature, and his eager desire to study nature and 
disentangle its “delightful tangle of things.”136  The seemingly selfish, solipsistic hedonism for 
which Pater was pilloried in the conservative press thus had its basis in a larger effort to address 
the individual’s spiritual needs in ways that conformed with up-to-date biological and 
psychological knowledge—an effort in which Clifford played a prominent part.137  As Dawson 
argues, both supporters and detractors of Pater’s movement consequently regarded the “language 
and assumptions” of science and aestheticism as “virtually interchangeable” (most infamously, 
W. H. Mallock’s 1877 roman à clef The New Republic charges both Clifford and Pater, 
caricatured respectively as Saunders and Rose, with a dangerous moral relativism).138  Pater’s 
concluding critique of Bruno’s “loose sympathies,” too, might easily have been addressed to 
Clifford’s standard of “absolute receptivity”: Bruno is so open-minded that he lacks an apparatus 
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for discriminating, either ethically or aesthetically, between “good, bad, and indifferent” 
qualities.139  His generous spirit and intellectual flexibility, Pater explains in a noticeably 
Darwinian idiom, “discourage[ed] any effort at selection.”140   
This tension between personal freedom (which underpinned a humanistic response to 
evolution that started with Darwin himself) and ethics troubled Pater in the final decade of his 
career.  As Hext argues, Pater often gestured toward ethical conceptions of “humanity at large” 
even as he struggled to articulate how his doctrine of self-culture could translate into widespread 
social benefit.141  I suggest that Pater found some resolution to this paradox in Clifford’s 
humanistic evolutionism, which asserted that the individual, by assuming an aesthetic attitude 
toward the cosmos, exerted some semi-mystical influence over future generations.  Clifford, we 
will recall, took pains to demonstrate continuity between the short-lived individual and divine, 
universal “Man,” in whom one could achieve an abstract kind of immortality.  Clifford’s religion 
of humanity, coupled with Darwin’s and Spencer’s evolutionary aesthetics and Tylor’s theories 
of the heritability of culture, raised the stakes of individual aesthetic experience and 
consequently magnified the importance of cultivating an aesthetic perspective on the world.  In 
this context, Pater finally placed his trust in rarefied evolutionary mechanisms to preserve and 
proliferate what he considered the ideal temperament.  It is in his evocations of generational 
progress that Pater comes closest to renewing his youthful claim that “a majority of [aesthetic 
personalities] would be the regeneration of the world.”142 
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 Pater’s intensely psychological novel Marius the Epicurean, which follows the titular 
protagonist as he explores the numerous philosophical systems flourishing in Antonine Rome, 
hints at the ways in which evolutionary process might amplify self-cultivation into larger cultural 
renewal.  Repulsed by pure Epicureanism and chilled by Stoicism, Marius embodies an 
intellectual middle ground between these extremes: his “unclouded and receptive soul” revels in 
the “full stream of refined sensation,” while his “hieratic refinement” prompts him to “the 
selection, the choice, of what was perfect in its kind.”143  Marius’s receptivity, in other words, is 
counterpoised against an instinct for tasteful discrimination that Pater once again expresses in the 
scientifically inflected term “selection.”  Marius’s course of self-education, the narrator remarks, 
thus requires “the enlarging and refinement of the receptive powers,” especially “those 
powers…which are directly relative to fleeting phenomena—the powers of sensation and 
emotion.”144  Unlike the more hedonistic Epicureans who he encounters, however, Marius 
realizes that this contemplative and aesthetic “manner of life might itself even come to seem a 
kind of religion—an inward, visionary, mystic piety or religion.”145  Marius’s sense of piety, in 
turn, gives him a rigorous standard of “perfect[ion]” by which to judge the “traits of nature and 
of man”: in this way, he moderates his desire for sensory pleasure with a disciplined and 
fastidious sense of taste.146   
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Throughout the novel, Pater imbues Marius’s religious attitude toward life with explicit 
evolutionary ramifications.  Although Marius himself is unaware of the precise mechanisms by 
which humankind evolves, Pater’s narrator freely adapts Tylor’s ideas about cultural 
development: the novel opens with a discussion of Pagan “survival[s],” and its history of early 
Christianity is premised on the maxim, reminiscent of Tylor, that religions “must…grow by the 
same law of development which has prevailed in all the rest of the moral world.”147  Similarly to 
“Poems by William Morris,” Marius remakes this basic scientific fact—that is, Tylor’s 
conception of religion as an anthropological phenomenon rather than a revealed truth—into a 
broad basis for individual choice.  Since no religion can claim absolute validity, the narrator 
reasons, Marius can assemble his personal philosophy with a “generous eclecticism” that is as 
organic and unconstrained as the “very spirit of life itself.”148  With his vital adaptability and 
refined taste, Marius embraces the best elements of Roman culture, including the beautiful 
liturgical survivals of Paganism, the compassionate humanism of early Christianity, and the 
joyous self-determinism of Epicureanism.  Over the course of his life, Marius also rejects those 
modes of thinking that lead to the suffering of others: during his service to Marcus Aurelius, for 
instance, Marius disavows the Stoic renunciation of the body that allows the otherwise fair-
minded emperor to tolerate the sight of violence in the gladiatorial arena.  Free to choose 
whatever is “perfect” from a diverse pool of religious beliefs, art objects, and ethical principles, 
Marius becomes, in effect, the selective agent for a form of cultural evolution.   
Given the possibility of Marius’s evolutionary influence, Pater can recast his aesthetic 
creed of self-perfection into an unexpectedly pro-social form of ethics.  Marius, the narrator 
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reminds us, is “no frivolous dilettante” but a serious “economist” who sets about “mak[ing] the 
most, in no mean or vulgar sense, of the few years of life.”149  In keeping with Clifford’s 
affirmative vision of Spencerian biology, Pater situates Marius’s individual practice of 
“economy” within a grander cooperative undertaking: by living out his philosophy, Marius 
“gives a meaning of his own, but quite a real and sincere one, to those old words [from the 
Gospel of John]—Let us work while it is day!”150  Like Clifford, Pater transmutes a potentially 
decadent Pagan sentiment—i.e., the idea that we should enjoy what little time we have by 
indulging our every desire—into an urgent appeal for collaborative labor.  (The quotation from 
John also bears a rhetorical likeness to Clifford’s own pseudo-Biblical entreaty, “Let us take 
hands and help, for this day we are alive together.”)  Marius’s “heresy,” the narrator declares, 
instead “becomes a counsel of perfection,” a permutation of “that larger, well-adjusted system of 
the old morality, through which the better portion of mankind strive, in common, towards the 
realisation of a better world than the present.”151   
For this reason, the childless Marius can still entertain an optimistic deathbed vision of 
his “link…to the generations to come”:  
Yes! through the survival of their children, happy parents are able to think calmly, and 
with a very practical affection, of a world in which they are to have no direct share; 
planting, with a cheerful good humour, the acorns they carry about with them, that their 
grandchildren may be shaded from the sun by the broad oak-trees of the future.…It was 
thus, too, surprised, delighted, that Marius, under the power of that new hope among men, 
could think of the generations to come after him. Without it, dim in truth as it was, he 
could hardly have dared to ponder the world which limited all he really knew, as it would 
be when he should have departed from it.152 
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At the novel’s conclusion, Pater thus arrives at a more consciously humanitarian aestheticism, 
one oriented toward the gradual amelioration of the species through self-culture.  Pater’s 
departure from the stark, cyclical materialism of “William Morris” also becomes clear in his 
reconsideration of what the narrator of Marius calls the “merely sceptical doctrine” of “perpetual 
flux,” which on deeper reflection appears to be “but the preliminary step towards a great system 
of almost religious philosophy.”153  In a moment of Cliffordian “apprehen[sion], in what seemed 
like a mass of lifeless matter, [of] the movement of the universal life,” Marius sees that 
Heraclitus really postulated a form of divine “continuance…maintained throughout the changes 
of the phenomenal world.”154  Marius’s generational hopes, which render his lifetime of aesthetic 
self-cultivation evolutionarily beneficial, have their genesis in this revelation of “harmony 
in…mutation” at play in the cosmos.155  On these grounds, David J. DeLaura determines that 
“Pater’s aestheticism, for all its confusion of ethics and aesthetics, is essentially a special 
morality—not art for art’s sake but for the sake of a special conception of the perfected life.”156   
 Clifford’s optimistic evolutionism helps explain how Pater could conceive of perfected 
living—with its delicate equipoise of sensual license and intellectual discipline—as a moral and 
social good.  Long after Clifford’s death, we can still discern traces of the mathematician’s 
divine, universal “Man” in Pater’s discussion of the “Zeit-geist” in his lecture “Plato and the 
Doctrine of Number” (1893): “it is humanity itself now—abstract humanity—that figures as the 
transmigrating soul, accumulating into its ‘colossal manhood’ the experience of ages; making 
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use of, and casting aside in its march, the souls of countless individuals.”157  Pater, ever 
suspicious of teleology, remains equivocal about the directionality of this “march,” in which an 
indiscriminate humankind accrues “experience” without necessarily benefitting from its hoard.  
Yet, the hereditary continuity that he terms “metempsychôsis” here stands as a kind of 
immortality; this immortality, though imposing and unsentimental, is ultimately more humane 
and aspirational than the mindless shuffling of atoms that he explicated in “William Morris” over 
twenty years earlier.  For Pater, the function of art in modern life was always to reaffirm the 
integrity of the individual within cosmic processes that seemed inimical to that integrity, such as 
the almost monstrous cultural accretion (the “sweeping together” of “ten thousand experiences”) 
that he describes in his famous reading of La Gioconda in “Leonardo da Vinci,” or the 
transmigration that he imagines in “Plato and the Doctrine of Number.”158  But Pater, building on 
Clifford’s philosophy, ultimately makes a larger, evolutionary claim for the aesthetic individual, 
whose “liberty of soul” and “beatific vision…of our actual experience of the world” contribute to 
the sublime life of the species.159 
 
III. Blind and the “Triumph of the Human Mind” 
 I turn briefly now to the radical aesthetic poet and critic Mathilde Blind, whose works 
from the 1880s bring together Pater’s philosophy of aesthetic self-cultivation with Clifford’s 
program for transformation on an evolutionary scale.  Although only rediscovered in the 
twentieth century, Blind was part of the cosmopolitan assemblage of famous progressives (many 
associated with Pre-Raphaelitism and the Aesthetic Movement) that gathered around her 																																																								
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stepfather, exiled activist Karl Blind.160  In the Blind home, revolutionaries such as Joseph 
Mazzini and Karl Marx mingled with writers such as John Stuart Mill, Huxley, Rossetti, Morris, 
and Swinburne, with whom Blind developed an intimate correspondence.161  Generally speaking, 
Blind’s deeply ingrained republicanism meshed with the principles of aestheticism, which Pater 
was concurrently defining in terms of its resistance to moral and artistic orthodoxy.  Blind was 
also a close friend of the Cliffords: she admiringly quotes Clifford in several of her writings, and 
she composed the short poem “Perfect Union” (dedicated to “W. K. C.”) on the occasion of his 
death in 1879.162  The poem imagines Clifford’s final moments, in which he faces his death 
“with unintimidated eyes,” as the triumphant culmination of his evolutionary optimism.163  
Secure in his “invincible belief / Of Man’s august supremacy,” Blind’s Clifford experiences an 
ecstatic religious vision of “paradise” before dying peacefully, and he uses his last ounce of 
energy to describe the apparition: “Perfect!,” he cries in typically rousing fashion, “No one 
knows / How perfect!”164   
As “Perfect Union” suggests, Blind’s friendship with Clifford guided her strikingly 
passionate reception of evolutionary theory.  Arthur Symons, in his retrospective on Blind’s 
career, observes that her “instinct for what was religious” found an outlet in “the scientific 
teaching of Darwin,…which inflamed her with the ardour of a worshipper.”165  “Her expressions 																																																								
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of strenuous and reverent unbelief,” continues Symons, “rise at times to almost the very highest 
rapture of Pantheism.”166  “Reverent unbelief” and rationalist “ardour” are some of the hallmarks 
of Clifford’s philosophy, and the quasi-pantheism that Symons describes savors of Pater’s neo-
Hellenistic interpretations of modern materialism.  In her lecture “Shelley’s View of Nature 
Contrasted with Darwin’s” and her evolutionary epic The Ascent of Man, Blind relies on both 
Clifford’s secular zealotry and Pater’s aesthetic sensibility as she searches for rational methods 
of progress consistent with her commitments to poetry, social justice, and self-determination 
both in politics and in art.  That Blind so readily fused Clifford’s and Pater’s respective 
philosophies into an affirmative projection of human evolution—a vision of futurity that surfaces 
in Wilde’s and Lee’s work as well—shows us that Clifford was, to many Victorian aesthetes, an 
important interlocutor for Pater and a founding figure in the Aesthetic Movement. 
 Blind’s interest in humanistic evolutionism emerges clearly in her lecture on Percy 
Bysshe Shelley, in which she attempts to concretize his utopian imagination by reconciling 
(rather than contrasting, as the title promises) Shelley’s and Darwin’s respective cosmologies.  
Blind initially aligns Shelley’s “rose-coloured” view of nature with Enlightenment conceptions 
of the earth as “an abode of love and harmony,” which she juxtaposes with “the reckless 
competition, the selfishness, the cruelty” of Darwinian natural law.167  Yet Blind soon claims that 
Shelley, had he lived to read Darwin, would have easily absorbed evolutionary theory’s most 
uplifting implications: Prometheus Unbound (1820) “would have shown the human race…not as 
physically and morally depraved, owing to its gradual alienation from Nature, but, on the 
contrary, as emerging from a semi-brutal, barbarous condition, and continually progressing to 
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higher stages of moral and mental development.”168  Blind considers this emphasis on human 
self-making—that is, humankind's “continually growing power” to overcome the “irresponsible 
forces of Nature”—“more in harmony with the Darwinian conception of the universe, and more 
consoling on the whole.”169  What Blind means by “the Darwinian conception of the universe,” 
however, more closely resembles Clifford’s and Pater’s evolutionary humanism—an eclectic 
amalgamation of Darwinian and Spencerian evolution, classical and Renaissance materialism, 
and religious rhetoric—which insisted on seeing the species, in Clifford’s words, as “a risen race 
and not a fallen one.”170   
Blind thus integrates Shelley’s radical utopianism into Darwin’s theory on the basis of 
their similarly progressive understanding of the material universe.  Shelley’s rapturous depictions 
of nature, Blind claims, intuited a beautiful cosmic telos that Darwin later proved scientifically.  
Blind concludes her lecture by discerning the “final junction” of both writers’ views in 
the glorious vistas they disclose of ever higher types of life replacing those that had gone 
before.  For, judging by analogy, better, wiser, and more beautiful things will inhabit this 
planet in the ages to come, according to the law of evolution, than we can now have any 
conception of.  And I hope that we are all agreed that in Shelley himself we have already a 
certain foreshadowing of something better—for with his exquisitely sensitive 
organisation,…with his scorn for vulgar aims ending in self-aggrandisement, with his 
impatience of the conventional, continually hampering standards of morality, and with his 
passion for reforming the world, he seems lifted, not only above the needs and greeds of 
sensual desires, but also above the fierce competition, the corroding jealousy, and 
malignant rivalries from which intellectual workers are so rarely exempt.171 
 
Blind’s account of Shelley’s poetic imagination here draws on both Pater’s transgressive 
aestheticism—with its elevation of the “sensitive,” disinterested, unorthodox personality—and 
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Clifford’s devout faith in the god-like power of “Man.”  Convinced, like Clifford and Pater, of 
the evolutionary value of intellectual and personal freedom, Blind celebrates Shelley’s disregard 
for moral convention, his disdain for “vulgar” economic gain, and his heroic rejection of the 
“dread law” of natural selection.172  Shelley’s life and work, in Blind’s understanding, thus 
presage the evolution of “better, wiser, and more beautiful things”: not just creatures, but also 
artworks, personalities, institutions, and philosophies. 
 By applying, as Clifford and Pater did, the language of evolutionary selection to the 
realms of art, morality, and belief, Blind asserts the importance of individual choice in 
evolutionary processes outside the natural selective paradigm of “fierce competition.”  This 
arrogation of selective power to humankind also allows Blind to situate Shelley’s poetics within 
a sustained project of racial self-improvement that will end in what she deems “the final triumph 
of the human mind over the brute forces of nature.”173  Shelley’s chief contribution to this project 
lies, for Blind, in the proto-aesthetic character of his poetry, specifically his preference for 
“beautiful idealisms” over naturalistic depictions of “mundane subjects” and “tragic themes.”174  
Since Shelley, in his “glowing anticipation of a better future in store for humanity,” consciously 
ignores the quotidian cruelties of everyday life, Blind predicts that his poetry “will become a 
factor in helping to bring [a better future] about.”175  That is, Shelley performs his evolutionary 
role by proposing moral alternatives to the “dread law” of nature, while refined readers (such as 
Blind’s listeners at the Shelley Society, where she delivered the talk) exert selective pressure by 
choosing to read and internalize his poetry.  Pater’s and Clifford’s influences are especially 																																																								
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palpable in Blind’s assumption (one adopted also by Wilde, Allen, and Lee) that self-culture can 
bring about widespread, long-term change. 
 In her epic retelling of the evolution of humankind, The Ascent of Man, Blind again 
attempts to harmonize the Darwinian reality of “immemorial strife” with the “invincible belief” 
in human progress that her poem “Perfect Union” identifies with Clifford.176  Ascent, more 
forthrightly than “Shelley’s View of Nature,” presents art and culture as alternatives to the 
violence of natural selection.  Blind’s noticeable inversion of the title of Darwin’s Descent—
which implied a decline that misrepresented the true nature of human evolution, according to 
Clifford—directly challenges a pessimistic strain that runs through certain Victorian poetic 
responses to contemporary science.  Alfred Tennyson’s elegiac poem In Memoriam (1850), with 
its iconic lament for “Nature, red in tooth and claw,” is only the most prominent illustration of a 
larger crisis of faith that looms over countless other poems, including Robert Browning’s 
“Caliban upon Setebos” (1864) and Matthew Arnold’s “Dover Beach” (1867).177  As Stevenson 
observes, and as we have already seen, the later poetry of Swinburne and Meredith posited 
“vision[s] of future progress” that explicitly rejected these earlier poets’ melancholy.178  Blind’s 
Ascent undoubtedly belongs to this pro-scientific tradition.  More recently, John Holmes has 
called Blind’s “teleological drive towards an ideal humanity favoured by nature and equated with 
the divine” a poetic “act of bad faith”—Blind, he claims, knew that this optimism ran afoul of 
																																																								
176 Blind, The Ascent of Man, 48;  “Perfect Union,” 125. 
177 Alfred Tennyson, In Memoriam, ed. Erik Gray (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 41. 
178 Stevenson, Darwin Among the Poets, 209. 
		 137 
Darwin’s non-teleological model of evolution.179  However, several literary and scientific 
authorities, including Clifford, Pater, and Swinburne, underwrote Blind’s idealism.   
Blind also found a key intellectual ally in Constance Naden, the contemporary poet and 
philosopher who sought to supplant a declining religiosity with a rational humanist philosophy 
that she termed “Hylo-Idealism.”  Hylo-Idealism, as Naden theorizes it, extrapolates the 
subjective psychology of Bain and others into the ambitious contention that “man is the maker of 
his own Cosmos.”180  Given the shaping power of our perception, Naden finds “our only hope for 
salvation…in the conscientious endeavor to draw new life from nature, and to make science 
itself a well-spring of ideal truth.”181  Many of Naden’s poems enact this idealistic materialism 
by rendering the physical universe in simultaneously scientific and mythic terms: her sonnet 
“The Nebular Theory” (1887), for instance, reimagines the birth of the universe as the sexual 
consummation of “atoms…Clinging and clustering, with fierce throbs of birth, / And raptures of 
keen torment, such as stings / Demons who wed in Tophet.”182  As such, Naden’s reverent 
pantheism both echoes Clifford’s devout expressions of nonbelief and anticipates the triumphant 
evolutionism of Blind’s Ascent.   
 Like “Shelley’s View of Nature,” Blind’s Ascent sustains its sense of hope by shifting the 
epicenter of evolutionary progress away from the natural world and toward the domain of 
culture.  Importantly, this shift operates in the poem’s kaleidoscopic prosody as well as its 																																																								
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content.  In the first section of Ascent, “The Chaunts of Life,” Blind employs dactylic hexameter, 
iambic tetrameter, and a number of complicated variations on ballad meter.  Her virtuosic array 
of verse forms evinces a variety and excess that seem to recreate the conditions of Darwinian 
evolution on the level of form itself.  As Jason Rudy argues, Blind believed that evolutionary 
progress consisted in the subjection of “unruly instinct, or natural disorder, to disciplined 
control”; this view of evolution convinced her that poetry, through its “imposition…of formal 
structure,” could push the species “toward ever higher levels of moral and intellectual 
sophistication.”183  The poem accordingly begins with a stark representation of primordial 
fecundity: humankind emerges from a “hell of hunger, hatred [and] lust” where life “mounts 
higher” only “step by panting step,” through cycles of explosive procreation and mass death.184  
But just as her prosody lends order and beauty to the chaos of “teeming earth,” Blind’s narrative 
carefully sets humankind, the “strange new creature,” apart from the “reeking swarms” of lower 
animals.185   Freed from want and “pressing hunger,” Blind’s primitive man begins to extricate 
himself from “Nature’s thrall” after he learns to recognize within nature “all shows of things in 
colour, sound, or form,” whether in the “symphonious” sounds of the sea or the magnificent 
colors of a misty valley.186  In Ascent, the birth of sensuality represents a pivotal change in 
humankind’s relationship to nature, which becomes an object of serene, pleasurable 
contemplation instead of the fraught locus of life-or-death struggle.  Blind directly links the 
species’ success to its singular ability—an imperfect one, as her lengthy meditation on war and 
poverty suggests—to suspend the brutal laws of nature, if only in the imagination.  In her 																																																								
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evolutionary history, the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure for its own sake is not a vestige of our 
animality but a marker of our humanity.  For Blind, the aesthetic sensibility of a Shelley or a 
Pater (or a Clifford, for that matter) thus represents a milestone on the way toward the future 
“triumph” she predicts at the end of “Shelley’s View of Nature.”  
 Consequently, Blind presents the creation and consumption of art as countermeasures 
against the “grey legacies of hate and hoar misdeeds” that humans have inherited from their 
ancestors.187  Blind’s prototypical artist, “pursued and stung and driven” by a battery of 
uncontrollable natural forces, finds “delivery in the realm of art” and in the “divine control” he 
exerts over “forms and hues and sounds that make / Life grow lovelier for their sake.”188  
Underlying Blind’s evolutionary account is the specifically Paterian, and more broadly aesthetic, 
claim that good art refines and elevates rather than represents everyday life: the early sculptor 
strenuously imbues his marble with “such beauty as ne’er bloomed in mortal mould,” and his 
successor, the painter, transfigures “common things” by “the magic of the brush.”189  But it is the 
poet, the most advanced of artists, whom Blind crowns “Lord of life’s changeful shows”: a god 
“in whose shaping brain / Life is created o’er again,” and “whose mighty potencies of verse / … / 
fashion to their strenuous will / The world that is creating still.”190  In this context, her complex 
and eclectic prosody—she pays her tribute to poetry in carefully wrought variations on the 
couplet—puts into practice the poet’s demiurgic power to “fashion” the world to her “strenuous 
will.” 
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 As her evolutionary history comes to a close, Blind further exploits her prerogative as 
poet by staging a euphoric religious vision reminiscent of Clifford, which she invokes in a 
versatile and varied trochaic tetrameter:  
Do you hear it, do you hear it 
Soaring up to heaven, or somewhere near it? 
From the depths of life upheaving, 
Clouds of earth and sorrow cleaving, 
From despair and death retrieving, 
All triumphant blasts of sound 
Lift you at one rhythmic bound 
From the thraldom of the ground. 
 
[……………………]  
 
Till no longer cramped and bound 
By the narrow human round, 
All the body’s barriers slide, 
Which with cold obstruction hide 
The supreme, undying, sole 
Spirit struggling though the whole…191   
 
Here, the speaker confidently proclaims her ability to free her readers, through the transcendent 
pleasures of metrical rhythm, from “thraldom” to the earth and their animal origins.  The poem’s 
slide into catalexis (which begins with the line, “All triumphant blasts of sound”) signals a 
metrical as well as tonal shift that accompanies the ascent out of “earth and sorrow” and “despair 
and death”; the stressed endings of subsequent lines mirror the exultant upward trajectory that 
Blind intends for her reader.  More dramatically, Blind positions this personal emancipation as 
the prelude to an even vaster operation at work in the universe as a whole—a semi-mystical 
striving toward perfection in which the discrete individual ultimately dissolves into the 
“supreme…Spirit” of humankind.  Blind’s application of the Darwinian term “struggle” to this 
process is telling: the most savage of activities, once the driving force behind a “chaos and 																																																								
191 Blind, The Ascent of Man, 54-55. 
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welter…of pain,” becomes sacred and ethereal when imagined on a large enough scale.192  For 
all her attention to the ugly realities of nature, Blind’s ambition in Ascent is to redeem our 
perception of nature by granting us (as Clifford and Pater so often attempted) epiphanic insight 
into the true beauty of the latent universal order, to which each human life makes its contribution 
in turn.   
 Blind thus joins a tradition of evolutionary aestheticism that began with Darwin’s 
recognition, thirty years earlier, of the “grandeur” inherent in the evolutionary “view of life.”193  
For Clifford and Pater, as for Darwin, the aesthetic occupied a special place within an otherwise 
uncaring cosmos.  With her invocation of a racial “Spirit”—one that ascends higher in the 
evolutionary scale through enculturation rather than predation—Blind expands the spiritual 
overtones of Clifford’s and Pater’s humanisms into a full-blown religion that weds scientific 
rationalism to the principles of aestheticism.  Clifford, Pater, and Blind, in keeping with 
Darwin’s aesthetic insights, not only espoused the “intellectual and spiritual passion” for beauty 
that Arnold had praised in John Keats, but also looked upon Arnold’s “religion of culture” as an 
evolutionary imperative.194  More important, the tenets of their evolutionary aestheticism 
motivated some of the most memorable expressions of fin-de-siècle aestheticism.  In Lee’s call 
for a “new spirituality” directed toward the evolution of “more sensitive” individuals—as well as 
in Wilde’s confidence in our eventual “Evolution…towards Individualism” and thence towards 																																																								
192 Blind, The Ascent of Man, 4. 
193  Darwin, Origin, 427. 
194 In its broad goals, though not in its attitude toward science, Arnold’s humanism harmonized with Clifford’s, 
Pater’s, and Blind’s respective evolutionary programs: for Arnold, culture “places human perfection in an 
internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our 
animality.”  Arnold, “John Keats,” in English Literature and Irish Politics, vol. 9 of The Complete Prose Works 
of Matthew Arnold, ed. R. H. Super (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), 213; Culture and 
Anarchy, in Culture and Anarchy with Friendship’s Garland and Some Literary Essays, vol. 5 of The Complete 
Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, ed. R. H. Super (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), 115.   
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“perfection”—we hear echoes of Clifford’s, Pater’s and Blind’s respective forms of faith in the 
evolutionary potency of liberated aesthetic experience.195  As Clifford’s legacy in particular 
demonstrates, both evolutionism and aestheticism in this period developed within an intellectual 
network that spanned disciplines, genres, and milieus.  What united these three writers, finally, 
was their sincere conviction that aesthetic pleasure was at once a religious practice, a biological 
necessity, and an act of heroic resistance.  Only by savoring the beauty of the world, they 
believed, could one escape from the brutalizing struggle for survival and, in doing so, lay the 
groundwork for a more perfect future.  In subsequent years, as we will see, Allen and Wilde 
moved away from their predecessors’ emphasis on piety and developed a more overtly utopian, 
and therefore more polemical, evolutionary aestheticism: one that helped launch aestheticism 
into both fame and notoriety in the last decade of the nineteenth century.
																																																								
195 Wilde, “The Soul of Man under Socialism,” in Criticism, Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man, ed. 
Josephine M. Guy, vol. 4 of The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 263, 
268; Lee, “The Use of the Soul,” in Althea: A Second Book of Dialogues on Aspirations and Duties (London: 
Osgood, McIlvaine, 1894), 289. 
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Chapter 3 
Sexual Selection and Social Progress:  
The Utopian Evolutionism of Grant Allen and Oscar Wilde 
 
 
What measures our distance above the beasts that perish consists in these three 
things—ethics, intellect, the sense of beauty.…On the third [our existing 
morality] lays no stress at all; and herein the new hedonism has its raison d’être.  
It is part of its mission to point out to humanity that literature, poetry, painting, 
sculpture, the beautifying of life by sound, and form, and word, and colour, are 
among the most important tasks of civilisation. 
    —Grant Allen, “The New Hedonism” (1894) 
 
 In his provocative polemic “The New Hedonism,” Grant Allen mounts a passionate 
defense of fin-de-siècle aestheticism by proposing a modern ethic—the titular “new hedonism,” 
which Allen borrows from Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890, revised 
1891)—that fully synthesizes aestheticism’s insights with up-to-date scientific knowledge.1  At 
first glance, Allen seems an unexpected ally for Wilde, in part because few literary historians 
have explored the link between the two contemporaries.  Many modern-day scholars of Allen’s 
work (including Peter Morton, Bernard Lightman, William Greenslade, and Terence Rodgers) 
have tended to focus on his popular science writing, his elaborations on Herbert Spencer’s 
evolutionary theories, and his controversial “New Woman” novels The Woman Who Did (1895) 
and The Type-Writer Girl (1897).2  Those who do connect Allen and Wilde, such as Nick 
Freeman, often focus on the two writers’ shared commitments to libertarian socialism rather than 
																																																								
1 Grant Allen, “The New Hedonism,” Fortnightly Review 55 (1894): 382. 
2 See Peter Morton, “The Busiest Man in England”: Grant Allen and the Writing Trade, 1875-1900 (2005), Bernard 
Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New Audiences (2007), and William 
Greenslade and Terence Rodgers’s collection of essays on Allen, Grant Allen: Literature and Cultural Politics 
at the Fin de Siècle (2005).   
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their overlapping philosophical and aesthetic concerns.3  As we can begin to see in the epigraph, 
however, Allen’s association of evolutionary progress with aesthetic cultivation echoes Wilde’s 
aphoristic assertion, in “The Decay of Lying” (1889, revised 1891), that a “proper sense of 
human dignity…is entirely the result of indoor life”: that is, a domesticated, ornamented, 
beautified existence.4  For Allen, too, a survey of human evolutionary history reminds us that our 
cultural achievements are all that lift us “above the beasts that perish.”  In this context, 
aestheticism’s commitment to the “beautifying of life” entails for him potentially sweeping 
consequences for the future evolution of humankind.  Allen’s vocal support for Wilde—which 
Allen expressed both privately in letters as well as publicly in his 1891 article “The Celt in 
English Art”—was not simply an alliance of political convenience, but also an integral part of 
Allen’s serious program for widespread social improvement. 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which Allen’s understanding of evolutionary 
process reinforced the increasingly ambitious and outspoken form of aestheticism that emerged 
in the late 1880s—a politicized Aesthetic Movement, best encapsulated in Wilde’s work, which 
departed from Walter Pater’s more restrained articulations of a disciplined, even religious, 
aesthetic philosophy.  First, I chronicle the genesis of Allen’s aesthetics in the 1870s, the early 
period in his career in which he still aspired to conduct serious scientific research on psychology, 
botany, and physics.  Although he soon abandoned scientific practice for scientific journalism, 																																																								
3 One exception is Michael S. Helfand and Philip E. Smith’s brief but suggestive article “Anarchy and Culture: The 
Evolutionary Turn of Cultural Criticism in the Work of Oscar Wilde” (1978).  Helfand and Smith argue that 
Wilde sought to eliminate Darwinian competition and “substitute sexual selection (eugenics) as the means of 
racial, and so cultural, improvement”; they add that Wilde’s theories were thus “representative of a group of 
radical social scientists…such as A. R. [Alfred Russel] Wallace and Grant Allen.”  Michael S. Helfand and 
Philip E. Smith II, “Anarchy and Culture: The Evolutionary Turn of Cultural Criticism in the Work of Oscar 
Wilde,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 20 (1978): 199-200; Nick Freeman, “‘Intentional Rudeness’?: 
The British Barbarians and the Cultural Politics of 1895,” in Grant Allen: Literature and Cultural Politics at the 
Fin de Siècle, ed. William Greenslade and Terence Rodgers (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005), 111-28.  
4 Oscar Wilde, “The Decay of Lying,” in Criticism, Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man, ed. Josephine 
M. Guy, vol. 4 of The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74.  
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Allen had nevertheless initiated certain trends that continued to surface in aesthetics throughout 
the century, especially in Vernon Lee’s work.5  As Regenia Gagnier has demonstrated, Allen’s 
“physiological aesthetics”—his term for the study of aesthetic feeling as a corporeal 
phenomenon—presided over a major late century shift toward an aesthetics of pleasurable 
consumption: I further argue that Allen’s early works formulated and popularized a science of 
aesthetics that valued beauty for its civilizing effects on the body and mind.6  These ideas in turn 
formed the basis of his mature nonfiction and fiction writings, in which he proclaimed ever more 
vigorously the evolutionary importance of the beautiful.  I then consider the impact that Wilde’s 
familiarity with the work of Allen, Spencer, Charles Darwin, W. K. Clifford, and others had on 
his aesthetics.  For Wilde, as for Allen, advances in biology, physiology, and psychology hinted 
at potential avenues for radical social change, without the need for the toxic “mixture of 
sympathy and coercion” that, as Lawrence Goldman observes, characterized earlier Victorian 
reform movements.7  In the mid 1890s, both writers thus expanded the reverent vision and 
disciplined libertarianism of Clifford and Pater into a more polemical mission: to convince their 
readership that the free cultivation and expression of one’s taste (whether in art, political 
movements, or sexual partners) could produce what Wilde called a “saner, healthier, more 
civilized” species.8  By serving as the cultural cornerstone for a systemic, multi-generational 
																																																								
5 Morton, “The Busiest Man in England”: Grant Allen and the Writing Trade, 1875-1900 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 2. 
6 Regenia Gagnier, “Production, Reproduction, and Pleasure in Victorian Aesthetics and Economics,” in Victorian 
Sexual Dissidence, ed. Richard Dellamora (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1999), 136. 
7 Lawrence Goldman, Science, Reform, and Politics in Victorian Britain: The Social Science Association 1857-1886 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 146. 
8 Oscar Wilde, “The Soul of Man under Socialism,” in Criticism, Historical Criticism, Intentions, the Soul of Man, 
267. 
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reorganization of all aspects of society, from marriage to the economy, aestheticism represented 
to Allen and Wilde the first step in the “realization of utopia” that Wilde equated with progress.9  
 
I. Aesthetic Pleasure and Evolutionary Progress in Allen’s Early Work  
 Though relatively obscure today, Allen was ubiquitous in the British press in the 1880s 
and 1890s.  Born in 1848 to a prosperous Irish-Canadian family, Allen’s early successes at Yale 
and Oxford evaporated after his disastrous first marriage, which he contracted out of principle 
rather than affection.10  Newly remarried and desperate for work, Allen accepted a professorship 
at a government college in Spanish Town, Jamaica in 1873.  By all accounts, Allen struggled to 
adjust to life in Jamaica, but his light teaching responsibilities left him abundant time for his own 
pursuits: his studies in political economy, biology, and philosophy further cemented his youthful 
radicalism, while his undergraduate interest in Spencer’s liberalism grew into an intense 
admiration for the philosopher’s entire evolutionary doctrine (in Morton’s words, evolutionism 
became in this time Allen’s “rational religion, and Herbert Spencer was its messiah”). 11  In 
1876, Allen returned to London to make his living through writing.  His first publications, which 
																																																								
9 Matthew Beaumont provides an edifying reading of Wilde’s use of “utopia,” which (according to Beaumont) both 
agrees with and disputes the linear, “bourgeois narrative of history.”  Wilde’s image of utopia is thus “too 
ambiguous simply to be interpreted as a celebration of progress.”  As I will argue, Wilde does celebrate a kind of 
progress: not social progress as conceived by the Victorian philanthropists with whom Wilde disagreed, but an 
evolutionary progress that would be brought about by individuals.  Wilde, “The Soul of Man under Socialism,” 
247; Matthew Beaumont, “Reinterpreting Oscar Wilde’s Concept of Utopia: ‘The Soul of Man under 
Socialism,’” Utopian Studies 15 (2004): 20-21. 
10 In his second year at Oxford, Allen married Caroline Bootheway—a working-class woman and possible former 
prostitute—because he considered it his chivalric duty to help her.  Bootheway’s illness and their poverty 
distracted him from his studies, and he graduated with an average degree that belied his early promise.  
Bootheway died soon afterward, in 1871.  These experiences undoubtedly influenced Allen’s later support for 
women’s sexual liberation, which he considered an antidote to prostitution.  Morton, “Biographical Essay,” in 
Grant Allen: Literature and Cultural Politics, 24; Edward Clodd, Grant Allen: A Memoir (London: Grant 
Richards, 1900), 35. 
11 Clodd, Grant Allen, 44-51; Morton, “Biographical Essay,” 25. 
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included specialized monographs on botany, physics, and psychology, proved unprofitable, and 
he soon entered the more lucrative world of periodical journalism.   
Despite Allen’s vexed relationship with the industry—perhaps best illustrated in his first 
novel, Philistia (1884), in which a newspaper editor repeatedly bowdlerizes the work of an 
idealistic young writer in order “to suit the taste of our public”—he thrived in this milieu.12  
Before his death in 1899, Allen published over thirty fiction and nonfiction books, dozens of 
short stories, several volumes of poetry, and hundreds of articles on topics as varied as biology, 
history, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and art criticism.13  Over the course of his prolific 
career, he contributed to almost every major British periodical of the day, at every level of 
literary respectability and scientific legitimacy—from the Pall Mall Gazette and Cornhill 
Magazine to the Fortnightly Review and Mind.14  One of his many protégés, the bohemian writer 
Richard Le Gallienne, called him “the most variously gifted man of letters of his time,” and a 
particularly “brilliant generaliser.”15  While he possessed neither Clifford’s academic credentials 
nor Wilde’s literary reputation, Allen was a similarly divisive figure to the Victorian public, 
especially once he began making the case against marriage in the 1890s.  Feminist historian Lucy 
Bland counts Allen, along with male “New Woman” novelists such as George Gissing and 
George Moore, among the most prominent proponents of “free unions” (or what Le Gallienne, in 																																																								
12 Grant Allen, Philistia (London: Chatto & Windus, 1884), 1:73. 
13 Morton, “Biographical Essay,” 23-28.  
14 The Pall Mall Gazette was a reform-minded and sometimes evangelical daily that reached its peak circulation 
under the editorship of W. T. Stead, a pioneer of investigative journalism.  The monthly Cornhill Magazine 
specialized in high-quality serial fiction and catered to a liberal, but not radical, middle-class audience.  The 
slightly pricier Fortnightly Review printed a mixture of serial fiction, poetry, criticism, and science.  Unlike the 
more cautious Cornhill Magazine, the Fortnightly Review (as we have seen) included pieces by controversial 
figures including Clifford and Algernon Charles Swinburne.  The psychologist Alexander Bain founded Mind in 
1876 as an elite specialist quarterly, but literary writers such as Allen and Lee occasionally contributed to the 
journal.  Laurel Brake and Marysa Demoor, Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century Journalism in Great Britain and 
Ireland (Gent: Academia Press; London: British Library, 2009), 478, 145, 227, 34. 
15 Richard Le Gallienne, “Grant Allen,” Fortnightly Review 66 (1899): 1022, 1025. 
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his retrospective on Allen, called “free love”).16  Allen’s fame and versatility brought him into 
contact with many of the enduring scientific and literary figures of his day, including Spencer, 
Darwin, Clifford, T. H. Huxley, George Meredith, and H. G. Wells.17  
Significantly, Allen’s earliest publications were inquiries into the biological origins of the 
aesthetic faculties.  His first two books, Physiological Aesthetics (1877) and The Colour-Sense 
(1879), attempt to trace the development of aesthetic feelings from “the simple pleasures in 
bright colour, sweet sound, or rude pictorial imitation, such as delight the child and the 
savage…to the more and more complex gratifications of natural scenery, music, painting, and 
poetry.”18  First and foremost, Allen argues that beautiful objects act upon the nerves so as to 
generate the “Maximum of Stimulation with the Minimum of Fatigue or Waste, in processes not 
directly connected with vital functions.”19  “Beauty,” from this essentially classical as well as 
Spencerian perspective, is a superfluous and pleasurable physiological response stimulated by 
objects, not a quality inherent in objects.20  Allen explicitly rests his definition of beauty—which 
also recalls Immanuel Kant’s ideas about the subjectivity of aesthetic taste in The Critique of 
Judgment (1790)—on the scientific findings of Darwin, Spencer (to whom Allen dedicates 
Physiological Aesthetics), Alexander Bain, and Hermann von Helmholtz, the renowned German 																																																								
16 Unlike Allen and Gissing, Bland argues, women “New Woman” novelists were often overtly skeptical of free 
unions.  Most women feminists, Bland adds, were more interested in curbing male sexuality than liberating 
female sexuality.  Lucy Bland, Banishing the Beast: Feminism, Sex and Morality, rev. ed. (London: Tauris 
Parke, 2001), 145, 150-51; Le Gallienne, “Grant Allen,” 1014.  
17 Morton, The Busiest Man in England, 110 
18 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics (New York: D. Appleton, 1877), ix. 
19 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 39. 
20 Bernard Bosanquet, in his History of Aesthetic (1892), associates the rise of Epicureanism and Stoicism with 
wider cultural trends toward “subjectivity and individualism,” which in turn resonated through classical art and 
aesthetic theory.  For Bosanquet, this turn toward subjective experience resulted in an “aesthetic of mere 
feeling”—essentially, an aesthetics of individual pleasure—that is characteristic of the Greco-Roman age.  
Bernard Bosanquet, A History of Aesthetic, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 85, 101. 
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physicist who conducted experiments on sensory perception in the 1850s and 1860s.  More 
subtly, Allen’s interpretation of his philosophical and scientific precedents also promotes Pater’s 
ongoing critical work.  As Gagnier argues, Allen’s unique application of Bain’s principles 
furthered an aesthetic paradigm “in which the cultivation of a distinctive ‘taste’ in the 
consumption of art replaced concern for its producers.”21  Like Darwin and Spencer, Gagnier 
adds, Allen’s emphasis on the subjective experience of art shifted critical focus away from the 
“productive body” of the artist (the figure of primary interest to the earlier critics William Morris 
and John Ruskin) and toward the “pleasured body” of the spectator. 22  Along these lines, Ian 
Small credits Physiological Aesthetics for clarifying a wide range of psychological research into 
a single account of aesthetic feeling that “was shared by an entire school of ‘impressionist’ 
critics” including Pater, Wilde, and Lee.23   
In Physiological Aesthetics and The Colour-Sense, Allen begins to locate utopian 
potential in the aesthetic by exploring the connection between the perception of beauty and the 
process of sexual selection, for him a more peaceable alternative to the distasteful brutality of 
natural selection.  Of course, as Gagnier points out, Allen’s aesthetics of the “pleasured body” in 
some ways abetted the broad shifts toward consumerism and commodity culture that marked the 
rise of modern neoliberal economics.24  Yet, Allen’s theory of aesthetic consumption also 
resisted these trends by consciously subverting the systems of competition that drove the 
Darwinian “struggle for existence” in both nature and the laissez-faire marketplace.  His own 
																																																								
21 Gagnier, “Production, Reproduction, and Pleasure,” 136. 
22 Gagnier, “Production, Reproduction, and Pleasure,” 139. 
23 Ian Small, Conditions for Criticism: Authority, Knowledge, and Literature in the Late Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 75.  
24 Gagnier, “Production, Reproduction, and Pleasure,” 127, 136. 
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tortured subservience to the public taste—dependent on the periodical trade for survival, Allen 
later lamented that he had compromised his “original thinking” to appease “two or three bigots 
among…thousands of subscribers”—informed his generally disdainful attitude toward the 
constraining influence of market forces on individuals.25  For Allen, aesthetic experience 
represented a rare exception to the natural laws of competition, because the nervous response to 
beautiful objects was one of the few organic processes that did not exacerbate the problem of 
resource scarcity that Darwin had so memorably articulated in the preceding decades.  Since we 
create artworks “expressly for the pleasure which their perception will give us,” Allen writes in 
Physiological Aesthetics, aesthetic pleasure is distinguished by its “disinterestedness and 
freedom from monopoly”; “as [the aesthetic feelings] are only remotely connected with life-
serving functions,” Allen continues, “it follows that they can give pleasure to thousands without 
detracting from the enjoyment of each.”26  In other words, aesthetic pleasure is an essentially 
infinite resource, exempt from the laws of competition that otherwise govern nature and the 
economy.  The Colour-Sense, echoing Spencer as well as Kant, likewise asserts that the human 
response to pleasing colors has gradually become “more and more divorced from life-serving 
functions with every onward step, until at last the aesthetic sentiment claims to rank with the 
moral feelings among the most disinterested elements of our nature.”27   																																																								
25 Allen, The British Barbarians: A Hill-Top Novel (London: John Lane, 1895), xiii, ix. 
26 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 37, 41. 
27 In The Critique of Judgment, as we have seen, Kant distinguishes the beautiful from the good on the basis of their 
appeals to our self-interest: objects are good because they promise some future benefit, while beautiful objects 
are immediately pleasurable in and of themselves.  However, Kant suggests that continuous exposure to certain 
forms of beauty might gradually cultivate more moral individuals.  “To take an immediate interest in the beauty 
of nature,” he writes, “is always a mark of a good soul, and…if this interest is habitual, it at least indicates a 
disposition of mind that is favorable to the moral feeling.”  By using sexual selection to explain the causal 
connection between aesthetic refinement and ethical (and evolutionary) progress, Allen adapts Kant’s thinking to 
a post-Darwinian context.  Immanuel Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Guyer 
and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 178; Allen, The Colour-Sense: Its Origin 
and Development (London: Trübner, 1879), 222-23. 
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Also significant for Allen’s utopian conception of the beautiful was his implicit extension 
of aesthetic consideration to all objects capable of stimulating the right nervous reactions, 
whether or not these objects were “art” in the common sense of the word.  On this point Allen 
agreed with both Spencer and James Sully, whose psychological approaches, as Small observes, 
effectively dissolved “any difference between art and non-art.”28  Allen’s physiological 
aesthetics opened up apparently limitless opportunities for aesthetic experience: these 
experiences were not limited to the art gallery or the opera house, but were available everywhere 
in the perceptible world.  It was this possibility of democratic, equitable, and collectivist social 
relations in the aesthetic realm—not a sense of moral outrage at the plight of the poor—that first 
drew Allen to socialism, which he would later define as a belief in “free and equal access to the 
common gifts and energies of Nature.”29  As I will discuss in my final chapter, his suggestion 
that all reasonably perceptive individuals, regardless of background, could reap the salutary 
benefits of aesthetic pleasure also reemerged in much of Lee’s and Bernard Berenson’s work 
from the 1890s.   
As a result, Allen proposes aesthetic education as a means for evolutionary progress that 
will rely neither on social Darwinism nor on utilitarian reform projects (the former approach, he 
believed, subjected personal autonomy to the crushing vicissitudes of life, while the latter 
sacrificed the wellbeing of the few to the needs of the many).  On the contrary, Allen’s scientific 
interpretation of aesthetic taste simultaneously allows for individual whim—the natural 
consequence of differences in “nervous organization,” environment, and heredity—and provides 
a “relative and temporary standard” for collective improvement in the form of “the judgment 
																																																								
28 Small, Conditions for Criticism, 74. 
29 Allen, “Individualism and Socialism,” Contemporary Review 55 (1889): 731. 
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of…the purest and most cultivated of our contemporaries.”30  He thus discerns in the concept of 
taste a procedure for cultural development that does not concede personal autonomy: we can 
increase the quality and number of our salutary encounters with the beautiful by deferring to the 
wisdom of “fine[ly]-nurtured” and exceptionally “discriminative” individuals.31  Gradually, 
Allen reasons, the species inches its way upward in the scale of aesthetic development through 
this friction between the “cultivated” avant-garde and the vulgar “multitude.”32  This progressive 
notion of artistic unorthodoxy, which he derived from evolutionary conceptions of the genetic 
“sport” as well as the libertarian rhetoric of Clifford and Pater, informed both Allen’s anti-
authoritarian politics and his own radical tastes: as his friend and fellow scientific writer Edward 
Clodd later recalled, Allen’s “love” for Swinburne’s Poems and Ballads (1866) began in the 
early 1870s, at the height of the poet’s controversy.33    
Allen’s early monographs supported the nascent Aesthetic Movement on other fronts as 
well.  For instance, the color green occupies a place of honor in Allen’s evolutionary history of 
decoration, and he spends a considerable portion of The Colour-Sense probing its unique appeal 
to “highly-cultivated eyes.”34  As Sally-Anne Huxtable notes, green also “characterised Aesthetic 
design” in the years after William Morris’s firm finished decorating what would be known as the 
“Green Dining Room” at the South Kensington Museum (now the Victoria and Albert 
Museum).35  Huxtable, in her analysis of the Green Dining Room, argues that its ornately 																																																								
30 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 48. 
31 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 48. 
32 Allen, The Colour-Sense, 232. 
33 Clodd, Grant Allen, 28. 
34 Allen, The Colour-Sense, 231. 
35 Sally-Anne Huxtable, “Re-reading the Green Dining Room,” in Rethinking the Interior, c. 1867-1896: 
Aestheticism and Arts and Crafts, ed. Jason Edwards and Imogen Hart (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 38. 
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patterned wallpaper presents a “utopian vision” of natural abundance and pastoral ease at the 
same time that it underscores its own artificiality.36  Ten years after Morris placed the finishing 
touches on his Green Dining Room, Allen singled out green for its relative urbanity: while red 
and orange arouse immediate pleasure because of their association with edible fruit, Allen 
explains, green lacks “any special function” related to survival and is so abundant in foliage that 
most “primitive” cultures never employ the color as a dye.37  But in “civilised or semi-civilised 
nations”—especially among “people who live an indoor life” and are therefore less accustomed 
to seeing green—Allen finds that highly cultivated individuals have gradually propagated a taste 
for the “gentle and modest” pleasures of green.38  In this context, Allen’s account of the counter-
natural and non-functional qualities of the hue constitutes an implicit scientific defense of 
aesthetic design and its contribution to the evolution of taste. 
Given the role that taste plays in human progress, both Physiological Aesthetics and The 
Colour-Sense seek to impress on their readers the ethical ramifications of art, which in its 
“highest” form is “not merely a means for the gratification of the senses,” but also an appeal to 
the “nobler sentiments of an all-embracing humanitarianism.”39  Allen, we must remember, looks 
to aesthetic pleasure in order to defend the individual against oppressive external forces: he thus 
carefully distinguishes the reformist imperative of his aesthetics from a prescriptive moralism, 
even as he often suggests that the experience of aesthetic beauty is an ethical good.  In Allen’s 
view, art becomes ethical not by presenting concrete lessons for real life (Allen, like Pater, insists 
																																																								
36 Huxtable adds that the room’s green paint—which used the modern compound lead chromate to achieve its 
depth—has since been discovered to be very toxic. Huxtable, “Re-reading the Green Dining Room,” 33, 35.   
37 Allen, The Colour-Sense, 232. 
38 Allen, The Colour-Sense, 233.  
39 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 216. 
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that the “true aesthetic arts” must always present a world “lovelier than reality”) but by “tuning 
us unconsciously into harmony with whatever is noblest in nature or in man.”40  In an 
understated evocation of Pater, Allen’s musical metaphor remakes the aesthetic consumer’s body 
into a passive instrument upon which sense impressions play, producing either sweet or 
discordant results.  This description of attunement presents a version of aesthetic experience that 
is arguably more spiritualized and more ambitious than Gagnier’s paradigm of the “pleasured 
body”: beautiful objects affect spectators on a physiological level far below conscious thought, 
and they do not merely please the senses but also condition the whole person for the forms of 
disinterested sympathy that an “all-embracing humanitarianism” requires.  (Interestingly, Allen’s 
humanitarian turn also allies him more closely with Ruskin than either writer might have liked: 
Allen openly disagreed Ruskin on many aesthetic and political issues, but here Allen seems to 
affirm the philanthropic aspect of Ruskin’s aesthetic theory.41)  
With its unique “freedom from monopoly” and its preternatural beauty, Allen concludes, 
good art inculcates its viewer into ways of thinking and feeling that draw one away from the 
animalistic instinct to compete, and toward the humane impulse for harmonious coexistence.  
The final pages of The Colour-Sense thus culminate in a grand proclamation on the future 
evolution of the species, which he describes with Cliffordian zeal:  
What a splendid and noble prospect for humanity in its future evolutions may we not find 
in this thought, that from the coarse animal pleasure of beholding food mankind has 
already developed, through delicate gradations, our modern disinterested love for the 
glories of sunset and the melting shades of ocean, for the…dying beauty of autumn 
																																																								
40 Allen, Physiological Aesthetics, 87, 216.  
41 In “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” for instance, Allen skewers Ruskin’s aesthetic opposition to the railway and 
other technological advancements.  Whatever its effects on the landscape, Allen counters, the railway 
democratizes culture by offering the middle class unprecedented access to the countryside, art galleries, and 
other spaces where travellers can hone their aesthetic sensibilities.  Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” Mind 5 
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leaves, for the exquisite harmony which reposes on the canvas of Titian, and the golden 
haze which glimmers over the dreamy visions of Turner!42 
 
While dazzling scientific visions of humankind’s transcendence over the state of nature were 
hardly Allen’s invention (Darwin and Clifford, as we have seen, articulated similar hopes), Allen 
here states the connection between evolutionary progress and the cultivation of “disinterested” 
aesthetic tastes more explicitly than any other critic to-date.  His series of developmental 
stages—which proceeds from the single-minded fixation on food to the appreciation for 
landscape and, finally, the taste for art qua art—broadly rehashes some of Spencer’s earlier 
arguments about beauty and utility, but Allen invests an evolutionary efficacy in beauty that 
Spencer had not articulated.  In “Use and Beauty” (1852), as we have seen, Spencer argues that 
objects can only be beautiful once they lose their use value: for him, the capacity to see beauty in 
nature therefore signals, but does not necessarily facilitate, one’s removal from the toils and 
tribulations of uncivilized life.  By contrast, Allen insists that aesthetic self-cultivation drives as 
well as reflects the wider social, cultural, and physical evolution of the species.  Importantly for 
Wilde, Allen’s concluding anticipation of an aesthetically “perfect day” also amplifies Pater’s 
more measured hope for the aesthetic “regeneration of the world” to an extreme pitch.43   
 Although Physiological Aesthetics received mixed reviews (Sully, for instance, 
commended Allen’s ambition but found his argument inconsistent and inept), the book was so 
widely read that the twentieth-century literary critics I. A. Richards, C. K. Ogden, and James 
Wood later counted it the sole British contribution to Continental aesthetic thought between 
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William Hogarth’s The Analysis of Beauty (1753) and Lee’s essays from the 1890s.44  Undaunted 
by the equally cool reception of The Colour-Sense, Allen continued to touch on aesthetical 
questions as he turned to journalism in the late 1870s.  His bibliography from this period boasts 
such suggestive titles as “Carving a Coco-nut” (1877), “Aesthetic Analysis of an Obelisk” 
(1877), “Colour in Painting” (1878), “Butterfly Aesthetics” (1880), and “The Philosophy of 
Drawing-rooms” (1880).45  Throughout these works, Allen’s fascination with the evolution of 
taste and his Paterian conception of aesthetic feeling as a mode of disinterested engagement with 
the material world remained largely unchanged.   
Allen’s essay “Aesthetic Evolution in Man” (1880), which appeared in Bain’s 
psychological quarterly Mind, concisely illustrates his aesthetic thinking in this period, and its 
revisions of Pater’s thought capture what was so innovative and problematic about Allen’s, and 
subsequently Wilde’s, aesthetics.  Put briefly, Allen argues that aesthetic development consists in 
a “gradual decentralisation” or spiraling outward “from the simple and narrow feelings of the 
savage or the child to the full and expansive aesthetic catholicity of the cultivated adult.”46  He 
reiterates the Darwinian idea, which he first articulated in The Colour-Sense, that humankind’s 
primitive love for the beauty of color and form began with the single-minded and “practical 
pursuit of food or mates.”47  Through the action of sexual selection, he continues, our aesthetic 
appreciation expanded to “objects in the non-practical environment,” including the “ornaments 
and pigments” with which humans began to adorn themselves: after this breakthrough in 																																																								
44 James Sully, “Critical Notices,” review of Physiological Aesthetics, by Grant Allen, Mind 2 (1877): 387-92; C. K. 
Ogden, I. A. Richards, and James Wood, The Foundations of Aesthetics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1922), 51. 
45 For an exhaustive bibliography of Allen’s many publications, see Greenslade and Rodgers, Grant Allen: 
Literature and Cultural Politics.   
46 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” 445. 
47 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” 448. 
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purposeless self-decoration, the aesthetic impulse led to further innovations in interior 
decoration, architecture, painting, statuary, and, finally, poetry.48  To Allen, this succession 
suggests a “long process of ever widening sympathies and ever multiplying associations,” which 
leads away from what he terms an “anthroponistic” fixation on self-preservation.49  Moreover, 
Allen implies, this process of expansion is theoretically available to everyone regardless of race, 
sex, or class, since the aesthetic feelings are “universal” and “common to all the race” by virtue 
of their basis in physiology.50  Crucially, the concluding lines of Allen’s evolutionary history 
both recall and rework Pater’s now-prominent creed of art for art’s sake: over the long course of 
time, Allen remarks, the aesthetic faculty “has progressed in unbroken order from the simple 
admiration of human beauty for the sake of a deeply-seated organic instinct, to the admiration of 
abstract beauty for its own sake alone.”51  
Nonetheless, “Aesthetic Evolution” deviates from Pater in important intellectual and 
rhetorical ways.  These differences help explain why the young Wilde—who, in 1880, had 
already began promoting his more assertive and flamboyant aestheticism—might have looked to 
Allen’s exuberant progressivism as a supplement to Pater’s more disciplined aesthetic 
philosophy.52  First, Allen lays out his plans for a better time to come in far less equivocal terms 
than Pater.  While Pater similarly assumed that culture, religion, and art developed in “successive 
stages,” Kate Hext reminds us that he tended to view history as a “cyclical process…without 																																																								
48 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man” 453.  
49 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” 450-51. 
50 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” 446. 
51 Allen, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” 464. 
52 Ellmann’s biography of Wilde is illuminating, but it does make frequent factual errors.  All references to 
Ellmann’s text in this chapter have been cross-referenced with Horst Schroeder’s exhaustive list of errata, 
Additions and Corrections to Richard Ellmann’s Oscar Wilde (2002).  Richard Ellmann, Oscar Wilde (New 
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hope of ultimate resolution.”53  Allen, as we can see in “Aesthetic Evolution,” considers history 
as intrinsically progressive—unsurprising, given his admiration for Spencer—and his other work 
rarely shies away from ordinal rankings of organisms, societies, or cultural products.54  Helpfully 
for Wilde, Allen in “Aesthetic Evolution” also upholds aestheticism’s social efficacy with a 
consistency and confidence that Pater’s writing rarely demonstrates.  As Linda Dowling 
observes, Wilde in his early career sought to balance the individuality of aesthetic experience 
with what he believed to be “the democratic scope and generous utopian dimension of art”: in his 
lecture “The English Renaissance of Art” (1882), for instance, Wilde speculates that the critic 
can bring the people “more in harmony with modern progress and civilisation” by teaching them 
“the spirit in which they are to approach all artistic work.”55  As I explain at length later in this 
chapter, Allen’s assertion of the democratic and socialistic implications of evolutionary 
aesthetics helped to stabilize Wilde’s fraught social consciousness.   
But the “irreducible dilemma” that Dowling pinpoints in Wilde’s later work—that is, the 
problem of reconciling the “Whig premise of a universal aesthetic capacity” with the patent 
vulgarity of much of Victorian popular culture—was already beginning to emerge in Allen’s 
early writing.56  In The Colour-Sense, “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” and most of his other work 
on aesthetics, Allen maintained that aesthetic progress was inevitable, since the taste for beauty 
obeyed the same Spencerian laws of development that he believed played out everywhere else in 																																																								
53 Pater, “Pico Della Mirandula,” Fortnightly Review 10 (1871): 379; Kate Hext, Walter Pater: Individualism and 
Aesthetic Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 89. 
54 Allen begins his series “Evolution in Early Italian Art” (1895-96), for instance, by asserting that certain artistic 
traditions, like all “favourably situated” organisms, “pass successively from the lowest rank in the organic 
hierarchy to the highest.”  Allen, “Evolution in Early Italian Art,” Pall Mall Magazine 6 (May 1895): 83.   
55 Linda Dowling, The Vulgarization of Art: The Victorians and Aesthetic Democracy (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1996), 90; Wilde, “The English Renaissance of Art,” in Miscellanies, vol. 14 of The Complete 
Works of Oscar Wilde, ed. Robert Ross (Boston: Wyman-Fogg, 1921), 263. 
56 Dowling, Vulgarization of Art, 92, 90. 
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the universe.  Allen’s experiences in journalism, however, seemed to belie the cultural apotheosis 
he continuously promised, and he sometimes explicitly doubted whether his writing—even if it 
was an authentic “expression of [his] own individuality”—made any contribution at all to “the 
enlightenment and bettering of humanity.”57  In his first novel, Philistia, he explores the inherent 
tensions between his political allegiance to the will of the people and his evolutionary investment 
in artistic and intellectual self-determination.  Ultimately, the novel attempts to resolve this issue 
by formulating a model of socially conscious aestheticism: one that could refine culture and, 
over the course of generations, uplift the species through the process of sexual selection.   
In keeping with Allen’s personal experience, Philistia documents the struggles of a 
young, upper middle-class man as he searches for a profession that will accord with his high-
minded principles.  As his name suggests, Ernest Le Breton holds sincere socialist beliefs that at 
times conflict with both the “aesthetic side to [his] nature” and his social and economic 
circumstances.58  Ernest first takes a post as tutor to the aristocratic Exmoors, though he chafes at 
the irresponsible lifestyle of his employers and the brazen romantic overtures of Lady Hilda, the 
freethinking daughter of the house.  Ernest then leaves to marry Edie, the working-class sister of 
his protégé, the brilliant mathematician (and likely Clifford analogue) Harry Oswald.  After a 
disastrous stint as a schoolmaster, Ernest takes up journalism to support his young family, but he 
descends into illness and poverty when he finds that he cannot soften his opinions to please a 
philistine readership.  (This theme of intersecting social and financial pressure reflects the 
novel’s complicated publication history: Allen planned to publish the novel serially in the 
Cornhill Magazine, but the editor objected, as Allen later reported, “that it was far too socialistic 
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for the tastes of his public.”59  Andrew Chatto, who had published Physiological Aesthetics and 
The Colour-Sense, offered to publish Philistia in three volumes, but only on the condition that 
Allen substitute a more upbeat ending.60)  Before Ernest can die of consumption, however, his 
friends conspire to publish one of his socialist pamphlets, an act that catapults him into the public 
eye and consequently saves his life.   
Regardless of his position as the novel’s nominal protagonist, Ernest remains an 
ambivalent figure at the conclusion of Philistia.  On the one hand, Ernest’s constant war with the 
systems of economic and social injustice in which he finds himself tends to produce only more 
misery.  His refusal to moderate his sense of “duty to the world,” for instance, draws him into a 
kind of “economical puritanism” (hence Ernest’s naïve idealization of physical labor), and his 
perverse obsession with martyrdom starves his family and nearly kills him.61  On the other hand, 
Ernest’s selflessness appears downright honorable next to the callous Epicureanism of his 
brother and foil, Herbert, who justifies his “selfishly prudent” decision to marry an heiress by 
capitulating entirely to the power of “environment”: a force that he warns will “crush [Ernest] 
between the upper and nether millstone” if he continues to “reform the world” rather than “live 
in it.”62  Allen, I suggest, provides a happy medium in the secondary character of Arthur 
Berkeley, a parson-turned-composer who rejects both Herbert’s self-indulgence and Ernest’s 
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asceticism in favor of a socially responsible aestheticism.  Early in the novel, Arthur eloquently 
defends his “aesthetic tendencies” to Ernest—who feels guilty about admiring what he calls 
“gewgaws”—with an allusion to John Keats’s “Endymion” (1818): “now,” Arthur asks, “why 
shouldn’t I spend [money] on the things that please me best and are joys forever?”63  At the same 
time, Allen stresses that Arthur’s luxuries are never extravagant: elsewhere, Arthur tells Herbert 
that he would sooner buy “a flute, or a book of poems, or a little picture, or a Palissy platter” 
than a bottle of champagne.64  Instead, Arthur manages to collect beautiful objects upon which 
he can “feast [his] eyes and ears” while still supporting his beloved father, all on a parson’s 
salary.65   
Similar to Ernest, Arthur’s personality initially conflicts with the pressures of his 
profession, which compel him to “keep up the dignity of the cloth by fighting shy of any 
aesthetic heterodoxies.”66  Unlike Ernest, however, Arthur frankly acknowledges that his current 
mode of life is unsuited to his inclinations.  More important, Arthur asserts his desires in 
language that also recognizes the social benefit that might result if he were in a more suitable 
position: “I can do more good by writing comic operas,” he confesses to his father, “than by 
talking dogmatically about things I hardly understand to people who hardly understand me.”67  
Later in the novel, Arthur achieves success as a composer in London and meets the perceptive 
Lady Hilda, who seconds Arthur’s socially oriented individualism.  “I believe there’s a corner 																																																								
63 Allen, Philistia, 1:81. 
64 Palissy ware, which was extremely popular in this period, imitated the style of sixteenth-century French potter 
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somewhere for every man,” Hilda declares, “if only he can jog down properly into his own 
corner instead of being squeezed forcibly into somebody else’s.”68  In Hilda’s understanding, 
which recalls Spencer’s theory of moving equilibrium, every individual must find his or her 
niche in a shared ecology of unique but interconnected niches.  By finding our “corner”—or 
matching “square m[e]n” to “square holes,” in Hilda’s colorful analogy—we both increase our 
own happiness and facilitate the harmonious functioning of society.69  In the case of Arthur, who 
ends up happily married to Hilda, aesthetic self-cultivation and social progress are compatible 
impulses: his love of beauty, his pursuit of music, and his attraction to Hilda enable him to 
rescue Ernest from an early death.  Arthur’s subplot thus exemplifies a socially constructive 
aestheticism founded not on the promise of practical reform—associated with a contemporary 
movement that Diana Maltz calls “missionary aestheticism”—but on biological and sociological 
notions of health and wellbeing.70  As Seth Koven likewise points out, aesthetes such as Ruskin 
participated in a “much larger project to reshape the interior and exterior landscapes of the urban 
poor” through art exhibitions, the construction of free libraries and museums, and public lecture 
series.71  In Philistia, Allen imagines a less paternalistic approach to social and cultural 
improvement, which comes about in the novel through the unforced proliferation of superior 
aesthetic and ethical values. 
Consequently, the ending of Philistia underscores the capacity for sexual attraction and 
aesthetic taste to regenerate society.  Allen presents Arthur and Hilda’s love match, for instance, 																																																								
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as the natural continuation of their “joint schemes” for the welfare of their friends.72  Allen also 
concludes the novel with Edie playfully reminding Ernest of their daughter’s birthday, a tacit 
rebuff to Ernest’s lingering yearnings for martyrdom (he wonders whether “it wouldn’t have 
been the most right thing in the end…if [his family] had all starved eighteen months ago 
together”).73  Certainly, Allen’s deployment of the marriage plot was partly a concession to 
Chatto’s demands for a more conventional denouement.  But we can also read the novel’s 
“good” marriages—which go forward in spite of parental objections, class barriers, and financial 
considerations—as examples of successful Darwinian sexual selection.  In accordance with the 
non-functionalist logic of sexual selection, Allen’s characters only fulfill their selective role 
when they choose their mates based on impulse, without heed to propriety or financial need.  
Given free reign, sexual selection establishes a renewed social equilibrium in the novel by 
connecting characters to their temperamental contraries: morbid Ernest marries chipper Edie, 
while impractical Arthur settles down with the enterprising Hilda.  (Ernest’s mercenary brother 
Herbert, by comparison, ends up in a loveless marriage with a rich but “selfishly prudent and 
cold-hearted wife, exactly after his own pattern.”74)  In Allen’s earliest novel, sexual selection 
transforms the characters’ individual aesthetic preferences into affective bonds that ultimately 
restructure and strengthen society.  
 
II. Sexual Selection and Allen’s Utopian Hedonism 
While Allen never repudiated his physiological aesthetics, the notion that sexual selection 
could provoke peaceful social upheaval eventually came to dominate his evolutionary thinking in 																																																								
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the last two decades of the nineteenth century.  In his essay “Falling in Love” (1886), he begins 
to theorize the ways in which sexual selection might translate individual experiences of aesthetic 
pleasure into wide-scale evolutionary gain.  Allen was noteworthy in this regard: as we have 
already seen, many scientific writers hesitated to vocalize their support for Darwinian sexual 
selection, in part because the theory appeared to elevate sexuality and the body in a shockingly 
irreligious way.75  In contrast to Darwin’s warier allies, Allen extols romantic love as “nature’s 
guiding voice within us,” which leads individuals to their “moral, mental, and physical 
complement[s]” and thus “speak[s] for the good of the human race in all future generations.”76  
Like “the butterfly that circles and eddies in his aerial dance” or the “peacock that struts about in 
imperial pride,” Allen argues, humans also “contribute to the future beauty and strength of [the] 
race” by making and responding to sexual displays (or “falling in love,” in everyday parlance).77  
As with all other species, sexual selection in humans amounts to what he calls a “lateral form of 
natural selection,” in which individuals themselves select the mates that will best suit their 
idiosyncrasies and, as a result, produce the healthiest offspring.78  Insofar as Allen here seeks to 
increase the rate of genetically “desirable” marriages, he does advocate for a kind of positive 
eugenics.  As Angelique Richardson observes, Allen’s rather facile ideas about personal beauty 
and bodily health (“the beautiful,” he writes in “Aesthetic Evolution in Man,” generally accords 
with “the healthy, the normal, the strong, the perfect, and the parentally sound”) appealed to 
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contemporary eugenicists such as Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, who considered racial 
competition indispensable to evolutionary progress.79  
These eugenic undertones notwithstanding, Allen chafed at all forms of social and 
political pressure, especially by the state: “Falling in Love,” then, not only stops short of the 
institutionalized eugenic strategies of Pearson and his ilk, but also categorically rejects any 
attempt to subject the “inner physiological promptings” of sexual inclination to “abstract 
biological and ‘eugenic’ principles.”80  Allen’s piece in fact castigates Sir George Campbell, the 
Liberal politician and critic of Darwin, for publicly recommending that marriages be arranged 
according to “physiological knowledge” rather than “foolish ideas about love and the tastes of 
young people.”81  The sexual instinct, Allen retorts, is “so conditioned, so curious, so vague, 
[and] so unfathomable” that it defies codification altogether.82  Allen thus denies that a 
bureaucracy, run like “a department of the India Office,” could possibly regulate procreation 
more effectively than our inborn aesthetic instincts: to decide marriages by “committee,” he 
warns Campbell, is to “crush out all initiative, all spontaneity, all diversity, all originality; you 
would get an animated moral code instead of living men and women.”83  Allen, in the face of this 
danger, demonizes “parents and moralists” and lionizes the “romance-writer” for 
“exalt[ing]…the mysterious native yearning of heart for heart” over the dictates of “calculating 
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expediency.”84  With a sharp irreverence characteristic of Clifford and Wilde, Allen declares that 
“it is the sentimentalists and the rebels who are always in the right on this matter”: it is only due 
to their persistent influence that “we still preserve some vitality and some individual features, in 
spite of our grinding and crushing civilisation.”85    
As we can begin to see, the mechanics of sexual selection as Allen understood them 
demanded the absolute freedom of both women and men to choose their partners on the basis of 
their aesthetic attractiveness.  Allen therefore suggests that individuals, when choosing mates, 
should prioritize expressive—that is, aesthetic—features such as “eyes or…moustaches” over the 
more nebulous and indeterminate qualities of “mind and character.”86  The same utopian logic 
behind Allen’s earlier theories of physiological aesthetics is also at work in his rebuttal of 
Campbell: since every individual could “easily find dozens” of fitting partners, courtship (like 
aesthetic sensation) constitutes a non-competitive process within which desire has free play and 
advantageous evolutionary modifications can accordingly accumulate without limit.87  The 
pleasure and happiness of individuals, then, turns out to be the very means by which the progress 
of the species comes about—a fact that Allen, in conclusion, posits as “one great proof of the 
real value and importance of the [sexual] instinct.”88  Sexual selection, as he hints in Philistia 
and explicitly claims in “Falling in Love,” poses a potential resolution to the apparent conflict 
between the desires of the individual and the good of society.  His glorification of romantic love 
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also offers a Darwinian revision of the sexual radicalism of James Hinton, the older doctor and 
reformer who proclaimed the virtues of humankind’s natural “pleasures, instincts, [and] 
impulses.”89  Hinton’s belief in the essential goodness of human desire arose from religious 
convictions that Allen did not share; but Hinton’s attempts to devise a morality based on the 
cultivation of a right “attitude or feeling of the soul” (rather than “arbitrary restraints” on 
conduct) presaged many of Allen’s and Wilde’s ethical claims.90 
While not widely read or cited, Allen’s “What is the Object of Life?” (1887), a sequel to 
“Falling in Love,” is significant for its attempt to derive ethical principles from these ideas about 
sexual selection and aesthetic pleasure.  Allen begins by answering his titular question from a 
cosmic perspective: as the universe lacks a “quasi-human artificer and designer,” he admits, “life 
as a whole…has no object.”91  From an evolutionary point of view, he continues, the object of all 
organic life is merely to survive and reproduce.  From the perspective of individuals, however, 
the object of life varies according to temperament and education: the “vast majority” of people 
continue to live out of an instinctual fear of death, he explains, but a “cultivated and educated 
minority”—a group of “more or less optimistic” individuals—try to “make the best” of life while 
still admitting its difficulties.92  “If human life has in this very restricted sense any general object 
at all,” Allen speculates, “that object is undoubtedly happiness, and happiness may be 																																																								
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approximately defined as a decided surplus of personal pleasure over personal pain.”93  By 
drawing on sexual selection as well as Spencer’s theory of play, Allen deduces from these 
premises an ethical and evolutionarily progressive hedonism: since the feeling of pleasure 
“roughly coincides with race-preservative activities,” he writes, “it follows that these two 
apparently distinct objects, the unconscious generic aim [of perpetuating the species], and the 
conscious individual aim [of being happy], are at bottom practically almost identical.”94  As in 
“Falling in Love,” the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure—tempered by a due concern for the equal 
happiness of others—meshes seamlessly with the long-term wellbeing of the species.  As a 
result, Allen finds the key to evolutionary progress not in the charity of “well-meaning and 
philanthropic” busybodies, but in the reparation of “bad social arrangements” that prevent 
individuals from doing whatever makes them happy.95  
Convinced of this connection between personal liberty, aesthetic taste, and evolutionary 
progress, Allen’s writing from the 1890s became more self-consciously polemical, extending in 
scope well beyond the scientific aesthetics with which he launched his career.  The most 
outspoken and confrontational of these pieces was “The New Hedonism,” in which Allen 
synthesized many of his longstanding beliefs about evolutionary aesthetics into an entire 
philosophy of life.  “The New Hedonism” owed much of its rhetorical daring, as well as its 
provocative title, to Allen’s long-standing admiration for Wilde, who encouraged the popular 
science writer’s forays into art criticism.  Like Allen, Wilde was a reluctant journalist, and the 
two writers crossed paths at least once during their tenure at the Pall Mall Gazette, when both of 
them participated in an intimate demonstration of “muscle-reading” at the newspaper’s offices in 																																																								
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May 1884.96  According to a newspaper account of the meeting, the “poet and apostle” of 
aestheticism apparently delivered an impromptu critique of the office’s soulless decoration: 
Wilde’s vivacious defense of the ornamental, coupled with his implicit denunciation of the 
philistine periodical press, undoubtedly impressed Allen.97  In his 1891 essay “The Celt in 
English Art,” Allen hails the “great and victorious aesthetic movement” for its much-needed 
revolt against “Teutonic dominance” in British art and politics; among the numerous Celtic 
writers who united radicalism with a decorative aesthetic, Allen reserves special praise for “Mr. 
Oscar Wilde,…whom wise men know for a man of rare insight and strong common sense.”98  
Wilde’s article “The Soul of Man under Socialism”—which drew, as we will see, on Allen’s 
“Individualism and Socialism” (1889)—appeared in the same issue of the Fortnightly Review, 
and letters of mutual appreciation soon crossed each other in the mail.  “I beg you will allow me 
to express my delight in your article,” wrote Wilde, “with its superb assertion of the Celtic spirit 
in Art.”99  An equally effusive Allen called Wilde’s “Soul of Man” a “beautiful and noble essay,” 
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and added that he “would have written every line [him]self—if only [he] had known how.”100  
Several years after this exchange, when Allen needed a name for his new philosophy, he settled 
on one of Wilde’s coinages from The Picture of Dorian Gray.  In Wilde’s novel, the aristocratic 
libertine Lord Henry prophesies a “new Hedonism” that both recalls and intensifies Pater’s 
insistence on receptivity: “a new Hedonism,” Lord Henry explains to Dorian, will “never accept 
any theory or system that would involve the sacrifice of any mode of passionate experience,” but 
will “teach man to concentrate himself upon the moments of a life that is itself but a moment.”101   
Like Lord Henry, Allen defines “new hedonism” as a revolutionary ethic of liberated 
“self-development” that he believes will remedy the conventional Victorian idealization of 
deprivation and “self-sacrifice.”102  With a daring chiasmus that channels Wilde’s aphoristic wit, 
Allen begins his essay by upending commonsense moralism: “the old asceticism said, ‘Be 
virtuous and you will be happy.’  The new hedonism says, ‘Be happy, and you will be 
virtuous.’”103  In a continuation of his early work on aesthetics, he upholds sex as the wellspring 
of “everything high and ennobling in our nature,” from “our love of bright colours [and] graceful 
form” to our feelings of sympathy and filial affection.104  Ever the iconoclast, Allen points to 
such risqué figures as Swinburne and the feminist writers Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley 
as evidence of Darwin’s scientific ennoblement of sexuality.  For Allen, the lives and works of 
these men and women confirm that the “most imaginative, the most beautiful-minded, [and] the 
most dainty-souled” individuals always pursue their desires, even (and especially) in the face of 																																																								
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social opprobrium.105  Their disregard for sexual propriety, Allen suggests, was part and parcel 
of a hedonistic individualism that allowed each of these thinkers to break new ground in their 
respective fields.  In the medium term, their sexual choices—Wollstonecraft’s decision to live 
out of wedlock with the philosopher William Godwin, thus leading to the birth of their daughter 
Mary, and Mary’s subsequent determination to elope with Percy Shelley, thus leading to her 
brilliant literary career—proved to be boons for British culture.  In the long term, Allen further 
argues, the aggregation of such liberated actions could promise what he elsewhere calls a “great 
age of humanity,” on par with Renaissance Florence and Elizabethan England.106 
Allen therefore couches his ethic of hedonism as a serious social “duty”: one that 
compels every person “to develop himself and herself to the highest possible point, freely, in 
every direction.”107  He further charges his reader “to think as far as [she or he] can think,” “to 
get rid of all dogmas, preconceptions, and prejudices,” “to be healthy of body and mind,” and “to 
be educated, to be emancipated, to be free, to be beautiful.”108  With an almost priestly esteem 
for sexuality—the new hedonist, Allen remarks, will “recognize in the sex-instinct the origin and 
basis of all that is best and highest within us”—the hedonist’s “object will always be so to use 
[the sexual instincts] as not to abuse them, either by enforced abstinence or by acquiescence in a 
hateful régime” of inequitable marriage.109  At the essay’s conclusion, Allen finally envisions a 
future society in which the internalization of hedonistic values has rendered love and 
childbearing matters of aesthetic choice rather than social pressure or financial convenience: in 																																																								
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this hypothetical utopia, not only will the “noblest, the purest, the sanest, [and] the healthiest” 
people be free to fulfill their “moral obligation” to reproduce, but they will also take pleasure in 
the task.110  However dissident, Allen’s new hedonism does not absolve individuals of moral 
culpability so much as reevaluate the ways in which the enlightened gratification of one’s desires 
can yield positive social outcomes.  Evolutionary aesthetics thus allowed Allen, like Pater and 
Clifford before him, to uncover an indirect moral payoff in the amoral experience of aesthetic 
pleasure.  At the same time, Allen seeks to rescue his eugenics from its reliance on coercive, 
even somewhat utilitarian discourses of fitness and obligation that otherwise clash with his 
libertarianism: his initial emphasis on the inherent value of happiness, his appropriation of the 
classical language of “hedonism,” his condemnation of marriage as an institutionalized form of 
sexual control, and his self-proclaimed alliance with the Aesthetic Movement were perhaps 
attempts to downplay his own domineering dogmatism.   
With its deliberately shocking attacks on bourgeois virtues and institutions, “The New 
Hedonism” set the tone for the remaining years of Allen’s controversial career.  One 
conservative critic, for instance, declared Allen’s essay nothing less than a scientific apology for 
a rampant culture of vice, from the “lawless sexual passion” of working-class murderers to the 
neo-Hellenic homosexuality of the “higher ranks of society” (much to the disappointment of 
Wilde’s friend, George Ives, Allen later denied that the new hedonism condoned 
homosexuality).111  Allen’s most widely discussed work, The Woman Who Did—a kind of 
novelistic experiment in the real-world application of new hedonism—did little to assuage these 																																																								
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allegations of licentiousness.  The novel’s provenance alone, quite apart from its content, ensured 
its notoriety among contemporary readers: The Woman Who Did appeared in John Lane’s 
controversial Keynotes series, which took its title from a collection of short stories by the 
feminist writer George Egerton (Mary Chavelita Dunne Bright) and featured designs by the 
decadent artist Aubrey Beardsley.  Moreover, Allen’s polemical epigraph to the novel, which 
insisted that this was the first piece of writing he had composed “wholly and solely to satisfy 
[his] own taste and [his] own conscience,” conspicuously put into practice his radical doctrine of 
self-determination.112  As Nicholas Ruddick observes, even otherwise liberal reviewers found the 
novel’s sincere defense of its titular heroine—a “martyr to the cause of truth and righteousness” 
who refuses to marry her lover on principle and eventually commits suicide—to be unpalatably 
extreme.113   
Most significantly, both “The New Hedonism” and The Woman Who Did gave Allen a 
prominent voice in fin-de-siècle debates about aestheticism and cultural evolution, in which 
Allen found himself defending the Spencerian promise of progress against what he called the 
“Jeremiads of Toryism.”114  Many of these debates centered on theories of “degeneration” that, 
in stark contradiction of Allen’s optimistic evolutionism, interpreted the rise of aestheticism as 
evidence of the impending decline of civilization.  Throughout the 1890s, reactionary 
evolutionists such as Cesare Lombroso, E. Ray Lankester, and Max Nordau issued dire warnings 
about the devolution of humankind: Nordau’s Degeneration, the most important of these works, 
appeared in English translation in 1895, the same year that Allen published The Woman Who Did 
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and Wilde was tried on charges of “gross indecency.”115  Unlike Wilde, Allen was not prominent 
enough in Europe to secure Nordau’s histrionic censure by name, but certain passages of 
Degeneration could have easily applied to Allen’s work.  For instance, Nordau might be 
addressing Allen’s aesthetic individualism when he ridicules the Wildean notion “that it is proof 
of honourable independence to follow one’s own taste without being bound down to the 
regulation…of the Philistine cattle.”116  In addition, Nordau’s partisans in England—especially 
around the time of Wilde’s trial—soon directed his critiques toward other writers associated with 
the Aesthetic Movement, including Allen.  In the essay “Tommyrotics” (1895), for example, the 
travel writer and barrister Hugh E. M. Stutfield rails against the “modern spirit of revolt” that he 
sees everywhere in the British cultural landscape.117  Over the course of his tirade, Stutfield takes 
aim at a range of offenders, including New Woman novelists, “ego-maniac” aesthetes, adherents 
of “aesthetic Hellenism,” political “revolutionaries, founders of Utopias, and builders of 
socialistic castles in the air.”118  But the real masterminds of this assault on tradition, Stutfield 
concludes, are intellectuals such as Allen and Wilde, who merge scientific views of sex and 
pleasure with progressive politics and a taste for the avant-garde.119  (In all likelihood, the 
condemnation of Stutfield and others only helped The Woman Who Did become a bestseller; 
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Ruddick points out that sales remained robust in the aftermath of Wilde’s conviction in May 
1895.120) 
For Allen, who had spent decades devising evolutionary methods of attaining just such 
utopias, Stutfield’s broadside was an onslaught on the optimistic heart of evolutionary 
aestheticism.  As Morton observes, Allen stopped courting sexual controversy around this time—
a shift that Morton attributes to Allen’s fatigue at “being, in his own eyes, so hopelessly 
misunderstood.”121  Nevertheless, Allen’s continued application of evolutionary paradigms to 
culture—for instance, in the series “Evolution in Early Italian Art,” which ran in Pall Mall 
Magazine and the English Illustrated Magazine through early 1896—suggests the degree to 
which he preserved his progressive beliefs, however embattled.  His history of Italian painting, 
written at the height of the degeneration panic, is still one of predominantly “upward evolution 
towards more modern types”: whenever artistic movements “grow necessarily in time a trifle 
monotonous” and begin to decline into decadence, Allen argues, a longing for “variety” soon 
leads to “new theme[s]” and “more advanced composition[s].”122  In this continuous flowering of 
creative activity, Allen rediscovered a sense of breathless possibility that the vogue for Nordau 
could not diminish.  “We move in the midst of one of the mightiest epochs the earth has ever 
seen,” Allen wrote in 1893, and this assertion remained as relevant as ever to his vision of 
history: “be a conscious partaker in one of the great ages of humanity,” he implores his reader, 
for “yours, yours is this glory!”123   
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III. Science, Liberalism, and Evolutionary Utopia in Wilde’s Critical Prose 
 From the very start of his career, Wilde was a voracious and careful reader of science.  
Many scholars have noted the palpable impact that other evolutionary, psychological, and 
anthropological thinkers had on Wilde’s aesthetic philosophy.  Heather Seagroatt, for instance, 
reads The Picture of Dorian Gray in the context of Wilde’s patent interest in psychology, which 
for him “challenged hard and fast distinctions between sciences and the arts.”124  Furthermore, 
several scholars have highlighted the optimistic, or at least affirmative, aspects of Wilde’s 
understanding of science.  Elisha Cohn argues that Wilde, by focalizing psychology through the 
“image of the beautiful [brain] cell,” formulated a “politics of aesthetics” that looked to 
“evolutionary process” rather than futile individual action for social amelioration.125  Wilde’s 
“neurological aestheticism,” in Cohn’s view, “integrated the dandy’s pleasures with the 
socialist’s critique of exploitation” and thus redirected his “focus toward the ongoing life of the 
species.”126  Along similar lines, John Wilson Foster asserts that Wilde “associated science not 
with pessimism or glum materialism but with optimism and progress.”127  “For Wilde,” David 
Clifford adds, “ideas about evolution slipped seamlessly into ideas of progress, individualism, 
and telos”—ideas that Wilde, I suggest, gleaned from Spencer, Allen, and Clifford as well as 
Darwin, who the aesthete greatly admired.128  
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In many ways, Wilde’s convergence with Allen began with his undergraduate studies in 
science and philosophy, long before either writer published a single article.  Wilde’s Oxford and 
Commonplace notebooks, which he kept from approximately 1874 to 1879, chronicle his 
formative engagements with many of the same scientific and philosophical thinkers that inspired 
Allen, from Darwin and Huxley to Kant and E. B. Tylor.129  Like Allen, Wilde had an 
omnivorous curiosity, a penchant for synthesizing knowledge across fields, and a facility for 
finding the greater stakes of technical details: in a typical entry from his Oxford notebook, Wilde 
fuses Spencerian biology with ethics as he wonders, “What is morality but the perfect adjustment 
of the human organism to the actual conditions of Life[?]”130  Wilde’s notebooks demonstrate a 
similarly keen interest in Clifford’s work on geometry and ethics.131  Wilde was particularly 
intrigued by the mathematician’s theory of the “tribal self,” which posited that the primitive 
sense of self extended to one’s entire social group.132  In his notes on the subject, Wilde 
pinpoints the anti-utilitarian and paradoxically individualistic repercussions of Clifford’s theory: 
if the “preservation of self,” Wilde reasons, “is not the individual self but what Clifford calls the 
‘Tribal self,’” then ethical good consists not in “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” 
but instead in “service done to a community by an individual who is part of that community.”133  
By positing a conception of social good that did not quash individual autonomy, Clifford 
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provided Wilde with an anthropological foundation for the anarchic socialism that he later 
expounded in “The Soul of Man under Socialism” (1891). 
  The young Wilde also looked to Spencer for ways of reinterpreting natural law so as to 
reaffirm a sense of cosmic harmony.  Wilde dedicates the first few pages of the Commonplace 
book to summarizing the philosopher’s thoughts on the essential unity of sociological, biological, 
and psychological science.  Wilde’s later gloss of progress accordingly adapts Spencer’s ideas: 
“Progress,” Wilde notes, “is simply the instinct of self-preservation in humanity, the desire to 
affirm one’s own essence…Mankind has been continually…turning the key on its own spirit: but 
after a time there is an enormous desire for higher freedom—for self-preservation.”134  To Wilde, 
Spencer’s conception of progress as a universal process of differentiation and integration 
suggested that individual acts of deviation from the norm—whether that norm was political, 
sexual, or artistic—were utterly necessary for the health of the organism and the consequent 
growth of civilization.  Wilde’s exploration of these ideas culminates in one of the most striking 
entries in the Commonplace book, in which hard-nosed discussions of embryology give way to a 
poetic meditation on the philosophical ramifications of his research:  
The splendor and grace of swift limbs, the grave beauty of girlish foreheads, the physical 
ecstasy of sensuous life—do we love these things less because the germ of man is to be 
found in the formless protoplasm of the deep seas, or in the hideous sluggishness of the 
Lower Amoebae— 
 as in the physical so it is in the moral life—we turn our eyes not to the deeper depths 
from which we may have sprung, but to the higher heights to which we can rise[.] 
 
While Wilde’s sumptuous language and elaborate syntax draw on Pater’s trademark style, 
Wilde’s resolution to see only the potential for upward development hews more closely to 
Clifford’s optimistic interpretation of Spencerian evolution.  Like Clifford, Wilde’s prophetic 
tone radiates an almost religious faith in humankind’s ability to ascend to “higher heights.”  																																																								
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Significantly, Wilde characterizes evolutionary advancement in terms of an aesthetic, and 
specifically formal, sophistication: “formless” and “hideous” single-celled organisms 
differentiate, in Spencerian fashion, into the beautifully diverse and yet coordinated parts of the 
human body.  As we will see, the idea that evolutionary progress parallels the civilizing process 
of aesthetic self-refinement is central to Wilde’s later articulations of utopian aestheticism.   
 Spencer’s and Clifford’s visions of evolutionary progress propelled Wilde through his 
early-career lectures in North America, which Dowling notes were strewn throughout with 
“ambitious” and “guileless” expressions of “moral optimism.”135  In particular, Wilde’s address 
“The English Renaissance of Art” sustains the confidence of the Oxford notebooks in part by 
grounding its definition of “Renaissance” in Spencerian notions of progress that Wilde 
considered scientifically authoritative.  For Wilde, the Renaissance was really an accelerated 
period of evolutionary growth, in which a happy confluence of material circumstances—
including developments in science, “technical improvements” in artistic execution, and a 
tendency toward “democratic and pantheistic” thinking—facilitated individual liberation and 
social cohesion simultaneously.  Wilde sees this same movement at work in contemporary 
English aesthetics: as individuals seek “new subjects for poetry, new forms of art, [and] new 
imaginative and intellectual enjoyments,” he explains, the culture at large is beginning to unite 
the “breadth” and “sanity” of Hellenism with the “intensified individualism…of the romantic 
spirit.”136  (Pater, we will recall, also applied evolutionary paradigms to the history of the 
Renaissance, but where Pater saw this history as cyclical, Wilde—with a hint of Spencer’s and 
Clifford’s teleological thinking—suggests that the English Renaissance is a decided 
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improvement on past iterations.)  Wilde’s early reference to “individualism” here—which I 
discuss in greater detail in conjunction with his socialism—also shows us the degree to which his 
politics were enmeshed in his understanding of both evolution and aesthetics.  
As Allen did several years earlier in Physiological Aesthetics and The Colour-Sense, 
Wilde’s “English Renaissance of Art” also seeks to reconcile the purely self-gratifying nature of 
aesthetic beauty with what he sees as the “lofty, spiritual mission” of art.137  Following Allen and 
Darwin as well as Swinburne and Pater, Wilde takes for granted that the “real influence of the 
arts” lies in their “sensuous element,” whether in the “splendid curves” of a statue, the “pictorial 
charm” of a painting, or a poem’s “inventive handling of rhythmical language.”138  Yet, it is by 
“satisfying” the sensual aesthetic faculty that art, according to Wilde, manages to “touch the 
soul.”139  So while Wilde denies that art itself can have “any other claim but her own perfection,” 
he finds a “social aim” in the correct spectatorial response to art—hence the urgency of criticism, 
which will show the public in what “spirit” they should receive the “joy” of sensual, aesthetic 
experience.140  Like Allen, Wilde suggests that art contributes to “modern progress and 
civilisation” not by teaching moral lessons, but by providing individuals with noncompetitive, 
nonviolent ways to interface with an often brutal world.  Although Wilde discusses art in a more 
spiritualized register than Allen, they shared at this juncture a basic belief in the capacity for 
beautiful objects to cultivate (or as Allen put it, “tune”) more humane, cosmopolitan subjects, 
thereby creating what Wilde describes as “a common intellectual atmosphere between all 
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countries.”141  As Gagnier explains, Wilde’s cosmopolitanism was closely related to the forms of 
late Victorian liberalism that Spencer and Morris developed in their respective fields: a 
liberalism that made individualism compatible with the social good by stressing the power of 
self-culture to rein in anarchic individual impulses.142  In this way, Wilde reasoned that the 
proliferation of art and the education of taste could effect positive political and economic change.  
“For the good we get from art,” Wilde states toward the end of his lecture, “is not what we learn 
from it; it is what we become through it.”143  
By Richard Ellmann’s account, audiences in New York warmly applauded this message 
after Wilde first delivered the lecture in January 1882.144  While the “Apostle of Aesthetics,” as 
several North American newspapers dubbed him, encountered a less friendly reception in the 
other cities on his tour, he remained sanguine about aestheticism’s revolutionary potential.145  In 
his many interviews from this period, Wilde insists on the movement’s eventual triumph, chiefly 
on the basis of its status as a scientifically attested theory.  To a journalist at the New York 
Evening Post, for instance, Wilde defines aestheticism as “the science of finding the beautiful by 
looking for it in pursuance of fixed laws”; in Rochester he declares, “I know that I am right, that 
I have a mission to perform.”146  Flush with the self-assurance of his calling, he avows to another 
journalist that he has “not the slightest doubt of the complete success of the movement,” because 																																																								
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“the desire for beauty is merely a heightened form of the desire for life.”147  He elaborates on this 
quintessentially Wildean synopsis of physiological aesthetics in a later interview: “one of the 
uses of art is to cultivate the senses,” he explains in the Montreal Star, “the ears of people who 
do not often hear good music become very coarse…Any right theory of education, it seems to 
me…must be founded on a principle of educating the mind, not directly, but through the means 
of the senses.”148  In the same interview, Wilde alludes to the radically democratic implications 
of this materialist approach to aesthetics, which Allen had also pointed out several years earlier 
in “Aesthetic Evolution in Man.”  Since “we all have eyes, ears, and hands,” Wilde remarks, we 
all share the capacity to enjoy and create beautiful art, and anyone who does so “must be a better 
man, a better workman, a better citizen”—even without the benefit of “abstract” instruction.149  
With the sanction of physiology and psychology, Wilde can style the Aesthetic Movement—
particularly its faith in the universal process of becoming through sensory experience—“the most 
democratic impulse in the history of the world.”150  
As Dowling observes, however, “Wilde’s early Whig optimism began to cool” in the 
years following his tour, as he confronted “what appeared to be the empirical results” of the 
individualist aesthetic: namely, a cultural landscape “now hideously defaced with the 
consequences of millions of individual aesthetic choices.”151 According to Dowling, the fact that 
Wilde, like Allen, “found himself implicated in and economically determined by the aesthetic 
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preferences of a vast new democratic audience” further demoralized the once-assured aesthete.152  
For this reason, Wilde’s critical essays from the late 1880s and early 1890s evince a certain 
sardonic skepticism of democracy, which he dismisses in “The Soul of Man” as “simply the 
bludgeoning of the people by the people for the people.”153  Furthermore, the Wilde of the essays 
cannot so easily foresee the all-encompassing social change he had confidently anticipated in his 
American lectures.  In “The Decay of Lying,” for instance, the aesthetic evangelist Vivian 
predicts that Britain will undergo an artistic revival “surely some day,” but his phantasmagoric 
predictions—he envisions Behemoths, Leviathans, dragons, and other “beautiful and impossible 
things” roaming the English countryside—renders his prophecy more ironic than sincere.154  As a 
queer writer, Wilde also had to reconcile his evolutionism with personal tastes that seemed 
incompatible with the procreative aspect of evolution.  Whitney Davis observes that many queer 
aesthetic writers in the period—including Wilde, Lee, John Addington Symonds, and Edward 
Carpenter—“accepted broadly naturalistic and evolutionary premises” even as they recognized 
that their “aesthetic tastes…had an anomalous or paradoxical status in Darwinian terms.”155  
These writers, Davis argues, consequently wondered whether a “same-sex taste for beauty, form, 
or art” might have “the same natural basis as the sense of beauty shaped, according to Darwin, in 
the cross-sex interactions of sexual selection.”156  Wilde, like many of his aesthetic colleagues, 
remained uncertain about whether the principles of sexual selection, which he began to see as the 
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firmest scientific grounds for his vision of aesthetic progress, could operate through mechanisms 
beyond that of heterosexual reproduction.  
These challenges notwithstanding, Wilde continued to advocate for the civilizing 
influence of decorative art by redirecting his attention toward the more diffuse effects of 
evolutionary process, and away from the immediate cultivation of “better men,” “better 
workmen,” and “better citizens” that he had described to the American press in the early 1880s.  
Allen contributed to Wilde’s renewed social optimism in several ways.  First, Allen scientifically 
redefined individual desire as a progressive evolutionary instinct that operated most effectively 
under libertarian social conditions (as we have seen, many readers of “The New Hedonism” 
construed Allen’s argument as a defense of homosexuality).  In this context, Wilde could 
conceive of individualistic, even anarchic forms of social organization that could generate 
evolutionary and social benefits without the need for forcible reform, unchecked Darwinian 
competition, or heteronormative eugenics.  This logic was particularly instrumental in Wilde’s 
complicated politics.  Secondly, Allen’s inquiries into the evolving cultural character of the 
“race” lent scientific support to Wilde’s own developing hypotheses about heredity and self-
culture—hypotheses that culminated in “The Critic as Artist” (1890, revised 1891), Wilde’s most 
emphatic articulation of his evolutionary aesthetic aims.   
By tracing Wilde’s utopian thinking through his early journalism, we can better 
understand the conflicted—and yet, for Wilde, compelling—reformist ambitions underlying later 
essays such as “The Critic as Artist” and “The Soul of Man.”  Though not as prolific a journalist 
as Allen, Wilde also relied on periodical publication for an income, and he spent much of the 
1880s navigating the same industry that agonized his Canadian colleague.  Wilde regularly 
contributed to the Pall Mall Gazette, where he first encountered Allen, as well as arts periodicals 
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such as the Dramatic Review and the Court and Society Review; Wilde also edited and produced 
copy for The Woman’s World from 1887 to 1889.157  Wilde’s and Allen’s shared distaste for 
journalism—Wilde’s experiences as both agent and target of journalistic rumor mongering led 
him to compare the press to the rack—did not prevent either writer from utilizing periodicals as 
platforms for their ideas.158  While Allen, as we have seen, leveraged the market for scientific 
articles in order to popularize his evolutionary theories of culture, Wilde, in the meantime, used 
his dozens of critical reviews to promote his views on the social dimensions of art.   
Wilde’s 1885 report of James McNeill Whistler’s famous “Ten O’Clock” lecture, for 
instance, applauds the American painter’s “marvellous eloquence” but disputes his complete 
separation of the artist from social context: in Wilde’s satirical estimation, Whistler effectively 
argued “that the only thing [the public] should cultivate was ugliness, and that on their 
permanent stupidity rested all the hopes of art in the future.”159  Joseph Bristow and Rebecca N. 
Mitchell situate this article within a “spirited, if eventually bitter, exchange” between Wilde and 
Whistler, who repeatedly accused Wilde of plagiarism.160  In a veiled attack on Wilde, Whistler’s 
lecture condemns the “voice of the aesthete” for venturing to “translat[e]” the sacred, self-
sufficient work of art into accessible critical language.161  An artist, Wilde replies in his review, 																																																								
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“can no more be born of a nation that is devoid of any sense of beauty than a fig can grow from a 
thorn,” and this certainty alone proves the real “value of beautiful surroundings” and, by 
extension, his own critical project.162  In a later review, by contrast, Wilde praises John 
Addington Symonds’s final volume of the Renaissance in Italy (1886) for achieving “something 
like the science of the true historian”; in true “critical spirit,” Wilde continues, Symonds does not 
treat “life as a mere spectacle” but instead contemplates “the laws of its evolution and progress” 
with humane compassion.163  As we can see here, Wilde’s refusal to hold the artist to ethical 
standards did not apply to the art critic, who he entrusted to instruct the public in the proper 
appreciation of beautiful objects.  For Wilde, as for Allen, an understanding of the role that the 
sense of beauty played in cultural evolution was a vital part of the critic’s pedagogical duty, 
which was to proliferate a civilized (and civilizing) aesthetic temperament. 
The specific critiques that Wilde levels at Symonds also speak to Wilde’s ongoing 
interpretation of socialism, a political creed that was closely tied to both his evolutionary 
worldview and his commitment to aesthetic individualism.  Symonds, Wilde remarks in his 
notice of Renaissance in Italy, “has something of Shakespeare’s sovereign contempt of the 
masses” and “hardly realizes that what seems romance to us was harsh reality to those who were 
engaged in it.”164  Wilde further points out that Symonds’s preoccupation with “great 
personalities”—also a hallmark of Pater’s historical criticism—occasionally tempts Symonds to 
view the past “rather as a picture to be painted than as a problem to be solved.”165  While Wilde 
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identifies with this “desire to represent life at all costs under dramatic conditions,” he implies 
that this aestheticization of the past is inconsistent with the reformist “office of history” and 
Symonds’s own “widened…sympathies.”166  History, Wilde here suggests, should recount the 
social and moral conditions of past ages with an eye toward the circumstances of the present: 
ideally, the historian’s all-encompassing sympathy (the “true critic,” he remarks elsewhere, 
“bears within himself the dreams and ideas and feelings of myriad generations”) allows him to 
envision more equitable social systems.167   
Wilde consequently approves of a lecture on tapestry that Morris delivered in 1888, 
because Morris, unlike Symonds, derives salient political lessons from history while still 
pleasing his audience with what Wilde summarizes as a “delightful” talk.168  According to 
Wilde’s retelling, Morris argues that certain technological and economic conditions peculiar to 
the medieval period resulted in the development of a “really beautiful and decorative” art form; 
Morris further construes this as evidence that modern-day “commercialism, with its vile god 
cheapness, its callous indifference to the worker, [and] its innate vulgarity of temper, is our 
enemy.”169  As Wilde’s review continues, his voice becomes indistinguishable from Morris’s, 
and by its end Wilde appears to have adopted Morris’s socialist ethos for himself.  “To gain 
anything good,” Wilde concludes without irony, “we must sacrifice something of our luxury—
must think more of others, more of the State, the commonweal.”170  “Commonweal,” as 
Elizabeth Carolyn Miller reminds us, was also the title of Morris’s socialist newspaper, which 																																																								
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Miller describes as a “utopian print space” that sought to counteract the commercialist tendencies 
against which Morris continually protested.171  “The art of the Commonweal,” Miller notes, was 
“surprisingly faithful to Wilde’s aesthetic vision,” and Wilde seems to have absorbed some of its 
utopian character in turn.172 
Morris’s conjunction between aesthetic progress and communitarianism, which Allen 
also articulated in an expressly evolutionary context, served to galvanize Wilde’s own 
progressive politics in the following years.  The same year that he positively reviewed Morris’s 
lecture, Wilde also began attending meetings of the Fabian Society: the socialist advocacy group 
whose members included Morris, Allen, the playwright George Bernard Shaw, the poet Edward 
Carpenter, the sexologist Havelock Ellis, and other prominent progressives.173  As Shaw later 
recounted, the Fabian Society in the 1880s was less a codified political party than a loose 
affiliation of radicals, in which “Anarchist and Socialist worked shoulder to shoulder” because 
neither “had any definite idea of what he wanted or how it was to be got.”174  As Ian Britain 
further explains in his history of Fabianism, the Fabians generally advocated for gradual change 
through the introduction of socialist reforms, although different factions within the group often 
disagreed vehemently on how exactly these reforms should be implemented.175  Unlike 
competing organizations such as the Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist League, 
which professed to be working-class movements, the Fabian Society culled its members from the 
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middle-class literati: many Fabians, Britain argues, were thus “passionate connoisseurs and 
indefatigable advocates of the pleasures which art could afford.”176  While Wilde’s participation 
in the Fabian Society was short-lived, the non-programmatic nature of the organization as well as 
its thoroughgoing interest in art attracted him to the socialist cause in this period.  
Wilde’s equally strong interest in individualism, however, reminds us of the intricacies of 
his distinctive political philosophy, which combined elements of both Fabian socialism and 
liberalism.  As Josephine M. Guy notes, “Individualism” (specifically when capitalized, as it 
appears in “The Soul of Man under Socialism”) was a distinct political movement that emerged 
in the early 1880s, around the time of Wilde’s North American lectures.177  Individualists, Guy 
explains, “defined freedom as the absence of physical or legal constraints” and, for this reason, 
opposed both censorship and state-based welfare systems; many Individualists looked to the 
writings of Spencer and John Stuart Mill for philosophical support for this view.178  Guy points 
out that this Individualist ideal of “negative liberty” appealed to Wilde, even as the movement’s 
leanings toward social Darwinism—Individualists often advocated for market deregulation and 
strong property rights—jarred with Wilde’s beliefs about the degrading effects of economic 
competition.179  This form of capitalistic individualism, Elaine Hadley adds, also defined liberal 
politics in the nineteenth century, especially as practiced by the Liberal Party under the 
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influential leadership of William Ewart Gladstone.180  Wilde’s skepticism about practical reform 
and laissez-faire economics aside, his membership in the Eighty Club—a political gentlemen’s 
club closely tied to Gladstone and the Liberal Party establishment—indicates at least some 
involvement in party affairs.181  At the intersection of these influences, Wilde’s work from the 
1890s attempted to unite the liberal values of self-determination and free thought with the 
democratic and artistic ideals of the socialist movement.  
Two additional models of social and political reform, which appeared in the late 1880s, 
guided Wilde’s ongoing inquiries into the political repercussions of his aestheticism.  The first of 
these was “Individualism and Socialism” (1889), Allen’s critique of the Liberty and Property 
Defence League—an organization that, as Guy notes, lobbied for Individualist causes.182  In this 
essay, Allen rejects what he sees as the antisocial motivations behind the LPDL and instead 
discerns “True Individualism” in the counter-competitive message of socialism.183  Allen, 
drawing on Mill, defines “Individualism” as the belief in “the full, free, and equal right of every 
citizen to the unimpeded use of all his energies, activities and faculties, provided only he does 
not thereby encroach upon the equal and correlative right of every other citizen” (this conception 
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of personal freedom reappeared in “The New Hedonism” several years later).184  However, Allen 
appends a caveat both to Mill’s liberalism and the more reactionary brand of Individualism that 
groups such as the LPDL derived from Mill.  A truly Individualist society, Allen contends, is 
only possible when every member “can start fair in the race for life, without finding [her or his] 
individuality encroached upon every side by hampering monopolies” such as exploitative labor 
practices, shortages of necessary resources, and moralistic legislation.185  Socialist reforms, Allen 
continues, can keep these monopolies in check, thereby enabling the individual to pursue desires 
that, as he argues elsewhere, ultimately result in evolutionary good.  Significantly for Wilde, 
Allen presses socialism in the service of Individualism, rather than the other way around: for this 
reason, Allen remains skeptical of “the State, that deus ex machina of current Socialistic thinking 
and writing,” and he warns against the “busybody meddlesomeness” of government and the 
redistribution of wealth by force.186  But with regard to the “real revolutions actually in 
progress,” including Irish Home Rule and the nationalization of natural resources, Allen believes 
that socialists and Individualists can work “side by side most amicably.”187  He accordingly 
embraces the “ideal and fanciful” nature of all “Utopias,” since the very impracticality of such 
“schemes” allows the Individualist and the socialist to join forces despite their differences.188  
With its bricolage of Gladstonian liberalism and Fabian socialism, its recognition of the complex 
social and biological conditions that jeopardize liberty, and its appreciation for the utopian 
sensibility, Allen’s “Individualism and Socialism” provided a helpful example to Wilde as he 																																																								
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drafted “The Soul of Man under Socialism.”  (Guy goes so far as to claim that Allen’s “tactic of 
combining an Individualist anti-statism with a Socialist critique of private property is virtually 
identical to that of Wilde in ‘The Soul of Man,’” though she grants that their respective essays 
diverge in tone and scope.189) 
The second of Wilde’s important political sources differed markedly from Allen’s essay 
in provenance, though not in intention.  Around the same time that Wilde encountered Allen’s 
libertarian socialism, he also read and reviewed Chuang Tzŭ: Mystic, Moralist, and Social 
Reformer (1889), a translation of the extent works of Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi.190  In a 
glowing 1890 review for the Speaker, Wilde calls the over two thousand-year-old treatise “the 
most caustic criticism of modern life I have met with for some time.”191  For Wilde, Zhuangzi is 
a proto-aesthetic philosopher, a consummate critic who combines the best aspects of every 
branch of human knowledge into an incisive “creed of Inaction” that upholds “self-culture and 
self-development” as the ultimate aims of life.192  In Wilde’s telling, Zhuangzi “sum[s] up in 
himself almost every mood of European metaphysical and mystical thought, from Herakleitus 
down to Hegel” and beyond; he “combines with the passionate eloquence of a Rousseau the 																																																								
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scientific reasoning of a Herbert Spencer,” and “he is one of the Darwinians before Darwin.”193  
This multifaceted temperament, Wilde continues, grants Zhuangzi rare foresight regarding the 
social, economic, and cultural problems that plague late nineteenth-century Britain.  In an 
anticipation of Spencer’s critique of industrial capitalism, for instance, Wilde’s Zhuangzi sees 
that “the accumulation of wealth” only exacerbates the crushing force of “competition” and leads 
to “the waste, as well as the destruction, of energy.”194  Wilde also highlights Zhuangzi’s timely 
critique of “Governments and Philanthropists,” which “tr[y] to coerce people into being good, 
and so destroy the natural goodness of man.”195   
Though implausible from Wilde’s Darwinian perspective, Zhuangzi’s vision of a pre-
civilized “Golden Age” provides Wilde with a basis for discussing the ways in which 
sociocultural progress might arise from the “spontaneous” and “intuit[ive]” conduct of 
autonomous individuals.196  In Wilde’s estimation, Zhuangzi’s “perfect man” is a model of 
Paterian contemplation whose “mental equilibrium gives him the empire of the world”; he can 
therefore “rest in inactivity, and see the world become virtuous of itself.”197  But this serene, 
cerebral objectivity does not entail political apathy, as Wilde illustrates in a cutting aside:  
All this is of course excessively dangerous, but we must remember that Chuang 
Tsŭ lived more than two thousand years ago, and never had the opportunity of seeing our 
unrivalled civilisation.  And yet it is possible that, were he to come back to earth and visit 
us, he might have something to say to [Chief Secretary for Ireland Arthur Balfour] about 
his coercion and active misgovernment in Ireland; he might smile at some of our 
philanthropic ardours, and shake his head over many of our organised charities; the 
School Board might not impress him, nor our race for wealth stir his admiration.198 																																																								
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Far from withdrawing him from social and political concerns, Zhuangzi’s (and by extension, 
Wilde’s) eschewal of action is what allows him to penetrate the most oppressively imperialistic 
and exploitative ideologies of the Victorian middle class.  By refusing to participate in these 
forms of political and economic subjugation, Zhuangzi’s “strange philosophy” of self-cultivation 
and non-intervention proves “dangerous”—an adjective Wilde uses several times—to those in 
positions of power.  Since self-culture and self-expression pose such potent challenges to the 
status quo, then, inactivity is not idleness but a vital form of dissident labor, which Wilde 
describes as the “work of the intellect.”199 
Wilde weaves these multidisciplinary threads into two of the most memorable 
professions of aesthetic philosophy in this period: namely, his critical essay “The True Function 
and Value of Criticism” (1890), which he revised and republished as “The Critic as Artist” in his 
collection Intentions (1891), and his political manifesto “The Soul of Man under Socialism.”  In 
both pieces, Wilde once again waxes optimistic about the long-term social value of aestheticism, 
but his earlier emphasis on educational reform and the popular dissemination of decorative art—
the core policies of “missionary aestheticism,” to once again borrow Maltz’s term—gives way to 
explorations of evolutionary process and racial development.200  Like Clifford, Pater, and Allen, 
Wilde’s essays creatively reinterpret the modern sciences in order to postulate an attitude toward 
life that might safeguard the happiness of the individual, minimize the suffering of others, and 
bring about positive social as well as evolutionary change.  It was in these essays that Wilde, as 
the journalist Holbrook Jackson remarks in his retrospective on fin-de-siècle Britain, “bridged 																																																								
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the chasm between the self-contained individualism of the decadents and the communal 
aspirations of the more advanced social revolutionaries.”201  
In keeping with this ambition, “The Critic as Artist” (subtitled “With some remarks upon 
the importance of doing nothing”) touches on a vast array of biological, anthropological, artistic, 
and historiographical issues adjacent to Wilde’s central concerns about art and society.  The two-
part essay takes the form of a Socratic dialogue between Ernest and his mentor Gilbert, who 
continuously shocks Ernest out of his honest, but unoriginal, opinions about the role of the critic.  
The dialogue begins with Ernest parroting the mainstream view of art criticism (which Whistler 
also expressed in his “Ten O’Clock” lecture) as a “shrill clamour” that violates the sanctity of 
creative work; “the Greeks,” Ernest asserts, “had no art-critics.”202  Gilbert counters with the 
example of Aristotle, who “concern[s] himself primarily with the impression that the work of art 
produces” and, “as a physiologist and psychologist,…knows that the health of [the aesthetic] 
function resides in energy.”203  As Gilbert’s gloss of Aristotle suggests, the evolutionary 
aesthetic theories of Spencer, Darwin, Clifford, Pater, and Allen are crucial to the cultural 
principles that Gilbert subsequently demonstrates to Ernest in part one of “The Critic as Artist.”   
First and foremost, Gilbert’s Spencerian notion of health as a function of energy calls into 
question Ernest’s simplistic privileging of life over art.  Gilbert explains catharsis, for instance, 
in terms that evoke Spencer’s idea of play as the salutary release of superfluous energy: 
Aristotelian tragedy “cleanses the bosom of much ‘perilous stuff’” by providing the viewer with 
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“high and worthy objects for the exercise of the emotions.”204  Secondly, Spencer’s equation of 
progress with differentiation—and, more powerfully, Clifford’s related warnings against 
“propriety” and the “crystallisation of the race”—surfaces in Gilbert’s radical upending of 
Ernest’s moralism.205  After Ernest ingenuously asserts that “it is much more difficult to do a 
thing than to talk about it,” Gilbert scoffs at the “man of action” who defies “scientific laws” that 
dictate even seemingly conscious action.206  In the face of this reality, trying to do “good” deeds 
is futile, while acting to please oneself—which Gilbert provocatively describes as “sin”—“is an 
essential element of progress.”207  His scientific reasoning draws on both Darwinian conceptions 
of species and (given the erotic import of “sin”) the progressive logic of sexual selection.  The 
“machine of life,” Gilbert explains, “may grind our virtues to powder…or transform our sins into 
elements of a new civilization, more marvellous and more splendid than any that has gone 
before.”208  “Through its curiosity,” he continues, “Sin increases the experience of race,” and 
“through its intensified assertion of individualism, it saves us from monotony of type…without it 
the world would stagnate, or grow old, or become colourless.”209  Finally, Gilbert’s scientifically 
inflected individualism feeds into a parallel defense of critical autonomy that Wilde (like Pater, 
Clifford, and Allen before him) derives from Bainian psychology.  Since aesthetic experience is 
“purely subjective,” Gilbert tells Ernest, the “meaning of any beautiful created thing is, at least, 
as much in the soul of him who looks at it, as it was in his soul who wrought it”; consequently, 																																																								
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the “highest criticism” is really “the record of one’s own soul,” a creative work that rivals and 
often eclipses the artwork it critiques.210   
The second half of “The Critic as Artist” (subtitled “With some remarks upon the 
importance of discussing everything”) refines the causal relationship between art, critical 
independence, and racial progress by explicating the aesthetic faculty in terms of its sexual 
selective purpose.  As Gilbert predicts at the end of part one, the intervening meal has a “subtle 
influence” on the conversation’s tenor: once he has taken care of his basic (or what Spencer and 
Allen might have deemed “life-serving”) needs, Gilbert becomes increasingly aware of the 
artistic “failures” of life.211  “Don’t let us go to life for our fulfillment or our experience,” Gilbert 
urges Ernest, “it is a thing narrowed by circumstances, incoherent in its utterance,” and 
ultimately dissatisfying to “the artistic and critical temperament.”212  Similarly to Pater and 
Clifford, Wilde chafes against the biological and physical forces that dictate day-to-day 
existence; like Allen, Wilde had sufficient familiarity with the journalism trade to count 
pecuniary need among these constrictions.  For Wilde, art grants its audiences a degree of 
precious control over their lived experience of the world and, in some measure, compensates for 
life’s demoralizing conditions.  By merely picking up a book or attending a play, Gilbert reasons, 
“we can choose the time of our initiation and the time of our freedom”; through art, we can 
“realize our perfection” while “shield[ing] ourselves from the sordid perils of actual 
existence.”213   
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In a broad sense, “life” and “art” come to connote, for Gilbert, the processes of natural 
selection—which operates through a confluence of external pressures—and sexual selection—
with its intimations of free choice, excess, and pleasure—respectively.  At his most sanguine 
moment, Gilbert thus imagines the possibility of self-perfection through the appropriation of 
progressive, sexual selective mechanisms.  “In the development of the individual,” Gilbert 
declares, 
even a colour-sense is more important…than a sense of right and wrong.  Aesthetics, in 
fact, are to Ethics in the sphere of conscious civilization, what, in the sphere of the 
external world, sexual is to natural selection.  Ethics, like natural selection, make 
existence possible.  Aesthetics, like sexual selection, make life lovely and wonderful, fill 
it with new forms, and give it progress, and variety and change.  And when we reach the 
true culture that is our aim, we attain to that perfection of which the saints have dreamed, 
the perfection of those to whom sin is impossible, not because they make the 
renunciations of the ascetic, but because they can do everything they wish without hurt to 
the soul, and can wish for nothing that can do the soul harm.214 
 
Gilbert’s analogy subtly, but significantly, revises his comments on sin.  While he maintains his 
previous claims about sin’s efficacy, “sin” here has morphed into the more benign locution of 
“do[ing] everything [one] wish[es].”  When Gilbert situates his “antinomian” licentiousness in 
the paradigm of sexual selection, it sheds its moralistic valence and ceases to be “sin” at all, in 
part because he considers science, like art, “out of the reach of morals.”215  In many ways, 
Gilbert appeals to the amoral “ethic of uselessness” that underwrote, as Christine Ferguson 
argues, both scientific philosophy and decadent literature in the fin de siècle: by invoking sexual 
selection, which provides an evolutionary standard for the selection of otherwise “useless” 
ornamental qualities, Gilbert is able to shake off the constraints of utilitarian “Ethics” and 
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simultaneously assume the ethical high ground.216  Like Allen, then, Wilde relies on the logic of 
sexual selection to align personal desire and “sin” with higher spiritual “perfection” (in this 
regard, Gilbert also explicitly defers to “Chuang Tsû the wise,” who defended “simple and 
spontaneous virtue” against the attacks of “wicked philanthropists”).217  With the proper 
cultivation, they believed, individuals will instinctually gravitate toward the lovely, the beautiful, 
and the good, and their own diverse inclinations—so long as these inclinations are given free 
rein—will reap evolutionary profit over the course of generations.   
In Gilbert’s esoteric discussions of race and heredity, Wilde elaborates on the 
mechanisms by which such beneficial aesthetic instincts might be preserved for future 
generations.  While these discussions often resemble in substance and tone Swinburne’s, 
Clifford’s, and Pater’s visions of universal “Man,” Wilde departs from his predecessors in his 
interpretations of hereditary science.  For instance, Gilbert strategically circumscribes, rather 
than magnifies, the power of individuals to shape humankind through conscious action: “by 
revealing to us the absolute mechanism of all action,” he tells Ernest, the “scientific principle of 
Heredity” frees us from the “burden of moral responsibility” and becomes the “warrant for the 
contemplative life.”218  As Michael Wainwright has shown, Wilde’s understanding of hereditary 
determinism draws on several competing theories of inheritance, including those of Spencer and 
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Darwin as well as the German naturalists Ernst Haeckel and August Weismann.219  Like Spencer, 
Haeckel belonged to the Lamarckian tradition, which held that acquired traits could be passed 
down to one’s offspring; Weismann and Darwin, as we have seen, generally disagreed.220  While 
David Clifford, in his summation of Wilde’s evolutionary thinking, places the aesthete in the 
Lamarckian camp along with Spencer, Wilde’s concession to hereditary determinism and reading 
of Weismann suggest that he may have been undecided on the subject.221  Far from an abstract 
academic issue, the fundamental nature of heredity was a pivotal question for Wilde, in part 
because his most optimistic scientific antecedents—namely Spencer and Clifford—premised 
their optimism on the assumption that cultivated characteristics were heritable to some extent.   
At the same time, the lack of scientific consensus on heredity gave rise to widespread 
speculations about hereditary culture that in turn facilitated Wilde’s social and evolutionary 
investment in the critic.  As Laura Otis argues, late Victorian psychologists and cultural critics 
alike detected apparent parallels between individual and cultural development and, on this basis, 
postulated the existence of an organic, racial memory.222  Consequently, to an observer such as 
Wilde the notion of “cultural inheritance” would have raised a skein of contentious uncertainties 
regarding the role of biological transmission in the perpetuation of the critical temperament.  In 
“The Critic as Artist,” these mysteries validate Gilbert’s imaginative figuration of heredity, a 
prismatic phenomenon that he alternately titles a “terrible shadow,” the “last of the Fates,” and 																																																								
219 Michael Wainwright, Toward a Sociobiological Hermeneutic: Darwinian Essays in Literature (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 25-28.  
220 As Wainwright and others have noted, and as I point out in the first chapter, Darwin became more amenable to 
the idea of use-disuse inheritance later in his career.  Wainwright, Toward a Sociobiological Hermeneutic, 27-
28.   
221 David Clifford, “Wilde and Evolution,” 213. 
222 Laura Otis, Organic Memory: History and the Body in the Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Centuries 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 93. 
		 201 
“the only one of the Gods whose real name we know.”223  The elusiveness of heredity’s inner 
workings allows Wilde to represent heredity in language that harkens back to Pater’s reading of 
La Giaconda in “Notes on Leonardo da Vinci” (1869), in which Pater imagines the “strange 
thoughts and fantastic reveries and exquisite passions” lurking behind her famous smile.224  In 
this vein, Gilbert directs his critical faculty toward a creative, and ultimately recuperative, 
representation of heredity that resolves scientific fact into the aestheticized image of “Nemesis”: 
the Greek spirit of retribution who both “rob[s] energy of its freedom and activity of its choice” 
and gives us, in recompense, “gifts of strange temperaments and subtle susceptibilities…wild 
ardours and chill moods of indifference, complex multiform gifts of thoughts that are at variance 
with each other, and passions that war against themselves.”225  Like Pater’s Giaconda, who 
emblematizes the modern “idea of humanity as…summing up in itself all modes of thought and 
life,” Wilde’s hereditary soul is immortal and vampiric—a denizen of “fearful places” and 
“ancient sepulchers” who has suffered “many maladies” and committed “curious sins.”226  “And 
so,” Gilbert proceeds, “it is not our own life that we live, but the lives of the dead”; similarly, the 
“soul that dwells within us is no single spiritual entity” but a kind of palimpsest upon which is 
written the experiences and desires of our ancestors.227  
In “The Critic as Artist,” the conception of culture that Gilbert derives from hereditary 
science is at once rational and surprisingly democratic, even as it endangers the individualism 
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that Wilde values so highly elsewhere.228  Gilbert’s mystical characterization of heredity 
continually conflates mythological imagery with the technical idioms of modern science: 
heredity, in his articulation, is both a deity and a “scientific principle” that presides over the 
“transmission of racial experiences.”229  As in his North American lectures, Wilde also 
underscores the democratic ramifications of his approach to hereditary culture.  In Gilbert’s 
scientific view, what we call the imagination “is simply concentrated race-experience,” and 
every member of the race, at least in theory, enjoys equal access to this well of accumulated 
emotional capacities.230  Gilbert’s use of “race,” furthermore, leaves the precise criterion for 
membership ambiguous.  In an unstated homage to Allen’s essay “The Celt in English Art,” for 
instance, Gilbert traces the “strange Renaissance” of aestheticism to a distinctly Celtic “creative 
instinct,” but he suggests that anyone may follow the Celt’s example.231  With the proper critical 
training and the right artistic stimulation, he implies, our human capacity for imagination allows 
us all “to escape from our experience, and to realize the experiences of those who are greater 
than we are”; since we all have the ability to “see the dawn through Shelley’s eyes” or “wander 
with [Keats’s] Endymion,” we can all potentially transcend those “ignoble” circumstances that 
“mar the perfection of our development.”232   
Most important for Wilde’s utopian thinking, Gilbert’s theory of a heritable culture also 
reveals a promising method for the conscious and progressive advancement of culture, not 
through “action”—which is always overdetermined by biological and environmental factors—																																																								
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but through the concerted exercise of what he calls the “critical spirit.”233  Like Pater’s titular 
hero in Marius the Epicurean (1885), Gilbert’s “true man of culture” interrogates his hereditary 
patrimony and learns, “by fine scholarship and fastidious rejection,” how to “separate the work 
that has distinction from the work that has it not.”234  In this way, the critic makes “instinct self-
conscious and intelligent”: that is, he analyzes his latent hereditary impulses, exteriorizes these 
indwelling instincts, and finally seizes control over an evolutionary process that structurally 
resembles sexual selection (sexual selection, after all, consists in the same procedures of passive 
consideration and “rejection” that Gilbert’s critic performs, only on a larger scale).235  The 
introspective “perfecting of [one]self” that Gilbert upholds as the critic’s only aim paradoxically 
becomes the very means by which the critic influences his wider milieu, because the critic, at the 
same time that he perfects himself, also “creat[es] in [the age] new desires and appetites” by 
“lending it his larger vision and his nobler moods”236  Sexual selection, as Wilde acknowledges, 
invests immense evolutionary power in the accumulated “desires and appetites” of individuals—
to such a degree that Gilbert predicts that the critic will spearhead humankind’s evolution into a 
more enlightened species.237  (At the conclusion of “The Critic as Artist,” scientific accounts of 
culture furnish not only a philosophical basis for a theory of modern criticism, but also concrete 
examples of the critical spirit at work.  In response to Ernest’s claim that criticism is “sterile,” 
Gilbert credits the work of two “critics” for making the nineteenth century “one of the most 
important eras in the progress of the world”: the first is Ernest Renan, the French Bible scholar 																																																								
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who published a controversial biography of the historical Jesus in 1863, and the second is 
Darwin.238)  In its rhetoric as well as its philosophy, “The Critic as Artist” recaptures some of the 
optimism of “The English Renaissance of Art”: in the intervening nine years, Wilde had only 
magnified the evolutionary importance of the independent and unorthodox personality. 
In “The Soul of Man under Socialism,” which appeared in the Fortnightly Review shortly 
before Wilde published a revised version of “The Critic as Artist” in Intentions, Wilde envisions 
ways in which we might “reconstruct society” so as to nurture more of these generative 
personalities.239  To this end, “The Soul of Man” picks up where “The Critic as Artist” left off: 
by praising those exemplary writers, such as Darwin, Renan, and Keats, who pursued their 
intellectual impulses without regard to the “clamorous claims of others.” 240  By breaking free of 
artistic and intellectual tradition, Wilde enthuses, these “great” men “realise[d]” their 
“perfection,” to their “own incomparable gain, and to the incomparable and lasting gain of the 
whole world.”241  Wilde subsequently admits that these men are exceptional: “the majority of 
people…find themselves surrounded by hideous poverty, by hideous ugliness, [and] by hideous 
starvation,” and this “unreasonable, degrading Tyranny of want” moreover compels them to do 
“work that is quite uncongenial to them.”242  An individual in these circumstances, he observes, 
“is merely the infinitesimal atom of a force that…crushes him” and, in doing so, effectively bars 
him from ever achieving “grace of manner, or charm of speech, or civilization, or culture, or 
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refinement in pleasures, or joy of life.”243  In Wilde’s representation of capitalism, which afflicts 
even the wealthy with its “demoralising” obligations, the compulsion to “sordid preoccupation” 
and “endless industry” seems as pervasive and inexorable as physical law.244  
For Wilde, the only solution to the widespread oppression of the individual—a solution 
that he frames in the aesthetic discourse of the critic rather than the sentimental register of the 
“misdirected” altruist—is the comprehensive reorganization of society according to socialist 
principles.245  Similarly to Allen, Wilde merges socialism and individualism into a progressive 
political philosophy by drawing on an eclectic assortment of scientific ideas, including Spencer’s 
conception of organic evolution, Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, and Clifford’s iconoclastic 
vitalism.  Socialism, Wilde explains, “will restore society to its proper condition of a thoroughly 
healthy organism, and insure the material well-being of each member of the community” by 
“converting private property into public wealth” and “substituting cooperation for 
competition.”246  In this way, socialism will “give Life” what Wilde calls “its proper basis and its 
proper environment” and allow the “disturbing and disintegrating force” of individualism to 
thrive.247  This individualist spirit will, in turn, combat “monotony of type, slavery of custom, 
[and] tyranny of habit,” thereby bringing “Life to its highest mode of perfection.”248  Wilde’s 
adoption of Spencer’s idiom of perfectibility here is strategic rather than naïve: Wilde was 
sufficiently familiar with Darwin to understand that the systems of competition Wilde associated 
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with capitalism were inseparable from biological existence.  Instead, his deference to Spencerian 
sociology—which was founded, as Wilde notes in his Commonplace book, on a “real analogy 
between the individual and the social organism”—is part of the essay’s concerted 
aestheticization of organic “Life.”249  Spencer’s organismic metaphor for society, like Clifford’s 
concept of the “tribal self,” reifies socialism’s communitarian ideals and thus enables Wilde to 
postulate a rational alternative to what he calls the “stress of competition and struggle for 
place.”250  
In this regard, Wilde’s vision of a socialist revolution mirrors his aspirations about 
aesthetics and its intervention in human evolution: just as aesthetics entail alternative 
evolutionary processes that privilege diversity, spontaneity, and pleasure over the exigencies of 
survival, socialism “substitut[es]” stable communalism for the brutality and volatility of 
capitalism.  Consequently, Wilde also tacitly relies on Darwinian sexual selection in “The Soul 
of Man,” although the theory is more problematic here than in “The Critic as Artist.”  A 
beneficial side-effect of the abolition of private property, Wilde observes in “The Soul of Man,” 
is the consequent disappearance of “marriage in its present form.”251  Like Allen in Philistia and 
“Falling in Love,” Wilde predicts that the liberated assertion of personality in sexual matters will 
lead not to anarchy, but to a more perfect social order: “individualism,” he writes, “converts the 
abolition of legal restraint into a form of freedom that will help the full development of 
personality, and make the love of man and woman more wonderful, more beautiful, and more 																																																								
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ennobling.”252  In a provocative application of Biblical exegesis, Wilde vindicates his vision of 
sexual liberation by looking to the story of Jesus and the adulteress, who was forgiven “not 
because she repented, but because her love was so intense and wonderful” that it fulfilled the 
higher ethical and evolutionary aim of self-development.253  Yet, it is important to note that “The 
Soul of Man,” unlike “The Critic as Artist,” never mentions sexual selection explicitly.  This 
relative reticence, I suggest, speaks to Wilde’s unresolved reservations about the theory’s basis 
in heterosexual reproduction.  As Davis notes, and as I will elaborate in my discussion of Lee in 
the next chapter, Wilde and other queer aesthetes had an ambivalent relationship to evolutionary 
theory: even as evolutionary accounts of beauty corroborated their optimistic aestheticism, the 
coercive heteronormativity of sexual selection threatened to spoil these utopian projections of 
generational progress.  In this light, Wilde’s ambiguous reference to the “love of man and 
woman” not only sidesteps potential accusations of sexual immorality (which critics such as 
Stutfield leveled at Wilde regardless) but also purposefully dissociates the salutary aspect of 
aesthetic and romantic desire from its reproductive functions.254  
Through its strenuous efforts to reshape our perception of material reality—which recall 
Pater’s and Clifford’s work from the 1870s and 1880s—“The Soul of Man” finally imagines an 
expressly “Utopian” evolutionary future without having to rely on Allen’s eugenic reasoning.  
Consider, by contrast, Wilde’s “The Decay of Lying”: in that essay, Wilde dismisses nature’s 
“curious crudities” and interprets its aesthetic “defects” as evidence of a general “lack of 																																																								
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design,” which the artistic imagination alone can remedy.255  In “The Soul of Man,” however, 
Wilde occludes nature’s shortcomings by stressing the ways in which beauty, individuality, and 
perfection are immanent in evolutionary order.  Individualism, he claims in a reference to 
Spencerian biology, “comes naturally and inevitably out of man,” because “it is the 
differentiation to which all organisms grow” and the “perfection that is inherent in every mode of 
life.”256  Instead of positioning individual freedom and aesthetic pleasure in opposition to nature, 
as he does in “The Decay of Lying,” Wilde heralds individualism as the highest manifestation of 
the laws of organic growth: “evolution,” he asserts, “is the law of life, and there is no evolution 
except towards Individualism.”257  By redefining evolutionary process in this way, Wilde can 
declare avarice and jealousy unnatural qualities resulting from social and economic constructs 
that suppress humankind’s natural cooperative instincts.  To be “natural,” conversely, is to be 
“absolutely unselfish” in one’s sympathies, which spontaneously extend to life’s “joy and beauty 
and energy” as well as its “sores and maladies.”258  Socialism, he concludes, is the political 
prerequisite for this natural process of individuation: by emancipating individuals from the 
brutalizing constraints of natural selection and the free market, socialism will pave the way for 
the unfettered exercise of choice that, as Allen had shown, was necessary for both personal and 
evolutionary progress.  But in “The Soul of Man,” Wilde argues that the self-perfection of the 
individual spreads to the rest of humankind through the abstruse, osmotic workings of cultural 
heredity and social equilibration, not through sexual reproduction.   
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In a less overtly polemical, but potentially more utopian way, Wilde further reflects on 
the social possibilities of aesthetic self-cultivation in his fairy tale “The Young King,” the first 
story from his collection A House of Pomegranates (1891).  While Wilde’s turn to the fairy tale 
in many ways emphasizes the impracticality of his utopian vision, the tale’s fantastic elements 
also sharpen his condemnation of the social conditions that render his utopia unobtainable.  As 
Jack Zipes argues, Wilde contributed to the ongoing radicalization of the fairy tale genre, a trend 
in children’s literature that the aesthete inherited from mid nineteenth-century reformists such as 
Morris and Charles Kingsley (I would also add Clifford to this tradition).259  At the end of the 
nineteenth century, Wilde and other children’s authors honed the reform-minded fairy tale into 
what Zipes calls “social dynamite,” artfully designed to “subvert” traditional modes of childhood 
“socialization by posing infinite textual possibilities for the subjects/readers to define themselves 
against the background of finite choices proposed by society.”260  In this context, the 
hermeneutic instability of “The Young King”—Jarlath Killeen identifies a “divide” between 
critics who focus on the story’s exploration of homosexual desire and those who highlight its 
status as a socialist text—is a continuation of the political critique that Wilde articulates in “The 
Soul of Man.”261  For Wilde, the fairy tale was a fitting medium for criticisms of both the status 
quo as well as the moralistic bromides that philanthropists offered as solutions to systemic social 
issues.  Through his fantastic representation of the young king’s awakening social consciousness, 
Wilde ultimately seeks to arouse a utopian and humanistic sensibility in his readers without 
prescribing a specific course of action—which, after all, would contradict Wilde’s belief in the 
progressive power of self-development. 																																																								
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The protagonist of Wilde’s “The Young King” stands as an exemplar of the Paterian 
aesthetic sensibility, which matures into an expansive, humane sympathy at the tale’s conclusion.  
The product of an illicit love-match between a princess and a poor artist, the infant king is hidden 
away with a goatherd and grows up in “the fine freedom of [a] forest life,” far away from the 
court and its restrictive rules of etiquette.262  After he is recognized as the rightful heir, the boy 
finds escape from “tedious Court ceremonies” in solitary “journeys of discovery” that take him 
through the palace’s wondrous art collection: he kneels “in real adoration” before a Venetian 
painting, gazes for hours at a carved figure of Adonis, and kisses a statue of Hadrian’s beloved 
slave Antinous.263  His fascination with the beautiful male form brings with it an “exquisite joy” 
in the “magic and the mystery of beautiful things”—an appetite for the ornamental that Wilde 
elsewhere declared crucial to the critical temperament. 264  The king also takes special pleasure in 
contemplating the golden robe and bejeweled crown and scepter that he will wear at his 
impending coronation.  The night before his coronation, however, the king has a series of dreams 
in which he witnesses the miseries that a series of weavers, pearl divers, and miners have 
endured to produce his regalia.  Although his courtiers dismiss his dreams, the king refuses to 
wear “what Grief has fashioned” and attends his coronation in the coarse garb of a goatherd.265  
As an angry mob storms the cathedral, bent on assassinating the “dreamer of dreams…who 
brings shame upon our state,” the king is miraculously clad in “fair raiment”: the sunbeams 
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weave him a new robe, his plain staff blossoms into “lilies…whiter than pearls,” and his modest 
garland blooms into a crown of roses “redder than rubies.”266 
 Like all of Wilde’s fairy tales, “The Young King” defies easy moral interpretation.  In 
doing so, the story resolutely declines to participate in the discourses of reform that Wilde 
considers complicit in the very injustices they seek to redress.  The concluding miracle appears, 
at first glance, to reward the king’s Christ-like sacrifice of luxury, which will presumably allow 
him to rectify the abuses he witnesses in his dreams.  But the king’s rejection of his 
accouterments has no practical impact on the suffering of those who made them: a poor man in 
the crowd astutely reminds the king that workers earned their living by producing the luxuries 
that he now refuses to wear, and the man further wonders whether anyone can “cure” his poverty 
by regulating the price of goods.267  The king’s elusive reply—he asks, “are not the rich and the 
poor brothers?”—acknowledges the idealism of his sartorial statement by evading the worker’s 
questions about economic policy in favor of a more abstract question about human kinship.268  
Once inside the church, the king confronts an equally skeptical bishop, who excuses social 
injustice as part of the systemic cruelty of the “wide world,” in which the same predatory 
impulses drive lions to kill and pirates to pillage.269  Again, the youth rebuffs the bishop’s 
inquiries into his practical plans for remedying the Darwinian brutality of life (“Wilt thou take 
the leper for thy bedfellow,” the bishop asks, “shall the lion do thy bidding, and the wild boar 
obey thee?”) by silently kneeling before the cathedral’s beautifully decorated altar.270   																																																								
266 Wilde, “The Young King,” 26-27.  
267 Wilde, “The Young King,” 23.  
268 Wilde, “The Young King,” 23.  
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As this scene suggests, the king’s newfound humanitarian sympathy does not require that 
he exchange his “strange passion for beauty” for the monastic self-denial that Wilde considered 
fatal to the development of personality.271  Instead, the same aesthetic instincts that motivate the 
king’s “real adoration” of Venetian painting also attract him to the “image of Christ” in its 
“jewelled shrine,” flanked by “marvellous vessels of gold.”272  The king’s love of beauty 
therefore helps him answer both the worker’s and the bishop’s functionalist objections to this 
sympathy.  Both of the king’s interlocutors attempt to limit his genuine, spontaneous feelings of 
compassion to what is economically expedient or practically feasible.  By reasserting his 
individuality—in particular, by embracing ever more steadfastly his devotion to sensual 
beauty—the youth is able to transcend the worker’s and the bishop’s utilitarian calculus: a 
calculus that perniciously reinforces the monetization and consequent debasement of individuals.  
The material signs of divine favor that the king receives on the altar thus serve to hallow his 
passive aesthetic attitude and legitimize it as an ethical stance.  The king’s intervention in the 
social order, such as it is, stems not from his intention to act, but from his decision to “detach 
[himself] from action”: like Gilbert and Zhuangzi, Wilde suggests, the king makes his most 
powerful critique when he wordlessly opts out of exploitative ideologies that value people 
merely for what they can produce rather than for who they are.273 
 
IV. The Eclipse of Happiness in Wilde’s Late Work   
“The Young King,” however, marked the zenith of Wilde’s utopianism.  While the king’s 
“strange passion for beauty” could generate a triumphant humanitarianism within the confines of 																																																								
271 Wilde, “The Young King,” 5. 
272 Wilde, “The Young King,” 6, 26. 
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a fairy tale, Wilde’s final works—produced in the wake of his conviction and imprisonment in 
1895—find no such straightforward correspondence between personal happiness and social 
regeneration.  Both De Profundis (composed 1897, published in abridged form 1905) and The 
Ballad of Reading Gaol (1898) bear out the hopelessness that Wilde felt during a two-year 
sentence that left him, in Ellmann’s words, “a broken man.”274  In De Profundis—the title that 
Wilde’s literary executor, Robert Ross, gave to a letter Wilde wrote from prison to his lover, 
Lord Alfred Douglas—the progressive conception of history that Wilde inherited from Spencer 
and Clifford gives way to his sense of life’s “unchangeable pattern.”275  “With us time does not 
progress,” Wilde remarks, “it revolves [and] seems to circle around one centre of pain.”276  More 
devastatingly for his evolutionary aestheticism, Wilde conceives of his prison term as a 
necessary “repentance,” not for his crime, but for his previous disavowal of “suffering and 
sorrow” and his concomitant determination to “live entirely for pleasure.”277  Although he 
maintains that personal growth benefits from wide experience (“to regret one’s experiences is to 
arrest one’s own development,” he asserts), he abandons the ethic of hedonism that he once 
confidently derived from both evolutionary aesthetics and Paterian philosophy.278  In retrospect, 
Wilde observes, “sorrow is the ultimate type both in life and art,” and pain is the crucible in 
which the soul “reach[es] its full stature of perfection.”279  Tellingly, Wilde argues that he 
“foreshadowed” this revelation in a scene from “The Young King,” in which the bishop asks the 																																																								
274 Ellmann, Oscar Wilde, xv. 
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kneeling boy, “Is not He who made misery wiser than thou art?”280  When he first penned the 
story, Wilde reflects, the bishop’s question “seemed…little more than a phrase”—an empty non 
sequitur for the king to demolish with the force of his aesthetic personality.  In De Profundis, a 
chastened Wilde retroactively defers to the bishop’s orthodox objections to the young king’s 
utopian sympathy.281   
Even Wilde’s exaltation in the beauty of “love”—a subject that he broaches frequently in 
De Profundis—fades in his last work, The Ballad of Reading Gaol.  The ballad reflects on the 
real-life case of Charles Thomas Wooldridge, who was imprisoned in Reading and hanged for 
murdering his wife while Wilde was incarcerated there.282  In accordance with the poem’s ballad 
form—a meter associated with Swinburne’s republican verse as well as older folk traditions—the 
speaker often adopts a collective voice that speaks on behalf of the mostly working class men 
who make up the prison’s “outcast” community.283  Gagnier thus claims that Reading Gaol 
sustains rather than rescinds Wilde’s commitments to political and sexual radicalism: the ballad, 
in her reading, stands as “a plea for sympathy for outcasts and for their re-entry into society,” “a 
personal testament to the power of sexual love,” and a “reaffirm[ation] of the dignity of the 
beloved body.”284  Certainly, the speaker promises that his circle of “broken heart[ed]” men—
both the inmates of Reading Gaol and the community of homosexuals who endured increasing 
hostility in the wake of Wilde’s trial—will finally be vindicated by the “holy hands that took / 
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The Thief to Paradise.”285  His description of this redemption, however, falls back upon the 
mystical language of scripture and its representations of divine judgment rather than the utopian, 
but still worldly, visions of social progress that Wilde entertained in his earlier works.  The 
ballad’s crushing refrain, “each man kills the thing he loves,” likewise bespeaks Wilde’s newly 
equivocal attitude toward the erotic.286  The revolutionary promise of sexual selection finally 
collapses under the weight of both institutional injustice, which the poem concretizes in its 
descriptions of the insurmountable prison wall, and the destructive, monopolistic drives that the 
speaker sees as inextricable from sexuality (Wooldridge, the story goes, killed his wife out of 
sexual jealousy).287  While Wilde, as Gagnier suggests, was perhaps “neither changed nor 
redeemed” by his punishment, he seemed no longer assured of the individual’s power to resist, 
much less transform, what he calls “Humanity’s machine.”288 
But in the popular consciousness, Wilde’s more famous writings, which he produced 
before his imprisonment, had already connected aestheticism with a utopian evolutionary 
sensibility.  Inspired by his prodigious undergraduate reading in science, philosophy, and 
literature, the young Wilde first conceived of aestheticism as a rational reform movement: it was 
this prophecy of imminent social renovation that the “Apostle of Aestheticism”—armed with a 
pseudo-religious exuberance that channeled the late Clifford—carried with him to North 
America in the early 1880s.  In the late 1880s, as aestheticism failed to deliver on its reformist 
potential, Wilde found new avenues for his social concerns in long-term projections of 
evolutionary improvement.  In the meantime, Allen had posited a causal link between aesthetic 																																																								
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pleasure and evolutionary advancement by creatively synthesizing Darwinian sexual selection 
with Spencerian conceptions of play; on these biological grounds, Allen further theorized the 
ways in which socialist reform might create socioeconomic conditions more conducive to 
generative self-gratification.  Although Wilde’s detractors often charged him with a nihilistic 
selfishness, his exhortations to individualism, as well as his own iconic performance of the 
aesthetic lifestyle, were motivated by his deeply held conviction that the cultivation and 
expression of one’s unique desires could radically transform society for the better.  Wilde and 
Allen, then, launched an explicitly political iteration of evolutionary aestheticism, one that 
applied Pater’s and Clifford’s relatively abstract ideals of the receptive temperament toward the 
most pressing social and economic issues of the day.  As we will see in the next chapter, Lee and 
her circle adapted the tacitly ethical (and, at times, moral) elements of evolutionary aestheticism 
into psychological theories of artistic encounter that persisted long after the fin de siècle. 
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Chapter 4 
“Art for the Sake of Life”:  
The “Life-Enhancing” Aesthetics of Vernon Lee and Bernard Berenson 
 
A self-described “believ[er] in scientific method, in human development, and in 
evolutional morality,” the cultural critic Vernon Lee (Violet Paget) continuously grappled with a 
tension between the corporeal origins of beauty and her own hope that art might elevate 
humankind by making us “more and more different from the original brutes that we were.”1  As a 
result, her early work often exhibits a profound ambivalence toward the aesthetic legacy of her 
mentor, Walter Pater.  In Belcaro (1881), for instance, Lee concludes that beauty “has no moral 
value,” because aesthetic feeling is entirely a matter of “physical sensation.”2  Her reasoning 
clearly calls to mind Pater’s famous conclusion to Studies in the History of the Renaissance 
(1873), in which he describes experience as a ceaseless stream of physical sense impressions.3  
Yet, as Vineta Colby observes, Lee refused to “reduce [art] to hedonism” (the charge that was 
generally leveled at Pater’s “Conclusion”), and Belcaro thus sharply rebukes “the men who go in 
for art for art’s sake” for “hanker[ing] vaguely after imaginary sensuous stimulation.”4  By 
contrast, Lee’s “Valedictory” to Renaissance Fancies and Studies (1895)—a retrospective on 
Pater’s work that appeared a year after his death—modulates her earlier criticism in telling ways.  
Pater’s image had changed in the fifteen years between Belcaro and Renaissance Fancies: he had 
returned to church in his middle age, and his reputation as a serious scholar had largely 
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superseded his notoriety as the author of the controversial Renaissance.5  In 1893, literary critic 
Edmund Gosse declared Pater the “first of our living critics,” unrivalled for both his brilliance 
and his “modesty.”6  As she looked back at his life in the “Valedictory,” Lee claimed that Pater 
had undergone nothing less than a “spiritual evolution” (a loaded word, for Lee) from “aesthete” 
to “moralist.”7  Lee reappraises his central doctrine accordingly: “his conception of art,” she 
claims, “was inevitably one of art, not for art’s sake, but of art for the sake of life.”8 With Lee’s 
revision of the aesthetic creed in mind, Stefano Evangelista argues that the “Valedictory” marked 
a “definitive closure” to Lee’s “personal engagement with aestheticism.”9  
But a closer reading of the “Valedictory” suggests that Lee did not break entirely from 
Pater’s philosophy.  On the contrary, Lee implies that her mantra, “art for the sake of life,” only 
hews closer to the aesthetic principles that inspired her teacher’s misguided coinage of “art for 
art’s sake” in The Renaissance.  Like Pater’s Renaissance, Lee’s “Valedictory” emphasizes self-
cultivation through pleasurable “impression[s].”10  At times, she pushes Pater’s ideas to the 
extreme and defends beauty from moral scrutiny in language more extravagant than the 
comparatively understated Renaissance: though beauty may be “united to perverse fashions” and 
art “employed to adorn the sentiments of maniacs and gaol-birds,” Lee asserts, “the beauty and 
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the art remain sound.”11  Her “Valedictory,” then, does not reject Paterian aestheticism so much 
as modify it by intensifying the ethical import of the essentially amoral, because physiological, 
experience of beauty.   
For Lee, this new area of intellectual engagement arose in part from her contact with her 
colleague and sometime rival, the American connoisseur Bernard Berenson.12  In Florentine 
Painters of the Renaissance, which he published in the same year as Renaissance Fancies, 
Berenson upholds an ethic of physical wellbeing that amplifies Pater’s aesthetics through a more 
recognizable evolutionary diction.  The gratification that we receive from beautiful artworks, 
Berenson maintains, “arises from their power to directly communicate life, to immensely 
heighten our sense of vitality”; in the presence of an exquisite painting, our very muscles move 
in sympathy with its figures, and thus “we feel as if the elixir of life, not our own sluggish blood, 
were coursing through our veins.”13  Here, Berenson attributes the spiritual effects of artistic 
encounter to its stimulation of bodily energy in excess of the requirements for mere survival—an 
idea of surplus that reminds us of Herbert Spencer’s theory of play.  Significantly, Berenson 
imbues aesthetic encounter with mystical as well as evolutionary value: the experience of the 
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beautiful refines the ugly inefficiencies of real biological life (“our own sluggish blood”) into an 
aestheticized fantasy of organic perfection (“the elixir of life”).14  
In this final chapter, I trace the evolutionary aestheticism of the late nineteenth century to 
its culmination in Lee’s and Berenson’s respective works in art history and cultural criticism.  In 
many ways, their notion of the “life-enhancing” qualities of form—a term that Lee occasionally 
borrowed after Berenson first used it in Florentine Painters—mediates between and expands 
upon the scientific aesthetics of their predecessors, including Pater and Spencer as well as 
Charles Darwin, Alexander Bain, Oscar Wilde, and Grant Allen.15  Lee’s and Berenson’s 
physiological conceptions of aesthetic experience and their investments in science (especially its 
“promise,” to quote Berenson, “of constant acquisition and perpetual growth”) recall Allen’s and 
Wilde’s utopian hedonisms.16  At the same time, Lee recoiled from the “moral anarchy” that she 
saw in the Renaissance, and she sought an alternative ethics in “our new creed of the perpetual 
development of the nobler by perpetual elimination of the baser motives of our nature”—a 
progressive doctrine upon which she hoped to found a “noble religion of choice and 
improvement.”17  She eventually settled on a theory of “psychological aesthetics” that she 
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developed initially in conversation with Berenson, who based his critical practice on the theory 
that painting stimulated a viewer’s “tactile imagination.”18  Lee, in her more exhaustive accounts 
of aesthetic pleasure, conceived of perception as a holistic physiological and emotional 
experience: one that activated the observer’s entire body, including her brain and her respiratory, 
circulatory, and nervous systems.  Since the perception of form both stimulated and relieved “the 
most important organs of animal life,” the consumption of art fulfilled a crucial function in the 
“stringent regulation” of the perceiving individual’s physical and emotional health.19  It was 
through the maintenance and proliferation of healthy bodies that art, for Lee, interceded in the 
evolution of the species.  In this way, Lee’s psychological aesthetics sought to rescue Paterian 
aestheticism from its solipsistic tendencies without resorting either to Allen’s aesthetic eugenics 
or to Wilde’s radical, libertarian politics.20  
Lee is a pivotal figure in the tradition of evolutionary aestheticism, for several reasons.  
First, she produced an astoundingly expansive body of writing that spanned multiple literary and 
scientific fields, and she continued working across disciplines in the early twentieth century, a 
period when amateur science was losing its cultural authority.21  More than any other 
predecessor or contemporary, Lee brought scientific thought to bear on her aesthetics and 
historiography.  Her histories of the Renaissance and her critiques of Victorian culture enlarged 
on a range of positivist models of aesthetics, including Theodor Lipps’s notion of empathy (or 																																																								
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Einfühlung) and Karl Groos’s theory of play (which drew, in turn, on Spencer’s work).  In this 
regard, she and Berenson (who considered his methods of connoisseurship “scientific”) 
perpetuated the methodologies of Clifford, Allen, and other Victorian science writers well 
beyond the nineteenth century.22  Since the early 2000s, scholars such as Vineta Colby, Christa 
Zorn, Patricia Pulham, Catherine Maxwell, and Shafquat Towheed have revived critical interest 
in the interdisciplinary aspects of Lee’s work, which demonstrate her impressive facility for 
biology, sociology, art history and theory, and psychology.  Secondly, Lee was a queer writer, 
and she associated both socially and professionally with other queer aesthetes such as Wilde, 
John Addington Symonds, A. Mary F. Robinson, and Michael Field (the joint pseudonym of the 
lesbian aunt-niece duo Katharine Bradley and Edith Cooper).  Her place within this milieu urges 
us to consider the ways in which these writers—all of whom accepted Darwin’s theory of sexual 
selection—balanced their belief in evolutionary science with tastes that, as Whitney Davis 
observes, “seem[ed] to have derived from nonprocreative aesthetic attractions and interests.”23  
Lastly, Lee’s affiliation with the Bloomsbury Group after the turn of the century forced her to 
engage with modernism’s shifting conceptions of both evolutionism and aesthetics.  By studying 
the trajectory of her ideas, we can better understand the afterlife of evolutionary aestheticism in 
the twentieth century and its important intervention in modernist aesthetics and modern-day 
literary criticism—subjects I discuss in the coda to this dissertation. 
Lee’s lifelong fascination with science and its promise of a unified theory of art had its 
origin in her cosmopolitan childhood.  Born in France to British parents, Lee grew up primarily 
in Italy, where she—like the titular youth of her essay “The Child in the Vatican” (1881)—fell 																																																								
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“intensely, passionately,” even painfully “in love” with art.24  As a girl, she toured Florentine 
galleries, attended shows at the Paris Opera, and rambled around Rome with her close friend, the 
soon-to-be famous portrait painter John Singer Sargent.25  Various tutors and family members 
supplemented Lee’s independent aesthetic education with rigorous training in philosophy, 
rhetoric, music, and mathematics.26  As Christa Zorn recounts, Lee’s mother strenuously 
impressed on the young Lee a “general belief in the soundness of rational thought,” while Lee’s 
older half-brother, the poet Eugene Lee-Hamilton, took an interest in cultivating his sister’s 
evident genius for comparative history.27  In keeping with her upbringing, her first book, Studies 
of the Eighteenth Century in Italy (1880), presents a “heterogeneous” picture of the “constitution 
and evolution of various arts compared with one another.”28  Her use of “evolution” is no 
coincidence: Studies of the Eighteenth Century relies on a Spencerian narrative of organic 
development that tracks Italian literature and music through phases of “spontaneous national 
growth” and natural “decay.”29  Lee’s formidable synthesis of art history with a general account 
of the religious, political, and philosophical “character of the eighteenth century” also indicates 
some familiarity with Spencer’s sociology, which treated culture and society as scientifically 
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explicable “organisms.”30  In her early historical work, the figure of the social organism provides 
Lee a basis for asserting the role that art necessarily plays in the rise and fall of civilizations.  Her 
later, more sweeping statements on the evolutionary stakes of artistic creation and consumption 
arose from these preliminary applications of scientific method to art history. 
More important, Lee’s conversance with scientific theory powerfully motivated her early 
aestheticism, which she explores in Belcaro.  In “Ruskinism,” she rejects John Ruskin’s claim 
“that the basis of art is moral” and “that the whole system of the beautiful is a system of moral 
emotions, moral selections, [and] moral appreciations.”31  By “making the physical the mere 
reflexion of the moral,” Lee continues, Ruskin perpetuates a charmed but mistaken perception 
about the “true state of things.”32  In Modern Painters (1843-60), as we have seen, Ruskin 
claimed that nature evidenced the omnipotence and generosity of its divine creator; the painter’s 
highest duty, he asserted, was to capture nature as faithfully as possible, in a spirit of religious 
“adoration.”33  Contrary to this worldview, Lee counters, “Sin and Pain and Injustice” exist “not 
despite Nature, but through Nature.”34  Thanks to Darwin, she continues, we now know that 
destruction and decline are written into the very fabric of nature, and “evil and good,” far from 
opposing one another in heroic contest, join together in “the same great work of action and 
reaction.”35  Her clear-sighted knowledge of this messy “world of reality”—in which “evil leads 
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to good” and the “abstract instinct for beauty” can be reduced to a “mere nerve tickle”—compels 
Lee to separate beauty from morality and truth:  
A true thing need by no means be a beautiful thing: that generations of men are doomed 
to sin and misery is no good fact; that millions of putrifying [sic] bodies lie beneath the 
ground is no beautiful fact, but both are nevertheless true facts, true with that truth of 
which science, had it perception of good and of beauty as well as mere perception of 
truth, should say, “I recognize, but I shudder”—And thus also is it with the good and the 
beautiful: they have no connection except that each, in its kingdom, is the best, the 
desirable, that for which we should all strive, that for which the whole of nature, despite 
its inextricable evils, seems to crave and to struggle.36 
 
In a remarkable echo of Pater’s “Poems by William Morris” (1868), “Ruskinism” logically 
deduces its counter-natural aesthetic from scientific conceptions of the natural world.  Similar to 
Pater and Clifford, Lee’s scientific refutation of Ruskin’s moralism leads neither to despairing 
quietism nor to cynical endorsements of debauchery.  Her meditations instead prompt a tacit call 
for aesthetic and moral self-perfection—one that she would repeat, with increasing urgency, in 
her later work.  By yoking this personal aspiration for excellence to a universal tendency for the 
“whole of nature” to progress, Lee also hints at a more encouraging cosmic vision that both 
recalls Clifford’s essays and presages Mathilde Blind’s Ascent of Man (1889).37   
 Belcaro expands upon this responsibility to “strive” for “the best” in “A Dialogue on 
Poetic Morality,” which both reinforces and complicates the aesthetics of “Ruskinism.”  “Poetic 
Morality” consists in an imagined conversation between the enlightened aesthete Baldwin—an 
alter ego of Lee’s that appeared in many of her subsequent books—and his younger companion 																																																								
36 Lee, “Ruskinism,” 207-208.  
37 By 1880, Lee was likely aware of Clifford’s work; in any case, she had certainly read “On the Scientific Basis of 
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which Clifford denounces utilitarian ethics.  Lee met Blind in 1881, and by 1882 she claimed to be “good 
friends” with the poet.  Lee, “Vivisection,” 788; Lee to Matilda Paget, 20-22 June 1881, in “Selected Letters of 
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Cyril, who feels guilty about wanting to write poetry “when there is so much evil to remove” 
from the world (as Emily Harrington has pointed out, Cyril “roughly corresponds” with 
Robinson, the poet and intimate friend to whom Lee dedicated Belcaro).38  Baldwin, in 
anticipation of Wilde’s aphoristic Gilbert in “The Critic as Artist” (1890, revised 1891), responds 
to Cyril’s dilemma with an apparent paradox: while the “only true religion” is “the religion of 
good,” Baldwin insists, “the creation of perfect beauty is the highest aim of the artist.”39  
Baldwin resolves this paradox by discriminating between two forms of ethical and moral “good.”  
He explains that individuals can “do good” either by “destroying evil” or by “creat[ing] good”; 
scientists, doctors, and social reformers pursue good by removing falsehood and pain from the 
world, while the artist “not merely removes pain, but adds pleasure to our lives.”40  For this 
reason, Cyril really “defraud[s] the world” of his poetic gifts—that is, his capacity to give 
readers “immense and long-lasting pleasure”—when he insists on pursuing practical matters to 
appease his conscience.41  In Baldwin’s reasoning, Cyril does the most good when he follows his 
inclination and writes poems that transport his audience “away for a moment from the struggle 
with evil”: his poetry is morally and socially instrumental precisely because it gives his readers, 
as he needlessly fears, “useless and selfish pleasure.”42  Though it rejects the label of 
aestheticism, “Poetic Morality” offers a moralistic gloss on many of Pater’s aesthetic ideas.  
Baldwin’s insistence that poetry provide a respite from “struggle,” for instance, reiterates Pater’s 
previous injunction to the artist to “give the spirit at least an equivalent for the sense of freedom” 																																																								
38 Lee, “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality,” 232; Emily Harrington, “The Strain of Sympathy: A. Mary F. Robinson, 
The New Arcadia, and Vernon Lee,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 61 (2006): 78. 
39 Lee, “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality,” 241. 
40 Lee, “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality,” 242. 
41 Lee, “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality,” 243. 
42 Lee, “A Dialogue on Poetic Morality,” 245. 
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that Darwinian nature denies.43  Likewise, Baldwin’s variation on “art for art’s own sake”—“I 
should have been more precise,” he tells Cyril, “in saying ‘art for beauty’s sake’”—clarifies 
Pater’s doctrine without refuting it.  As Regenia Gagnier and Ian Small have shown us (and as 
we have seen in the previous three chapters), late-Victorian aesthetics increasingly focused on 
aesthetic feeling rather than art objects: by displacing all of the transcendent possibilities that 
Pater ascribed to “art” onto the subjective perception of “beauty,” Lee upholds the critical 
practices that Pater spearheaded in the 1870s.   
 As Zorn observes, however, Lee nonetheless “frowned upon ‘immoral’ artists and all 
forms of (male) egocentrism or self-indulgence.”44  Baldwin, who otherwise agrees with much of 
Pater’s philosophy, denounces Algernon Charles Swinburne’s poems as “morbid and obscene,” 
and he chides Walt Whitman and other “mystico-sensual” poets (whom Pater, Clifford, Allen, 
and Wilde all appreciated) for “calling nasty things by beautiful names.”45  In Baldwin’s 
reluctance to beautify concepts and actions he considers “nasty,” Lee begins to articulate her 
unique position within late Victorian debates concerning the regenerative or degenerative social 
possibilities of art.  To the extent that Lee agreed with Pater’s (and later Wilde’s and Allen’s) 
emphasis on aesthetic pleasure, she absolutely belongs to the aesthetic school of thought that 
Small credits for the subjective turn in criticism, and which Gagnier associates with the 
consumerist figure of the “pleasured body.”46  But Kristin Mahoney rightly points out that Lee 
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“cannot be described as submitting uncritically to this tradition.”47  Instead, Mahoney explains, 
Lee “develop[ed] a method of consumption that engage[d] with modern theories of aesthetic 
pleasure and desire while preserving what was redemptive and ethical in previous theories of 
appreciation,” including those of John Ruskin and William Morris.48   
Lee’s negotiation of these two paradigms—the hedonic aesthetics of Allen, Wilde, and 
Pater versus the almost ascetic self-discipline of Ruskin (and what she sees as the older, 
spiritually “evolved” Pater)—occurred over the course of years.  Consequently, many of her 
works from the 1880s evince her as-yet-unresolved stance toward these scientific and redemptive 
aesthetics.  Lee began seriously grappling with this tension after she moved to London in 1881, 
where she was “taken up” (as she put it in a letter to her brother) by the Paters, Leslie Stephen, 
and W. K. Clifford’s widow, Lucy Clifford.49  Lee’s writings in this period—her first, 
unsuccessful novel Miss Brown (1884), her essay collections Euphorion (1884) and Baldwin 
(1886), and several ghost stories from her collection Hauntings (1890)—offer us glimpses into 
her ongoing theorization of evolutionary aestheticism, which prompted her intense interest in 
both psychology and Berenson’s connoisseurship in the 1890s.   
Lee’s circle in London in the early 1880s was a diverse mélange of writers, editors, 
aesthetes, scientists, and revolutionaries, many of whom shared her interest in liberal causes.  
When she first arrived in the city, Lee was still in her early twenties and relatively little known—
William Michael Rossetti and Oscar Wilde, she was surprised to discover, “were the only two 
creatures who seemed to have heard of [her] as a writer”—but she quickly cultivated friendships 
with more established Victorian writers such as Robert Browning and the feminist critic Frances 																																																								
47 Kristin Mahoney, “Haunted Collections: Vernon Lee and Ethical Consumption,” Criticism 48 (2006): 42. 
48 Mahoney, “Haunted Collections,” 43. 
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Power Cobbe.50  Her many literary acquaintances soon grew to include Rossetti, Wilde, Walter 
Pater and his sisters Clara and Hester, Mathilde Blind (whose poetry she and Robinson greatly 
admired), and Edmund Gosse.  Lee also befriended Lucy Clifford, whose salon included many of 
her late husband’s friends and, later in the century, the American novelist Henry James and his 
brother, the psychologist William James.51  The young Lee often described “Mrs Clifford” and 
her friends in unflattering terms: “She is an agreeable sort,” Lee wrote to her mother, but she 
“lives at the world’s end, & the visit cost me 5 shillings, certainly more than it was worth.”52  As 
we learn in Lee’s letters, Clifford also introduced Lee to several prominent scientific figures, 
including the science writer Edward Clodd (also a close friend of Allen’s), the rationalist Leslie 
Stephen (whom Lee described as a “solemn, scraggy lantern jawed Rubens type”), and T. H. 
Huxley (a “little apish creature,” Lee remarked, “talking atheism sixteen to the dozen”).53   
Lee’s lively caricatures aside, she incorporated the ideas of her London milieu into her 
ongoing formulation of aestheticism.  Surrounded by W. K. Clifford’s friends and admirers, Lee 
developed an appreciation for his almost religious sense of responsibility for future generations 
(a posterity that, as we saw in the second chapter, he often personified as “Man”).  The 
mathematician, who died several years before Lee moved to London, makes brief, but 
significant, veiled appearances in her first novel, Miss Brown.  The novel tells the story of Anne 
Brown, a poor nursery maid who attracts the sexual attention and financial patronage of wealthy 
aesthete Walter Hamlin.  The statuesquely beautiful Anne, soon the toast of Hamlin’s bohemian 
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set, is quickly disillusioned with the callous frivolity of aesthetic society.  Seeking to rescue 
Anne from her melancholy, her principled and philanthropic cousin Richard takes her to the 
lectures of a young philosopher who clearly resembles Clifford: the speaker, Andrew Richmond, 
is “a red-haired young man of genius, dying of consumption, who had for truth and righteousness 
a passion such as other men may have for sport.”54  Richmond shares many of Clifford’s ethical 
principles as well as his distinctive fervor and sickly constitution; Anne listens, enraptured, as he 
touts the “value of each good impulse carried out, and each evil one resisted, in making morality 
more natural and spontaneous in the world.”55  Inspired by Richmond’s “secular and scientific 
religion,” Anne escapes the Bunyanesque “slough of desponding pessimism” into which she has 
fallen and finds instead a “new faith in the triumph of right” and a “new belief in the necessity of 
doing one’s duty for the sake of mankind and of progress.”56  Lee’s description of Richmond as a 
much-slandered “prophet of the advent of justice” also recalls Clifford’s fierce rejection of 
“fatalism” and his contentious posthumous reputation.57  
Beyond demonstrating her interest in the mathematician’s legacy, Lee’s fictionalized 
Clifford brings to our attention some of her anxieties about the libertarian strain that Clifford and 
Pater (and later Wilde and Allen) injected into aesthetic and evolutionary philosophy.  While 
Richmond’s call for moral “spontane[ity]” brings to mind Clifford’s endorsement of “quasi-
spontaneous…action from within,” Lee omits Clifford’s concomitant advocacy for social, 
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sexual, and political “freedom.” 58  For Clifford, progressive evolutionary processes depended on 
the “selection of sports,” or extraordinary organisms whose deviances from the norm open up 
possible avenues for the future development of the species.59  He thus urged others to defer to 
their own “inner core” of “conscience and reason” (a phrase that Lee uses in her sketch of 
Richmond), which both tapped into the hereditary “spirit of man” and induced individuals to act 
in novel and potentially generative ways.60  His stringent standards of ethical good, in other 
words, rejected stultifying codes of moral conduct in favor of a radical individualism that Allen 
and Wilde later incorporated into their highly politicized aestheticism.   
By contrast, Lee’s Richmond cautions against “yielding to the preferences of [one’s] own 
nature” and “departing from the moral rules of the world” in the mistaken belief that, in doing so, 
one is merely “following the highest law.”61  This extreme moral self-determinism, he adds, is 
the real “danger of our epoch of moral transition.”62  Richmond’s alarm here smacks more of 
Ruskin’s critiques of modernity—one thinks of Ruskin’s warning against the “love of pleasure” 
that leads to the “greatest catastrophes” of the race—than Clifford’s breathless excitement about 
the impending “kingdom of Man.”63  As Colby observes, the often humorless satire of Miss 
Brown especially targeted those who would pervert “the lofty Platonic aestheticism of Walter 
Pater into sensuality and hedonism,” and Lee’s concerns about this hazard emerge in her 
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characterization of Richmond (in another departure from the real Clifford, Richmond never cites 
those “mystico-sensual” poets Whitman or Swinburne).64  By transmuting Clifford’s ethic of 
freedom into Richmond’s concession to the “moral rules of the world,” Lee attempts to rewrite 
one of the founding expressions of evolutionary aestheticism in order to downplay its intimations 
of licentiousness.  Her qualified representation of Clifford is one of several instances in which 
the novel vacillates between radical appeals to individual (and, Zorn argues, particularly female) 
self-assertion and worried injunctions against the dangers of runaway self-indulgence.65  We also 
see this uncertainty in the novel’s uneven attitude toward aesthetic art: for instance, Anne recoils 
from the moral bankruptcy of Hamlin’s sketches even as the narrator describes the “flower-like” 
nakedness and “burning lips” of his figures with Swinburnean relish.66  The novel’s inconsistent 
tone is especially conspicuous in its unexpectedly defeatist ending, in which Anne, only just 
uplifted by Richmond’s religion of progress, resigns herself to a loveless marriage with Hamlin.  
The reviews of Miss Brown that most bothered Lee pointed out this self-contradiction and led her 
to wonder privately whether she had written an “immoral book,” guilty of all the offenses for 
which she would have “execrate[d] Zola or Maupassant.”  Lee was so steeped in aesthetic culture 
that her mission to “moralise the world,” as she reflected in her journal shortly after the novel’s 
publication, seemed to have resulted in a novel curiously divided against itself.67  
In many ways, the erratic irony and dour social vision of Miss Brown reflected the line of 
historical research that Lee was pursuing in the early 1880s.  The central contradictions that 
troubled her novel—her dueling commitments to Pater’s aesthetic philosophy and social 																																																								
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amelioration, her desire to remain optimistic in the face of a Darwinian world, her simultaneous 
belief in the primacy of pleasure in art and its ethical efficacy—also motivate Euphorion (1884), 
a collection of essays about the Italian Renaissance and her fellow Victorians’ relationship to the 
period.  As Hilary Fraser reminds us, Victorian poets, novelists, and critics adopted a multiplicity 
of stances toward the Renaissance—a relatively recent concept that the European historians Jules 
Michelet and Jacob Burckhardt codified in the 1850s.68  Fraser situates Lee within a particularly 
celebratory tradition of British scholarship, which “represented the Renaissance as the transition 
from the corrupt and obsolete world view of the Middle Ages to the free and enlightened 
civilization of the modern world”; although they took differing approaches to the study of 
history, the aesthetic critics Pater and Symonds also belonged to this tradition.69  Despite their 
affirmations of the Renaissance, Fraser adds, these writers readily acknowledged “the infamous 
depravity of the period which Ruskin so deplored.”70  On the one hand, the Renaissance 
exemplified to these aesthetes the triumph of scientific and artistic progress—an “onward 
progress [in] which we still participate,” Symonds wrote in his first volume of Renaissance in 
Italy (1875)—over the entropic decline of the medieval period.71  On the other hand, episodes of 
Renaissance history betrayed what Lee called a “horrible moral gangrene” at the heart of 
sixteenth-century Italian society.72  Ruskin, in his influential Stones of Venice (1851-53), blamed 																																																								
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the Venetians’ “unscrupulous and insatiable pursuit of pleasure” for the collapse of their empire, 
and he furthermore declared this hedonism to be the “consummation” of the Renaissance 
“spirit.”73  Even Symonds, who boldly defended homosexuality against the opprobrium of 
mainstream Victorians, denounced Renaissance vice as “shameful.”74  It is the apparent 
“anomaly” of Renaissance history—“seething with good and evil,” as Lee explains, brimming 
with shocking stories of “assassinations and fratricides” amid its marvelous artworks—that 
occupies Lee’s Euphorion.  In particular, her essay “The Sacrifice” deals with the apparent 
incompatibility of public morality and artistic innovation, one that the Renaissance and the 
contemporary Aesthetic Movement so forcefully brought to Lee’s attention.  
Like Pater, to whom she dedicates Euphorion, Lee defines the Renaissance not as a 
temporal period but as a “condition” produced by the confluence of certain sociopolitical, 
geographic, demographic, and economic factors.75  For Lee, the Renaissance arose wherever 
“feudal and ecclesiastic” influences, which had “crushed the spontaneous life” of earlier classical 
revivals, lost their hold over “democratic and secular communities.”76  The awakening of civic 
and humanistic sentiment in these communities, according to Lee’s account, depended on the 
spread of political and religious freedom; “the great revival of human intelligence and character 
[could] thoroughly succeed,” she reasons, only where citizens lived a “free political, military, 
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and commercial life.”77  Her definition of the Renaissance thus recognizes the necessity of 
liberty (or as Pater put it, the “sense of freedom”) to social development.  Based on Spencer’s 
model of the social organism, Lee’s notion of social “growth” also contains within it what she 
poetically calls “the seed of death,” or “that expanding element which develops, ripens, rots, and 
finally dissolves all living organisms.”78  Therefore, it was not “the volition of the Italians” but 
“the very nature of their political forms” that produced Italy’s violent and anarchic power 
relations.79  As in Miss Brown, freedom of conduct in “The Sacrifice” proves a double-edged 
sword, both allowing the spontaneous self-expression so crucial to Renaissance invention and 
encouraging the Machiavellian political scheming that led to Italy’s disintegration.  For Lee, the 
Renaissance illustrates the cyclical structure of evolutionary sociology as well as the agon of her 
aestheticism: “self-cognizance,” “intellectual freedom,” and all its accompanying cultural 
benefits appeared to Lee (and Pater, Allen, and Wilde, to varying extents) to demand a “heavy 
price” in the form of a “loss of all moral standard, all fixed public meaning.”80 
In a departure from the cynicism of Miss Brown, however, “The Sacrifice” ultimately 
affirms the long-term cultural profits of this bargain by recasting the “moral chaos” of the 
Renaissance into the precious “sacrifice” of the essay’s title.81  Again, Spencer’s analogy 																																																								
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between biological evolution and the evolution of culture, government, and society is 
instrumental to this reinterpretation of Renaissance history.  As in “Ruskinism,” Lee grants that 
nature’s “system of evolution and progression” inevitably “includes such machinery as 
hurricanes and pestilence, carnage and misery, superstition and license, Renaissance and 
Eighteenth Century.”82  The imprecise parallelisms of Lee’s sentence position the Renaissance 
and the eighteenth century in vaguely homologous relationships to both cultural trends 
(“superstition and license”) and Malthusian natural phenomena (“pestilence” and “carnage”).  
This syntactic slippage encourages us to see historical periods as not only the end products of a 
deterministic evolutionary “system,” but also the “machinery” for future evolutionary 
development.  For Lee, the shift from the freedom of the Renaissance to the “happy-go-lucky 
practicalness” of the eighteenth century is part of the continuous equilibration between opposites 
that drives “progress” in the organic and inorganic realms.83  Just as cells or human beings, 
though short-lived in themselves, have a hand in perpetuating the superstructures of which they 
form constituent units (i.e., the body and the species), the Renaissance, Lee argues, needed to 
collapse in order to perform its larger function: disseminating its “strong intellectual food” to 
“the starvelings of the North,” who benefited from Italy’s cultural “riches” at the same time they 
plundered its material wealth.84  Lee consequently asserts: “the entire political collapse of Italy 
was not only inevitable from the essential nature of the civilization of the Renaissance, but it was 
also indispensable in order that this civilization might fulfil its mission.”85  The conclusion of 
“The Sacrifice” situates Italy’s decline within a larger timeframe that includes “modern 																																																								
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society”—on this scale, the tragic history of the Renaissance reveals a comedic, even teleological 
trajectory that culminates in Lee’s own “calm, safe, scientific” era.86  Before Wilde ever claimed 
that the commission of “sin” was the driving force behind cultural innovation, Lee used the same 
provocative logic in order to surmount Ruskin’s moralistic critique of the Renaissance.  If it is 
true that the “Italians had seen the antique and let themselves be seduced by it,” Lee writes in a 
later essay in Euphorion, we should “only rejoice thereat,” because this seduction triggered “the 
union of antique and modern” that laid the groundwork for progress.87 
This continuity between far-flung historical periods made the practice of history, for Lee, 
more than a purely academic exercise.  From the 1880s onward, her studies of the Renaissance 
energized her increasingly ambitious critiques of late Victorian society, which she believed could 
only benefit from the lessons of fifteenth-century Italy.  Like Pater and Symonds (and Ruskin, to 
his chagrin), Lee saw in the Renaissance certain “habits of thought, a mode of life, political, 
social, and literary institutions, not unlike those of to-day”; “the Renaissance,” she adds, 
“possessed the germs of every modern thing,” including that “thorough consciousness of our 
own freedom and powers.”88  More significant for her later cultural criticism, Lee implicates 
scientific discovery in the moral decay of the Renaissance: “had [the Italians] not discovered,” 
she asks in Euphorion, “that what had been called right had often been unnatural, and what had 
been called wrong natural?  Moral teachings, remonstrances, and judgments belonged to that 
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dogmatism from which they had broken loose.”89  The growth of science, according to Lee’s 
history, produced an ontological crisis that in turn destabilized preexisting systems of ethics, 
which she suggests were based on notions of natural morality.  By nullifying the preexisting 
alignment of “right” with “natural,” new conceptions of nature precipitated the Italians’ 
“instinctive and universal disbelief in all that had been taught them.”90  Lee here gestures toward 
an exciting but also unsettling parallel between the Renaissance Italians and her contemporaries, 
whose perceptions of the world have undergone similar changes.  Implicit in her history of 
Renaissance irreverence is the revolution in worldview central to every articulation of 
evolutionary aestheticism: the intellectual “bombshell,” as Allen describes it in his 1885 
retrospective Charles Darwin, which exploded all notions of a divinely directed, 
“anthropocentric universe.”91  To Lee, the moral relativism that such a worldview warranted (a 
relativism that, as we will recall, Clifford, Pater, Allen, and Wilde welcomed) had spiraled into 
moral anarchy in the Renaissance, and threatened to do so again.   
In light of this cautionary example from history, Lee produced a second collection of 
critical dialogues, Baldwin (1886), in which she addresses just such moral anarchy.  Her 
introduction to Baldwin offers a gently facetious biographical sketch of the titular sage, whose 
story resembles Lee’s: born in France and educated in Rome, Baldwin has lived a Paterian “life 
of exclusively mental experiences,…merely receiving a series of impressions and responding 
thereunto by a series of opinions.”92  With his “illusive, shimmering,” and (as Pater might say) 
diaphanous personality, Baldwin suffers acutely from the spiritual and moral agonies of his time, 																																																								
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in particular the “moral discomfort attendant upon a disbelief in a future life.”93  Lee thus uses 
Baldwin to explore more socially constructive ways in which philosophy might surmount the 
“moral shock” peculiar to both the Renaissance and the late nineteenth century.94  For instance, 
“The Responsibilities of Unbelief” pits the agnostic Baldwin against interlocutors who embody 
alternative responses to the “scientific view of the world.”95  In a tacit continuation of Clifford’s 
1877 essay “The Ethics of Belief”—which condemned, on moral grounds, the “sweet illusions 
and darling lies” of orthodox religion—Lee’s dialogue examines the various moral doctrines that 
might fill the now-vacant role of traditional faith.96  On one side, the solicitous, well-meaning 
Vere argues that everyone be allowed to partake in the “beautiful and consoling fictions” of 
whatever belief system they choose, while the elitist Rheinhardt cares little for public morality so 
long as he can savor his “own intellectual ambrosia” unmolested.97  Against his friends’ 
individualistic philosophies (ones associated, in Lee’s mind, with misreadings of Pater’s 
aestheticism), Baldwin proposes an aristocracy of thought: a class of individuals, exempted from 
“all necessity of manual labour and business routine,” who will “separate the true from the false, 
and gradually substitute higher aims and enjoyments for lower ones.”98  Importantly, the 
aristocracy that Baldwin describes performs its moral function via the methods of aestheticism, 
which emphasizes the positive effects of disinterested discrimination and selection.  Wilde’s 
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early lecture “The English Renaissance of Art” (1882), for instance, endorses the “exquisite 
spirit of choice” that allows the artist to “realise for us that which we desire”—an ideal world 
free from the “social problems of today” and absolutely superior to the “world of real fact.”99  
Pater’s novel Marius the Epicurean (1885) similarly upholds its eponymous protagonist’s 
“hieratic refinement” as an ethical (and not simply aesthetic) drive toward “the selection, the 
choice, of what was perfect in its kind.”100  In Baldwin’s appeal to the leisure class, Lee 
promotes the same detachment from quotidian life that Pater and Wilde associate with the ideal 
aesthetic temperament. 
But Lee’s intense interest in morality, which she expresses more persistently than either 
Pater or Wilde, leads her to stress the progressive social function and real intellectual labor that 
this aristocracy must perform.  For example, Baldwin’s process of separation and substitution 
results in the development of explicitly “higher” cultural norms, and he considers his rejection of 
Vere’s “consoling fictions” only one foray in “the great battle to make the kingdom of that which 
is into the kingdom of that which should be.”101  The inherent upward tendency of this “battle” is 
writ small in Baldwin’s (and, by association, Lee’s) own life story.  In his youth, Baldwin is a 
stereotypical aesthete, “engrossed in artistic and archaeological subjects” and laboring under the 
belief (a false one, Baldwin later learns) “that the only worthy interest in life was the beautiful”; 
as a young man, this “narrow happiness” is destroyed, first by his gradual apprehension of the 
“frightful dissonances of the world” and then by the sudden death of his close friend, whose loss 
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induces in Baldwin an “acute, moral sickness.”102  For Lee, Baldwin’s spiritual crisis 
miniaturizes the upheavals of the Renaissance and the late nineteenth century, and his response 
further exemplifies the constructive forms of unbelief that this crisis could produce.  Instead of 
retreating into “those beautiful dreams which consoled other men,” Baldwin “forced [himself] to 
keep awake in that spiritual cold,” reading “only scientific books” that made him “doubt and 
examine all the more.”103  Through rigorous self-training, he reaches a truer, evolutionary 
understanding of morality: the moral sense, he could now see, “had arisen in the course of the 
evolution of mankind,” and thus “right and wrong meant only that which was conducive or 
detrimental to the increasing happiness of humanity.”104  Baldwin extracts from this insight not 
“moral solitude,” but an ardent conviction that he is “but a drop in the moral flood called 
progress,” because his moral sense is both the product of previous generations and “an essential 
contribution to the morality of millions of creatures who will come after me.”105 At the end of 
“Unbelief,” Baldwin succeeds in transforming evolutionary theory’s devaluation of the 
individual—its Malthusian nightmare of “millions of creatures,” all jostling for space—into an 
affirmation of his own role in the species’ onward march toward progress.  “If I fall,” he tells his 
companions, “those on either side of me will be less united and less vigorous to resist, those 
following me will stumble.”106  (Baldwin’s epic figuration of personal belief reminds us of 
Clifford’s equally dramatic condemnation of credulity as a “sin against mankind”—an 
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apparently trivial offense that drags the species “back into savagery.”107)  Like all of the figures 
associated with evolutionary aestheticism, Lee relies on the generational consciousness of 
evolutionary thought to resist the solipsistic nihilism that modern science seemed to invite.   
Lee elaborates on this system of moral progress in “Honour and Evolution,” a later essay 
in Baldwin that returns to the central issues of her 1882 polemic, “Vivisection: An Evolutionist 
to Evolutionists.”  In publishing “Vivisection,” Lee joined a heated public debate about animal 
experimentation that became more turbulent after the passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act in 
1876.108  The question of how morality—which was often bogged down in what Lee dismissed 
as “so much sentimental twaddle”—could be applied to rational and dispassionate scientific 
pursuits was central to this debate.109  As Lucy Bending explains, anti-vivisection activists 
cataloged the suffering of lab animals in melodramatic detail and denounced as monstrous any 
experimentalist who could tolerate such sights; meanwhile, supporters of the practice either 
denied that animals experienced pain in the same way that humans did, or pointed to the useful 
information that scientists gleaned from the procedure.110  A rationalist from childhood, Lee was 
skeptical of the often gendered language of sensibility in which many antivivisectionists 
articulated their objections to experimental science (she shared these concerns with Cobbe, a 
prominent antivivisectionist who instructed women supporters to temper excessive expressions 
of emotion in favor of thoughtful moral objections).111  Nonetheless, Lee’s credence in 																																																								
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Spencerian theories of play and her own fascination with physiological aesthetics convinced her 
of the evolutionary harm that accompanied both the experience and the infliction of physical 
pain.  Her argument thus targets rational partisans on both sides of the conflict: she grants the 
expediency of vivisection while rejecting it as an unconscionable violation of “honour,” which 
for Lee forbids the accumulation of “advantages…at the expense of wholesale and profitless 
agony to another race.” 112  By commanding us to forego material gain in the disinterested pursuit 
of justice, Lee argues, honor suppresses the “baser motives of our nature” and elevates the 
“nobler” ones; as such, honor is both an ancient chivalric code and “the most crowning 
perfection of the evolution of society.”113  Vivisection, because it subjects the wellbeing of others 
to the dictates of self-interest, represents a breach of honor that threatens society with devolution.  
In this sense, Lee’s early outcry against the “temptation” of vivisection was motivated by a 
typically aesthetic distaste for utilitarianism as well as her specific concern about “evolutional 
morality.”114   
“Of Honour and Evolution,” which consists in a dialogue between Baldwin and the 
disenchanted amateur chemist Michael, repeats much of the material from “Vivisection” 
verbatim.  However, Lee’s dialogic version of her argument offers subtle but important revisions 
of her earlier discussion of “evolutional morality.”  These revisions speak to the ways in which 
Lee’s morality in the 1880s was still inextricable from her aesthetics, however doggedly she 
criticized Ruskin for “making the physical the mere reflexion of the moral.”  “Of Honour and 																																																																																																																																																																																		
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Evolution” begins by addressing Ruskin’s recent intervention in the antivivisection movement: 
in 1884, he resigned as Slade Professor of Art at Oxford after the physiologist and vivisectionist 
John Burdon-Sanderson was appointed to the medical faculty.115  Early in Lee’s essay, Michael 
tells Baldwin that Ruskin’s protest has inspired him to read more about the practice of 
vivisection.  Michael is repulsed by what he learns, so he determines to “wash [his] hands of 
science” and renounce “this rationalism which rationally abets abomination.”116  As in 
“Unbelief,” the older Baldwin has already passed through this period of self-doubt and 
introspection, and he has emerged with the spiritual maturity that Lee believed could be forged 
only in that crucible.  Baldwin, aware that his protégé is approaching the tipping point, sets out to 
vindicate “the doctrines of evolution and evolutional morality” before Michael, like Vere, 
retreats into the comforts of “any mystically established code of right and wrong.”117  Baldwin 
thus defines “evolutional morality” in the same scientific, and yet reverential, vocabulary that 
Lee used in “Vivisection.”  Evolutional morality, he claims, is a rational “religion” that derives 
its code of behavior not from abstract belief or received dogma but from the evolutionary 
principle of selection: this morality seeks to cultivate the best in human nature by encouraging 
individuals to choose “justice” over convenience, “fortitude” over irresolution, and “forbearance 
from the coveted” over destructive self-indulgence.118   
By framing her “new creed” as an exercise in individual “choice,” Lee bases her 
evolutional morality on the discriminating aesthetic attitude that Pater praised in figures such as 
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Marius and Leonardo da Vinci.119  Lee makes this connection between the evolutional moralist 
and the aesthete even clearer in a passage unique to “Honour and Evolution,” in which Baldwin 
points to concrete examples of human progress.  As Baldwin and Michael walk through a train 
station, the latter glumly observes “that modern civilization has a sort of mark of the beast,” a 
“sugges[tion] of hell” into which vivisection “neatly” fits.120  Baldwin responds to Michael’s 
Ruskinian pessimism by reminding him that the modern era is a “moment of transition.”121  “We 
may have new evils,” Baldwin admits, but “we have also new sensitiveness to them.  In former 
days there was no such hideosity [sic] as a large London railway station, but I question whether 
there was either any capacity for feeling its hideousness as we do.  So also as to vivisection.”122  
Here, Lee’s rigid separation of the aesthetic from the moral sphere—a distinction that she 
postulated in Belcaro and struggled to maintain in her subsequent works—breaks down once 
again in Baldwin’s comparison between the improved “capacity for feeling…hideousness” and 
the “sensitiveness” to “new evils.”  Importantly, the only way in which he can substantiate his 
promises about the impending moral evolution of Victorian society is by equating moral 
development with more patent advancements in popular taste.  For instance, Baldwin 
characterizes both the moral and the aesthetic sense as faculties of perception that mostly operate 
on the level of bodily sensation (the “capacity for feeling,” or “sensitiveness”).  He further 
implies that both evolve through the accretion of apparently minor decisions on the part of 
individuals: an operation that Lee, like Wilde and Allen, identified with Darwinian sexual 
selection.  While Lee elsewhere distinguishes aesthetic from moral qualities (aesthetic beauty, 																																																								
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Baldwin remarks in a later essay, “exists…only in the domain of the senses”), she fuses the two 
here in the service of a larger argument against the reactionary despondency of thinkers such as 
Ruskin.123  But as Allen, Bain, and others had shown—and as Lee well understood from her 
Renaissance scholarship—aesthetic preferences reflected corporeal appetites, and so refinements 
in taste did not necessarily entail corresponding improvements in character.  In “Honour and 
Evolution” and other essays in Baldwin, we begin to understand why morality and aesthetics 
converge, often confusingly, in Lee’s early writing: her uncompromising rejection of “mystically 
established codes of right and wrong” left only evolutionary (and therefore materialist) 
explanations for the moral feelings.  She thus could never divorce the moral sense entirely from 
the sensate body that produced aesthetic and “moral impressions” alike.124  
Lee certainly understood the difficulties that this confusion between the aesthetic realm 
(associated with the body, free play, and Renaissance paganism) and the moral realm (associated 
with the soul, self-discipline, and medieval Christianity) posed for her project of evolutional 
morality.  In many ways, her concurrent work in the supernatural genre, which she theorized in 
her early essay “Faustus and Helena” (1881) and pursued in her collection of ghost stories 
Hauntings (1890), reflected critically on these difficulties in her evolutionism.  I dwell at some 
length on Lee’s understanding of the supernatural in order to elucidate the dialectical nature of 
her evolutionary aesthetics in the 1880s.  As Patricia Pulham observes, the conventions of 
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supernatural fiction allowed Lee the freedom to play with the “boundaries…between the past and 
the present” in ways that challenged the notion of evolutionary progress.125  The ghost story 
presented to Lee (in Pulham’s words) an “elemental space,” within which the modern world—
with its “calm, safe, scientific” rationality and its mechanistic schemes for economic and social 
growth—commingled with an insuppressible ancient world—a world marked by violence, 
superstition, and a grotesque, as well as alluring, Dionysian abandon.126  Consequently, the tone 
and temporality of her supernatural fiction is often at odds with her critical nonfiction.  On the 
whole, Lee’s earlier nonfiction (and, to a lesser extent, Miss Brown) looks forward to 
evolutionary futurity and highlights the individual’s small but meaningful contribution to the 
cultural progress of the species.  By contrast, her supernatural fiction fixates on what she calls 
the “real spectre of the antique”: the encounter with the “ghostly” that resurrects, if only 
momentarily, the “imaginative power” of “the divinities of old.”127    
It was the retrospective, protean mode of the supernatural genre that enabled Lee to 
explore several obstacles to evolutionary morality that her earlier essays had glossed over: issues 
such as the patently uneven advancement of evolution, the moral perils of aesthetic pleasure, 
and, more intensely, the degenerative potential inhering in her passion for the past.  As Lee 
defined it, the supernatural genre appealed to a uniquely modern desire to re-experience the 
magical thinking of one’s childhood.  Since “we moderns,” Lee remarks in “Faustus and 
Helena,” now “view nature as a prosaic machine built by no one in particular,” we can no longer 
believe in the genuine existence of the supernatural, whether in the form of demons, spirits, or 																																																								
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deities.128  As a result, she argues, we seek to recapture the “delightful semi-obscurity of vision 
and keenness of fancy of our childhood; when a glimpse into fairyland was still possible, when 
things appeared in false lights, brighter, more important, more magnificent than now.”129  She 
concludes that the ghost story—because it grants us, albeit temporarily, “this liberty of seeing in 
things much more than there is, which belongs to man and to mankind in this childhood”—is the 
best medium for satisfying this “passionate, nostalgic craving for the past.”130   
But to an evolutionary thinker such as Lee, the analogy between the childhood of “man” 
and the childhood of “mankind” was not merely a metaphor: it was a scientific fact that made the 
revival of the infantile imagination a potentially degenerative prospect.  The biological theory of 
recapitulation—popularly theorized by Darwin, Spencer, and, later, the German naturalist Ernst 
Haeckel—asserted that individuals, in the course of their embryological development, repeated 
the evolutionary phases through which their species had passed.131  This blurring between 
ontogeny (the development of the individual) and phylogeny (the development of the race) had a 
far-ranging impact on Victorian cultural figurations of the child.  Evolutionary studies of culture 
and psychology, as Athena Vrettos and others have pointed out, “fostered a view of children as 
primitive, instinctual, and wild,” both “susceptible to, and in need of, civilizing influences.”132  
The anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor tacitly relied on recapitulation theory when he used his 
own memories of childhood (a time when “we dwelt at the very gates of the realm of myth”) to 																																																								
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speculate about the emotional power of animism during the “childhood of the human race.”133  
Lee’s essay “The Child in the Vatican,” taking its cue from these discussions of childhood 
development, frequently refers to the titular child as a “small barbarian”; in Althea (1894), 
Baldwin treats “the barbarian, the child, the brute, [and] the degenerate” as more or less 
interchangeable (all four individuals, Baldwin elaborates, are incapable of penetrating the “shell 
of egoism”).134  Jessica Straley, in her survey of Victorian children’s literature, concludes that 
recapitulation theory “generated a crisis about childhood,” which appeared to be both an age of 
innocence and “a living relic of a still prehuman, even bestial past.”135   
In this context, Lee’s conception of the supernatural genre had serious consequences for 
evolutional morality and the “noble religion of choice and improvement” upon which she 
founded her hopes for the future.  Evolutional morality, we recall, demanded that the individual 
relate to her environment in a disinterested, rational, and (to use Lee’s coinage) “honourable” 
way.  The Victorian child, in a literal sense, was a throwback to the pre-civilized human, whose 
experience of material life was more magical, more aesthetic, but also more animalistic than the 
civilized adult’s.  Since there was little substantive difference, in this view, between the 
“delusory” imagination of childhood and the “retrograde” mysticism that Lee, through Baldwin, 
so staunchly demolished, the nostalgia for childhood (and, by extension, the past) betrayed an 																																																								
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atavistic desire to regress to primal forms of belief.136  The phenomenon of haunting—insofar as 
Lee defined it as a pleasurable psychological regression to a prior stage of development—thus 
tested the viability of evolutional morality, and progress more generally, when confronted by the 
emotional appeal and hereditary weight of the past. 
In stories such as “Amour Dure” (1887) and “Oke of Okehurst” (1886), Lee dramatizes 
the friction between the potentially degenerative desire for the “antique” and the progressive 
practice of evolutional morality.  These concerns are reflected in the stories’ exploration of the 
psychological burden of familial, national, and racial history.  The Prussian historian Spiridion 
Trepka, protagonist of “Amour Dure,” travels from Posen to Italy in order “to come face to face 
with the Past”—a desire that is thwarted, at first, by his own enmeshment in “modern, northern 
civilisation” and what he sees as the “degeneracy” of modern Italians.137  Like Lee, Spiridion is 
acutely conscious of his status as expatriate: in the diary entries that comprise the story, he often 
refers to his Prussian citizenship, and he turns his Germanic ethnicity into a recurring pun on 
“Vandal” (most amusingly, he describes his research in Italy as an act of “modern scientific 
vandalism,” by which he resumes the colonization that his Vandal ancestors began in 455).138  
Spiridion’s more recent progenitors also cast a shadow on his life, as we learn when he attributes 
his infatuation with the sixteenth-century femme fatale Medea da Carpi to familial proclivities: 
“shaken” by a ghostly encounter with Medea’s portrait, he attempts to calm himself by soberly 
considering the “case of [his] uncle Ladislas, and other suspicions of insanity in the family.”139  
His academic interest in Medea’s life and personality, which soon ripens into frenzy, likewise 																																																								
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tends to cluster around questions of hereditary determinism.  Her long list of lovers—“Pico, the 
Groom, Stimigliano, Oliverotto, Frangipani, [and] Prinzivalle degli Ordelaffi,” all of whom died 
violently as a result of Medea’s scheming—becomes for Spiridion a kind of pedigree, which he 
repeats with the growing conviction that he, too, must sacrifice himself for the long-dead 
Medea.140  Spiridion’s temperamental fatalism leads him to believe that even his horoscope 
(which “tallies almost exactly with that of Medea da Carpi”) and his palm (a palm reader in 
Poland, he recalls, found there a “cut-line which signifies violent death”) have destined him to 
die for Medea’s love.141  Over the course of the story, Lee purposefully overdetermines 
Spiridion’s increasingly eccentric behavior, which he ascribes alternately to hereditary impulse, 
supernatural interference, the influence of alcohol, and fate.  
Spiridion’s compromised autonomy, in turn, calls to his mind vivid and irresistible 
reminiscences of childhood.  Zorn points out that these instances of “heightened spiritual 
sensation” tend to provoke Spiridion’s ghostly encounters, because they compromise the 
“boundaries between imagination and reality, past and present.”142  Lee’s distinctly aesthetic 
sketches of the historian’s memories thus broach, for her, the problematic linkages between 
aestheticism, nostalgia, and degeneration.  Toward the beginning of the story, for instance, the 
“sight of snow falling gently” makes Spiridion “feel back at Posen, once more a child.”143  Not 
coincidentally, this is the point at which his fragile sense of identity begins to fracture and merge 
with Medea’s doomed lovers: “I fancied I saw it all,” he records, “and that I, somehow, was 
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Marcantonio Frangipani come to liberate her.”144  Several weeks later, as Spiridion awaits what 
he knows will be a fatal meeting with Medea, the smell of incense rouses “the recollection, 
almost the sensation, of those Christmas Eves long ago at Posen and Breslau, when [he] walked 
as a child along the wide streets.”145  Lee, continuing the psychological inquiry she began in 
“Faustus and Helena,” posits a loose association between the historian’s affinity for the past, his 
reliving of childhood, and his rapid descent into a petty lawlessness that ends in his death.  
Spiridion’s regressions to childhood are both the symptom and the mainspring of a broader 
confluence of hereditary pressures that constrain his thoughts and actions.   
The consequences for morality become clear in the story’s climax, in which Spiridion 
commits a literal “act of vandalism”: at Medea’s urging, he hacks at the statue of her arch-
nemesis, Duke Robert, and flees guiltily as if “pursued by the tramp of hundreds of invisible 
horsemen.”146  Lee never states whether his crime and subsequent death are the result of a 
familial neurological condition (“some little coil of [the] brain, the twentieth of a hair’s-breadth 
out of order”), racial predispositions to criminality, the workings of fortune, or the Machiavellian 
manipulation of a real ghost.147  In any case, Spiridion cedes his capacity for ethical choice to 
degenerative, and yet perversely seductive, forces outside his control—forces that, at times, are 
indistinguishable from the evolutionary pressures of heredity and accident.  By taking full 
advantage of the “essentially vague” nature of the supernatural, Lee in “Amour Dure” 
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experiments with the aleatoric elements of Darwinian evolution and presents a world resistant to 
the positivist morality of “choice and improvement” that she proposed in her earlier essays.148    
Alice Oke, the central character of “Oke of Okehurst,” is similarly preoccupied with 
history, but her attraction to the past expresses itself in a conscious intention to imitate (and, 
from an evolutionary standpoint, recapitulate) the life of her ancestor, also named Alice Oke.  
Over the course of the story, Lee’s narrator—an unnamed painter and amateur psychologist with 
a taste for unusual personalities—relates the strange occurrences he witnessed during his stay at 
Okehurst, the country home of William and Alice Oke.  The narrator, he tells his friend, first 
meets Alice after William commissions him to paint her portrait.  On his arrival at Okehurst, the 
painter immediately deems William an “absolutely uninteresting” Englishman, whose sole 
notable feature is an ominous facial expression that the narrator terms the “maniac-frown.”149  
Alice, by contrast, furnishes the painter with a fascinating object of both artistic and scientific 
study.  Her ineffable “grace and exquisiteness…hits off exactly [his] desires for beauty and 
rareness,” while her “fantastic” and “morbid” imagination piques his psychological interest.150  
Alice and William, the narrator learns, are first cousins and descendants of a Jacobean-era 
couple, Alice and Nicholas Oke; according to legend, the seventeenth-century Alice disguised 
herself as her husband’s page in order to help him murder her lover, the poet Christopher 
Lovelock.  The narrator soon realizes that the modern-day Alice has developed a “psychological 
mania” for her namesake, whom she resembles so closely as to seem her “reincarnation.”151   
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Lee’s mixed scientific and mystical idiom leaves room for her reader to interpret Alice’s 
eerie resemblance to her ancestor as a sign of Alice’s pathological psychology.  More 
specifically, Lee invites us to attribute Alice’s “mania” to a diseased aestheticism that threatens 
to suspend Alice in a perpetual state of psychological and evolutionary immaturity.  Angela 
Leighton argues that Lee “uses the ghost story to express all the seduction and ambiguity of 
aestheticism itself”; as Leighton further points out, the aestheticism that appears in Lee’s ghost 
stories is a “materialistic creed” that seeks bodily contact with historical objects.152  Alice Oke, 
with her “curious, inactive, half-invalidish life,” her affection for Jacobean relics (perhaps best 
exemplified in her attachment to the old Alice’s yellow drawing room), and her “contemptuous 
indifference” to her husband’s practical affairs, exemplifies many of the “diaphanous” qualities 
that Lee vested in her own alter ego, Baldwin.153  In Alice, however, these qualities become 
bizarrely repellent, even to the aesthetically inclined narrator.  He describes Alice as an 
incongruous “mixture of self-engrossed vanity, of shallowness, [and] of poetic vision,” at once a 
“wonderful…exotic creature” and a “repulsive” female “Narcissus.”154  Alice thus magnifies 
elements of the aesthetic temperament to monstrous proportions—her uncanny ability to emulate 
her ancestor’s seventeenth-century aesthetic appears “abominable,” her dreamy detachment from 
real life spirals into a break with reality, and her “poetic” imagination becomes ungovernable.155  
Though the narrator fails to make the connection, Lee implies that this perverse aestheticism is 
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tied to Alice’s arrested development: the narrator often compares Alice to a “naughty child,” 
utterly incapable of resisting her impulses or demonstrating compassion for others.156 
Gradually, the narrator apprehends the grave moral “mischief” that Alice’s infantile 
aestheticism unleashes within the household, as her obsession with Lovelock and her 
speculations about reincarnation spark a folie à deux that includes her apparently innocuous, but 
in reality “hysterical,” husband.157  Alice (“with the enjoyment of a perverse child,” the narrator 
observes) actively feeds William’s growing paranoia about an intruder on the estate, cementing 
his worrying “maniac-frown” into “a permanent feature.”158  At the climax of the tale, William 
imagines he has caught his wife in intimate conversation with Lovelock.  He then accidentally 
kills Alice in an attempt to shoot the interloper, subsequently tries and fails to shoot himself, and 
finally dies a few days later, “raving” mad.159  While the modern-day Okes do not follow their 
ancestors’ example exactly, their demise delivers on the portents of history.  William’s pattern of 
suspicious thinking, which results in Alice’s murder, ominously echoes the homicidal jealousy of 
his ancestor, Nicholas; the murder itself fulfills both Nicholas’s dying vow to kill his own wife 
and his “prophecy” that the family line would end when a “master of Okehurst should marry 
another Alice Oke.”160  In “Oke of Okehurst,” as in “Amour Dure,” the desire to raise a “real 
spectre of the antique” (which Lee identifies, at times, with her own aesthetic approach to 
history) leads to the disastrous recapitulation of hereditary violence.  By structuring her ghost 
stories in this way, Lee quite intentionally stages a series of emblematic conflicts between a 																																																								
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particular kind of aestheticism—one alive to the decadent pleasures of the “antique”—and her 
forward-looking evolutional morality: an already endangered doctrine that relied, to her 
frustration, on harrowingly violent and often unpredictable natural processes.  
 By the late 1880s, Lee’s dialectical oscillation between the evolutionary and the aesthetic 
seemed to have come to an impasse.  Colby, Lee’s biographer, attributes Lee’s apparent 
intellectual troubles to the “series of breakdowns” that she endured after A. Mary F. Robinson 
unexpectedly announced her engagement in 1887.161  We may hesitate to chalk up Lee’s self-
critical turn entirely to melancholy (Colby rather dramatically claims that Lee felt as if “life had 
betrayed her”), but Colby rightly highlights the unusually world-weary tone of Lee’s Juvenilia 
(1887), which captures an important transitional moment in her thinking.162  In the introduction 
to Juvenilia, she mourns the “comparative Elysium” of “those aesthetic, classic, Goethian days” 
of her youth, when she trusted the “morality of all antique art and philosophy,” and “the 
Beautiful” (at least “when it is temperate, harmonious, perfect”) seemed to be tantamount to “the 
Good.”163  Lee resumes this wistful strain in the “Epilogue”: whereas “beauty…is simple, 
harmonious, complete,” Lee laments, “the human element, the world, full, even at the best, of 
dissonance, imperfection, complexity, and enigma, that awaken suspicion and evil thoughts, 
[leaves] us…with a notion that under the surface all is far from beautiful.”164  In the wake of her 
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devastating separation from Robinson, Lee is especially attuned to the gulf between the aesthetic 
ideal of beauty and the painful realities of the world, and she once again connects aesthetic 
idealism to childhood.  While she drops the intimations of degeneration that made the child so 
fraught in “Faustus and Helena,” her resignification of childhood in her supernatural fiction 
makes her youthful conflation of beauty and goodness appear, from her mature perspective, 
irresponsible as well as naïve.   
Alongside this elegiac mode, however, Juvenilia makes another dialectical 
countermovement toward an affirmative vision of the future that resembles much of Lee’s extant 
critical work.  But this is a resemblance with a difference.  In Juvenilia, Lee diverts her attention 
away from the moral duties of the “aristocracy” she anticipated in Baldwin and toward the 
aesthetic life of the average person.  On the subject of “beautiful things,” she remarks,  
there is no doubt that we, privileged people, are given too much of them and give them 
too much of our attention; but that is not saying that in the world at large there is too 
much of them or too much attention given thereunto.  It is an evil of distribution.  And 
one result, let us hope, of our thinking somewhat of matters less pleasant, may be, in the 
long run, in the long-expected future, which yet sometimes comes with a rush, that the 
less selfish work of the world will be no longer the mere removal of evil, but also the 
distribution of good; and among various sorts of good, one of the best is beauty.165 
 
Lee’s focus on the unequal “distribution” of beauty marks, for her, a relatively new interest in 
aestheticism’s democratic undercurrents (Allen and Wilde, of course, were already exploring this 
topic in their respective discussions of physiological aesthetics and cultural criticism).  In 1887, 
Lee attended at least one meeting of the Fabian Society, where she heard speeches by William 
Morris and women’s rights activist Annie Besant.166  While Lee declined to join the group, she 
broadly agreed with the Fabian vision of gradual socialist reform: H. G. Wells, the lifelong 
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socialist and one time Fabian who became a warm correspondent of Lee’s in the early 1900s, 
addressed her affectionately as his “Sister in Utopia.”167  By the late 1880s, as she distanced 
herself from the dreamy, elitist aestheticism Juvenilia associates with childhood inexperience, 
Lee was also beginning to consider Ruskin’s work afresh.  In particular, his essay collection 
Unto This Last (1862) proposes a political economy based not on a “Science of Accumulation” 
but on what he calls a “Science of Distribution”; “THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE,” Ruskin 
declares, and “that country is the richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy 
human beings.”168  In Ruskin’s formula of wealth and life, Lee discerned a route by which the 
“privileged” aesthete could act in “the world at large” without trafficking in the destructive forms 
of laissez-faire commerce that, for Lee, only exacerbated the world’s “dissonance.”  Members of 
the cultured elite, she hints in Juvenilia, might be perfectly placed to patronize an alternative 
economy of “good” (a subtle pun on “goods”) in which capital flows through the circulation of 
“beautiful things.”  
 The distributive role of the critic proved increasingly compelling to Lee in the early 
1890s, when she settled at Il Palmerino—her country home in Florence—and came into contact 
with several like-minded art lovers whose work dovetailed with her new aesthetic interests.169  
Her coterie in Florence included her devoted partner and accomplished painter Kit Anstruther-
Thomson, the aspiring young art historian Maud Crutwell, the American novelist Edith Wharton, 
and several other women admirers that Lee’s friend, the composer Ethel Smyth, called her 
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“cultes.”170  Bernard Berenson, a fresh Harvard graduate with few publications to his name, 
arrived with a letter of introduction in 1889.  He was only one of many expatriate Italophiles to 
make the obligatory “pilgrimage” (as Colby describes it) to Il Palmerino, but the intellectual 
exchange that began with this first meeting lasted for decades and had a special impact on their 
respective bodies of work.171  Lee and Berenson’s personal relationship, however, was a troubled 
one: both Colby and Fraser describe the young Berenson as competitive and insecure (especially 
when it came to Lee’s comfortable reputation as a Renaissance expert), and Colby further 
suggests that their temperaments (“volatile, argumentative, sensitive to every slight”) were too 
alike to harmonize.172  Berenson soon moved nearby and established his own clique of writers, 
historians, and aesthetes, many of whom also knew the woman he ironically dubbed “Sibylla 
Palmerina.”173  His circle included his partner and eventual spouse Mary Costelloe, the poets 
Katharine Bradley and Edith Cooper (known professionally and personally as Michael Field), the 
art critic Sidney Colvin, and William James.174  At this stage, Colby remarks, Lee regarded 
Berenson “as a kind of junior colleague”; Lee guided him through Florentine galleries and 
provided gracious, but honest, feedback on his manuscripts, which he accepted grudgingly.175  
His most influential ideas about art attribution and connoisseurship had their genesis in the 
period between 1892, when he became a regular visitor to Il Palmerino, and 1897, when his 
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allegations of plagiarism against Lee and Anstruther-Thomson put an end to their friendship.176  
It was in the intervening years that Berenson, often with help from Costelloe and the Fields, 
began exploring the psychological mechanisms underlying the experience and enjoyment of art 
(according to Berenson’s biographer Ernest Samuels, the topic was “a favorite staple of debate in 
the Anglo-American salons of Florence”).177   
A survey of Berenson’s intellectual precedents shows us why his work both excited and 
challenged Lee in the mid-1890s.  Like Lee, Berenson decided early on in his career that the 
secret to aesthetics lay in the natural sciences rather than metaphysics.178  By the 1890s, 
Berenson could draw on a rich tradition of materialist histories of the Renaissance, including 
Pater’s Renaissance, Lee’s Euphorion, and Symonds’s seven-volume Renaissance in Italy 
(1875-86).  As we have seen, the latter half of the nineteenth century also witnessed an uptick in 
scientific publications on the physiology and psychology of beauty: Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology (1855), Darwin’s Descent of Man (1871), Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics (1877), 
and Edmund Gurney’s Power of Sound (1880) all treated the perceptions of sound, color, and 
form as functions of the nervous system, subject to the laws of evolution.  Alison Brown and 
Ernest Samuels note that Berenson and Costelloe developed an interest in this line of research in 
the early 1890s, when the pair began to copy extracts from the work of Gustav Fechner and 
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Gurney—both experimental psychologists who studied the sensations of color and sound, 
respectively—into their shared commonplace book.179  
Along these lines, Berenson found additional encouragement in the work of William 
James, his psychology professor at Harvard and an old acquaintance of Lee’s.  Most obviously, 
James’s general approach to psychology provided a scientific model for Berenson’s own 
inquiries into the bodily experience of art.  James held that every mind was “yoked to a body 
through which its manifestations appear,” and that this nexus of sensation, thought, and emotion 
operated on the basis of natural laws that the science of psychology could discover.180  James 
also put forward the influential James-Lange theory of emotion, so called because James 
developed the idea concurrently with Danish physician Carl Lange in the 1880s.181  According to 
James and Lange, bodily sensations were the direct cause, not the physiological side effect, of 
the emotions.  As James explains in Principles of Psychology (1890), he and Lange agree that 
“bodily changes follow directly the perception of an exciting fact, and…our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur is the emotion.”182  Every organism, he elaborates, is a “sounding-board” 
upon which sense impressions play, producing unique emotional “reverberations” via the 
stimulation of the “skin, glands, heart, and other viscera” as well as the muscles.183  Significantly 
for Berenson and Lee, the James-Lange theory prioritized the rudimentary corporeal sensation 																																																								
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over its complex mental emanations, making the body the gateway to the “higher” social, moral, 
and aesthetic emotions. 
Moreover, James’s insistence on the scientific practice of psychology pushed Berenson 
toward Giovanni Morelli’s trademark “experimental method” of connoisseurship: a “science of 
Art,” in Morelli’s words, that determined the course of Berenson’s career.184  An Italian 
revolutionary and doctor as well as an art critic, Morelli’s background in anatomy primed him to 
notice minute variations in the representation of the human form.185  In Italian Masters in 
German Galleries (1880), he searches for artistic signatures in the minor details of a painting—
often the rendering of hands and ears—and catalogs and compares these minutiae in order to 
attribute paintings to their creators.186  Morelli’s singular method, which claimed the scientific 
mantle of Galileo and Darwin for the previously humanistic discipline of connoisseurship, was 
also peculiar for its combination of rigorous empiricism and candid personal response.187  For 
instance, when Morelli finds himself “quite cold” in the presence of a “universally celebrated 
picture,” he “must pronounce this picture repainted,” even in the absence of concrete proof.188  
He “cannot help it,” he confesses: “either I am crazed, or all my predecessors are fundamentally 
mistaken.”189  Throughout Italian Masters, Morelli makes use of both objective and subjective 
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data, supplementing his meticulous examination of artistic technique with running commentary 
on his physiological and emotional reactions to the pieces in question—e.g., his frigid lack of 
“enthusiasm” over an alleged Rafael, or his “delight” in the harmonious colors of a genuine 
Moretto.190  For Morelli, good connoisseurs relied as much on their elusive capacity for bodily 
responsiveness—the ability to serve as a “sounding board,” in James’s paradigm—as on their 
eye for formal detail. 
This marriage of empirical observation to psychological self-analysis appealed to the 
young Berenson, who sought out Morelli’s disciples in Italy and eventually met the expert 
himself in 1890, shortly after he first called on Lee.191  Berenson’s first major publications, 
Venetian Painters of the Renaissance (1894) and Lorenzo Lotto: An Essay in Constructive 
Criticism (1895), bear the traces of his aesthetic education.  His indebtedness to Pater, Lee, and 
Symonds is clear in his preface to Venetian Painters, which hails the Renaissance not simply as a 
golden age of art, but also as a pervasive “spirit” of “intellectual curiosity and energy.”192  “Our 
faith in science and the power of work,” Berenson writes, is “instinctively in sympathy with the 
Renaissance”; in particular, the Renaissance “foreshadowed…the promise [that modern science] 
holds out of constant acquisition and perpetual growth.”193  “The Renaissance,” he adds in a later 
chapter on Tintoretto, “had resulted in the emancipation of the individual, in making him feel 
that the universe had no other purpose than his happiness…In this lies our greatest debt to the 
Renaissance, that it instituted the welfare of man as the end of all action.”194  For Berenson, as 																																																								
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for Allen, Clifford, Wilde, and other evolutionary aesthetes, the Renaissance was a touchstone in 
the history of liberal humanism and its cherished values of individuality, rationality, and 
progress.  “Even if it had had no art whatever,” Berenson concludes, the Renaissance deserves 
scholarly attention for what it can teach Victorians about how they might cultivate and direct this 
emancipatory zeitgeist in their own day.195   
Berenson’s Lorenzo Lotto, his biography of the sixteenth-century painter, begins to flesh 
out the scientific methodology that he was developing from his reading of James and Morelli as 
well as his conversations with Lee.  Following Morelli, Berenson identifies Lotto’s paintings by 
analyzing details such as “the ears, the hands, the ringlets of hair,” and “other such unimportant 
and even trivial things.”196  In homage to James, Berenson regards Lotto as a “psychological 
problem,” one that the connoisseur must solve by parsing “clue[s]” embedded in the painter’s 
“habitual” execution of seemingly meaningless details.197  Besides his focus on form—the 
painting’s visual features as opposed to its subject matter and “general look”—Berenson also 
relies on the subjective introspection that was the hallmark of both Paterian and Morellian 
assessments of art.198  (“What is this song or picture,” Pater famously asked in his preface to The 
Renaissance, “to me?”199)  Berenson’s critical analysis thus often consists in descriptions of what 
Lotto’s paintings “make us feel”: Lotto’s depictions of architecture, for instance, give us the 																																																								
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dizzying “effect of unexpected sheerness of depth,” and his portraits elicit our “spontaneous 
kindness” and “sympathy” for his sitters.200   
More dramatically, Berenson concludes Lorenzo Lotto by revealing that the “mere 
cataloguing” of previous chapters was only the groundwork for the study’s true aim, which is to 
excavate “our” own attitude toward Lotto and his art.201  Now that we have processed the 
evidence, Berenson writes, we are  
at last free to ask ourselves what is our final impression of the artist…[O]ur final 
impression of works of art remains an equation between them and our own temperament.  
Every appreciation is, therefore, a confession, and its value depends entirely upon its 
sincerity…The perfect masterpiece, among the many requirements it must fulfil, must 
give us the attitude of a typical human being toward the universe.  The perfect criticism 
should give us the measure of the acceptability at a given time of the work of art in 
question.202 
 
Berenson’s definition of criticism as “confession” clearly looks back to the work of Pater and 
especially Wilde, who categorized criticism as a type of “autobiography.”203  But Berenson, 
more consciously than his predecessors, opens up this line of critical inquiry to a lay public: his 
recommendation that readers of Lorenzo Lotto consult with photographic reproductions of 
Lotto’s paintings suggests that his target audience lacks immediate access to the originals, and 
his notion of “perfect” criticism presupposes an element of social consensus about what is 
“acceptable at a given time.”  His subjective approach further invites non-specialists to 
interrogate their own emotional responses to artworks, responses whose merits lie not in their 
sophistication or erudition but in their “sincerity.”  Berenson makes this point more explicitly in 																																																								
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“Rudiments of Connoisseurship,” a theoretical treatise that he began before Lotto and published, 
still incomplete, in 1902.  The connoisseur, he argues in this fragment, ultimately makes use of 
three types of data: historical documentation (including contracts of sale and other supporting 
records), critical tradition, and “the works of art themselves.”204  The most reliable of these 
materials is the work itself, and specifically the “morphological characteristics” that Morelli had 
taught him to interpret.205  But alongside these tools of scientific authentication, Berenson 
stipulates that a “Sense of Quality is indubitably the most essential equipment of a would-be 
connoisseur.”206  More “Art” than science, Berenson’s “Sense of Quality” seems to correspond 
with the affective, self-interrogative facet of the Morellian method.   Since the “Sense of 
Quality” refers to emotions and responses rather than “demonstrable things,” its precise nature 
seems to elude explanation: Berenson’s essay thus abruptly ends after he introduces the 
subject.207   
Michael Field—who accompanied Berenson on his gallery visits and undoubtedly heard 
early versions of his aesthetic theories—allude to this critical principle in their collection of 
ekphrastic poetry Sight and Song (1892).208  Each of the volume’s poems, in keeping with 
Field’s attraction to both Berenson and his brand of criticism, attempts to translate the visual 
experience of a specific painting into lyric poetry.  In the preface to Sight and Song, Field 																																																								
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stresses the importance of “see[ing the paintings] from their own center,” even as they allow that 
the “inevitable force of individuality must still have play” in any given encounter with art.209  
Here, the poets walk a fine line between Pater’s subjective criticism and the aesthetic ideal (one 
equally important to Pater) of serene disinterestedness and impersonality.  As Julia F. Saville 
argues, Sight and Song thus “follows the imperative of Berenson and Morelli to respond to each 
painting on its own representational terms.”210  The poems themselves subtly appropriate 
Berenson’s hybrid method: their speakers inhabit the perspective of a disinterested but 
responsive viewer, who feels the “dizzy sickness” of Bellini’s Christ as keenly as she revels in 
the “delicious womanhood” of Giorgione’s Venus.211  That is, the paintings, to quote Field’s 
headnote to Sight and Song, “objectively incarnate” certain formal qualities independently of 
their audiences; the viewer, however, must serve as a “pure” conduit for the work’s aesthetic 
signals in order to receive a “more intimate” impression of the work as it truly exists.212  For 
Field as well as for Berenson, the good-faith effort to ascertain one’s honest impression of the 
work—to sympathize with it, and to analyze one’s resulting feelings—was more conducive to 
aesthetic appreciation than the knowledge, however encyclopedic, of a painting’s historical 
context or technical achievements.   
The democratic notion that anyone with some modicum of sensitivity could enjoy the 
enriching pleasures of art encouraged Berenson to broaden the scope of his established theories 
in Florentine Painters of the Renaissance (1896).  As Costelloe reported, the purpose of the 																																																								
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survey was to uncover “the ‘why’ of real art enjoyment”: that “why,” Berenson determines, is 
what he terms “tactile values,” or those “muscular sensations of movement” that combine with 
“retinal impressions” in order to produce a sense of three-dimensional space.213  By building on 
the hedonic aesthetics of Spencer and Allen as well as James’s psychological insights, Berenson 
assumes that artistic representation “stimulates to an unwonted activity psychical processes 
which are in themselves the source of most (if not all) of our pleasures.”214  In contrast to the 
“ordinary sensations” of sight, he reasons, the “enhanced pleasure” of aesthetic experience 
“never tend[s] to pass over into pain,” because art can stimulate the viewer’s nervous system 
without physically taxing the muscles.215  In conveying “tactile values” more efficiently than real 
life, a good painting “gives us the pleasures consequent upon a more vivid realisation of the 
object,” and these pleasures, in turn, “immensely heighten our sense of vitality.”216  Pollaiuolo’s 
Battle of the Nudes, for instance, simulates the sensation of “muscular strain” in our own bodies, 
thereby allowing us to “imagine ourselves imitating all the movements…without the least effort 
on our side.”  As we gaze upon Pollaiuolo’s Hercules and Antaeus, he enthuses, we “feel as if a 
fountain of energy had sprung up under [our] feet and were playing through [our] veins.” 217  
Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, which for Berenson exemplifies this aesthetic and physiological 
phenomenon, likewise draws us into its drama without drowning us: “how we revel,” he reflects, 
“in the force and freshness of the wind, in the life of the wave!”218  These works therefore give 
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us a “hyperaesthesia not bought with drugs, and not paid with cheques drawn on our vitality,” 
and it is this “life-enhancing” or “life-communicating” quality that, for Berenson, makes art 
spiritually fulfilling as well as sensually stimulating.219   
Berenson’s economic metaphor for vitality—which he describes, in Spencerian terms, as 
a fund of energy that grows or shrinks according to our actions—raised the social and 
evolutionary stakes of his aesthetics in ways that proved critical for Lee.  As Berenson describes 
it, the muscular sensation of “tactile values” is a necessarily vicarious and nonproductive 
experience.  In the hands of a good artist, a scene of “strain and pressure” stirs in viewers 
sympathetic feelings of exertion, but “without the confusion and fatigue of actuality”; since we, 
the audience, never perform any physical activity ourselves, we are able to “enjoy” the sensation 
of exercise “at our leisure.”220  Like Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics, Berenson’s theory of 
tactile values posits a method of creation and consumption that bypasses the Malthusian 
corollaries of depletion, scarcity, and competition.  His notion of “hyperaesthesia,” which signals 
an excessive sensibility, thwarts the Darwinian laws of nature by allowing spectators to feel “as 
if” they were expending “energy” while simultaneously increasing (or at least, not depleting) 
their stock of vitality.  The vitality that comes from art, then, is an endlessly renewable 
physiological, emotional, and spiritual resource that, for the young connoisseur, broaches 																																																								
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correspondingly boundless evolutionary prospects.  He voices this evolutionary hope (which he 
considers in itself “life-enhancing”) most emphatically in his overview of Leonardo da Vinci’s 
“universal genius”: Leonardo’s nearly perfect career, Berenson declares, “brings us the gladdest 
of all tidings—the wonderful possibilities of the human family, of whose chances we all 
partake.”221  While he never specifies how tactile values aid in the improvement of the “human 
family,” Berenson may have presumed that his readers already understood the connection 
between aesthetics and sexual selection, given Wilde’s and Allen’s highly public 
pronouncements on the subject.  In any case, Berenson broadly extrapolates his aesthetics into a 
stirring projection of humankind’s evolutionary advancement.   
As both Brown and Samuels affirm, Berenson’s principle of tactile values was his 
foremost contribution to art criticism, particularly twentieth-century criticism surrounding 
impressionism and its modernist descendants.222  For her part, Lee considered the idea central to 
Berenson’s important intervention in modern aesthetic thought: his “intellectual mission,” she 
instructed him in a letter from 1894, was not the advancement of Morellian “picture-expertise,” 
but the “mission of bringing the essential, pleasure-giving qualities of art within the reach of a 
greater number of persons whose nature would permit them to enjoy if only time & effort were 
saved for them.”223  Lee’s characterization of Berenson’s connoisseurship as a “mission” is 
telling: his early work pioneered a new form of “missionary aestheticism” (to borrow Diana 
Maltz’s term) that accorded with Lee’s longing for a Ruskinian economy of “life” while also 
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satisfying her standards of scientific rigor.224  In a momentous boon for Lee, who had long 
sought for a way to reconnect aesthetics to morality, Berenson identified, through tactile values, 
the psychological effect that made the proliferation and consumption of art “life-enhancing” and 
therefore ethical.  She could begin to see that his work fulfilled an important social and cultural 
task: his surveys saved otherwise responsive amateurs the “time & effort” of sifting through the 
entire archive of Renaissance painting, and in doing so granted the public an easier entrée into 
the invigorating world of art.  
Berenson’s ethical connoisseurship thus presented a possible solution to the problem of 
“distribution” that Lee first posed in Juvenilia.  She had continued to contemplate this topic in 
her subsequent writings, most pressingly in the retrospective “Valedictory” to Renaissance 
Fancies and Studies, with which I began the chapter.  In the “Valedictory,” Lee recommends that 
the “mere reader, who comes to art not for work, but for refreshment…go straight to the 
masters.”225  Rather than “arrang[ing] pictures and statues as we might minerals or herbs in a 
museum,” she further muses, perhaps her fellow critics should concentrate on leading the “poor 
tired people, longing for a little beauty,” to those artworks that (in accordance with each 
individual’s “natural affinities”) could provide this refreshment “unmixed.”226  To Lee, 
Berenson’s Florentine Painters—with its attentiveness to those works that the connoisseur 
deemed the “best vehicle[s]” for tactile values—served as a practical demonstration of the 
critic’s ability to promulgate artistic pleasure via a phenomenon she would later call “aesthetic 
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sociability.”227  Lee was so intrigued by Berenson’s science of connoisseurship that she reviewed 
Florentine Painters for the psychological journal Mind shortly after the monograph appeared.  
Her review grants that the book “shows no traces of psychological training” (an unfair assertion, 
given Berenson’s course of study under James) but advises that psychologists read the volume 
anyway, because its investigation into the aesthetic emotions coincides “with some of the most 
significant recent psychological discoveries.”228  Among Berenson’s chief psychological 
breakthroughs, she writes, is his notion that the experience of tactile values operates through the 
“translation” of external visual data into internal “bodily states.”229  Lee also foregrounds his 
choice of the term “life-enhancing”: his vitalist diction suggests that the “aesthetic phenomenon” 
is not an “accident in evolution” but an essential biological and psychological activity, one that 
perpetuates our existence by prompting “a direct increase of vitality” in our bodies.230    
Lee found corroborating evidence for Berenson’s ideas in her own psychological 
experiments, which she conducted throughout the 1890s with the willing assistance of 
Anstruther-Thomson.  For nearly a decade, the women toured galleries, studios, and churches 
across Italy together, always following the same procedure: while Anstruther-Thomson inspected 
a painting or circled a column, Lee watched her young companion’s movements and asked her 
probing questions about her sensations.231  Anstruther-Thomson also kept journals in which she 
scrupulously recorded her physical reactions to art and architecture, including changes in her 
posture, heart rate, and temperature, her breathing patterns, and the loosening and tightening of 																																																								
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her various muscles.  Many subsequent commentators—from their friend and contemporary 
Ethel Smyth to modern-day scholars Fraser and Maltz—have pointed out the voyeuristic 
eroticism of the pair’s gallery visits, which seemed to stand in for Lee’s repressed desires for 
sexual intimacy.232  Carolyn Burdett and Susan Lanzoni, by contrast, highlight the serious 
scientific aims of Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s unusual method, which built on and tested the 
limits of preexisting psychological theories.233  Their underlying motivations aside, Lee and 
Anstruther-Thomson searched tenaciously for an evolutionary explanation for the sense of 
beauty that might accord with their solemn reverence toward art.  Though the impact of their 
experiments on the discipline of psychology was minimal—and Lee herself later tempered the 
physiological aspects of her aesthetics to focus on the more ideational concept of “empathy”—
elements of their evolutionary aesthetics, as I will discuss in the coda, continued to shape art 
criticism in the first decades of the twentieth century.   
The immediate result of Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s long collaboration was their joint 
publication of “Beauty and Ugliness” (1897), a Contemporary Review article that is both a 
milestone in Lee’s career and one of the most fascinating examples of the Victorian science of 
aesthetics.  The two-part essay begins by dismissing older aesthetic theories as either erroneous 
or misguided.  Predictably, Lee’s long-standing aversion to both utilitarianism and mysticism 
leads her to reject any theory that explains the aesthetic sense “by reference to…utility and 																																																								
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inutility” or “supernatural origin.”234  More surprisingly, she and Anstruther-Thomson also 
express some skepticism about Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, Spencer’s concept of play, 
and Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics, deferring instead to the “artistic intuition” and 
“experience” of Ruskin.235  Lee’s renewed appreciation for Ruskin, whom she once roundly 
castigated for his opposition to science, is part of her important reappraisal of evolutionary 
aesthetics.  As Burdett has shown, Lee carefully annotated Allen’s monograph on aesthetics and 
read widely in the field of evolutionary psychology, whose leaders included Spencer as well as 
James Sully and Francis Galton.236  Her differences with these evolutionists stemmed not from 
their materialist explanation of aesthetics—her faith in scientific rationalism remained solid 
throughout her career—but from their limited claims for the sense of beauty.  Spencer, as we 
have seen, classified aesthetic emotion as a healthy play activity (as distinguished from “life-
serving” work), and many evolutionary psychologists followed suit by assigning aesthetic 
experience a relatively minor role in psychic life.  In his notorious 1894 essay “The New 
Hedonism,” Allen used the play theory of aesthetics as the basis for an ethic of pleasure, which 
looked to the individualistic pursuit of happiness—and in particular, sexual satisfaction—to 
bring about a higher civilization.237  While Allen, like Lee, envisioned an entire society built 
upon the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity, he still credited the “love of bright colours, graceful 
form, melodious sound, [and] rhythmical motion” to the “sexual instinct.”238  To Lee, the 
dominant evolutionary theories therefore appeared to reduce aesthetic emotion either to harmless 																																																								
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frivolity (in the case of Spencer) or to hedonic decadence (in the case of Allen).  Ruskin, for all 
his resistance to evolutionary theory, imbued the aesthetic sense with the divine magnitude that 
Lee believed the subject merited.  Though she still very much situated herself within an 
evolutionary tradition, she sought in “Beauty and Ugliness” to address deficiencies in the theory 
that, for years, had troubled her attempts to formulate an aesthetics that was both morally 
irreproachable and scientifically grounded.   
In the introduction to “Beauty and Ugliness,” Lee and Anstruther-Thomson thus 
immediately acknowledge the indispensable function of the “aesthetic phenomenon,” which 
regulates the individual’s “perception of Form” for the ultimate “benefit of the total 
organism.”239  The “perception of Form,” as they define it, comprises the intricate bodily and 
mental operations by which we amalgamate “elementary impressions”—the basal sense data that 
Allen had discussed in Physiological Aesthetics—into the “aesthetic cognition” of an external 
object.240  Like many physiologists and psychologists in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Lee and Anstruther-Thomson assume that visual stimuli induce a complex assortment of 
embodied reactions: the sight of a chair, for example, initiates “movements of the two eyes, of 
the head, and of the thorax, and balancing movements in the back…accompanied by alterations 
in the equilibrium of various parts of the body.”241  Like James, they consider these reactions to 
be constitutive of the perception of the chair itself, not mere side effects of an independent 
process of visual sensation.  More unusually, the collaborators also argue that these corporeal 
responses correlate closely with the physical properties of the object under observation.  In the 
presence of a jar, they explain in another illustration, “one accompanies the lift up, so to speak, 																																																								
239 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, “Beauty and Ugliness I,” 544. 
240 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, “Beauty and Ugliness I,” 547-48. 
241 Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, “Beauty and Ugliness I,” 548. 
		 276 
of the body of the jar by a lift up of one’s own body”; meanwhile, the jar’s tapered sides “bring 
both lungs into equal play” by provoking gentle inward breaths.242 
Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s ideas about physiological mimicry lead them to a 
distinctive interpretation of beauty that harkens back to Pater’s subjective criticism while 
attempting to tackle “the abstract question [of] what beauty is in itself” that Pater had refused to 
undertake.243  Their answer to this question is closely tied to their concept of “Form Perception,” 
by which they mean a kind of aesthetic internalization.244  When we call an object “round, or 
high, or symmetrical,” they argue in “Beauty and Ugliness,” we are actually describing a 
“change in ourselves productive of the sense of height, or roundness or symmetry”: the aesthetic 
adjectives we apply to objects, in psychological fact, pertain to subjective states that we have 
transferred onto the “non-ego.”245  “It is we, the beholders,” the co-authors powerfully assert in 
the second part of their essay, “who…make form exist in ourselves,” and only in a secondary 
psychological maneuver do we turn the “subjective inside us…into the objective outside.”246  In 
their line of reasoning, we append the descriptor “beautiful” to forms that stimulate beneficial 
internal sensations: sensations that are “extraordinarily composed, balanced, co-related in their 
diversity,” or otherwise “favourable to the [organic] processes in question.”247  “Beauty” is thus a 
catch-all term for the feelings of bodily and mental harmony that spectators gain in the course of 
seeing, internalizing, and realizing certain forms.  Since these interludes of harmonious 
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wellbeing are advantageous to the individual, they further reckon, the human race must have 
“evolved” a “special [aesthetic] instinct…which forces us to court or to shun those opposite 
qualities of Form which we call beauty or ugliness.”248    
Certainly, Lee and Anstruther-Thomson found precedent for their psychological 
aesthetics in Robert Vischer’s and Theodor Lipps’s respective theorizations of Einfühlung, or the 
process by which individuals project their psychic states onto external objects.  (Although most 
scholars translate Einfühlung as “empathy,” in this period the German term referred to a specific 
psychological relationship between observers and their inanimate surroundings, not the feeling of 
sympathy among sentient subjects that “empathy” generally denotes today.249)  Similarly, the 
German psychologist Karl Groos had already proposed that observers took pleasure in aesthetic 
forms by imitating them in a motor process he called “Inner Mimicry.”250  Berenson’s previous 
discussions of “life-enhancing” tactile values also paved the way for Lee and Anstruther-
Thomson’s subsequent dissection of artistic form into a series of physiological triggers (the 
parallels inspired Berenson, later that year, to accuse his colleagues and neighbors of stealing his 
ideas—or as he bitterly quipped, “putting [them] freshly, with all the illusion of lucidity”).251  
More generally, the central argument of “Beauty and Ugliness” fixates on the spectator’s 
psychological experience of pleasure, in a manner reminiscent of the earlier work of Pater, Allen, 
and other scientifically minded aesthetes.  Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s peculiar contribution 																																																								
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to this body of thought lies in their bold contention (opposite Spencer’s play theory and its 
adherents) that the aesthetic sense serves as the interface between the self and the entire physical 
world, not just “aesthetic” objects narrowly defined.  In their view, our attraction to beauty 
constitutes far more than an escapist urge or peripheral procreative compulsion: if the perception 
of form is a master mechanism that presides over respiration, balance, and circulation by 
synchronizing them with the environment, then the presence of beauty signals an environment 
that is conducive to the healthful continuation of these vital processes.  The aesthetic faculty, for 
Lee and her partner, regulates a fundamental instinct toward whatever is best for the individual’s 
somatic and psychological wellbeing.  “Pleasure,” Lee would later clarify, “lead[s] us along 
livable ways.”252 
In “Beauty and Ugliness,” this understanding of the beautiful informs Lee and 
Anstruther-Thomson’s ambitious declaration of the evolutionary stakes of the aesthetic sense.  
“So far from narrowing and lowering the importance of the aesthetic instinct,” the authors 
profess, “we are really widening and elevating it when we define it as the regulator of Form 
Perception.”253  By diverging from the strictly counter-functionalist theories of Spencer, Pater, 
Allen, and Wilde, Lee and Anstruther-Thomson assign a diffuse use-value to the aesthetic sense: 
For while we refuse [the aesthetic instinct] the impulses toward making or doing things 
(by the old theory) utterly useless in themselves, we attribute to it a selective and coercive 
power which fashions to its purposes the constructive and expressive impulses of 
mankind, and selects and rejects with the imperiousness of a great organic function 
among the experiments and possibilities of daily life; till, from claiming a merely 
negative influence in the work and the play of existence, it ends, in its highest power, 
with setting the active impulses of man to work for its sole and single gratification, and to 
create out of reality a world more consonant with the most deeply organised and most 
unchanging modes of man’s existence.…[I]t is all this stringent insistence that necessary 
objects and actions should obey a law different from that of practical necessity, which 																																																								
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really teaches us the importance of the aesthetic instinct among rude civilisations of the 
past and the present.254  
 
Importantly, Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s refusal to conflate beauty with uselessness—a tenet 
of aestheticism that, to them, unfairly devalued beautiful buildings, vessels, and other “necessary 
objects”—does not entail a concession to utilitarianism.  “Beauty and Ugliness,” following Lee’s 
earlier work, instead seeks an aesthetics that might simultaneously transcend the petty exigencies 
of “practical necessity” and still somehow intervene in the messy domain of “daily life.” 
Lee and Anstruther-Thomson come closest to theorizing such an aesthetics in the long 
passage above, in which they locate the aesthetic instinct within the post-Darwinian framework 
of selection.  For all their criticisms of the sexual selective account of beauty—criticisms related 
to the “strict code of morality…in matters of sex” that Lee, according to Colby, inherited from 
her mother—the co-authors nevertheless characterize the aesthetic instinct as a “great organic 
function” analogous, though not identical, to sexual selection.255  Like Allen’s and Wilde’s 
aesthetic conceptions of sexual selection, Lee and Anstruther-Thomson envision aesthetic taste 
as a discriminative force beholden to the “sole and single gratification” of “man” rather than the 
oppressive demands of competition.  But the ultimate “work” of this process of selection, as they 
articulate it, is not to maintain what they call the “organs of animal life,” or even to make life 
more agreeable by differentiating (in a “merely negative” way) beautiful and pleasurable 
experiences from ugly and unwholesome ones.256  Neither do the authors accept the hypothesis 
that the aesthetic instinct, because it is the engine of sexual selection, can promote positive 
change only over the course of generations.  Instead, the aesthetic faculty shifts from a 																																																								
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mechanism of passive judgment into a “power”—one unburdened by what Lee considered sexual 
selection’s numerous drawbacks—for active creation and lateral, as well as generational, 
transformation.  (Even their syntax subtly reinforces this shift by ceding grammatical agency to 
the aesthetic instinct: at first, the authors “refuse” and “attribute” various qualities “to it,” but 
after the semicolon the aesthetic instinct itself “ends…with setting the active impulses of man to 
work” and thus becomes the subject of the sentence).   
By postulating standards of value more virtuous than “that of practical necessity,” and 
diligently applying this loftier standard to every area of life, the aesthetic instinct promises “to 
create out of reality a world” more amenable to humankind’s physical and emotional needs.  Lee 
and Anstruther-Thomson thus arrogate the vocabulary and logic of evolutionary selection to their 
own ideal of the demiurgic aesthetic faculty, which presses the “imperious” forces of nature into 
the service of human culture and progress.  Their psychological aesthetics—with its basis in 
hard-nosed physiology, its intimation of an ethics rooted in the harmonious operations of organic 
life, its generous recognition of aesthetic value in everyday sense experiences, and its program 
for evolutionary development without the need for sexual reproduction—seemed finally to 
resolve Lee’s decades of intellectual effort.     
As is so often the case in her career, Lee lived to regret the more idiosyncratic 
generalizations of “Beauty and Ugliness,” which she later attributed to youthful 
“cocksureness.”257  In her 1912 collection Beauty & Ugliness and Other Studies in Psychological 
Aesthetics, she admits that she had “confused in [her] mind” the “closely connected” but 
“independent” aesthetics of James, Groos, and Lipps (Lee reports that Lipps, the theorist of 
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Einfühlung, had been particularly unsparing in his criticism of her 1897 article).258  Lee’s 
headnote to the anthologized version of “Beauty and Ugliness” explains that she no longer 
considers “organic and mimetic sensations” to be the primary explanation for “aesthetic form-
preference”; while she still grants these sensations “secondary importance,” her aesthetics now 
favors Lipps’s notion of “formal-dynamic empathy…as a mere mental phenomenon” over 
Groos’s idea of “Inner Mimicry” and (by association) Berenson’s theory of tactile values.259  By 
1912, as we can see in Beauty & Ugliness, she had largely abdicated her right to practice science, 
a prerogative that she now reserved for the “Experimental Psychologist.260  “My aesthetics,” she 
remarks in the volume’s general preface, “will always be those of the gallery and the studio, not 
the laboratory.”261  Only in some of her very late works—notably The Handling of Words and 
Other Studies in Literary Psychology (1923) and Music and its Lovers (1932)—did she 
recommence publicizing her original psychological research.262  
Despite her doubts about her credentials, however, Lee never abandoned the essential 
doctrine of “Beauty and Ugliness”: that aesthetic pleasure was a vitalizing psychological 
experience, and, consequently, that the aesthetic sense afforded a better mode of being in the 
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material universe.263  Her collection of travel essays Genius Loci (1899) makes no mention of 
either science or psychology, but its exploration of the “passion for places” rests on the 
theoretical foundations of her earlier work, particularly on the idea (which Lee forwarded in 
“Beauty and Ugliness”) that the aesthetic instinct evolved to guide organisms toward more 
healthful environments.264  In this vein, her term “genius loci” refers to the influence that 
particular landscapes exert on “our heart and mind”—their capacity for “charming us,…for 
raising our spirits, [and] for subduing our feelings into serenity and happiness”—and her 
vignettes speculate on the ways in which places, through the sum of their aesthetic effects, can 
regenerate the sensitive traveller.265   
Take, for instance, Lee’s sketch of Genoa, then a popular destination for ailing tourists.  
She is struck, at first, by the “incongruity” of the place, which boasts “all this loveliness merely 
to die in, inch by inch.”266  But this “dreadful spasm of almost pagan superstition” soon gives 
way to an interval of “nobler paganism,” in which she rejoices at the fact that the “sea and the 
sky and the Hesperides’ vegetation…go on living and praising the goodness of life”: “would it 
not be wise,” she wonders, “if we, too, having bowed our head for a minute at the passage of 
Death, should recognise also that Death—others, or ours—passes indeed every minute, but 
passes only, while life abides and is eternal?”267  Lee’s aesthetic vision of Genoa, and 
specifically her ability to appreciate its distinctive collocation of loveliness and decay, allows her 																																																								
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to intuit a comforting (Berenson might say “life-enhancing”) sense of cosmic continuity.  As in 
“Beauty and Ugliness,” it is the sensation of beauty that prompts the feeling of spiritual uplift, 
not vice versa.  Many of her subsequent travel essays, though relatively indifferent to the 
intricacies of perception, remain captivated by the spiritual resonance of beautiful landscapes: 
she returns to the subject in The Enchanted Woods (1905), The Golden Keys (1925), and other 
collections, which later twentieth-century authors such as Edith Wharton and Aldous Huxley 
both admired and emulated.268 
Lee also continued to address larger questions of art and evolutionary progress in the 
twentieth century.  In essays such as “Higher Harmonies,” from Laurus Nobilis: Chapters on Art 
and Life (1909), she relinquishes technical jargon and reinvests in the evolutionary potency of 
what she calls, in remarkably Paterian phrasing, “the true, expanding, multiplying life of the 
spirit.”269  More poetic and less methodical than “Beauty and Ugliness,” “Higher Harmonies” 
characterizes the love of beauty as both a deep-seated appetite for fleshly comfort and an 
outward-looking impulse toward spiritual perfection.  The aesthetic faculty, Lee explains, feeds 
our instinctual “craving” for “organic harmony,” a sense of wellbeing that consists in the 
“backward-forward, contraction-relaxation, taking-in-giving-out, diastole-systole” motion 
inherent in all life processes.270 At the same time, the aesthetic instinct also impels us to search 
for more reliable sources of this harmony “outside life,” since daily existence inevitably leaves 
most of these cravings “unsatisfied.”  Addressing this unfulfilled desire for harmony, Lee argues, 
is the purpose of art.  If the harmonies of form belong to the same order of phenomena as the 																																																								
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periodic rhythms of biological life, she reasons, then the individual can repair the uncontrollable 
“defects of rhythm” in “real things” (defects that “tend to stoppage of life”) by courting instead 
“a harmony created on purpose in the things which he can control”—i.e., in the sights and 
sounds to which he intentionally exposes himself.271  “In art,” she concludes, “the place of 
natural selection is taken by man’s selection,” and this selective process affects the “soul” 
through the internal workings of sensation: “every time we experience afresh the particular 
emotion associated with the quality beautiful, we are adding to that rhythm of life within 
ourselves,” and so long as the emotion endures, “the soul is more clean and vigorous, more fit for 
high thoughts and high decisions.”272  The evolutionary idiom of “fit[ness],” though rooted in a 
notion of physical “vigor,” here transcends its associations with the Darwinian state of nature 
and denotes a distinctly moral, hierarchical judgment.  Lee’s playfully loose diction, which freely 
hybridizes scientific and religious discourses, thus allows her to make broad moral arguments 
about the aesthetic sense without betraying the uncertainty of her early essays or falling back on 
the occasionally tortuous logic of “Beauty and Ugliness.”  In some ways, Lee had proven to 
herself what she denied years ago in her assessment of Ruskin: aesthetics was a form of “moral 
selection,” because the experience of beauty subordinated, if only for a moment, the animalizing 
pressures of natural law to the triumphant, moral will of humankind.  
Lee’s most resolute and succinct defense of these principles in the twentieth century 
appears in The Beautiful: An Introduction to Psychological Aesthetics, a textbook that she 
published as part of the Cambridge University Press “Manuals of Science and Literature” series.  
I conclude this chapter with The Beautiful in part because this work demonstrates Lee’s ongoing 
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support for a quintessentially Victorian science of aesthetics—one that conceived of aesthetic 
sensation as an evolved instinct toward beneficial bodily and mental states.  In the context of 
Lee’s post-Victorian legacy, The Beautiful is notable less for its ingenuity (after all, Lee intended 
it as a primer of existing knowledge) than for its continued allegiance to a progressive 
evolutionary aesthetics, even in the midst of modernist upheaval.  As Kristin Mahoney points 
out, “conventional” assessments of modernism highlight “modernist dismissals of the fin de 
siècle”: Wyndham Lewis’s avant-garde magazine BLAST (1914-15), for instance, famously 
“BLAST[ed]” the “years 1837 to 1900.”273  Benjamin Morgan further reminds us that twentieth-
century critics regarded Lee’s “kinaesthetics of literature” as “distasteful,” and pioneers of New 
Criticism in particular—including I. A. Richards and W. K. Wimsatt—presented their formalism 
as a corrective to the subjective and affective trends of Victorian aesthetics.274  But as both 
Mahoney and Morgan argue, and as we will see in the coda, the persistent relevance of Lee’s 
aesthetics in the early twentieth century challenges the narrative of rupture that so often 
dominates discussions of modernism’s relationship to the Victorian period.275  The Beautiful, 
because it extended evolutionary aestheticism into the era of modernism, provides a fitting segue 
into my concluding discussion of Lee’s influence on twentieth-century aesthetics. 
The Beautiful, as Lee makes clear in the book’s “Preface and Apology,” seeks to “explain 
aesthetic preference” in “terms intelligible to the lay reader.”276  For this reason, she speaks not 
as an experimental psychologist to other specialists—as she did in “Beauty and Ugliness”—but 																																																								
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as a well-versed authority to interested amateurs, as Berenson did in his surveys of Florentine 
and Venetian painting.  In publishing her “little book,” Lee sees herself as embarking on the 
same aesthetic “mission” with which she charged Berenson, though she approaches her task from 
the perspective of psychology rather than connoisseurship.277  She begins by defining the term 
“beautiful,” which expresses the “contemplative satisfaction” that we derive from things (more 
accurately, certain “aspects” or impressions of things) apart from their uses.278  She further 
divides these pleasure-giving “aspects” into two classes.  The first is “sensation,” which includes 
color and sound.  These chemical phenomena render us passive by “invading and subjugating us 
with or without our consent,” and for this reason they cannot “afford the satisfaction connected 
with the word beautiful” in isolation.279  Color and sound are only beautiful, she continues, in 
combination with the second class of aesthetic experience, which she calls the “perception of 
relations” or “shape.”280  As Lee describes it here, shape perception relies in part on the 
mechanics of Berenson’s tactile values, since perception requires us to make “minute 
adjustments” in our muscles at the same time that we focus our mental attention on the object.281  
The Beautiful thus sustains Lee’s earlier declarations, dating to the 1890s, in favor of a subjective 
and embodied aesthetics: “the main fact of all psychological aesthetics,” she once again asserts, 
is “that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction which we get from shapes is satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction in what are, directly or indirectly, activities of our own.”282 
																																																								
277 Lee, The Beautiful, v. 
278 Lee, The Beautiful, 4, 8, 18. 
279 Lee, The Beautiful, 23, 30.  
280 Lee, The Beautiful, 29.  
281 Lee, The Beautiful, 31-33. 
282 Lee, The Beautiful, 30.  
		 287 
This becomes especially clear in Lee’s explication of empathy, to which she attributes 
“the bulk of whatever satisfaction we connect with the word Beautiful.”283  To reiterate, Theodor 
Lipps and several other German philosophers argued that individuals projected their thoughts 
and feelings onto external objects via a process called Einfühlung, which Lee translates as both 
“empathy” and “infeeling.”284  As an example, Lee asks her reader to consider the commonplace 
description of mountains as “rising.”  We say that the “mountain rises,” Lee explains, not 
because the mountain itself is moving upward, but because we have transferred to the mountain 
both “the thought of the rising which is really being done by us at that moment” and, by 
association, the “idea of rising as such.”285  In this moment of infeeling, which we achieve in the 
course of perceiving shapes, we briefly suspend the interests of self and the demands of “our 
scattered or hustled existence,” even as we experience the “movement and energy [that] we feel 
as being life.”286  It is this interval of restful and restorative activity (a notion reminiscent of 
Berenson’s “tactile imagination”) that makes beauty, for Lee, both “elevating and purifying.”287  
Moreover, by acknowledging the associational aspects of psychological aesthetics, Lee grants 
beauty the power to “irradiate” objects that are not, strictly speaking, beautiful—human 
“character[s]” or “bit[s] of machinery,” for example, can be beautiful insofar as an observer can 
contemplate them with disinterested pleasure.288  Based on these psychological facts, she posits 
an inexact, but to her “undeniable,” evolutionary rationale behind the “capacity for aesthetic 
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satisfaction”: its “power for happiness and hence for spiritual refreshment,” coupled with its 
“tend[ency] to inhibit most of the instincts [that] can jeopardise individual and social existence,” 
must have accorded humankind a “mass of evolutional advantages.”289  
The Beautiful captures many of the major ideological trends and conflicts within 
evolutionary aestheticism as it took shape in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  First, the 
contrast that Lee implicitly draws between the “life-corroborating” aesthetic encounter and the 
life-depleting pressures of survival has its roots in Darwin’s and Spencer’s mid-century theories 
of beauty.290  Regardless of how exactly they thought the aesthetic sense arose—whether through 
sexual selection, in the case of Darwin, Allen, and Wilde, or through a salutary instinct for rest, 
in the case of Spencer and, to a certain extent, Pater and Lee—all of the figures associated with 
evolutionary aestheticism believed that the aesthetic sense had evolved as a countermeasure 
against the fatigues of everyday existence.  Secondly, like Pater and Clifford, Lee broadens the 
subject of aesthetics to include our relations with the entire sensate world, not just with artistic or 
even beautiful objects.  So while she seeks to provide a more rigorous psychological account for 
what previous evolutionary aesthetes articulated in terms of temperament or worldview, her 
theorization of the “perception of relations” entails the same possibility of cultural renewal 
through aesthetic self-training.  For Lee as well as her predecessors, the often unstated, but 
sometimes quite explicit, social purpose of aestheticism was to disseminate the tools for 
perceiving the material world in spiritually redemptive and socially generative ways.   
Along these lines, The Beautiful also bears traces of a frustrating and yet productive 
tension that runs through nearly all theorizations of evolutionary aestheticism.  On the one hand, 
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evolutionary aesthetes accepted scientific accounts that reduced aesthetic emotion to the 
solipsistic experience of apparently useless pleasure.  For radicals such as Clifford, Allen, and 
Wilde, this theory seemed to underwrite an individualism that was both politically revolutionary 
and sexually subversive; even less politicized figures, such as Pater and Lee, discerned in the 
science of aesthetics a justification for their passionate relationships with art.  On the other hand, 
many of these same aesthetes sought to develop an aesthetic theory that could convert the 
intrinsic personal value of art into widespread social benefit.  As we have seen, Pater, Wilde, and 
others reconciled the hedonic and ethical facets of their aesthetics in various ways.  In The 
Beautiful—specifically, its insistence that the pleasure of empathy comes from its “momentary 
abeyance of all thought of an ego”—we get a glimpse of Lee’s own strategy for balancing her 
inward-looking aestheticism with her pro-social ethics.291 
Finally, Lee in The Beautiful strikes the same progressive, anticipatory tone that many 
evolutionary aesthetes adopted in their own work, and which was perhaps the most striking 
peculiarity of the tradition.  Pressed to identify the real purpose of aesthetic feeling, Lee 
speculates that its combination of physical perception (the “contemplation of beautiful shapes,” 
which “involves perceptive processes in themselves mentally invigorating and refining”) and the 
“play of empathic feelings” allows us to “realise the greatest desiderata of spiritual life, viz. 
intensity, purposefulness, and harmony.”292  “Such perceptive and empathic activities,” she 
further elaborates, “cannot fail to raise the present level of existence and to leave behind them a 
higher standard for future experience.”293  Consequently, Lee declares, these flashes of 
heightened existence “can only be spiritually, organically, and in so far, morally beneficial,” both 																																																								
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for the individual in the short term and for humankind in the long term.294  The aspirational 
momentum built in to Lee’s aesthetics here recalls the teleology of her 1881 essay “Ruskinism,” 
in which the young Lee claimed that all of “nature, despite its inextricable evils, seem[ed] to 
crave and to struggle” for the “best.”295  Although the minutiae of Lee’s aesthetic philosophy had 
evolved many times since the early 1880s, The Beautiful attests to her continued confidence in 
the transformative and “purifying power” of beauty.296  Besides her theories of aesthetic 
empathy, it was the persistent optimism of her worldview—one premised on the connection 
between embodied aesthetic experiences and the organic development of the species—that 
would define her reputation in the twentieth century.  A younger generation of aesthetic theorists, 
however, was already beginning to challenge Lee’s positive vision of futurity, and it is through 
such challenges to Lee that I wish to delve into the twentieth-century afterlife of evolutionary 
aestheticism.
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Coda 
Evolutionary Aestheticism in the Twentieth Century 
 
 
 In a 1933 letter to the painter and art critic Roger Fry, Vernon Lee thanked him for his 
ringing endorsement of her book Music and its Lovers, which she had published the previous 
year.  Lee’s “empirical study” of aesthetic responses to music had evidently provoked some 
discussion among Fry’s friends, many of whom belonged to the avant-garde collective that had 
become known as the Bloomsbury group.  Fry praised Music and its Lovers to the painter 
Vanessa Bell, and Bell’s sister, the novelist Virginia Woolf, in turn relayed his approval to the 
composer Ethel Smyth, who was a friend of Lee’s.  Smyth then encouraged Fry to write to Lee 
directly.1  Fry’s warm letter of appreciation, however, was a “delightful, astonishing surprise” to 
Lee, who confessed to him that she had not received the “recognition…which [she] should have 
liked when [she] was young, some forty or fifty years ago.” 2  By the early 1930s, Lee further 
admitted that she feared “all [her] work on aesthetics [was] utterly wasted,” and that her hard-
won psychological theories had been completely overshadowed by both Freudian psychoanalysis 
and “Berensonian Connoisseurship”—her somewhat sardonic term for Bernard Berenson’s 
flourishing profession as a consultant to wealthy art collectors.3  With the exception of Fry, it 
seemed to Lee, neither modern critics nor practitioners of the new psychology cared about the 
opinions of a Victorian “amateur and jack of all trades” such as herself.4   
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 But Lee’s painful sense of her own obsolescence, which she expressed so candidly to Fry, 
obscures the significant impact that her work had on twentieth-century aesthetics.  As Katherine 
Mullin points out, most members of the Bloomsbury group had come of age in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, and several hailed from the Victorian “intellectual aristocracy” to which 
Lee also belonged.5  Virginia Woolf and Vanessa Bell’s father was Leslie Stephen, the 
prominent man of letters who had edited a posthumous collection of W. K. Clifford’s essays: it 
was Stephen who, a decade later, welcomed Lee into Clifford’s old circle.  Consequently, the 
“posture of newness” (to quote Mullin) that characterized modernist writing both fed into and 
drew on an intense interest in the cultural legacy of the Victorians.  Peter Nicholls, in his 
landmark book Modernisms (1995), adds that “much that has proved controversial about the 
literary forms of modernism has its origins in the writing of the nineteenth century.”6  In order to 
conclude this dissertation, I will take a brief look at the reception of Lee’s ideas in the early 
twentieth century, particularly among her readers in the Bloomsbury group and the New Critical 
movement, which emerged in contentious conversation with the formalism of Bloomsbury.  The 
work of Fry, Woolf, Clive Bell, I. A. Richards, and other modernist critics attests to the 
continued authority of Lee’s psychological aesthetics and, more broadly, the complicated post-
Victorian legacy of evolutionary aestheticism.  Accelerating to the present day, I will 
subsequently situate some of the fundamental ideas of evolutionary aestheticism in relation to the 
recent groundswell of interest in a politically engaged and ethically committed aesthetics. 
 Of the core members of the Bloomsbury group, Fry, Bell, and Woolf show the most 
interest in Lee’s earlier theories of beauty and ugliness, in part because these writers engaged 																																																								
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seriously with the tradition of aesthetic scholarship that Walter Pater had launched in the 1870s.  
Fry in particular, who was nearly a generation older than his Bloomsbury colleagues, was 
steeped in nineteenth-century aesthetics.7  At Cambridge, Fry received a degree in the natural 
sciences and briefly considered continuing his scientific work before electing instead to attend 
art school.  While he is most famous for organizing several Post-Impressionist exhibitions in the 
early 1910s—and thereby ushering in a new era in British visual art—Fry was originally an 
Italian Renaissance specialist who had spent much of the 1890s in Italy, honing his creative and 
critical skills by studying the Old Masters.8  His first book, Giovanni Bellini (1899), reflects this 
course of scientific and aesthetic training in several ways.  First, the book conducts a distinctly 
Morellian survey of Bellini’s body of work, which Fry identifies by pinpointing “peculiar,” 
telltale details such as the arrangement of drapery or the composition of hands.  In the book’s 
preface, Fry thanks Berenson—by now a recognized authority on Franco Morelli’s method—for 
his “generous encouragement and learned advice” throughout the project.9  Secondly, Fry’s 
tendency to explain Bellini’s art as a byproduct of the artist’s personality and the conditions of 
fifteenth-century Venice is reminiscent of both Lee’s and Pater’s historicism: the “happy serenity 
of Bellini’s art,” Fry writes, “spring[s] in part from the good fortune of his life,” and in part from 
the general “splendour” of Venetian customs.10  For Fry, as for Pater, Lee, and Berenson, a 
painting always bears traces of the artist’s temperament as well as the prevailing zeitgeist of its 
epoch, and it is the role of the art critic to tease out and disambiguate these sources.  
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 In his later criticism, Fry postulates a more recognizably modernist aesthetics that both 
challenges and sustains elements of nineteenth-century evolutionary aestheticism.  His influential 
volume Vision and Design (1920)—a collection of essays and lectures spanning from 1900 to 
1920—illustrates how he forged modernist aesthetic principles from Victorian precedents.  
Although Fry’s writing generally lacks Lee’s experimental ambition, it nonetheless demonstrates 
his continued interest in the physiology and psychology of aesthetics: he explains, for instance, 
that the immediate attraction of Post-Impressionism is its more “scientific evaluation of color.”11  
Like many of his aesthetic forebears, moreover, Fry’s grounding in natural science leads him to 
make a “great distinction” between “actual life” (the realm of activity, morality, and ethics) and 
the contemplative, “imaginative life” (the realm of aesthetic emotion).12  “Actual life,” in Fry’s 
explicitly Darwinian understanding, subjects individuals to the coercive pressures of basic 
survival: the “processes of natural selection,” he writes in “An Essay in Aesthetics” (1909), have 
instilled in us various “nervous mechanisms” that, in turn, compel us to take an appropriate 
“responsive action.”13  The “imaginative life,” by contrast, consists in psychic experiences that 
do not result in any concomitant reaction.  In our imaginative life, he explains, “the whole 
consciousness may be focussed [sic] upon the perceptive and emotional aspects of the 
experience,” and we consequently “become true spectators” of the world around us.14  For Fry, 
art both captures and stimulates these intervals of pleasurable passivity by “present[ing] a life 
freed from the binding necessities of our actual existence.”15  Fry thus arrives at a counter-																																																								
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12 Fry, “An Essay in Aesthetics,” in Vision and Design, 13. 
13 Fry, “An Essay in Aesthetics,” 13. 
14 Fry, “An Essay in Aesthetics,” 13, 14. 
15 Fry, “An Essay in Aesthetics,” 15. 
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natural, amoral, and escapist aesthetics by way of the same scientific logic that led many 
Victorian critics—including Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, Grant Allen, and Vernon Lee herself—to 
aestheticism.  This logic also attracts Fry to the egalitarian economic ideals of his predecessors: 
while he stops short of endorsing socialism, he postulates (in an unmistakable gesture toward the 
politics of Wilde and William Morris) that a socialist “Great State” might free talented 
individuals to pursue their art without regard to its market value.16 
 Since Fry readily accepted the same scientific facts upon which Pater, Wilde, Lee, and 
others premised their aestheticism, he largely agreed with their beliefs in the sacrosanct and 
special nature of aesthetic feeling.  To Fry, however, the separation between art and “actual life” 
complicated attempts to assign any social, moral, or evolutionary value to beauty beyond its 
capacity to stimulate the individual imagination.  For the evolutionary aesthetes of the nineteenth 
century, as we have seen, the diffuse generational advantages of aesthetic feeling arose from its 
status as an evolved instinct without short-term survival value.  In a departure from this line of 
thinking, Fry hesitated to extend the liberating effects of solitary aesthetic experience to society 
or the species as a whole, in part because he deemphasized the physiological aspects of aesthetic 
encounter.  “All art,” he remarks in the introduction to an exhibit he organized in 1912, “depends 
upon cutting off the practical responses to sensations of ordinary life, thereby setting free a pure 
and as it were disembodied functioning of the spirit.”17  Unlike Allen, Lee, and Berenson, who 
connected the spiritual benefits of beauty to the corporeal processes of sensation, Fry posited an 
aesthetics that allowed observers to transcend their bodies entirely: an aesthetics in which the end 
goal was not bodily harmony or health, but an almost ascetic disregard for bodily existence 																																																								
16 Not long after he first published his essay on “Art and Socialism,” Fry founded the Omega Workshop: a design 
firm, in the tradition of Morris & Co., which sought to produce beautiful and useful home furnishings.  Fry, “Art 
and Socialism” (1912), in Vision and Design, 54; Marcus, “Bloomsbury Aesthetics,” 173. 
17 Fry, “The French Post-Impressionists,” in Vision and Design, 169.  Emphasis mine. 
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altogether.  More important, the rarefied and intensely personal nature of Fry’s aesthetics—“it 
seems to be as remote from actual life and its practical utilities as the most useless mathematical 
theory,” he remarks in the conclusion to Vision and Design—dissuaded him from aligning the 
discrete history of art with the greater evolutionary history of humankind, as his Victorian 
predecessors had done.18  Aesthetic emotion, for Fry, was simply too “elusive” and “uncommon” 
to produce change on an evolutionary scale.19  His rejection of the Eurocentric “tyranny of the 
Graeco-Roman tradition” and his corresponding enthusiasm for ancient American and African 
art also speak to his skepticism about the progressive narratives that defined evolutionary 
aestheticism.20		Laura Marcus, in her helpful summation of Bloomsbury aesthetics, thus 
characterizes Fry’s work as “transitional,…situated between the ‘empathic’ and ‘physiological’ 
aesthetics of the late nineteenth century…and the ‘autonomy aesthetics’ of Modernism.”21 
 We can detect a similar ambivalence toward late Victorian aesthetics in the work of art 
critic Clive Bell, Fry’s younger Bloomsbury colleague.  Bell’s seminal book on aesthetics, Art 
(1914)—which emerged from his experience of Fry’s Post-Impressionist exhibits—is a case in 
point.22  In Art, Bell delves into many of the questions about perception and emotional response 
that guided Victorian inquiries into aesthetics.  Furthermore, his attempt to pinpoint the essential 
element common to all visual art—what he termed “significant form,” or the “moving 
combinations and arrangements” of line and color that constitute the unique appeal of artistic 
objects—certainly recalls the sweeping theoretical ambitions of the Victorian “science of 																																																								
18 Fry, “Retrospect,” 211. 
19 Fry, “Retrospect,” 211. 
20 Fry, “Ancient American Art,” in Vision and Design 76.  
21 Marcus, “Bloomsbury Aesthetics,” 165. 
22 Marcus, “Bloomsbury Aesthetics,” 169.  
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aesthetics.”23  Bell’s formalism also broadly echoes many of the central tenets of nineteenth-
century aestheticism, including its juxtaposition of art against a brutal and unsightly natural 
world (“art transports us,” he declares, “from the world of man’s activity to a world of aesthetic 
exaltation”), its consequent fascination with decorative and nonrepresentational art, its eschewal 
of moralism, and its simultaneous insistence on the intrinsic ethical value of aesthetic experience 
(Bell, building on the ethics of philosopher G. E. Moore, claims that art is “above morals, or 
rather, all art is moral because…works of art are immediate means to good”).24  Although Bell 
had reached intellectual maturity in the early twentieth century, the subjective nature of his 
aesthetics looks back to the early work of Pater and his heirs: Bell allows that he is “making 
aesthetics a purely subjective business,” because “we have no other means of recognizing a work 
of art than our feelings for it.”25  His consequent definition of good criticism—the role of the 
critic, for Bell, is not to instruct the artist, but to train the tastes of an audience by “making 
[them] see” significant form—also bears similarities to Wilde’s, Lee’s, and Berenson’s 
respective notions of ethical, pro-social criticism.26 
 At the same time, Bell distanced himself from the Paterian tradition in several striking 
ways.  Most apparently, he had little regard for the aesthetic worth of Renaissance art, which he 
considered overly invested in representational detail and “technical swagger.”27  More significant 
for the legacy of evolutionary aestheticism, his distaste for the period extended to the scholarly 
methods that some evolutionary aesthetes applied to Renaissance studies.  “To criticise a work of 																																																								
23 Clive Bell, “What is Art?,” in Art, ed. J. B. Bullen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 11. 
24 Bell, “What is Art?,” 25, 20. 
25 Bell, “What is Art?,” 8-9. 
26 Bell, “What is Art?,” 9. 
27 Bell, “What is Art?,” 23. 
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art historically is to play the science-besotted fool,” he remarks in Art: “no more disastrous 
theory ever issued from the brain of a charlatan than that of evolution in art.  Giotto did not 
creep, a grub, that Titian might flaunt, a butterfly.”28  To Bell, the Renaissance was “nothing 
more than a big kink” in the long decline from the vital art of early Christianity to the 
scientifically accurate, but spiritually impoverished, art of the Victorian period.29  He thus calls 
into question both aestheticism’s valorization of Renaissance humanism—which he repeatedly 
describes as a decadent, “disease[d]” materialism—and the teleological tendencies that pervaded 
much of Victorian scientific and literary culture.30  (His caricature of extant scholarship on 
Giotto and Titian pointedly targets John Addington Symonds and perhaps also Allen, both of 
whom used explicitly “evolutionary” paradigms in their art historical work.31)  Bell’s 
conspicuous admiration for “primitive” art, which he felt conveyed significant form to observers 
more directly and efficiently than modern art, further compounds his rejection of evolutionary 
aestheticism and its progressive conceptions of history.32   
																																																								
28 Bell, “Art and Life,” in Art, 102. 
29 Bell here uses “kink” in its most obvious sense: the Renaissance is a “twist” or “curl” in the otherwise uniform 
downward slope of post-Byzantine art history.  Curiously, his usage also seems to suggest the figurative 
definition of “kink” as a personal quirk or whim, often resulting from physical or mental illness.  While the 
modern-day understanding of “kink” as a deviant sexual proclivity postdates Art, Bell undoubtedly draws on 
contemporary pathological connotations when he applies the term to the Renaissance, especially given the fact 
that he elsewhere associates the period with decay and disease.  Bell, “The Christian Slope,” in Art, 160; Oxford 
English Dictionary, s.v. "kink, n.1,” accessed 17 January 2017, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/103561?rskey 
=7mpJjM&result=1. 
30 Bell, “The Christian Slope,” 155. 
31 See John Addington Symonds, “On the Application of Evolutionary Principles to Art and Literature” (1890) and 
Grant Allen, “Evolution in Early Italian Art” (1895). 
32 Bell’s assessment of primitive art, however positive, is fully in line with twentieth-century colonialist attitudes.  
As Marianne Torgovnick argues, modern writings about the primitive are more often “reactions to the present” 
than genuine attempts at ethnographic understanding.  In this context, Bell’s and Fry’s celebrations of African 
drawing and Aztec design are also calculated rejections of Victorian painting; troublingly, Torgovnick further 
reminds us, their praise for primitive aesthetics perpetuates insidious stereotypes of indigenous people as 
childlike and somehow more authentic.  Bell, “What is Art?,” 23; Marianne Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage 
Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 8, 99.  
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In a subtler, but no less important way, Bell undercut much of the utopian power of 
Victorian aesthetics by shifting his attention away from “beauty” and toward significant form.  
As Marcus explains, Bell “insiste[d] on the radical autonomy of the aesthetic sphere and 
aesthetic response” more strenuously than either Fry or anyone in Fry’s nineteenth-century 
milieu.33  Bell thus considered “Beauty” too loose and general a term to describe the special 
quality that belonged exclusively to good art: for Bell, the emotional response that most 
“beautiful” objects (including “birds and flowers and the wings of butterflies”) elicit is “very 
different” from “that which [we] feel for pictures, pots, temples and statues.”34  While his 
dismissal of nature as unaesthetic aligns with the general principles of aestheticism, his hard-and-
fast distinction between the beauty of “birds and flowers” and the significant form of art 
contradicts the sexual selective account of aesthetics that formed the basis of evolutionary 
aestheticism.  For progressive aesthetes such as Allen, Wilde, and Lee, the fact that a complex, 
nuanced aesthetic sense had evolved from the taste for ornament in mates proved that aesthetic 
discrimination had powerfully shaped the species for the better; the dissemination of an ideal 
aesthetic temperament, they believed, promised further improvement in the future.  But in order 
for self-cultivation to contribute to the development of the species, all aesthetic experiences—
whether the object of admiration was a landscape, a beautiful body, a painting, or a set of blue 
china—had to activate the same basic, salutary biological processes.  By divorcing everyday 
experiences of the beautiful from aesthetic responses to artistic form, Bell cut off the pathway 
through which aesthetic self-culture could create long-term evolutionary change.  So while Bell 
claims that art can precipitate a morally valuable sense of “spiritual exaltation,” this experience 
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34 Bell, “What is Art?,” 13. 
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is an isolated good, limited to the individual who enjoys this exaltation: for this reason, Bell 
admits that he is only “tempted to believe that art might prove the world’s salvation” in his 
“giddier moments.”35 
Virginia Woolf, perhaps the most famous member of the Bloomsbury group, likewise 
revised and adapted nineteenth-century scientific aesthetics as she formulated her own theories 
about beauty and art.  Lee’s work was especially influential in this regard.  As Dennis Denisoff, 
Kirsty Martin, and others have argued, Woolf’s vexed sense of personal and intellectual affinity 
for the older writer palpably influenced both her novels and her nonfiction.36  On the one hand, 
Woolf was (to use Christa Zorn’s words) a “pungent critic of Lee’s prose style,” which Woolf 
considered obscure, overwrought, and idiosyncratic.37  Moreover, Woolf believed that this prose 
style entailed serious consequences for Lee’s capacity as an aesthetic critic.  In a review of Lee’s 
essay collection Laurus Nobilis (1909), Woolf claims that Lee lacks the “divine impersonality” 
required to purify subjective impressions into clear-sighted assessments of the world as it truly 
exists.38  For Woolf, Lee’s entire worldview belonged to a type of late nineteenth-century 
rationalism that Woolf associates, in her unfinished retrospective “A Sketch of the Past” (1940), 
with her father’s cohort and its now-quaint “reverence” for “eccentric” and polymathic 
geniuses.39  On the other hand, Woolf clearly respected Lee’s erudition as well as her genuine 																																																								
35 Bell, “What is Art?,” 35. 
36 Dennis Denisoff, “The Forest beyond the Frame: Picturing Women’s Desires in Vernon Lee and Virginia Woolf,” 
in Women and British Aestheticism, ed. Talia Schaffer and Kathy Alexis Psomiades (Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 1999), 252; Kirsty Martin, Modernism and the Rhythms of Sympathy: Vernon Lee, Virginia 
Woolf, and D. H. Lawrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 82. 
37 Christa Zorn, Vernon Lee: Aesthetics, History, and the Victorian Female Intellectual (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2003), 10. 
38 Qtd. in Zorn, Vernon Lee, 14. 
39 Virginia Woolf, “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being: Unpublished Autobiographical Writings, ed. Jeanne 
Schulkind (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), 136. 
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devotion to the beautiful.  In her essay A Room of One’s Own (1929), Woolf includes Lee in a 
list of exemplary women experts, alongside the classicist Jane Harrison and the Middle East 
scholar Gertrude Bell.40  In a later untitled and unpublished sketch, Woolf’s fictionalized narrator 
reflects on her connection to the writer whose name had become almost synonymous with the 
“spirit” of Italy: “Yes, I knew Vernon Lee…I’m one of those people who want beauty, if it’s 
only a stone, or a pot…I never spoke to [Lee].  But in a sense, the true sense, I who love beauty 
always feel, I knew Vernon Lee.”41  Most tellingly, Woolf’s Hogarth Press—the modernist 
institution that she founded with her spouse, the critic and political theorist Leonard Woolf—
published Lee’s treatise The Poet’s Eye in 1926.  In the essay, Lee argues that poetic meter 
“elicit[s] a degree of imitative activity” in the reader and thus makes its audience feel “stronger, 
freer, more purposeful”: we recognize in her statement both the theoretical framework and the 
optimistic tenor of psychological aesthetics.42  That Woolf published the piece suggests that she 
valued, if not fully accepted, Lee’s psychological explanation for the appeal of verse. 
Woolf’s artistic responses to contemporary philosophy also indicate her more substantive 
agreements both with Lee and, more broadly, with nineteenth-century evolutionary aestheticism.  
As Ann Banfield points out, Woolf was familiar with the “new philosophical Realism” of 
mathematicians such as Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, who drew on their 
scientific backgrounds in order to theorize an epistemology that reduced the “common-sense 
world” into “sense-data” and atomized “perspectives.”43  Banfield consequently argues that 																																																								
40 Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, ed. Shari Wattling (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2001), 94. 
41 Woolf, “[Portrait 7],” in The Complete Shorter Fiction of Virginia Woolf, ed. Susan Dick, 2nd ed. (Orlando: 
Harcourt, 1989), 247-46.   
42 Lee, The Poet’s Eye (London: Hogarth Press, 1926), 11. 
43 Ann Banfield, The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1. 
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many of Woolf’s most distinctive formal practices—including her experiments in stream-of-
consciousness and non-linear storytelling, her use of multiple narrators, her elegiac posture, and 
her luminous descriptions of physical objects—were responses to “the world revealed by 
science.”44  Like Lee and her nineteenth-century predecessors, then, Woolf derived her concern 
for form in part from scientific propositions about the nature of perception, its basis in cognitive 
processes, and its alignment (or misalignment) with external reality.  Following the logic of the 
evolutionary aesthetes, Woolf further discerned the ethicality of art in its ability to redress or 
compensate for the troubling perplexities of the world, at least as science understood it.  In A 
Room of One’s Own, for instance, she concludes that literature must give its readers renewed 
access to a “reality” that modern philosophy had proved to be “erratic” and “undependable”: the 
“business” of the writer, she asserts, is to “find,” “collect,” and “communicate [this reality] to the 
rest of us,” thereby granting us intervals of “intenser…invigorating life.”45  
Where Woolf departs from Lee, Berenson, and other writers in the evolutionary aesthetic 
tradition is in her conception of how, precisely, art “invigorates” life.  In A Room of One’s Own 
and several of her other writings on aesthetics, Woolf maintains that art must always seek to 
depict an underlying material “reality.”  For the evolutionary aesthetes, reality consisted in the 
demoralizing natural conditions of struggle and violence that all humans should rightly reject; 
furthermore, the peculiar physiological and psychological properties of sensation meant that 
aesthetic experiences (and culture at large) could serve as both bulwarks against this reality and 
aids in the creation of alternative conditions for living.  Woolf, on the contrary, thought of 
objective reality—in the form of raw, unprocessed sense-data—as an escape from the constraints 
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of subjective perception.  Hence Woolf’s pioneering interest in film: as Marcus explains in her 
study of modernist film criticism, Woolf’s engagements with the genre were more substantial 
than those of her Bloomsbury contemporaries.46  Woolf’s essay “The Cinema” (1926), for 
instance, hails the new medium for its intimations of “life as it is when we have no part in it,” 
and “beauty [that] will continue to be beautiful whether we behold it or not.”47  Importantly, 
Woolf affirms that film can only achieve artistic expression because of its ability to draw its 
audience into this “different reality,” one abstracted from the bounded and singular perspectives 
through which individuals typically see the world.48  Since film, Woolf continues, can briefly 
surmount “the pettiness of actual existence”—a pettiness closely tied to our sensory 
limitations—she anticipates that the medium will eventually mature into an art form uniquely 
capable of conveying the transcendent “continuity of human life.”49  The motion picture camera, 
as Woolf understands it, thus has the tantalizing potential to overturn nineteenth-century 
aesthetics by circumventing the psychological subjectivity upon which this aesthetics was 
based.50 
In her own writing, Woolf aspires toward similar forms of perspective-less 
representation: or, in Banfield’s words, “the abolition of the subject but not of its object.”51  The 
results of this aesthetics of disembodiment are perhaps most clearly audible in Woolf’s 																																																								
46 Marcus, The Tenth Muse: Writing about Cinema in the Modernist Period (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 99. 
47 Woolf, “The Cinema,” Arts (June 1926), 314. 
48 Woolf, “The Cinema,” 314. 
49 Woolf, “The Cinema,” 314, 316. 
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experimental novel The Waves (1931), which recounts the interconnected lives of its central 
characters through a series of first-person soliloquies and stylized dialogues.  Over the course of 
the novel, six childhood friends discuss major events (including marriages, love affairs, and the 
untimely death of one of their own) in veiled and imagistic language that tends to elide, rather 
than differentiate, their identities.  Late in The Waves, the sensitive Bernard—the closest the 
novel has to a focal character—observes that he is “not one person” but “many people,” and he 
consequently does not know “how to distinguish [his] life” from that of his five friends.52  The 
novel’s ultimate ambition is to render this continuity as faithfully as possible: to capture a 
holistic vision of these characters’ fragmented and intertwined subjectivities by “describ[ing],” 
as Bernard further reflects, “the world seen without a self.”53  To do so, Woolf eschews many of 
the formal conventions of novelistic storytelling, particularly the depiction of character as 
logical, self-contained, and consistent over time.  
The formal heterodoxy of The Waves, I suggest, speaks to Woolf’s most fundamental 
break with Lee’s intellectual tradition.  In the context of her writings about her father as well as 
her critiques of Lee’s lack of “impersonality,” Woolf’s narration “without a self” strikes a small, 
but pointed, blow to the individualism at the center of the Aesthetic Movement.  Pater’s practice 
of relentless introspection, Wilde’s strident insistence on the autonomy of the critic, and Lee’s 
analyses of physiological responses to art were all rooted in the assumption that individual 
impressions were paramount, and that the perceiving subject was necessarily the arbiter of taste 
and meaning.  To Woolf, however, these ideas betokened simplistic views of selfhood that 
overestimated the coherence of individuals and, in doing so, often had the unintended effect of 
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reducing real people to mere objects.  For instance, at the conclusion of her biography Roger Fry 
(1940), Woolf decisively proclaims that “human beings are not works of art.”54  Her comment, 
nominally about the difficulties of biographical writing, also subtly reproaches Pater’s 
aestheticism: although she admired Pater’s masterful prose and keen eye for beauty, her refusal 
to aestheticize Fry’s life repudiates Pater’s tendency to subject the “engaging personality” to the 
same aesthetic scrutiny as a “song or picture.”55  The purpose of art, for Woolf, was not to 
indulge the observer’s longing for self-realization or self-determination—possibly at the expense 
of other people—but to penetrate the semblance of individuality in order to free the observer, if 
only for a few moments, from the encumbrance of subjectivity itself.  
Around the same time that members of the Bloomsbury group were giving full 
expression to their artistic and political concerns, several academics from a slightly younger 
generation—including I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, who, like many of the Bloomsbury men, 
attended Cambridge—were beginning to formulate alternative approaches to literary 
interpretation.  Both Richards’s and Ogden’s formalist theories, which would lay the foundations 
for the New Criticism, differed in many ways from the aesthetics of Bloomsbury, but they were 
similarly indebted to the psychological aesthetics of the previous century.  Modern-day scholars 
such as Benjamin Morgan and Jesse Cordes Selbin have recently identified connections between 
Victorian reading practices and the methods of the New Criticism.  Selbin, for instance, argues 
that the “populist pedagogy” of John Ruskin and other Victorian reformers “anticipated certain 
protocols of New Critical close reading,” particularly Richards’s attempts to “democratize 
literary study” by recasting criticism as a set of portable skills that any reader might apply to a 																																																								
54 Woolf, Roger Fry: A Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), 294. 
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work of literature, regardless of her historical knowledge of the text.56  In a slightly different 
way, Morgan traces some of the aspects of the New Criticism directly to Lee’s theory of 
empathy, which she applied in her later career to literature as well as visual art. 57  Morgan 
argues that Lee preempted the New Criticism by promoting empathy as a “critical mode” for 
confronting all of the arts: her “physiological formalism,” he adds, proved threatening to 
Richards and his colleagues, because critical empathy “promised to reconcile Victorian 
physiological aesthetics” with emerging New Critical practices.58   
Like the Bloomsbury writers, then, twentieth-century critics such as Richards, Ogden,  
W. K. Wimsatt, and René Wellek often conspicuously (and, as Morgan claims, strategically) 
dismissed Lee’s theory of empathy as excessively intimate and emotional, even as they relied on 
the psychological aesthetics that she and other evolutionary aesthetes had developed in previous 
decades.  In their early books The Foundations of Aesthetics (1922) and The Meaning of 
Meaning (1923), Richards and Ogden (joined by their Foundations co-author, James Wood) set 
out to resolve “the chaos in aesthetics” by classifying existing accounts of beauty into three 
categories: unsystematic theories that treat beauty as an “unanalysable” quality; instrumentalist 
theories that equate beauty with truth, representational fidelity, or social good; and, finally, 
psychological theories that offer rational explanations for beauty.59  In The Foundations of 
Aesthetics, Richards, Ogden, and Wood attribute these “psychological views” to the Victorian 																																																								
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evolutionists and, more precisely, to Herbert Spencer’s theory of play, which gave rise to a 
prominent non-utilitarian aesthetics of pleasure that they call the “English aesthetic.”60  In 
Spencer’s psychological tradition, the authors include the Spanish-American philosopher George 
Santayana as well as Allen (whose Physiological Aesthetics, they observe, was widely read on 
the Continent), Fry, Bell, and Lee.   
Certainly, Richards and his co-authors dedicate several pages to their critiques of 
psychological aesthetics—especially empathy, which they describe as a “vaguer” and “more 
limited” form of Allen’s and Santayana’s respective hedonisms.61  At the same time, the authors 
append to these psychological theories their own of conception of “synaesthesis”: their term for 
the “evanescent” experience of “both equilibrium and harmony” that beautiful objects stimulate 
within individuals.62  Insofar as “synaesthesis” describes dynamic states of equilibrium, in which 
certain sensory and emotional “impulses” counterbalance one another, Richards, Ogden, and 
Wood seem to refine, rather than reject, the Spencerian premises of Victorian aesthetics.63  
Significantly, this idea of synaesthesis also hints encouragingly, if indistinctly, toward methods 
of social amelioration through aesthetic experience.  The “educative value of art,” the authors 
further explain, derives from the capacity for synaesthesis to facilitate “contact with other minds 
than our own” and, simultaneously, to induce “disinterested” mental states that allow us to 
“become more ourselves” by freeing us from the stifling pressures of daily life.64  The authors’ 
descriptions of synaesthesis as a process for both “individualisation” and “sympathetic 																																																								
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understanding” (terms that remind us of those cornerstones of Spencerian progress, 
differentiation and integration) culminate in the surprisingly life-affirming conclusion of 
Foundations: “the ultimate value of equilibrium,” they write, “is that it is better to be fully than 
partially alive.”65   
In Richards’s most influential work, Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), the ethical 
and democratic implications of synaesthesis give rise to a philanthropic vision of criticism that 
seeks—in the manner of Wilde, Berenson, and Lee—to transform the individual benefits of 
aesthetic encounter into widespread social good.  Early in Principles, Richards allows that 
experimental psychology has revealed the aesthetic functions of “obscure processes” such as 
“empathy” and “muscular imagery,” and he endorses a rational and “psychological” (rather than 
“ethical” or “metaphysical”) method for assessing aesthetic value.66  Beauty, Richards reiterates, 
is the term we append to qualities that foster equilibrium among our many physical and 
psychological impulses.  Importantly, Richards insists that these impulses are active in every 
aspect of life, and he consequently reasons that exposure to beauty can refine these impulses in 
ways that affect one’s general conduct.  “No life can be excellent,” he asserts, “in which the 
elementary responses are disorganised and confused”; “bad taste and crude responses,” he adds, 
are “actually a root evil from which other defects follow.”67  Richards thus urges the critic to 
engage directly with the “wider social and moral aspects of the arts”: in doing so, the critic can 
both “bridge the gulf” between the populace and the cultured elite and “protect the arts against 
the crude moralities of Puritans and perverts.”68  The model of critical outreach that he describes 																																																								
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here, in which the cultural elite make a concerted effort to disseminate good art and train the 
popular taste, is in keeping with the forms of ethical criticism and connoisseurship that emerged 
from evolutionary aestheticism in the late nineteenth century.  So while Richards explicitly 
rejects “art for art’s sake” and its “myth of the ‘contemplative’ or ‘aesthetic’ attitude,” he 
nonetheless counts Pater among the most famous expounders of the “‘moral’ theory of art” upon 
which Richards founds his critical system.69  For Richards, as for the evolutionary aesthetes, the 
moral and social benefits of art, such as they were, lay in the psychological states that artistic 
form induces in sufficiently sensitive observers; an artwork’s subject matter and historical 
provenance, while not trivial, were secondary to the aesthetic effects the artwork produced.  
In its earliest form, then, the New Criticism retained some of the core principles of 
evolutionary aestheticism, including its credence in psychological accounts of aesthetic 
sensation, its elevation of artistic form over content (which was both an elitist and a democratic 
idea), its investment in the social benefits of good taste, and its consequent celebration of the 
critic.  At the same time, the New Criticism, after Richards, discarded evolutionary 
aestheticism’s most original philosophical insights: namely, its revulsion at the violence of 
Darwinian nature, its attendant desire to extricate art from the worst conditions of “life,” and its 
interest in the individual as the locus of nonviolent evolutionary development.  Stripped of its 
evolutionary motivation, the image of aestheticism that persisted into the twentieth century—in 
the work of the Bloomsbury group and the New Critics—lost much of its radical, utopian 
character.  In later twentieth-century debates about the New Criticism, “aestheticism” thus often 
appears as an accusation of political quietism, a disparaging byword for aristocratic indifference 
to art’s ideological baggage.  Wellek, in a 1978 issue of Critical Inquiry, responds with 																																																								
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indignation to just such a charge.  Detractors of the New Criticism, Wellek observes, often 
equate it with an “‘esoteric aestheticism,’ a revival of ‘art for art’s sake,’ uninterested in the 
human meaning, the social function and effect of literature.”70  He dismisses the accusation as 
“baseless”: while aesthetes and New Critics agree that the “aesthetic experience is set off from 
immediate practical concerns,” the New Criticism (so Wellek argues) belongs to an older 
tradition of historically conscious aesthetics stretching back to Immanuel Kant, Friedrich 
Schiller, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge and developed in the twentieth century by Ezra Pound 
and T. S. Eliot (not, Wellek implies, by scholars such as Vernon Lee, who Eliot derisively 
references in a draft of The Waste Land).71  In protest against those who would denigrate the 
New Criticism as aloof and irrelevant, Wellek gestures, albeit vaguely, to the cultural and social 
advantages of criticism: “the role of criticism is great for the health of poetry, of the language, 
and ultimately of society.”72 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s—a period coinciding with the rise of feminist theory, 
postcolonial theory, the New Historicism, and other critical approaches—these tailored critiques 
of aestheticism and the New Criticism fed into larger debates about the political efficacy of 
aesthetics in general.  In The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), for instance, the Marxist critic 
Terry Eagleton offers a jaded view of aesthetic philosophy and its role in the perpetuation of 
capitalist ideologies.  On the one hand, Eagleton argues, the rise of aesthetics in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries “marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers 
and capacities,” which in turn furnishes a humanistic foundation for “revolutionary opposition to 
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bourgeois utility.”73  In this way, aesthetics discloses both a “liberatory concern” for the 
autonomous individual and a “utopian image of reconciliation” across social, geopolitical, and 
cultural divides.74  On the other hand, Eagleton sees the aesthetic as complicit in the 
entrenchment of capitalist values, in part because the liberal “idea of autonomy” that emerges 
from aesthetic discourse “provides the middle class with just the ideological model of 
subjectivity it requires for its material operations.”75  Although Eagleton, by his own admission, 
largely ignores British aesthetics in favor of the German tradition, we can readily extend his 
assessment to Victorian aestheticism: according to his logic, the very forms of individualism that 
made the Aesthetic Movement politically potent in its time also insidiously reinforced the ideal 
of the self-determining consumer that underpins capitalist society.76   
More recently, however, many scholars (including several specialists in nineteenth-
century British literature and culture) have responded to Eagleton’s critique by attempting to 
recover modes of aesthetic engagement that might challenge, rather than fortify, the status quo.  
Regenia Gagnier, as we have seen, disputes what she sees as “reified notions of ‘the Aesthetic’” 
(such as Eagleton’s) by examining the “plurality of aesthetics in Victorian Britain.”77  While 
Gagnier recognizes the ways in which aestheticism, through its model of the “pleasured body,” 
helped enshrine modern consumerism, she situates the pleasured body among several other 
“competing models” of aesthetic experience in the period and thereby provides a more fine-
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grained explication of Victorian history.78  She also credits Pater, Wilde, and other aesthetes for 
both conceding “their own implication within consumer, or commodity, culture” and attempting 
to address their involvement in capitalist ideologies through their creative work.79  In doing so, 
Gagnier opens up nineteenth-century aesthetic, economic, and scientific discourses to Marxist 
analysis while acknowledging the nuanced political allegiances of the writers—many of them 
fiercely skeptical of free markets—who participated in these discourses.   
By comparison, Isobel Armstrong in The Radical Aesthetic (2000) advances a more 
comprehensive critique of both Eagleton and the anti-aesthetic theoretical trends that he helped 
promote.  Put concisely, Armstrong builds on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories of play 
as well as the modernist criticism of Theodor Adorno in order to envision an aesthetic “grounded 
in an experience that happens to everybody.”80  That the sense of beauty is “embedded” in 
universal “processes…of consciousness” poses, for Armstrong, the radically democratic 
potential of the aesthetic.81  Expanding on Armstrong’s theoretical intervention, the Romanticist 
Simon Malpas joins Shakespeare scholar John J. Joughin in proposing a critical approach that 
they term “the New Aestheticism”: the phrase also serves as the title of a 2003 anthology, 
curated by Joughin and Malpas, of exemplary essays that apply the theory to particular texts.82  
While contributors to The New Aestheticism represent a diverse array of scholarly 
specializations, they all share a concern for the aesthetic experience of art and, crucially, a desire 
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to analyze these experiences in their own right, without “rush[ing] to diagnose art’s 
contamination by politics and culture.”83  Joughin, Malpas, and their colleagues address the 
criticisms leveled at aestheticism and its theoretical legacy by professing the “transformative 
cognitive potential of the aesthetic”—more precisely, of aesthetic “encounter”—and the “world-
disclosing capacity” of aesthetic criticism.84  Beyond the field of nineteenth-century studies, both 
Elaine Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just (1999) and Peter De Bolla’s Art Matters (2001) make 
important contributions to this ongoing effort in cultural criticism to reevaluate and recuperate 
the aesthetic response to art. 
The complex intersections of aesthetics and politics have also generated interest in 
disciplines besides English, particularly in modern-day philosophy.85  Most intriguingly, one of 
the key utopian features of evolutionary aestheticism—that is, its innovative claims for the 
revolutionary power of taste—reemerges in the work of radical British philosopher, feminist 
critic, and peace activist Kate Soper.  Any ideological through line from the Victorian aesthetes 
to Soper, an important figure in the British New Left, might appear improbable in light of 
aestheticism’s historically hostile reception among leftist academics.  Soper’s writings on anti-
consumerist aesthetics, however, reveal some remarkable parallels with the more political 
iterations of evolutionary aestheticism.  In much of her recent work, she proposes that we combat 
the ecological and socioeconomic devastation of consumer capitalism by fostering an ethic of 
“new” or “alternative hedonism,” which will encourage affluent consumers to attach aesthetic 																																																								
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value to sustainability rather than mere accumulation.86  The aim of alternative hedonism, Soper 
writes in Troubled Pleasures (1990),  
is not deprivation but a different balance of gratification.…Community, friendship, 
sexual love, conviviality, wild space, music, theater, reading and conversation, fresh air 
and uncontaminated land and water: it is with these attractions we should be cultivating 
desire and pandering to the senses, rather than with images of improving shares, the flight 
to the Bahamas and the second car.  We should aspire to a new eroticism of consumption, 
an altered aesthetic of needs: one which makes the senses recoil from commodities which 
waste the land, throw up ugly environments, pollute the atmosphere, absorb large 
quantities of energy and leave a debris of junk in their wake.87 
 
While Soper never refers to either Wilde or Allen—surprising given their important articulations 
of “New Hedonism” in the 1890s—her mission of social change through the training of erotic 
appetites recalls these aesthetes’ earlier writings.  Consider Wilde’s dialogic essay “The Critic as 
Artist” (1890, revised 1891), in which the aesthete Gilbert speculates about the spiritual and 
moral ramifications of cultural refinement: those who achieve “true culture,” Gilbert reasons, 
also attain “the perfection of those to whom sin is impossible, not because they make the 
renunciations of the ascetic, but because they…can wish for nothing that can do the soul 
harm.”88  For Soper, as for Wilde, Allen, and many of their fellow aesthetes, the careful 
cultivation of tastes can channel one’s desires toward more ethical sources of pleasure.   
Of course, Soper’s repeated calls for an “aesthetic revisioning” are motivated by the 
existential crises of our own time, including accelerating climate change and rising economic 
inequality.89  But in its expansive and urgent invocations of the future—one spearheaded by a 																																																								
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cosmopolitan, cultured avant-garde—her alternative hedonism both echoes and amplifies her 
Victorian predecessors.  The cultural changes that Soper anticipates, while not explicitly 
evolutionary, nonetheless require a “gestalt shift of optic and hedonist perception” that will occur 
over the course of generations.90  Heartened, she observes that this shift is already gaining 
momentum among “affluent global elites,” for whom experiences such as slow food, 
downsizing, and ecotourism have begun to supplant older, primarily American tokens of the 
“good life.”91  She further predicts that, by sensitizing more and more people to the joy (and not 
just the necessity) of green living, this “anti-consumerist aesthetic” will gradually realign human 
self-interest with the long-term ecological health of the planet.92  At stake, for Soper as well as 
the evolutionary aesthetes, is nothing less than the continued existence of the human species: she 
consequently celebrates the “interstitial and emerging” possibilities of culture, even at the “risk” 
of becoming “too utopian.” 93  In Soper’s articulation of alternative hedonism, more explicitly 
than in either Armstrong’s or Malpas’s respective literary critiques, the return to aesthetics 
precipitates a careful, clear-eyed optimism about the potential for culture to revolutionize the 
ways in which we see and interact with our world.   
How can we explain this resurgence of critical and philosophical interest, not merely in 
the notion of aesthetic experience but also in its power to reshape society?  At the very least, this 
strain of utopian aesthetics testifies to the enduring appeal of evolutionary aestheticism’s central 
aims, despite the near-complete erosion of its scientific authority.  In the eighty-five years since 
Lee expressed to Fry her despair over the declining cachet of her aesthetics, the psychological 																																																								
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and biological claims of evolutionary aestheticism have all but disappeared from scientific 
writing.  In the realm of popular science, speculations about human development, which 
Victorian writers such as Clifford, Allen, and Wilde directed toward provocative, progressive, 
and future-oriented social critiques, now more often serve to explain and thus naturalize the 
status quo.94  Victorian evolutionary accounts of the sense of beauty have also lost traction in the 
twenty-first-century science of aesthetics: next to the sophisticated experiments and cutting-edge 
imaging of modern neuropsychology, Allen’s hypotheses about sexual selection and Lee’s 
gallery observations must appear amateurish and imprecise.95  What has survived, however, in 
both philosophical and literary critical discourse, is evolutionary aestheticism’s innovative 
melding of generous philanthropic vision with a serious commitment to the rights of self-
expression, dissident thought, and aesthetic play.  That the independent actions of individuals, 
each pursuing their own pleasures, might somehow yield a more cohesive, harmonious, and 
ethical society remains as alluring an idea today as it was in the late nineteenth century.  Whether 
or not they take their cues directly from the evolutionary aesthetes, modern-day philosophers and 
critics continue these aesthetes’ work as they search for ways to create a better world without 
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sacrificing our inborn longing for beauty: that elusive quality which makes life not merely 
tolerable, but also—to quote Wilde one last time—“lovely and wonderful.”96
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